Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

[davidbfpo]

Rex,

You wrote just:

Yet they could have had those thing many years earlier, arguably under much better conditions--but didn't, because the Rhodesian Army was so successful that Smith couldn't see the writing on the wall.

At several points in post-UDI Rhodesia, before the war took hold, the senior military commanders did visit Ian Smith, urging him to change his stance in negotiations as Rhodesia was in such a strong position it could make concessions and each time Ian Smith said no there was no need to.

The first time Ian Smith's confidence was punctured was Henry Kissinger's visit in 1976, when a presentation was given by the USA on all aspects of the situation and in particular that the war was not winnable. By that time "taking the gap", falling re-enlistment rates and lack of resources were all having an impact. The Rhodesian military were also astonished that so much had been learnt, much of it from satellite imagery, SIGINT etc.

[JMA]

Rex,

You wrote just:

At several points in post-UDI Rhodesia, before the war took hold, the senior military commanders did visit Ian Smith, urging him to change his stance in negotiations as Rhodesia was in such a strong position it could make concessions and each time Ian Smith said no there was no need to.

The first time Ian Smith's confidence was punctured was Henry Kissinger's visit in 1976, when a presentation was given by the USA on all aspects of the situation and in particular that the war was not winnable. By that time "taking the gap", falling re-enlistment rates and lack of resources were all having an impact. The Rhodesian military were also astonished that so much had been learnt, much of it from satellite imagery, SIGINT etc.

Don't forget that the first wake-up call was the coup in Portugal in 1974. Who could have predicted that? The shock wave was also felt in South Africa as Angola now opened up access to SWA/Namibia for SWAPO/PLAN.

Then you focus on the supposed "gee-whizz" electronic stuff when you forget (or don't mention) that Smith agreed to the Kissinger Agreement of 1976 (probably only after South Africa threatened to cut off all financial and military aid if he did not) and went to the Geneva Conference to sign the agreement only for the Brits under the Chairmanship of that hopeless incompetent Ivor Richard to collapse like a wet paper bag before the increased demands of the nationalists and the OAU.

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

My comments on the Rhodesian military and advice to Prime Minister Ian Smith are based on conversations with several Rhodesian officers. IIRC some books also refer to this, but I cannot cite sources - except didn't Ken Flowers mention it? For the new to Rhodesia readers Ken Flowers was the ex-policeman who headed Rhodesia's external agency, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and somewhat controversial.

The comment on the Kissinger presentation in 1976 is based on wider conversations with politicians and the military, plus an academic who watched the situation. Again IIRC I think the reaction is shown in some books.

You refer to:

the supposed "gee-whizz" electronic stuff

.

My recollection is that the USA did not pay great SIGINT attention to the region, although more after Portugal's exit and after the Soviet-Cuban arrival in Angola. What surprised the Rhodesian military was the extent of US understanding of their problems, for examples the exit dates for serving career officers and who was who in operations from monitoring car parking at headquarters. Some Rhodesians thought some, if not more of the information came from "insiders", traitors and elsewhere. The other snag was that much of the information and analysis was known about within parts of the military, but had not been given to the politicians.

I left alone what happened to the Kissinger involvement as that was peripheral to SWJ and my interest in Rhodesian history is not all embracing.

Later on, with the Lancaster House Agreement, I recall the reporting on the emergence from the "bush" right across Rhodesia of thousands of guerillas and followers into the assembly points etc. This was also commented upon in the open literature by the Commonwealth Monitoring Force and others which I read in 1980 and shortly after - including articles in UK Army publications.

I fully accept that many of the guerillas remained in the "bush" to ensure that the rural voters cast their votes for ZANU and that many of those in the assembly points (BBC cites 22,000) were not guerillas.

[JMA]

JMA,

My comments on the Rhodesian military and advice to Prime Minister Ian Smith are based on conversations with several Rhodesian officers. IIRC some books also refer to this, but I cannot cite sources - except didn't Ken Flowers mention it? For the new to Rhodesia readers Ken Flowers was the ex-policeman who headed Rhodesia's external agency, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and somewhat controversial.

The comment on the Kissinger presentation in 1976 is based on wider conversations with politicians and the military, plus an academic who watched the situation. Again IIRC I think the reaction is shown in some books.

You refer to:.

My recollection is that the USA did not pay great SIGINT attention to the region, although more after Portugal's exit and after the Soviet-Cuban arrival in Angola. What surprised the Rhodesian military was the extent of US understanding of their problems, for examples the exit dates for serving career officers and who was who in operations from monitoring car parking at headquarters. Some Rhodesians thought some, if not more of the information came from "insiders", traitors and elsewhere. The other snag was that much of the information and analysis was known about within parts of the military, but had not been given to the politicians.

I left alone what happened to the Kissinger involvement as that was peripheral to SWJ and my interest in Rhodesian history is not all embracing.

Later on, with the Lancaster House Agreement, I recall the reporting on the emergence from the "bush" right across Rhodesia of thousands of guerillas and followers into the assembly points etc. This was also commented upon in the open literature by the Commonwealth Monitoring Force and others which I read in 1980 and shortly after - including articles in UK Army publications.

I fully accept that many of the guerillas remained in the "bush" to ensure that the rural voters cast their votes for ZANU and that many of those in the assembly points (BBC cites 22,000) were not guerillas.

I would suggest that it was a surprise to Rhodesians as to why the US was bothering to show that degree of interest in situation in their little country. So what was the implied threat of holding this knowledge? That Kissinger would pass it on to the Soviets (in 1976)? Or pass it on to the insurgents?

I suppose you heard of the arrest in June 1979 of three CIA agents? (Smith's book "The Great Betrayal" pg 308) And how Carter promised to lift sanctions against (then) Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in exchange for the release of the spies who had also been operating in Kenya and South Africa. Sadly the idiot Muzorewa agreed to release the spies on Carter's word. Big mistake. The rest is history.

As to information being passed to foreign governments during the war. We were never concerned with (nor should we ever have been) stuff classified as "Restricted" ending up anywhere from the CIA to MI6 to the insurgents.

Of concern to us was the fact that at one point operational intel was being passed on. For example on one camp attack into Zambia when we were going through the paperwork in their ops room we found a fresh signal they had received that morning saying "You will be attacked at 12h00 today". Then there were the numerous cases where attempts were may to kill/assassinate Nkomo and Mugabe but on arrival they were never at home. A number of other examples. It was a war and we were aware that everyone was out there with their spies and sources. Everyone trying to be more clever than the next.

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

Amidst your post was:

Of concern to us was the fact that at one point operational intel was being passed on. For example on one camp attack into Zambia when we were going through the paperwork in their ops room we found a fresh signal they had received that morning saying "You will be attacked at 12h00 today".

I learnt when in Zimbabwe in 1985 that operational security lapses had caused immense concern and aside from the "usual suspects" some thought was given to the regular arrival of external supporters before each major external operation. Supporters who provided the funding and more - they were not identified, but the finger of suspicion pointed northwards to Arabia. Their arrival in executive jets invariably was to Salisbury and could have been monitored.

After 1980 the Rhodesians discovered that some of the lapses could be attributed to the weather station at Salisbury airport, which was all-African and from their position could monitor the build-up of aircraft. Maybe even requests for weather reports? IIRC the Rhodesian Air Force main operating base, New Sarum shared the civil Salisbury airfield.

Security did work and I was told that ZANLA had never worked out where the ammunition was stored for the AML armoured cars; it had been in the squash courts and had been unseen.

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

You cited:

Op Manacle was the name of the Op for the Mozambican bridges and was first in line. But on the 15th November 1979 during the Lancaster House Talks there was a switch and the go ahead was given to take out the Zambian bridges which effectively put ZIPRA out of the war.

As the rush was on to prepare for the Mozambique part of the op the word came through from London that the cease fire had been signed and all external ops were terminated.

In the late-1980's there was a Granada TV series 'End of Empire', with two episodes on Rhodesia (UDI & Lancaster House) and many years later the BBC had another. Dropping the bridges was mentioned IIRC in both and in one, cannot recall which now, a Mozambique government advisor to Samora Machel referred to the intense pressure applied to Mugabe to agree in London. Not sure of the dates, but that may explain why the switch of targets was made to Zambia.

[JMA]

JMA,

You cited:

In the late-1980's there was a Granada TV series 'End of Empire', with two episodes on Rhodesia (UDI & Lancaster House) and many years later the BBC had another. Dropping the bridges was mentioned IIRC in both and in one, cannot recall which now, a Mozambique government advisor to Samora Machel referred to the intense pressure applied to Mugabe to agree in London. Not sure of the dates, but that may explain why the switch of targets was made to Zambia.

Up until Nkomo's people shot down the two civilian aircraft (Viscounts) Smith was in talks with him with a view to an agreement to the exclusion of Mugabe. After that and with Nkomo laughing about it in international TV there was no chance of 'white' Rhodesia accepting an agreement with Nkomo. (In his memoirs, Story of My Life (1985), Nkomo expressed regret for the shooting down of both planes)

Yes it is understood that Machel virtually forced Mugabe to attend to Lancaster House conference and when Mugabe walked out at one point he received a message from Machel stating that if he left London he was not to return to Mozambique.

As far as the switch (of bridge targets from Mozambique to Zambia) was concerned it appears that the Brits realised that the only way to end the war was to hand the country to Mugabe. Nkomo/ZIPRA had maintained a conventional force and had an invasion plan (planned by the Russians) via Victoria Falls. There was still a chance that Nkomo/ZIPRA could use that force to invade after Mugabe won the election so the Brits arranged for the Rhodesians to drop the key bridges and thus put the ZIPRA conventional force out of the war.

To be truly astonished about how the events on the Brit side unfolded one just has to trace Maggie Thatcher's timeline where at one stage she refused to meet "the terrorist" Mugabe and promised to lift sanctions through to when Mugabe was awarded a knighthood and not a sound was made by Britain when Mugabe's North Korean trained 5th Brigade did their little genocide thing on 30,000 Ndebele (the ethnic group represented by Nkomo and ZIPRA) in the early years after independence.

The Brit excuse is that they had to try and show the white South Africans that it was indeed possible to have a peaceful and economically successful African state and news of the genocide would not help with the acceptance of the possibility of benign majority rule. So careful management and aid was supplied to Zimbabwe until South Africa was a done deal and then they cut Zimbabwe loose... the rest is history.

[baboon6]

JMA,

Amidst your post was:

I learnt when in Zimbabwe in 1985 that operational security lapses had caused immense concern and aside from the "usual suspects" some thought was given to the regular arrival of external supporters before each major external operation. Supporters who provided the funding and more - they were not identified, but the finger of suspicion pointed northwards to Arabia. Their arrival in executive jets invariably was to Salisbury and could have been monitored.

After 1980 the Rhodesians discovered that some of the lapses could be attributed to the weather station at Salisbury airport, which was all-African and from their position could monitor the build-up of aircraft. Maybe even requests for weather reports? IIRC the Rhodesian Air Force main operating base, New Sarum shared the civil Salisbury airfield.

Security did work and I was told that ZANLA had never worked out where the ammunition was stored for the AML armoured cars; it had been in the squash courts and had been unseen.

There have also been allegations in the past of a spy or spies within COMOPS. Who they were, how they would have passed on information and whether the allegations have any merit- I couldn't say. I don't know if this is related to the three CIA agents mentioned by JMA above.

[JMA]

There have also been allegations in the past of a spy or spies within COMOPS. Who they were, how they would have passed on information and whether the allegations have any merit- I couldn't say. I don't know if this is related to the three CIA agents mentioned by JMA above.

Yes there was certainly a leak in COMOPS. Later a very strict "need to know" basis was maintained in that only Gen Walls (who had authorised the Op) and the implementing unit knew of the pending Op. There was still some potential for leaks as to get to Lusaka there was a lot of Air Force types in the loop and to get to Maputo (by South African Navy submarine or gunboat) also required a lot of people to know. Apart from that one camp in Zambia where had they had the ability that Op could have been a disaster most of the assassination attempts resulting in the target being called away at short notice for and urgent meeting or other and apart from Mugabe in Maputo, Nkomo left his guards and staff to face the music. Obviously the source did not want to blow his cover if there was a massive welcoming committee when the troops arrived. And yes there were always a number of battle indications when helicopters started to concentrate in one particular area etc etc the key source would always have been if they had someone planted in the Air Force as they were always deeply involved and by necessity a lot of people got to know about what was about to go down.