Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

[jcustis]

The A76 ate batteries, and they had no means of indicating the power level left in the battery, other than a terse "change your battery you are breaking up," or something ruder, you were never sure if it was fully ok other than a radio check with friends etc. They were also large by todays standards, for what they did - but we are talking about seventies technology. They worked just fine with overhead callsigns, although sometimes they received "flutter" from the helicopters as they turned. I should add that A76`s came with an attachment to plug into the aerial socket called a Sputnik (it looked like one). This basically consisted of a coax cable connected to a small hub with 3 or 4 inverted and flexible aerial blades screwed into it. The idea was to fix the sputnik up a tree, and this increased our comms range by quite a bit. I remember sending sitreps to a relay stick sat on top a large hill about 15 KM`s from my position, where the terrain between us was very hilly and broken up. The relay was placed there to allow a number of sticks to communicate with our base camp some 30 km`s away.

For much longer distance comms we had another beast of a machine that would fill a back pack by our usual light weight standards. I think this was called a B52, if memory serves me correct, and I don`t think any pun on the bomber was intended. I can only remember our stick carrying one of these on one occasion, and that after the war while our Commando was exercising in the Inyanga Mountains by doing the SAS selection course for a laugh (!) The B52 had an elaborate aerial arrangement that had to be laid out in a certain pattern, and were really meant for a base site, rather than a patrol. They were great at picking up Radio 5 in South Africa though, a popular music channel (strictly forbidden of course, just mentioned in passing

Rhodesian Allouettes were all modified to try combat Strelas (SAM7). Basically the airforce engineers designed a shroud that directed the hot air leaving the turbine up into the blades of the chopper, instead of straight out the back as was standard. If you look at pics of Rhodesian Allouettes you will see the mod. For reasons unknown the South Africans didn`t take the design up and it was absent on their Allouettes. Thankfully troopies were generally unaware of the strela threat, but of course we were aware of the danger from RPG7 rockets (etc). Our training had us out of the choppers pretty smartly after the wheels contacted the earth - bump and go. G-cars hugged the tree tops especially on run in, and they used ground features to good effect. I was frequently surprised by Allouettes suddenly appearing as they rose from over behind a small hill very near to our position, and their overall "quietness" when watched on approach was frankly astonishing. The Bells on the other hand could be heard many miles away when inbound, and of course they deafened the hell out of us by the time we got out of them. While they carried 8 troops instead of 4, the noise would have made them awful in the "surprise" department. Dont underestimate the effect of the comparative quietness of the Allouettes on approach, this will have played a huge part in Fire Force`s success.

Why didn`t more K-Cars, Daks, or Lynxs get shot down by Strelas given their relatively higher flying altitude? I have absolutely no idea. It seems to me the terrs could have caused mayhem with our FF if they had applied a few clever traps with those things. They certainly knocked a few Trojans down, and a Canberra went down in Mozambique apparently shot down, and of course we lost two civilian airliners, but to my knowledge we never lost a chopper to a strela. Strange, perhaps they kept the fact quiet? We certainly had choppers shot down by ground fire, a few of which crash landed and were recovered, and we had a South African Puma helicopter and a Dak take RPG7 hits in Mozambique, the former causing the greatest single loss of RLI troops.

As an aside, I always found pictures of the troops on FF ops interesting. Certainly by the end of 1979/1980, the use of short trousers was no longer, and we all wore normal camo long trousers, or one piece camo jumpsuits. This was because a number of troops had taken hits in the legs, so a dress change was instituted, but I don`t know what year this occurred - sounds all rather casual I know, but the use of shorts and light running shoes was originally designed to help increase speed and mobility. People are sometimes surprised by our dress in the bush, however while spit and polish and identical kit was expected in the barracks, out in the bush we were free to make our own choice in webbing, light weight boots or running shoes, etc etc. We wore face veils as bandanas to keep the sweat out of our eyes (who the hell is Rambo anyway?), and no helmets (unless jumping from a Dak) because of their weight (I`m sure you know this anyway). I used to wear a pair of shoes called Veld Skoens, a popular, soft, tan coloured leather shoe sported by officers, but not allowed as normal dress when in barracks for the other ranks (boots only for us). I modified my "Vellies" (pronounced Fellies, or Felt Skoons, an Afrikaans word) by having our cobbler replace the sole with car tyre tread, as car tyres were used by the locals out in the villages to make sandles. It made the shoe a bit heavier, but the tread spoor blended in well when in a TTL. And those vellies gave me 30 000 miles . . .

This exchange reminded me of an important fact, and that was the degree of independent action expected from the troops on the ground. Because Fire Force operations required a very detailed synchronized ballet of air assault support, close air support, observations posts, paratroopers, and sweep and stop groups, independent action was not expected. In fact, it was more likely frowned upon. Much of the coordination was accomplished through the Mk. 1 eyeball, and restricting movement was a simple means of deconflicting the ever so dangerous geometry of fires.

[bismark17]

Thanks for posting the Q&A! Very interesting. I need to dust off my old books, I got the Elite and the first version of the Selous Scouts book but have not got the revised edition. I better get back on my old book seller and start ordering from them again. They have a better selection than amazon.com when it comes to Rhodesian and SADF books.

[jcustis]

Thanks for posting the Q&A! Very interesting. I need to dust off my old books, I got the Elite and the first version of the Selous Scouts book but have not got the revised edition. I better get back on my old book seller and start ordering from them again. They have a better selection than amazon.com when it comes to Rhodesian and SADF books.

I have both of those as well, and Assignment Selous Scouts by Jim Branch (Special Branch) in the mail from SA right now.

It's an interesting coincidence that NPR discussed Mugabe's birthday party this am, and contrasted it against the fact that the "average" Zimbabwean can't buy a loaf of bread. Sensationalistic for sure, but the truth is still bad.

[JMA]

This exchange reminded me of an important fact, and that was the degree of independent action expected from the troops on the ground. Because Fire Force operations required a very detailed synchronized ballet of air assault support, close air support, observations posts, paratroopers, and sweep and stop groups, independent action was not expected. In fact, it was more likely frowned upon. Much of the coordination was accomplished through the Mk. 1 eyeball, and restricting movement was a simple means of deconflicting the ever so dangerous geometry of fires.

How "independent" is independent? Yes the Fire Force battle field was generally well choreographed by the Fire Force Commander (FF Cmd). When contact was made it was often at very close ranges where even the use of the 20mm canon from the K-Car would have been potentially dangerous to that particular stick (4-man callsign). These short range contacts were also normally short and sharp. In this 'corporals war' it was the stick commander's skill and aggression which was the critical success factor. By the time he had a chance to call in on the radio the local contact was all but over. Quite often an adjacent or nearby stick would report the contact to the FF Cmd who would then come overhead and at 800 ft and could see what was happening on the ground subject of course to the local tree cover. Over time we got better and better at what and how we did things on Fire Force and integral to the overall success was the ability of the generally 19-20 year old L/Cpls to deal with their local contact situations together with the aggression and skill of the gunner in the stick (armed with a FN- MAG).

[jcustis]

JMA,

First off, welcome to the Council. I'm am keenly looking forward to whatever contribution you might make.

On the point of indepedent operations, I was referring to my understanding that once dropped off in a stop, stick ldrs were not expected to maneuver around at the slightest indication of an adjacent contact, or unverified report of a fleeing terr. I admit that it may have seemed I thought sticks never moved, but I realize that there always had to be some degree of initiave and thought applied. It would have, I imagine, sharply contrasted with current team and squad-level operations seen today.

[jcustis]

I have heard that contact recording, and it is very interesting.

Throughout me read of FF operations materials, i have always focused on anything that indicated the thought that went into deconfliction of the geometry of fires, especially when sticks could not see each other. Did the FF Cmd ever give compass directions, or even azimuths, and direct sticks to restrict their fires to those directions? I'm familiar with the "show map" radio call, mentioned in the Venter book, so I believed at least small sketch maps were used. Thank you for the insight there.

Would you mind answering a series of questions about your equipment and fighting load?

[JMA]

I have heard that contact recording, and it is very interesting.

Throughout me read of FF operations materials, i have always focused on anything that indicated the thought that went into deconfliction of the geometry of fires, especially when sticks could not see each other. Did the FF Cmd ever give compass directions, or even azimuths, and direct sticks to restrict their fires to those directions? I'm familiar with the "show map" radio call, mentioned in the Venter book, so I believed at least small sketch maps were used. Thank you for the insight there.

Would you mind answering a series of questions about your equipment and fighting load?

The recording I'm talking about is this one: http://kiwi6.com/file?id=5i20a1ox5m It is the first part of 6 and is in MP3 format.

That recording was from mid 1976. You will hear stick being warned that a stick was in the "village' to their North and to watch out for them or that a stick (say Stop 3) was approaching them along the river-line from the East. The lie of the land was never as flat as a board so there was normally some protection provided against stray fire into a particular direction. In the event of a particular stick having a contact other sticks in the general line of fire would take cover if necessary. The "crack and thump" and the sound of that fire (which weapon) would indicate what action should be taken. New men would tend to over react to any firing and it was only with experience that they learned to differentiate between "stray" rounds passing over head and those aimed at them. There is specific training needed in this aspect in my opinion. I note much talk of the "Drake Shoot" as a training aid. Yes it really helps and can be repeated in modified form to make sure that troops are applying the lesson. However, there were not to many times where we swept through an area using continuous prophylactic fire into likely cover. In contact yes, troops would (or should have) fired into their arcs but if no fire is being returned it is rather pointless to just keep on firing.

The best instructions for direction were when given in reference to the position of the K-Car (as in "walk towards me.... Now"). But yes often sticks were told to move North, or East etc but never by degrees in my experience. Often the direction of movement was corrected by the FF Cmd either again by reference to his position or by a feature on the ground ("can you see the village ahead of you? OK, then on the right of that village (in relation to the stick) is some thick bush, I want you to move in that direction and clear that bush.")

Of course I will answer questions. The 30 years may have dulled my memory a bit but I'll give it my best shot.

PS: I'm using our terminology in the main so if you need clarity just ask. Like the word "deconfliction" is one I'm not familiar with.

[Graycap]

Thank you for your great informetions and insight.

As a long time lurker of this council I've been infected by Jcustis interest in Rhodesian bush war and I'm trying to find time enough to read all the books ans docs collected (I've found a good copy of Ron Daly Sealous Scouts! ).

I'd like to inform you that the link that you have provided is not working.

I obtain a 0 byte file.

Is it just me?

v/r

[jcustis]

No, it's not just you. I cannot play the file either.

JMA, you asked about any freedom to adjust equipment, and as I said, I'm curious about the fighting kit you carried. What was your standard load for each callout, and what was adjusted based on time of day and threat? Also, how much rifle ammunition and grenades did a trooper carry? Finally, besides the A76 radio, did stick ldrs carry other mission-specific equipment?

[JMA]

Thank you for your great informetions and insight.

As a long time lurker of this council I've been infected by Jcustis interest in Rhodesian bush war and I'm trying to find time enough to read all the books ans docs collected (I've found a good copy of Ron Daly Sealous Scouts! ).

I'd like to inform you that the link that you have provided is not working.

I obtain a 0 byte file.

Is it just me?

v/r

I have uploaded Part 1 to the following:

http://www.fileden.com/files/2010/4/...rce1976-01.mp3

There is a 1 Gig download limit so first come first served. Let me know if it works and then we can make a plan with the other 5 parts.

[JMA]

JMA,

First off, welcome to the Council. I'm am keenly looking forward to whatever contribution you might make.

On the point of indepedent operations, I was referring to my understanding that once dropped off in a stop, stick ldrs were not expected to maneuver around at the slightest indication of an adjacent contact, or unverified report of a fleeing terr. I admit that it may have seemed I thought sticks never moved, but I realize that there always had to be some degree of initiave and thought applied. It would have, I imagine, sharply contrasted with current team and squad-level operations seen today.

Happy to be here, thank you.

When dropped off there was always some degree of movement required to move into position. If the FF Cmd wanted a line of flight 'blocked' he would direct a stick to a position where he wanted them and they would take up a position, mark that position and wait there. These sticks would have a good idea of where the other sticks were in relation to them and had a good idea of the limits of their movement was. Positions of stop groups may be adjusted from time to time according to how the action developed. There was no hard and fast rule as the ground and situation dictated the plan. With experience Fire Force Cmds got better at 'reading' the ground and knowing where to put sticks/stops where/when to sweep when to keep certain sticks static etc. It was always a very fluid situation. The action may take a few hours or take all day and extend overnight. If the call-out was based on a sighting of say 10 terrs and they were all accounted for then we would move on. If not we would keep searching the area to find the rest. The OP would remain in place so sometimes it would be a plan to withdraw the FF and let the OP call us back when the survivors came out of hiding. The average kill rate was 80% so as the war got hotter and call outs came virtually every day maybe the FF did not spend the time on searching for the last one or two terrs as we used to do in the early days.