Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

[davidbfpo]

I have consolidated four RFI threads into this:All matters Rhodesian / Rhodesia (merged thread)

A lot of information sits in the main thread: Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI) and the recently published book: Africa's Commandos - new book on the RLI (Now in Historians arena).

As the war in Rhodesia was within a region wracked by conflict it is worth checking another thread: South Africa's COIN war in SWA/Namibia/Angola and COIN in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961–1974 (Now in Historians arena).

A debate over the Rhodesian tactic 'Fireforce' is found in the Afghan context: Moving the Rhod. Fire Force concept to Afghanistan?

A general search finds Rhodesia / Rhodesian appears in over a hundred threads, often in book lists for example.

I have copied this to the main thread.

[davidbfpo]

History Today is a popular UK magazine and I caught this article today via Twitter. The title 'A Secret History of African Decolonisation' is misleading, the article is just about the French role in Rhodesia and is minus any footnotes:http://www.historytoday.com/joanna-w...decolonisation

The author is at Portsmouth University, her bio:http://www.port.ac.uk/centre-for-eur...na-warson.html

From the outset, French arms were vital to counterinsurgency efforts led by the Rhodesian Security Forces, with at least 50 French-manufactured Alouettes in the service of the Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF) between 1965 and 1980. The Rhodesians also had access to Mirage FI planes and Maxtra rocket launchers, leading one Zambian press report from 1977 to conclude that 22 per cent of all military material used by the RhAF was of French origin.

I found this odd. The Mirages were South African planes, I'd expect the Maxtra rocket launchers were too. IIRC the Alouettes came via commercial contacts, although Rhodesia did have some in 1965; I don't recall them being South African owned. In all my contacts with ex-Rhodesian military officers not one has mentioned the French.

[davidbfpo]

Bloggers use each other's material, so hat tip to this other site for assembling a set of video links to Rhodesian footage, in particular an American who served as an officer with the RAR (3yrs 1976-1979):http://www.smallwars.com/forum/analy...esian-bush-war

There's also, a so far unread MA dissertation by a Kings War Studies student, 'An Embarrassment of Riches? - Britain's Lost Lessons from the Thodesian Counterinsurgency War', 71 pgs:http://www.smallwars.com/articles/91...-adam-robinson


The Abstract:

The counterinsurgency war fought in Rhodesia has a particular resonance for Britain. The Rhodesian Forces fought a protracted war using largely British equipment and British tactics, learnt from a shared experience of counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya, Kenya and Aden. When Rhodesia declared independence in 1965, the two countries went their separate ways and subsequent lessons from Rhodesia have generally gone unheeded by Britain. This paper will address the lessons that were presented by this war that could have been learnt and adopted by Britain during its subsequent counterinsurgencies of Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan. The paper will go on to analyse why some of those lessons were not addressed or, if they were, whether it was from the experiences in Rhodesia or from the UK’s own experiences. The fundamental questions of how Britain learns its counterinsurgency lessons and whether there was a conscious decision, because of Rhodesian secession, to ignore any experiences from Rhodesia will be answered. By using academic sources, direct contact with those involved in the Rhodesian counterinsurgency and by reference to contemporary and current doctrine, this paper will conclude that there are several lessons from Rhodesia that the UK could have learnt, and even some that are still to be heeded. It will conclude that the UK has had, until recently, a poor history of studying and codifying counterinsurgencies, that it has always been introspective when examining counterinsurgency lessons, and that it was because of this, and no other reason, that Rhodesia is not taught as a counterinsurgency case-study.

[rhodtpr]

History Today is a popular UK magazine and I caught this article today via Twitter. The title 'A Secret History of African Decolonisation' is misleading, the article is just about the French role in Rhodesia and is minus any footnotes:http://www.historytoday.com/joanna-w...decolonisation

The author is at Portsmouth University, her bio:http://www.port.ac.uk/centre-for-eur...na-warson.html



I found this odd. The Mirages were South African planes, I'd expect the Maxtra rocket launchers were too. IIRC the Alouettes came via commercial contacts, although Rhodesia did have some in 1965; I don't recall them being South African owned. In all my contacts with ex-Rhodesian military officers not one has mentioned the French.

According to Petter-Bowyers "Winds of Destruction" (30 degrees South - 2005) the Rhodesian AF owned 8 Alouette III helicopters by late 1960-early 1970;

"We had only eight helicopters and could ill afford a slow turn around and the physical stresses that repeated refueling induced during intense operations." (P.102).

On page 107 of the same book Petter-Bower states that the Sud Aviation of France provided 3 more Alouette hellicopters after UDI in 1965 (to compliment the 5 in service at the time of UDI) in exchange for the RhAF newly designed and developed "pressure-refueling pump".

The SAAF provided men and equipment (Op Polo) from the mid-1970's in order to provide their aircrews with operational experience. A SAAF liason officer posting was permanently attached to RhAF HQ (P.239).

Through this relationship Rhodesia was able to employ South African aircrew and aircraft in the Bush War effectively sidestepping international sanctions that were in place against the country since UDI in 1965.

In 1976 a shipment of 18 Cessna 337's were flown directly from Reims in France to Rhodesia in two ferry moves...the planes were disguised as Malagasy fisheries aircraft and registered to a false company in Spain. The Rhodesian pilots were accompanied by a French pilot who handled all the communications and logistics involved in the move. (P.253-259)

Operation Sand involved the training of RhAF pilots and aircrew via attachment to the SAAF on all SAAF aircraft which included RhAF pilots manning a squadron of Mirage III aircraft (p.266).