Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

[carl]

JMA:

I can't fault SWJ for publishing that piece. It was an editorial decision and sometimes ya' win and sometimes ya' lose. It did stimulate a lot of discussion which is always a good thing.

As history the piece is hopeless. Maybe the editors knew that, maybe not (I suspect they did) but that didn't really matter because people who comment on it can easily rip it apart; and they have done so.

When viewed as other than a historical account, it has a lot of value. You can pick it apart to see what makes those guys tick and use it for future reference.

JMM99:

That Turse fellow is foul, Ellsworth Touhy, Savonarola foul judging by that piece you excerpted. It is a little scary in a moral and physical sense that he can achieve the prominence he has in our country.

[JMA]

JMA:

I can't fault SWJ for publishing that piece.

Carl you are too kind.

It was an editorial decision and sometimes ya' win and sometimes ya' lose.

Well in this case it is the truth that is the loser.

It did stimulate a lot of discussion which is always a good thing.

Not sure the discussion has been in the right direction. We are talking about a blatant attempt to lie and deceive and what are we discussing? The merits and demerits of the Rhodesian War and the Rhodesians.

As history the piece is hopeless.

Yes, but what merit does it have. The only one I can see is that it can be used as an example of a deliberate attempt to alter history through the misuse of (admittedly second rate) universities and the exploitation the gullible (or useful idiots) who help spread the lie.

This can be used in military colleges as a warning to how the past can be twisted and altered in the most dishonest ways by ideologically motivated individuals who are both unwilling and unable to live with the truth of the past and seek to sanitize their role.

Maybe the editors knew that, maybe not (I suspect they did) but that didn't really matter because people who comment on it can easily rip it apart; and they have done so.

I don't think the Journal editors had the faintest idea about the bush war and that this was an attempt to sanitize the actions of depraved killers. I don't think it has been ripped apart. The key proposition has in the main been missed ... that being that Dzimbanhete wants readers to believe that the atrocities carried out by ZIPRA/ZANLA were justifiable acts of justice of people who deserved to die.

When viewed as other than a historical account, it has a lot of value. You can pick it apart to see what makes those guys tick and use it for future reference.

It should have been presented in that way then... but it wasn't.

[jmm99]

is here. I've talked about the editorial policy as it relates to technical things (the bottom half of the page). Now, we should look at the substantive part (the top half); and the policy lede ("Citizen Kane's Statement of Principles"):

We believe that responsive publishing and open dialog around well formed ideas grounded in experience and/or deep study (hopefully both) serves our community better than the protracted processes found in other venues to incrementally advance the rigor of a piece before its eventual exposure to light. We want to publish viewpoints on today's issues today, rather than in months or years.

We screen submissions so that we are reasonably convinced that the articles we publish are worthwhile additions to the dialog in the community. To us, that means they are:

•An offering concise and tightly argued enough to be worthy of the time of our busy readers;

•Serious, thoughtful work from a stakeholder worth understanding, if not necessarily agreeing with;

•Relevant and of interest to practitioners of small wars;

•Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive; and

•Written well enough that the message comes through clearly.

Saying that these articles are "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive..." implies to me (once an assistant editor for a couple of years on a law review) some sort of substantive review process.

In truth, "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ..." might as well have been left out, because the following paragraphs establish that no one really looks at whether the article is "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ...." So, the policy continues:

Our experimentation with various approaches to peer review has led us believe that the vast expertise of our readership and the immediacy of their response via open comments is far better vetting than a review panel we could assemble and labor slowly through.

We do not screen articles for their compliance with a house position or agenda. The flip side of that is that we do not necessarily agree with what we are publishing. We do not pretend to own the dialog or preach any gospel. SWJ does not promote any particular position, other than one of rigorous reflection and cross-examination given the complexities of small wars. The point is not for us, the authors, or for any site user to be right, but for all of us to be more informed and better.

We would like to provide our authors more editorial review than they get, which is next to none. We only make minor formatting and mechanical edits; we'd do more if we were better staffed. In the meantime, let's not let your red pen or our lack of enough of them get in the way of good ideas reaching the right eyes and ears promptly.

While we screen submissions, we do not and cannot fully vet authors and facts. Problems will come up from time to time. Authors who choose to submit their work to us do so courageously, realizing that they are subject to a public wire brushing by our discriminating and vocal readers for any errors.

We trust our audience to appreciate the distinction between inaccuracies that do not foul the rest of the work, and major issues: either deal-breaker errors or deception that we were too dumb and busy to interdict before publishing. If the latter two come up, we will deal with them as they arise. If livable errors come up, note and move on.

Now, to be frank, I've no problem with what these caveating paragraphs say. In fact, SWJ is neither the Harvard Law Review nor the Michigan Law Review, having a large student editorial staff and a faculty editorial board. Vetting even a couple of footnotes takes a lot of time, as my posts will soon prove. I don't expect that to happen before an SWJ article is published. As a corollary, I also don't expect SWJ articles to be necessarily "reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ...." Caveat emptor.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

This post deals with this text from Dzimbanhete's article:

The balance of probability points to the Rhodesian Selous Scouts as being responsible for the murder. It was very likely that the Rhodesian Selous Scouts were responsible for the murder of white missionaries at rural outposts and rural African businessmen.[5]

[5] The Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Tourism and Immigration published a pamphlet in July 1978 in which the description of the murders is given.

Missionary murders rang a bell; and lo and behold, a bit more than three years ago, I'd downloaded the report he cited. It's still there:

The Murder of Missionaries in Rhodesia
Ministry of Information
Rhodesia
July, 1978

The report recites a dozen incidents (most with multiple victims). All eyewitnesses identified the attackers as "guerrillas" or "terrorists". In addition, forensic evidence existed such as this:

Chief Inspector David Perkins, a ballistics expert with the British South Africa Police at the time of Musami Mission massacre of February 7, 1977, testified at the inquest that an AK rifle bearing the number 3036, of North Korean manufacture, had been proved under microscopic examination to be one of the weapons used in the slaying.

A notebook found on the body of a terrorist, Mombi Macheni, contained the following passage:

On Sunday the day of 6/2/77 we went to Musami at St Paul's Mission. We reached there at 9.15 and we had a storming raid. We shot four Europeans who were priests. Sisters were five, and altogether there were nine, eight dead.

We took a watch only. No comrades were injured in the action.

On the same day we went to Mazvidva and killed informers, kraalhead and the other one. This was 12.15, then we went.

Nobody was injured. We were very happy.

The entry in the notebook was signed by "No Talks" Mabhena. Beside his name was the number 3036.

The report (no surprise, since it is a government report) presents no evidence (much less "the balance of probability" or "very likely") that the Selous Scouts were responsible for the murders. Thus, so far as this particular text and footnote by Dzimbanhete is concerned, a fact checker could say "pants on fire."

What we do find in the report and elsewhere are claims by the Patriotic Front leadership that Rhodesian security forces committed the ca. 1976-1978 murders of white missionaries and black kraal leaders. One media outlet, quite independent of the government, is the Catholic Herald Co. UK archive (cited in this and the next post on Berejena Mission). In any Catholic Herald archive, you can hit "zoom page" for a blowup of the original column allowing correction of some bad OCRing by the archivist.

We didn't kill priests says Front
17th March 1978

THE Patriotic Front Leaders, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo have vigorously denied that their forces fighting in Rhodesia have attacked missionaries or are against the church in any way.

In an interview with the Catholic Herald on Wednesday Mr Mugabe said his ZANLA forces were specifically instructed not to harm missionaries but to regard them as their friends. "The missionaries are first and foremost working for the people and to work against them is obviously to work against the people they serve."

Mr Mugabe explained that ZANLA did not use violence against local Africans to gain support he said his forces used education and persuasion even if assistance was refused to the guerillas.

He strongly denied that his forces had been involved in the killing of missionaries at Lupane in 1976 and Musami in 1977.
...
Mr Nkomo said that the freedom fighters had been told not to harm the missionaries. "I have broadcast that message myself," he said.

He described as nonsense and absolute rubbish allegations that the Patriotic Front was anti-Christian or anti-missionary. "The stand which the Catholic bishops have taken against the Smith regime has alienated them from the regime and it has retaliated by deliberately punishing them. It has then tried to blame it on the guerrillas."

Mr Nkomo did admit that there might be one or two "unruly people" amongst the guerrillas but he promised that they would be punished by demotion or fatigues or some other method.

One might well question Mugabe's credibility in 1978, given his track record after 1978 to date. In fact, that is exactly what some South Africans are doing.

Becoming Zimbabwe (2009; Institute for Justice and Reconciliation). Here's some snippage:

This report provides a complimentary aspect to "Becoming Zimbabwe" by posing a general critique of history teaching and curriculum in Zimbabwe. It attempts to enhance the book’s use, and serves as an educational tool at secondary and higher levels for comparison and analysis of history teaching and curriculum in Zimbabwe. The report also provides an outline of the kinds of historical texts and narratives on Zimbabwe, and how they are taught within Zimbabwean technical colleges and universities. The supplement therefore provides an overview of history teaching in Zimbabwe in relation to the content and focus of "Becoming Zimbabwe".

The book is B. Raftopoulos and A. S. Mlambo (eds), Becoming Zimbabwe. A History, c. 850–2009, Harare, Weaver Press, 2009.

Back to the report and the literary genre inspired by Mugabe. Chapter I deals with the uses of liberation history in Zimbabwean politics, as exemplified by Mugabe's and ZANU PF's "Patriotic History" (snips):

Patriotic History proclaims ZANU PF as the alpha and omega of Zimbabwe’s past, present and future. Zimbabweans are encouraged to be ‘patriotic’, which means supporting ZANU PF.

Anything short of this is considered ‘unpatriotic’.

Patriotic History has four main themes:

1. land;
2. no external interference based on ‘Western ideals’ such as human rights;
3. race; and
4. a ‘patriots’ versus ‘sell-outs’ distinction.
...
‘Patriots’ versus ‘sell-outs’

Lastly, Patriotic History separates Zimbabweans into ‘patriots’ and ‘sell-outs’, such that opponents to ZANU PF are necessarily classified as ‘pro-colonial’, ‘sell-outs’, ‘un-African’, and ‘puppets’, while followers of ZANU PF are categorised as ‘patriots’. The patriots and sell-outs distinction is extended to the rest of the globe. External critics of ZANU PF are typecast as ‘foes’ of black Africa.

The distinction has its genesis in late 1950s urban politics and has been a constant premise in nationalist politics since. The denotation of ‘sell-out’ changes over time depending on the character of a challenger. To be a ‘sell-out’ during the liberation war was to be an informant of the colonial Rhodesian state and to support a rival nationalist party. To be a ‘sell-out’ after 2000 is to abandon ZANU PF’s ‘central’ role in nationalist history, to resist the land seizures, and to value civil and political rights over economic rights.

Patriotic History is a sophisticated narrative that plays on real historical grievances such as land. Indeed it is more than a narrative. It is part of a political culture that legitimises violence, and inhibits political tolerance, civil and political rights, and democracy.

To me, Dzimbanhete's article fits into the "Patriotic History" genre, which itself is a part of the nationalistic "freedom fighter" and "freedom violence" narrative. I have no idea whether the man is a Mugabe supporter or not.

Here is the abstract for his 2012 article about the armed liberation struggle:

Title: ‘I died for this country’: National Heritage and Zimbabwe’s War of Liberation

Abstract

What legacies make the Zimbabwean war of independence a national heritage?

The significance of posing this question cannot be overemphasised. There is an explosion of current and dominant narratives of the war whose sentiment is that the people who died during and because of the liberation struggle made sacrifices that bequeathed national heritage status to Zimbabwe’s war of liberation. The same perspective stresses that sacrifices were a monopoly of the people who ‘jumped the borders’ out of colonial Rhodesia during the war years. The same body of narratives attaches prominence to the inaccurate but deliberate definition of the terms, ‘deserters and sell outs’ in the process of appropriating the Zimbabwean armed independence struggle for particular groups of people.

This paper seeks to show that the co-operation and unity between the armed liberation fighters and the povho (the black civilian population in the war zones) during the period of the war constitutes an impressive legacy of Zimbabwe’s war of liberation. The cordial relationship, a product of a shared political goal, manifested in the collaboration between the freedom fighters and their hosts, confers national heritage status to the war. This study revisits this aspect of Zimbabwe’s liberation war and examines the contribution of various categories of the African population.

The paper thus challenges perspectives that privilege a single category of the participants of the war and also overemphasise death as the only notable sacrifice made during the decolonisation process of Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the article demonstrates that sacrifices during the armed struggle were not a monopoly of any one group.

My next post will deal with a less clear-cut set of facts, Berejena Mission.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

This post deals with this text from Dzimbanhete's SWJ article:

Writing in 2006, Parker, a former Rhodesian serviceman, revealed that the Selous Scouts were responsible for the murder of Father Killian Huesser, a Roman Catholic priest based at Berejena Mission in February 1980.[3]

[3] J. Parker, Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (Alberton: Galago, 2006), p. 285.

The Aluka Database has two relevant entries (both interviews in 1998; abstracts only; text behind paywall). The first interview covered the period from 1976-1980 at Berejena Mission:

Interview with Constantine Vengesai

Description: A teacher in various Chivi schools up to 1976 when he moved to the controversial Catholic Mission of Berejena, he was part of the group of teachers who initiated a fund for the guerrillas and his testimony is rich in the day to day happenings at the mission involving guerrillas and soldiers. He also details the inter-party rivalry between ZAPU and ZANU supporters and how this literally led to the flight of ZAPU activists from the district during the war.

The second interview, dealing with Fr Huesser's death, comes later.

The second source for 1976 events at Berejena are the Catholic Herald archives, from which we learn quite a bit, as in this article:

Mission Priest held by Smith
3rd December 1976

FR PAUL ECiLl[EGLI], 47-year-old Swiss Catholic missionary, was arrested last week by Ian Smith's Rhodesian authorities at the Berejena Mission, southeast of Fort Victoria.
...
A spokesman for the Bethlehem Fathers in Britain commented: "It is generally assumed that Fr Egli has been arrested for refusing to disclose the whereabouts of freedom fighters and for attending guerrilla meetings."

Sr Aquina Weinrich, OP, writing in the current issue of Blackfriars, highlighted the moral dilemma posed by the illegal Rhodesian regime's oppression of the majority black population — "a committed Christian must ask himself whether the cause of justice and peace is better served by force of arms or by the continuation of present oppression . . . in this situation neutrality does not exist."

Liberation Theology is at its clearest in the sister's comments above. Here is her article, GUERILLA WARFARE IN RHODESIA, New Blackfriars Volume 57, Issue 678, pages 499–505, November 1976 (first page only; the rest is behind a paywall).

So, from at least 1976 on into 1980, Berejena Mission provided material support to the guerrillas (a possible motive for the government to act harshly); but the Berejena area was subject to intense inter-party conflict between ZAPU and ZANU supporters (a possible motive for either guerrilla faction to act harshly toward the other faction's supporters). As Sr Weinrich said ... "neutrality does not exist."

Immediately after Fr Huesser's death, who did it was a mystery to the Catholic Herald:

Precarious path to freedom and unity
29th February 1980

Also of significance are the deaths in the past month of two Catholic priests, Father Raymond Machikicho and Father Kilian Huesser.

It is ironic and tragic that Father Machikicho should have been killed by supporters of' the guerrillas. The death of Father Iluesser[Huesser] is still a mystery.

The death of Fr Machikicho was less of a mystery:

Church concern for Rhodesian refugees and fear of violence
8th February 1980

The concern mirrors wider fears about the possible breakdown of the ceasefire: this week Fr Raymond Machikicho, a black priest working with the Bethleham Fathers near Gwelo, and his driver, became the latest victims of the continuing violence when they were beaten to death, allegedly by young guerillas.

However, by early March, fingers were pointed by Berejena Mission clergy at Rhodesian security forces:

Mugabe men not killers
7th March 1980

1 HI. 1 ORCLS[THE FORCES] of Mr Robert Murata:[Mugabe], who won a resounding victor:, ifi [victory in]this week's Rhodesia elections, were not responsible for the recent harassment of mission stations. This is the claim made by priests and nuns in Rhodesia.

Fr Killian I luesser[Huesser], of the Bethlehem Fathers, was murdered at Berejena Mission two weeks ago by a group of men dressed like Mugabe's Zimbabwe Africa National I.iberation Army (ZANLA). But priests at the mission claim the inert[men] were really members of the Rhodesian Security Forces.

Their evidence was backed-up by Dominican Sisters in a BBC Panorama programme on Monday.

"Beaten-up people tell us they always fear auxiliaries or Security Forces" said a nursing sister. Relationships between the Church and the guerrillas has been fairly good.

Mr Mugabe was brought up as a Catholic, and although he no longer professes his faith, he keeps close contact with Church leaders.

It appears that this claim was based on hearsay (unless the priests claimed to eyewitnesses, who were spared ??); and on total irrelevancy (the Dominican Sisters of the BBC program).

Thanks to the Aluka Database, we might have a credible eyewitness to the murder (the second interview mentioned above):

Interview with Ratidzo Hasha

Description: A Form One student at Berejena Mission in southern Chivi who witnessed the murder of a Roman Catholic Priest Father Killian Heusser by members of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts towards the general elections of 1980.

Eyewitnesses do not necessarily hold up to cross-examination, but do provide probable cause (at least in the US) for the case to move forward.

Parker seems to be something of a red herring. I gather he does not claim to have been present at Huesser's murder; but is relying on hearsay of one kind or another. The picture as to Parker is more than a bit muddied by the following, source 1 and source 2 (taken from source 1) are the same:

Parker not our man:

REGARDING ‘ South Africa ’s plot to kill Prince Charles’ (May 7) and the status of Jim Parker, author of Assignment Selous Scouts.

As the officer commanding Special Operations CIO Headquarters, I categorically state that Parker was never an attested member of the BSAP Rhodesian Special Branch, or the Selous Scout Regiment.

At no time during his service as a police reservist was he authorised by a competent authority to direct, brief, or command personnel in the field.

The alleged attack on Berejena Catholic Mission in the Chibi Tribal Trust Land on the night of February 19, resulting in the death of Father Huesser, was never contemplated by those officers in authority, and was totally unlawful.

- MJ McGuinness, via e-mail — letter to the editor Sunday Times, (28 May 06)

and in response,

About turn:

REGARDING “ South Africa ’s plot to kill Prince Charles” (May 7), and MJ McGuinness’s disavowal, “Parker not our man” (Letters, May 28) of the Special Branch status of Jim Parker, author of Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer:

I have the utmost respect for McGuinness, who is a former colleague from my Rhodesian BSA Police days. I have listened to several hours of taped interviews that Parker conducted with McGuinness while researching his book. Much of what he wrote emanated from McGuinness, including the plot to assassinate Prince Charles and much more. Surely he wouldn’t have been so revealing if he hadn’t accepted Parker’s bona fides as a former subordinate — albeit a “lowly” reservist and not a regular policeman? Particularly as he also acknowledged Parker as “his man” in the tapes.

Regarding the Berejena Mission incident that was “never contemplated by those officers in authority”, such a thing couldn't have been anything else but unlawful.

The same would apply to similar incidents that McGuinness discussed with Parker which occurred in what were then Salisbury, Gwelo and Rusape. It is also evident from the McGuinness tapes that certain officers in authority did more than just “contemplate” in those cases.

Does this explain his puzzling about-turn?

- Peter Stiff, publisher of Assignment Selous Scouts by Jim Parker, Alberton — letter to the editor, Sunday Times (4 June 2006)

The student at Berejena, Ratidzo Hasha, seems the best evidence to support this particular Dzimbanhete claim, but Dzimbanhete doesn't appear to mention him.

This research took far too long for its worth to me.

PS: Dzimbanhete also has two 2013 articles on JIARM: LANGUAGE AS AN ASPECT OF THE WAR: SPECIAL SHONA REGISTERS OF ZIMBABWE'S LIBERATION WAR; and NEGOTIATING FOR SURVIVAL: THE NATURE OF THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ZANLA)'S GUERRILLA WARFARE DURING ZIMBABWE'S WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

I believe we are drifting off the essential focus of Dzimbanhete's paper which was:

The foregoing discussion has shown that current attempts to equate and link the selective nature of violence that was deployed by the revolutionary guerrilla forces to contemporary outbreaks of violence are unfounded and devoid of academic analysis. The nonselective violence that is perpetrated by troops of an incumbent government is normally intended to stifle legitimate demand for economic and political spaces by the citizens. On the other hand the application of violence on civilians by the liberation fighters was in the interest of creating economic and political space. It would be fitting to refer to guerrilla violence as ‘freedom violence'.

So quite frankly if, repeat if, some priest was taken out for collaborating with the insurgents that could hardly be termed 'non-selective violence'.

So it all comes down, according to Dzimbanhete, 'creating economic and political space'.

Just as with that garbage from the Dutch boy, which the MR saw fit to publish, the thesis is not proven (by any stretch of the imagination).

In point of fact what he attempts to sell is that the atrocities of the insurgents were justifiable and acceptable. As he attempts to convince:

Executions were dictated by the need to survive since civilian collaboration with the colonial army forces put the lives of the freedom fighters and the peasants at risk. It was clear that guerrilla violence that visited the rural folk was discriminate. It was used against only those elements of the rural population, who against the express advice of the liberation forces collaborated with the Rhodesian security forces.

This as opposed to:

The violence that the Rhodesian colonial forces perpetrated against the rural peasants was apparently systematic and organised. It is on this score that it should be appropriately labelled ‘terrorism' and it was the Rhodesian security forces that deserved to be called ‘terrorists'.

In the Rhodesian thread on SWC many aspects of the Rhodesian bush war have been discussed and more discussion would serve to inform people better on what worked and what did not work during the bush war.

However, I see little point in using a piece of garbage such as this paper to launch into such discussions. The MR published and thereby gave some credibility to the Dutch boy just as the Journal has done with Dizumbanhete's garbage. Both the MR and the Journl should be ashamed.

[JMA]

Mike,, well done on sifting through all that.

Interesting indication of Dzimbanhete's selective cherry picking is Parker as a source.

I did not bother to read Parker's book as my information was that Parker himself was not what he claimed to be.

Nevertheless, Dzimbanhete gleefully grasps Parker supplied evidence that Rhodesian Forces killed a priest ... while at the same time discarding Parker's reports of grotesque atrocities by the insurgents.

The man can't have it both ways.

But the great sadness is that first the Journal and then some individuals take this clown seriously.

This post deals with this text from Dzimbanhete's SWJ article:

The Aluka Database has two relevant entries (both interviews in 1998; abstracts only; text behind paywall). The first interview covered the period from 1976-1980 at Berejena Mission:

The second interview, dealing with Fr Huesser's death, comes later.

The second source for 1976 events at Berejena are the Catholic Herald archives, from which we learn quite a bit, as in this article:

Liberation Theology is at its clearest in the sister's comments above. Here is her article, GUERILLA WARFARE IN RHODESIA, New Blackfriars Volume 57, Issue 678, pages 499–505, November 1976 (first page only; the rest is behind a paywall).

So, from at least 1976 on into 1980, Berejena Mission provided material support to the guerrillas (a possible motive for the government to act harshly); but the Berejena area was subject to intense inter-party conflict between ZAPU and ZANU supporters (a possible motive for either guerrilla faction to act harshly toward the other faction's supporters). As Sr Weinrich said ... "neutrality does not exist."

Immediately after Fr Huesser's death, who did it was a mystery to the Catholic Herald:

The death of Fr Machikicho was less of a mystery:

However, by early March, fingers were pointed by Berejena Mission clergy at Rhodesian security forces:

It appears that this claim was based on hearsay (unless the priests claimed to eyewitnesses, who were spared ??); and on total irrelevancy (the Dominican Sisters of the BBC program).

Thanks to the Aluka Database, we might have a credible eyewitness to the murder (the second interview mentioned above):

Eyewitnesses do not necessarily hold up to cross-examination, but do provide probable cause (at least in the US) for the case to move forward.

Parker seems to be something of a red herring. I gather he does not claim to have been present at Huesser's murder; but is relying on hearsay of one kind or another. The picture as to Parker is more than a bit muddied by the following, source 1 and source 2 (taken from source 1) are the same:

and in response,

The student at Berejena, Ratidzo Hasha, seems the best evidence to support this particular Dzimbanhete claim, but Dzimbanhete doesn't appear to mention him.

This research took far too long for its worth to me.

PS: Dzimbanhete also has two 2013 articles on JIARM: LANGUAGE AS AN ASPECT OF THE WAR: SPECIAL SHONA REGISTERS OF ZIMBABWE'S LIBERATION WAR; and NEGOTIATING FOR SURVIVAL: THE NATURE OF THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ZANLA)'S GUERRILLA WARFARE DURING ZIMBABWE'S WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

I want to get back to the topic of "selective violence" ("targeted killing" in my jargon, as in this thread, The Rules - Engaging HVTs & OBL) in a later post tonite - hopefully not focusing on the Zimbabwe Prof and the Dutch Boy.

A couple of brief points about your comments on SWJ. First:

We have to find x number of words for each edition and will use anything to fill up the edition.

I don't think that is accurate simply because there are no editions. A few months ago, I went through the archives month by month from Jan 2012. The articles are simply posted day by day (roughly 1 a day, but that varies), apparently as they come in.

Second:

... better they just say: ... Some will be meaningful, some will be garbage, sift through it all yourself.

Yup. Caveat emptor. End SWJ digression - at least for me.

-----------------------------------------
Parker, Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (Amazon quoting: 16 Used from $91.35, 6 New from $201.06; it may be "fiction", but it sure is expensive fiction).

There are only two reviews; I'll snip from both.

Rhodesian Bush War & BLACK Operations, April 28, 2008
By Troy A. Lettieri "Professional Warrior" [JMM Lookup, About 1, see post #1, SFC, 3rd SFG, Bronze Star w/ V; About 2, business; SWC Member as taldozer, Last Activity: 04-29-2013, Join Date: 02-21-2006]

This review is from: Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (Paperback)

NOTE - I rate this book a solid 3.5

This book is an important read in understanding the history of the Selous Scouts and the unit's full spectrum of operations. The book covers the direct involvement of the British South African Police (BSAP) Special Branch (SB) which played a major role in all Pseudo-Operations undertaken by the Selous Scouts. The Selous Scouts was basically established as a joint BSAP and Army unit. The SB was responsible for "turning", training and re-introducing the newly "turned" terrorist to the Selous Scouts for operations against their comrades. The SB function is often over looked or given a cursory look it other works/books on the Selous Scouts (as in Reid-Daly's "Pamwe Chete" and other titles on the Selous Scouts).

Now, you must know there is some major controversy associated with this book. The Selous Scouts Association (SSA) has distanced itself from this book. The SSA said that there are some extraordinary claims as to what the Selous Scouts did during the war and the SSA has described the major claims in the book as "total fiction". The SSA also claim that Parker was not an attested member of the Rhodesian Special Branch and he was not a member of the Selous Scouts Special Branch. Rather that he was in fact a Police Reservist. But Peter Stiff, the publisher of the book, has stated that the above claims are not true and that the Parker, was a Reserve Detective Section Officer with SB Selous Scouts at Operation Repulse virtually fulltime as an A Reservist during the last years of the war. All I can say as a avid researcher/historian on Rhodesian matters, I have learned most former Rhodesian Spec Ops types are very closed mouth about their "operational" past and today still remain security conscious. So I feel the "real" truth of the matter will never be known for a long time if ever.

Over all this book is well documented and has extensive endnotes and bibliography, as well as many never before published photographs.

With the controversy aside the book still is a required read for the military/intelligence professional.

and the second:

Informative, but not what you might be expecting., June 10, 2011
By Historicool [JMM Lookup, About 1, nothing beyond this]

This review is from: Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (Paperback)

This book, aside from detailing several supposed top secret operations that have proven to be controversial claims, the book has the unfortunate honor of being one of the few books about the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. It is important to note, from the start, that this book primarily covers the Special Branch side of the Selous Scouts, which was largely responsible for intelligence processing and more police-focused operations.

The book begins with coverage of the war in general up until the author joined the Special Branch Selous Scouts including some basic coverage on the war, Selous Scouts operations, and some interesting information on the Operation Repulse and Operation Thrasher areas and events occurring there. This is one of my gripes with this book - namely the coverage of the general war. While the coverage of Selous Scouts operations is entertaining it is overwhelmed by basic information on the bush war that could be found elsewhere. As the reader goes along the information on the Operation areas becomes more plentiful, but again the information is not always related to Scouts operations. Eventually information on Scouts Chem/Bio warfare, and the day to day operations of the Scouts in the later years of the war comes to light, but again, this is information on the Special Branch of things, which is vastly different than information on the Army Scouts. There is also some brief discussions of attacks on religious missions, and opponents of the regime - which has likely caused so much of a stir due to the author's lack of documentation to prove that these were sanctioned ops rather than rogue ones. It's difficult to prove some of these claims due to the country changing hands and the likely destruction of documentation, but the author should qualify these statements a bit more then. Its difficult too when one of his major sources for the book Mac McGuiness later denied saying some of the information attributed to him the book

The book's latter quarter covers the Scouts and their South African allies attempts to prevent the ZANU-PF from gaining power, then assassination attempts against Mugabe before he can take power. Again, the claims are interesting, but not well proven. Naturally, claims of things like attacks against UANC, etc supporters by Scouts dressed as ZANLA in an effort to get the Brits to disallow the ZANU from the elections, poisonings, etc. do not paint the Scouts in a good light and is bound to elicit vehement denials, but the author should have known to back up his claims strongly or soften them a bit more than he does by saying "I am not sure, but I have good belief based on evidence X and Y to say that the higher ups knew about Operation A or B."

Overall, it's a decent read, though needs to be taken with a grain of salt. The author adds to the limited information on the Scouts from the perspective of Special Branch, but should have done more (and perhaps his editor as well) to explain some of his more fantastic claims and spent fewer pages on a general accounts of the war. At the same time,his (albeit brief) discussion of SADF Paras a Fireforce units towards the end of the war, the use of Recce's as "D" Squadron RSAS, the use of SADF "Rose" mines (and the attendant dangers to the user as well as the target), and the integration of SAS and Selous Scouts into the South African Recce Commandos is of definite use to those interested in SADF and Rhodesian special units.

So, from these reviews I glean about the Parker book, " Some will be meaningful, some will be garbage, sift through it all yourself"; and definitely Caveat Emptor.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

Its shocking... better they just say: "We have to find x number of words for each edition and will use anything to fill up the edition. Some will be meaningful, some will be garbage, sift through it all yourself."

is here. I've talked about the editorial policy as it relates to technical things (the bottom half of the page). Now, we should look at the substantive part (the top half); and the policy lede ("Citizen Kane's Statement of Principles"):

Saying that these articles are "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive..." implies to me (once an assistant editor for a couple of years on a law review) some sort of substantive review process.

In truth, "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ..." might as well have been left out, because the following paragraphs establish that no one really looks at whether the article is "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ...." So, the policy continues:

Now, to be frank, I've no problem with what these caveating paragraphs say. In fact, SWJ is neither the Harvard Law Review nor the Michigan Law Review, having a large student editorial staff and a faculty editorial board. Vetting even a couple of footnotes takes a lot of time, as my posts will soon prove. I don't expect that to happen before an SWJ article is published. As a corollary, I also don't expect SWJ articles to be necessarily "reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ...." Caveat emptor.

Regards

Mike