Page 20 of 22 FirstFirst ... 101819202122 LastLast
Results 381 to 400 of 428

Thread: Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

  1. #381
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    the Dzimbanhete article isn't worth a review.

    What I was trying to put across is that the article (exemplified by its coinage of the term "freedom violence") comes from the same well (manure pile, whatever) as the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, in their carving out exceptions for the "freedom fighter", the "transitory guerrilla", the "occasional IED layer", etc., etc.

    It reminded me of the agitprop of the 60s and 70s, which I also said in the post. As I use the term "agitprop" here (agitation of a mass audience by propagation of the written word), the material can be true, false or mixed (white, black or varying grays) and can be acceptable, unacceptable or "so what" (depending on the reader's viewpoint). The author Dzimbanhete uses a more limited definition:
    One man's freedom fighter is another man's ...

    Apart from attempting a great deception Dzimbanhete seems to have missed the history of the last 30 years that questions the definition of 'freedom' that was delivered to the 'toiling masses' of Zimbabwe upon liberation. Some might say they were delivered from the frying pan into the fire.

    I guess I am surprised that there has been such a limited reaction to this deliberate attempt to deceive and sanitize depraved killers. This is the great tragedy.

    That kind of agitprop is definitely black (or a deep shade of gray) in content. One might well ask whether Dzimbanhete's article itself is "propaganda" as Sturges defines it. Sturges, BTW, is in Pretoria (faculty bio). Here are abstracts of his 2004 and 2005 articles.

    The "literary genre" of Dzimbanhete's article is similar to that of our USAian Nick Turse (born in 1975; Wiki), who has made himself a career from the time of his 2005 Columbia University Ph.D dissertation, "Kill Anything That Moves: United States War Crimes and Atrocities in Vietnam, 1965-1973", to the present - his 2013 Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam. Whether Turse's agitprop about Vietnam is black, white or gray is not going to be an issue for me here. Turse does resemble Dzimbanhete (re: that author's talk of "freedom violence") in Turse's 2000 article, New Morning, Changing Weather: Radical Youth of the Millennial Age:
    I don't know this character but let us agree that there were atrocities committed in Vietnam... by both sides. Just as this Turse person tried to make a name for himself (and get a Ph.D at the same time) so is this Dzimbanhete person. Shameful behaviour that should have been recognised by the Journal Editorial Board.

    In this early Turse piece, we have another example of the "freedom violence genre". Is it "propaganda" in the Sturges sense: material "to confuse and deceive those that receive it ?"
    Well he certainly confused the editorial board of the Journal into publishing it.

    I can't see how they can do anything but resign in disgrace.

    Finally, to your question (asked before about the Dutch article): how do these things get past editorial boards. The secret is to footnote the hell out of everything - in Dzimbanhete's article, 31 footnotes preceded by a bibliography of over a dozen books, articles and oral interviews. To completely vet these (to determine how black, white or gray), one would have to check the substance of each cite; and also determine its credibility.
    Yes, shocking indeed. In this case Dzimbanhete interviewed three people. Like the Dutch boy he seems to have had a preconceived idea/position/belief and went about trying support it by searching out random cites to support that position. One wonders if the institution matters. Are first rate institutions as slovenly as the second rate institutions of this one and that of the Dutch boy?

    As to the first cite, did Parker say that; and, if so, is Parker a credible witness ? I don't know; but would find out if this were a litigated case. It isn't, however. The second cite (the Ministry of Information, Tourism and Immigration) doesn't, on its face, prove the "probability" asserted.
    Mike what Parker reports is probably true. Unlike Dzimbanhete there is no point in attempting to deny which I can't state with absolute certainty did not happen.

    What I am attempting to understand is why at this late stage Dzimbanhete is seeking to decriminalize the atrocities carried out by the insurgents.

    I would offer two guesses, one, that as the Mugabe regime nears collapse the killers who are now old men would be concerned that with the fall of the regime their protection would fall away and they would be vulnerable to both or either legal or vigilante action from family of their victims. Two, that in the spiritual context of Zimbabwe these aging killers are attempting to appease any angry spirits -ngozi or evil spirits - by convincing themselves that their acts were not murder but rather acts of justice therefore would not upset the spirits.

    For good or bad, editorial boards do not do that kind of vetting - that process is left to the reader or independent reviewer.
    This is clearly for bad (or worse as you like). So why have an editorial board then?

  2. #382
    Council Member carl's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2005
    Location
    Denver on occasion
    Posts
    2,460

    Default

    JMA:

    I can't fault SWJ for publishing that piece. It was an editorial decision and sometimes ya' win and sometimes ya' lose. It did stimulate a lot of discussion which is always a good thing.

    As history the piece is hopeless. Maybe the editors knew that, maybe not (I suspect they did) but that didn't really matter because people who comment on it can easily rip it apart; and they have done so.

    When viewed as other than a historical account, it has a lot of value. You can pick it apart to see what makes those guys tick and use it for future reference.

    JMM99:

    That Turse fellow is foul, Ellsworth Touhy, Savonarola foul judging by that piece you excerpted. It is a little scary in a moral and physical sense that he can achieve the prominence he has in our country.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

  3. #383
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post
    JMA:

    I can't fault SWJ for publishing that piece.
    Carl you are too kind.

    It was an editorial decision and sometimes ya' win and sometimes ya' lose.
    Well in this case it is the truth that is the loser.

    It did stimulate a lot of discussion which is always a good thing.
    Not sure the discussion has been in the right direction. We are talking about a blatant attempt to lie and deceive and what are we discussing? The merits and demerits of the Rhodesian War and the Rhodesians.

    As history the piece is hopeless.
    Yes, but what merit does it have. The only one I can see is that it can be used as an example of a deliberate attempt to alter history through the misuse of (admittedly second rate) universities and the exploitation the gullible (or useful idiots) who help spread the lie.

    This can be used in military colleges as a warning to how the past can be twisted and altered in the most dishonest ways by ideologically motivated individuals who are both unwilling and unable to live with the truth of the past and seek to sanitize their role.

    Maybe the editors knew that, maybe not (I suspect they did) but that didn't really matter because people who comment on it can easily rip it apart; and they have done so.
    I don't think the Journal editors had the faintest idea about the bush war and that this was an attempt to sanitize the actions of depraved killers. I don't think it has been ripped apart. The key proposition has in the main been missed ... that being that Dzimbanhete wants readers to believe that the atrocities carried out by ZIPRA/ZANLA were justifiable acts of justice of people who deserved to die.

    When viewed as other than a historical account, it has a lot of value. You can pick it apart to see what makes those guys tick and use it for future reference.
    It should have been presented in that way then... but it wasn't.

  4. #384
    Council Member
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    4,021

    Default Small Wars Journal Editorial Policy

    is here. I've talked about the editorial policy as it relates to technical things (the bottom half of the page). Now, we should look at the substantive part (the top half); and the policy lede ("Citizen Kane's Statement of Principles"):

    We believe that responsive publishing and open dialog around well formed ideas grounded in experience and/or deep study (hopefully both) serves our community better than the protracted processes found in other venues to incrementally advance the rigor of a piece before its eventual exposure to light. We want to publish viewpoints on today's issues today, rather than in months or years.

    We screen submissions so that we are reasonably convinced that the articles we publish are worthwhile additions to the dialog in the community. To us, that means they are:

    •An offering concise and tightly argued enough to be worthy of the time of our busy readers;

    •Serious, thoughtful work from a stakeholder worth understanding, if not necessarily agreeing with;

    •Relevant and of interest to practitioners of small wars;

    Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive; and

    •Written well enough that the message comes through clearly.
    Saying that these articles are "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive..." implies to me (once an assistant editor for a couple of years on a law review) some sort of substantive review process.

    In truth, "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ..." might as well have been left out, because the following paragraphs establish that no one really looks at whether the article is "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ...." So, the policy continues:

    Our experimentation with various approaches to peer review has led us believe that the vast expertise of our readership and the immediacy of their response via open comments is far better vetting than a review panel we could assemble and labor slowly through.

    We do not screen articles for their compliance with a house position or agenda. The flip side of that is that we do not necessarily agree with what we are publishing. We do not pretend to own the dialog or preach any gospel. SWJ does not promote any particular position, other than one of rigorous reflection and cross-examination given the complexities of small wars. The point is not for us, the authors, or for any site user to be right, but for all of us to be more informed and better.

    We would like to provide our authors more editorial review than they get, which is next to none. We only make minor formatting and mechanical edits; we'd do more if we were better staffed. In the meantime, let's not let your red pen or our lack of enough of them get in the way of good ideas reaching the right eyes and ears promptly.

    While we screen submissions, we do not and cannot fully vet authors and facts. Problems will come up from time to time. Authors who choose to submit their work to us do so courageously, realizing that they are subject to a public wire brushing by our discriminating and vocal readers for any errors.

    We trust our audience to appreciate the distinction between inaccuracies that do not foul the rest of the work, and major issues: either deal-breaker errors or deception that we were too dumb and busy to interdict before publishing. If the latter two come up, we will deal with them as they arise. If livable errors come up, note and move on.
    Now, to be frank, I've no problem with what these caveating paragraphs say. In fact, SWJ is neither the Harvard Law Review nor the Michigan Law Review, having a large student editorial staff and a faculty editorial board. Vetting even a couple of footnotes takes a lot of time, as my posts will soon prove. I don't expect that to happen before an SWJ article is published. As a corollary, I also don't expect SWJ articles to be necessarily "reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ...." Caveat emptor.

    Regards

    Mike

  5. #385
    Council Member
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    4,021

    Default Murder of Missionaries in Rhodesia

    This post deals with this text from Dzimbanhete's article:

    The balance of probability points to the Rhodesian Selous Scouts as being responsible for the murder. It was very likely that the Rhodesian Selous Scouts were responsible for the murder of white missionaries at rural outposts and rural African businessmen.[5]

    [5] The Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Tourism and Immigration published a pamphlet in July 1978 in which the description of the murders is given.
    Missionary murders rang a bell; and lo and behold, a bit more than three years ago, I'd downloaded the report he cited. It's still there:

    The Murder of Missionaries in Rhodesia
    Ministry of Information
    Rhodesia
    July, 1978
    The report recites a dozen incidents (most with multiple victims). All eyewitnesses identified the attackers as "guerrillas" or "terrorists". In addition, forensic evidence existed such as this:

    Chief Inspector David Perkins, a ballistics expert with the British South Africa Police at the time of Musami Mission massacre of February 7, 1977, testified at the inquest that an AK rifle bearing the number 3036, of North Korean manufacture, had been proved under microscopic examination to be one of the weapons used in the slaying.

    A notebook found on the body of a terrorist, Mombi Macheni, contained the following passage:

    On Sunday the day of 6/2/77 we went to Musami at St Paul's Mission. We reached there at 9.15 and we had a storming raid. We shot four Europeans who were priests. Sisters were five, and altogether there were nine, eight dead.

    We took a watch only. No comrades were injured in the action.

    On the same day we went to Mazvidva and killed informers, kraalhead and the other one. This was 12.15, then we went.

    Nobody was injured. We were very happy.

    The entry in the notebook was signed by "No Talks" Mabhena. Beside his name was the number 3036.
    The report (no surprise, since it is a government report) presents no evidence (much less "the balance of probability" or "very likely") that the Selous Scouts were responsible for the murders. Thus, so far as this particular text and footnote by Dzimbanhete is concerned, a fact checker could say "pants on fire."

    What we do find in the report and elsewhere are claims by the Patriotic Front leadership that Rhodesian security forces committed the ca. 1976-1978 murders of white missionaries and black kraal leaders. One media outlet, quite independent of the government, is the Catholic Herald Co. UK archive (cited in this and the next post on Berejena Mission). In any Catholic Herald archive, you can hit "zoom page" for a blowup of the original column allowing correction of some bad OCRing by the archivist.

    We didn't kill priests says Front
    17th March 1978

    THE Patriotic Front Leaders, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo have vigorously denied that their forces fighting in Rhodesia have attacked missionaries or are against the church in any way.

    In an interview with the Catholic Herald on Wednesday Mr Mugabe said his ZANLA forces were specifically instructed not to harm missionaries but to regard them as their friends. "The missionaries are first and foremost working for the people and to work against them is obviously to work against the people they serve."

    Mr Mugabe explained that ZANLA did not use violence against local Africans to gain support he said his forces used education and persuasion even if assistance was refused to the guerillas.

    He strongly denied that his forces had been involved in the killing of missionaries at Lupane in 1976 and Musami in 1977.
    ...
    Mr Nkomo said that the freedom fighters had been told not to harm the missionaries. "I have broadcast that message myself," he said.

    He described as nonsense and absolute rubbish allegations that the Patriotic Front was anti-Christian or anti-missionary. "The stand which the Catholic bishops have taken against the Smith regime has alienated them from the regime and it has retaliated by deliberately punishing them. It has then tried to blame it on the guerrillas."

    Mr Nkomo did admit that there might be one or two "unruly people" amongst the guerrillas but he promised that they would be punished by demotion or fatigues or some other method.
    One might well question Mugabe's credibility in 1978, given his track record after 1978 to date. In fact, that is exactly what some South Africans are doing.

    Becoming Zimbabwe (2009; Institute for Justice and Reconciliation). Here's some snippage:

    This report provides a complimentary aspect to "Becoming Zimbabwe" by posing a general critique of history teaching and curriculum in Zimbabwe. It attempts to enhance the book’s use, and serves as an educational tool at secondary and higher levels for comparison and analysis of history teaching and curriculum in Zimbabwe. The report also provides an outline of the kinds of historical texts and narratives on Zimbabwe, and how they are taught within Zimbabwean technical colleges and universities. The supplement therefore provides an overview of history teaching in Zimbabwe in relation to the content and focus of "Becoming Zimbabwe".
    The book is B. Raftopoulos and A. S. Mlambo (eds), Becoming Zimbabwe. A History, c. 850–2009, Harare, Weaver Press, 2009.

    Back to the report and the literary genre inspired by Mugabe. Chapter I deals with the uses of liberation history in Zimbabwean politics, as exemplified by Mugabe's and ZANU PF's "Patriotic History" (snips):

    Patriotic History proclaims ZANU PF as the alpha and omega of Zimbabwe’s past, present and future. Zimbabweans are encouraged to be ‘patriotic’, which means supporting ZANU PF.

    Anything short of this is considered ‘unpatriotic’.

    Patriotic History has four main themes:

    1. land;
    2. no external interference based on ‘Western ideals’ such as human rights;
    3. race; and
    4. a ‘patriots’ versus ‘sell-outs’ distinction.
    ...
    ‘Patriots’ versus ‘sell-outs’

    Lastly, Patriotic History separates Zimbabweans into ‘patriots’ and ‘sell-outs’, such that opponents to ZANU PF are necessarily classified as ‘pro-colonial’, ‘sell-outs’, ‘un-African’, and ‘puppets’, while followers of ZANU PF are categorised as ‘patriots’. The patriots and sell-outs distinction is extended to the rest of the globe. External critics of ZANU PF are typecast as ‘foes’ of black Africa.

    The distinction has its genesis in late 1950s urban politics and has been a constant premise in nationalist politics since. The denotation of ‘sell-out’ changes over time depending on the character of a challenger. To be a ‘sell-out’ during the liberation war was to be an informant of the colonial Rhodesian state and to support a rival nationalist party. To be a ‘sell-out’ after 2000 is to abandon ZANU PF’s ‘central’ role in nationalist history, to resist the land seizures, and to value civil and political rights over economic rights.

    Patriotic History is a sophisticated narrative that plays on real historical grievances such as land. Indeed it is more than a narrative. It is part of a political culture that legitimises violence, and inhibits political tolerance, civil and political rights, and democracy.
    To me, Dzimbanhete's article fits into the "Patriotic History" genre, which itself is a part of the nationalistic "freedom fighter" and "freedom violence" narrative. I have no idea whether the man is a Mugabe supporter or not.

    Here is the abstract for his 2012 article about the armed liberation struggle:

    Title: ‘I died for this country’: National Heritage and Zimbabwe’s War of Liberation

    Abstract

    What legacies make the Zimbabwean war of independence a national heritage?

    The significance of posing this question cannot be overemphasised. There is an explosion of current and dominant narratives of the war whose sentiment is that the people who died during and because of the liberation struggle made sacrifices that bequeathed national heritage status to Zimbabwe’s war of liberation. The same perspective stresses that sacrifices were a monopoly of the people who ‘jumped the borders’ out of colonial Rhodesia during the war years. The same body of narratives attaches prominence to the inaccurate but deliberate definition of the terms, ‘deserters and sell outs’ in the process of appropriating the Zimbabwean armed independence struggle for particular groups of people.

    This paper seeks to show that the co-operation and unity between the armed liberation fighters and the povho (the black civilian population in the war zones) during the period of the war constitutes an impressive legacy of Zimbabwe’s war of liberation. The cordial relationship, a product of a shared political goal, manifested in the collaboration between the freedom fighters and their hosts, confers national heritage status to the war. This study revisits this aspect of Zimbabwe’s liberation war and examines the contribution of various categories of the African population.

    The paper thus challenges perspectives that privilege a single category of the participants of the war and also overemphasise death as the only notable sacrifice made during the decolonisation process of Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the article demonstrates that sacrifices during the armed struggle were not a monopoly of any one group.
    My next post will deal with a less clear-cut set of facts, Berejena Mission.

    Regards

    Mike

  6. #386
    Council Member
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    4,021

    Default Berejena Mission

    This post deals with this text from Dzimbanhete's SWJ article:

    Writing in 2006, Parker, a former Rhodesian serviceman, revealed that the Selous Scouts were responsible for the murder of Father Killian Huesser, a Roman Catholic priest based at Berejena Mission in February 1980.[3]

    [3] J. Parker, Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (Alberton: Galago, 2006), p. 285.
    The Aluka Database has two relevant entries (both interviews in 1998; abstracts only; text behind paywall). The first interview covered the period from 1976-1980 at Berejena Mission:

    Interview with Constantine Vengesai

    Description: A teacher in various Chivi schools up to 1976 when he moved to the controversial Catholic Mission of Berejena, he was part of the group of teachers who initiated a fund for the guerrillas and his testimony is rich in the day to day happenings at the mission involving guerrillas and soldiers. He also details the inter-party rivalry between ZAPU and ZANU supporters and how this literally led to the flight of ZAPU activists from the district during the war.
    The second interview, dealing with Fr Huesser's death, comes later.

    The second source for 1976 events at Berejena are the Catholic Herald archives, from which we learn quite a bit, as in this article:

    Mission Priest held by Smith
    3rd December 1976

    FR PAUL ECiLl[EGLI], 47-year-old Swiss Catholic missionary, was arrested last week by Ian Smith's Rhodesian authorities at the Berejena Mission, southeast of Fort Victoria.
    ...
    A spokesman for the Bethlehem Fathers in Britain commented: "It is generally assumed that Fr Egli has been arrested for refusing to disclose the whereabouts of freedom fighters and for attending guerrilla meetings."

    Sr Aquina Weinrich, OP, writing in the current issue of Blackfriars, highlighted the moral dilemma posed by the illegal Rhodesian regime's oppression of the majority black population — "a committed Christian must ask himself whether the cause of justice and peace is better served by force of arms or by the continuation of present oppression . . . in this situation neutrality does not exist."
    Liberation Theology is at its clearest in the sister's comments above. Here is her article, GUERILLA WARFARE IN RHODESIA, New Blackfriars Volume 57, Issue 678, pages 499–505, November 1976 (first page only; the rest is behind a paywall).

    So, from at least 1976 on into 1980, Berejena Mission provided material support to the guerrillas (a possible motive for the government to act harshly); but the Berejena area was subject to intense inter-party conflict between ZAPU and ZANU supporters (a possible motive for either guerrilla faction to act harshly toward the other faction's supporters). As Sr Weinrich said ... "neutrality does not exist."

    Immediately after Fr Huesser's death, who did it was a mystery to the Catholic Herald:

    Precarious path to freedom and unity
    29th February 1980

    Also of significance are the deaths in the past month of two Catholic priests, Father Raymond Machikicho and Father Kilian Huesser.

    It is ironic and tragic that Father Machikicho should have been killed by supporters of' the guerrillas. The death of Father Iluesser[Huesser] is still a mystery.
    The death of Fr Machikicho was less of a mystery:

    Church concern for Rhodesian refugees and fear of violence
    8th February 1980

    The concern mirrors wider fears about the possible breakdown of the ceasefire: this week Fr Raymond Machikicho, a black priest working with the Bethleham Fathers near Gwelo, and his driver, became the latest victims of the continuing violence when they were beaten to death, allegedly by young guerillas.
    However, by early March, fingers were pointed by Berejena Mission clergy at Rhodesian security forces:

    Mugabe men not killers
    7th March 1980

    1 HI. 1 ORCLS[THE FORCES] of Mr Robert Murata:[Mugabe], who won a resounding victor:, ifi [victory in]this week's Rhodesia elections, were not responsible for the recent harassment of mission stations. This is the claim made by priests and nuns in Rhodesia.

    Fr Killian I luesser[Huesser], of the Bethlehem Fathers, was murdered at Berejena Mission two weeks ago by a group of men dressed like Mugabe's Zimbabwe Africa National I.iberation Army (ZANLA). But priests at the mission claim the inert[men] were really members of the Rhodesian Security Forces.

    Their evidence was backed-up by Dominican Sisters in a BBC Panorama programme on Monday.

    "Beaten-up people tell us they always fear auxiliaries or Security Forces" said a nursing sister. Relationships between the Church and the guerrillas has been fairly good.

    Mr Mugabe was brought up as a Catholic, and although he no longer professes his faith, he keeps close contact with Church leaders.
    It appears that this claim was based on hearsay (unless the priests claimed to eyewitnesses, who were spared ??); and on total irrelevancy (the Dominican Sisters of the BBC program).

    Thanks to the Aluka Database, we might have a credible eyewitness to the murder (the second interview mentioned above):

    Interview with Ratidzo Hasha

    Description: A Form One student at Berejena Mission in southern Chivi who witnessed the murder of a Roman Catholic Priest Father Killian Heusser by members of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts towards the general elections of 1980.
    Eyewitnesses do not necessarily hold up to cross-examination, but do provide probable cause (at least in the US) for the case to move forward.

    Parker seems to be something of a red herring. I gather he does not claim to have been present at Huesser's murder; but is relying on hearsay of one kind or another. The picture as to Parker is more than a bit muddied by the following, source 1 and source 2 (taken from source 1) are the same:

    Parker not our man:

    REGARDING ‘ South Africa ’s plot to kill Prince Charles’ (May 7) and the status of Jim Parker, author of Assignment Selous Scouts.

    As the officer commanding Special Operations CIO Headquarters, I categorically state that Parker was never an attested member of the BSAP Rhodesian Special Branch, or the Selous Scout Regiment.

    At no time during his service as a police reservist was he authorised by a competent authority to direct, brief, or command personnel in the field.

    The alleged attack on Berejena Catholic Mission in the Chibi Tribal Trust Land on the night of February 19, resulting in the death of Father Huesser, was never contemplated by those officers in authority, and was totally unlawful.

    - MJ McGuinness, via e-mail — letter to the editor Sunday Times, (28 May 06)
    and in response,

    About turn:

    REGARDING “ South Africa ’s plot to kill Prince Charles” (May 7), and MJ McGuinness’s disavowal, “Parker not our man” (Letters, May 28) of the Special Branch status of Jim Parker, author of Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer:

    I have the utmost respect for McGuinness, who is a former colleague from my Rhodesian BSA Police days. I have listened to several hours of taped interviews that Parker conducted with McGuinness while researching his book. Much of what he wrote emanated from McGuinness, including the plot to assassinate Prince Charles and much more. Surely he wouldn’t have been so revealing if he hadn’t accepted Parker’s bona fides as a former subordinate — albeit a “lowly” reservist and not a regular policeman? Particularly as he also acknowledged Parker as “his man” in the tapes.

    Regarding the Berejena Mission incident that was “never contemplated by those officers in authority”, such a thing couldn't have been anything else but unlawful.

    The same would apply to similar incidents that McGuinness discussed with Parker which occurred in what were then Salisbury, Gwelo and Rusape. It is also evident from the McGuinness tapes that certain officers in authority did more than just “contemplate” in those cases.

    Does this explain his puzzling about-turn?

    - Peter Stiff, publisher of Assignment Selous Scouts by Jim Parker, Alberton — letter to the editor, Sunday Times (4 June 2006)
    The student at Berejena, Ratidzo Hasha, seems the best evidence to support this particular Dzimbanhete claim, but Dzimbanhete doesn't appear to mention him.

    This research took far too long for its worth to me.

    PS: Dzimbanhete also has two 2013 articles on JIARM: LANGUAGE AS AN ASPECT OF THE WAR: SPECIAL SHONA REGISTERS OF ZIMBABWE'S LIBERATION WAR; and NEGOTIATING FOR SURVIVAL: THE NATURE OF THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ZANLA)'S GUERRILLA WARFARE DURING ZIMBABWE'S WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 12-14-2013 at 07:29 AM.

  7. #387
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    I believe we are drifting off the essential focus of Dzimbanhete's paper which was:
    The foregoing discussion has shown that current attempts to equate and link the selective nature of violence that was deployed by the revolutionary guerrilla forces to contemporary outbreaks of violence are unfounded and devoid of academic analysis. The nonselective violence that is perpetrated by troops of an incumbent government is normally intended to stifle legitimate demand for economic and political spaces by the citizens. On the other hand the application of violence on civilians by the liberation fighters was in the interest of creating economic and political space. It would be fitting to refer to guerrilla violence as ‘freedom violence'.
    So quite frankly if, repeat if, some priest was taken out for collaborating with the insurgents that could hardly be termed 'non-selective violence'.

    So it all comes down, according to Dzimbanhete, 'creating economic and political space'.

    Just as with that garbage from the Dutch boy, which the MR saw fit to publish, the thesis is not proven (by any stretch of the imagination).

    In point of fact what he attempts to sell is that the atrocities of the insurgents were justifiable and acceptable. As he attempts to convince:
    Executions were dictated by the need to survive since civilian collaboration with the colonial army forces put the lives of the freedom fighters and the peasants at risk. It was clear that guerrilla violence that visited the rural folk was discriminate. It was used against only those elements of the rural population, who against the express advice of the liberation forces collaborated with the Rhodesian security forces.
    This as opposed to:
    The violence that the Rhodesian colonial forces perpetrated against the rural peasants was apparently systematic and organised. It is on this score that it should be appropriately labelled ‘terrorism' and it was the Rhodesian security forces that deserved to be called ‘terrorists'.
    In the Rhodesian thread on SWC many aspects of the Rhodesian bush war have been discussed and more discussion would serve to inform people better on what worked and what did not work during the bush war.

    However, I see little point in using a piece of garbage such as this paper to launch into such discussions. The MR published and thereby gave some credibility to the Dutch boy just as the Journal has done with Dizumbanhete's garbage. Both the MR and the Journl should be ashamed.
    Last edited by JMA; 12-14-2013 at 02:44 PM.

  8. #388
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Its shocking... better they just say: "We have to find x number of words for each edition and will use anything to fill up the edition. Some will be meaningful, some will be garbage, sift through it all yourself."


    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    is here. I've talked about the editorial policy as it relates to technical things (the bottom half of the page). Now, we should look at the substantive part (the top half); and the policy lede ("Citizen Kane's Statement of Principles"):

    Saying that these articles are "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive..." implies to me (once an assistant editor for a couple of years on a law review) some sort of substantive review process.

    In truth, "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ..." might as well have been left out, because the following paragraphs establish that no one really looks at whether the article is "Reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ...." So, the policy continues:

    Now, to be frank, I've no problem with what these caveating paragraphs say. In fact, SWJ is neither the Harvard Law Review nor the Michigan Law Review, having a large student editorial staff and a faculty editorial board. Vetting even a couple of footnotes takes a lot of time, as my posts will soon prove. I don't expect that to happen before an SWJ article is published. As a corollary, I also don't expect SWJ articles to be necessarily "reasonably factual, analytical, or otherwise substantive ...." Caveat emptor.

    Regards

    Mike

  9. #389
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Mike,, well done on sifting through all that.

    Interesting indication of Dzimbanhete's selective cherry picking is Parker as a source.

    I did not bother to read Parker's book as my information was that Parker himself was not what he claimed to be.

    Nevertheless, Dzimbanhete gleefully grasps Parker supplied evidence that Rhodesian Forces killed a priest ... while at the same time discarding Parker's reports of grotesque atrocities by the insurgents.

    The man can't have it both ways.

    But the great sadness is that first the Journal and then some individuals take this clown seriously.


    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    This post deals with this text from Dzimbanhete's SWJ article:

    The Aluka Database has two relevant entries (both interviews in 1998; abstracts only; text behind paywall). The first interview covered the period from 1976-1980 at Berejena Mission:

    The second interview, dealing with Fr Huesser's death, comes later.

    The second source for 1976 events at Berejena are the Catholic Herald archives, from which we learn quite a bit, as in this article:

    Liberation Theology is at its clearest in the sister's comments above. Here is her article, GUERILLA WARFARE IN RHODESIA, New Blackfriars Volume 57, Issue 678, pages 499–505, November 1976 (first page only; the rest is behind a paywall).

    So, from at least 1976 on into 1980, Berejena Mission provided material support to the guerrillas (a possible motive for the government to act harshly); but the Berejena area was subject to intense inter-party conflict between ZAPU and ZANU supporters (a possible motive for either guerrilla faction to act harshly toward the other faction's supporters). As Sr Weinrich said ... "neutrality does not exist."

    Immediately after Fr Huesser's death, who did it was a mystery to the Catholic Herald:

    The death of Fr Machikicho was less of a mystery:

    However, by early March, fingers were pointed by Berejena Mission clergy at Rhodesian security forces:

    It appears that this claim was based on hearsay (unless the priests claimed to eyewitnesses, who were spared ??); and on total irrelevancy (the Dominican Sisters of the BBC program).

    Thanks to the Aluka Database, we might have a credible eyewitness to the murder (the second interview mentioned above):

    Eyewitnesses do not necessarily hold up to cross-examination, but do provide probable cause (at least in the US) for the case to move forward.

    Parker seems to be something of a red herring. I gather he does not claim to have been present at Huesser's murder; but is relying on hearsay of one kind or another. The picture as to Parker is more than a bit muddied by the following, source 1 and source 2 (taken from source 1) are the same:

    and in response,

    The student at Berejena, Ratidzo Hasha, seems the best evidence to support this particular Dzimbanhete claim, but Dzimbanhete doesn't appear to mention him.

    This research took far too long for its worth to me.

    PS: Dzimbanhete also has two 2013 articles on JIARM: LANGUAGE AS AN ASPECT OF THE WAR: SPECIAL SHONA REGISTERS OF ZIMBABWE'S LIBERATION WAR; and NEGOTIATING FOR SURVIVAL: THE NATURE OF THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ZANLA)'S GUERRILLA WARFARE DURING ZIMBABWE'S WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

    Regards

    Mike

  10. #390
    Council Member
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    4,021

    Default Mark,

    I want to get back to the topic of "selective violence" ("targeted killing" in my jargon, as in this thread, The Rules - Engaging HVTs & OBL) in a later post tonite - hopefully not focusing on the Zimbabwe Prof and the Dutch Boy.

    A couple of brief points about your comments on SWJ. First:

    We have to find x number of words for each edition and will use anything to fill up the edition.
    I don't think that is accurate simply because there are no editions. A few months ago, I went through the archives month by month from Jan 2012. The articles are simply posted day by day (roughly 1 a day, but that varies), apparently as they come in.

    Second:

    ... better they just say: ... Some will be meaningful, some will be garbage, sift through it all yourself.
    Yup. Caveat emptor. End SWJ digression - at least for me.

    -----------------------------------------
    Parker, Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (Amazon quoting: 16 Used from $91.35, 6 New from $201.06; it may be "fiction", but it sure is expensive fiction).

    There are only two reviews; I'll snip from both.

    Rhodesian Bush War & BLACK Operations, April 28, 2008
    By Troy A. Lettieri "Professional Warrior" [JMM Lookup, About 1, see post #1, SFC, 3rd SFG, Bronze Star w/ V; About 2, business; SWC Member as taldozer, Last Activity: 04-29-2013, Join Date: 02-21-2006]

    This review is from: Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (Paperback)

    NOTE - I rate this book a solid 3.5

    This book is an important read in understanding the history of the Selous Scouts and the unit's full spectrum of operations. The book covers the direct involvement of the British South African Police (BSAP) Special Branch (SB) which played a major role in all Pseudo-Operations undertaken by the Selous Scouts. The Selous Scouts was basically established as a joint BSAP and Army unit. The SB was responsible for "turning", training and re-introducing the newly "turned" terrorist to the Selous Scouts for operations against their comrades. The SB function is often over looked or given a cursory look it other works/books on the Selous Scouts (as in Reid-Daly's "Pamwe Chete" and other titles on the Selous Scouts).

    Now, you must know there is some major controversy associated with this book. The Selous Scouts Association (SSA) has distanced itself from this book. The SSA said that there are some extraordinary claims as to what the Selous Scouts did during the war and the SSA has described the major claims in the book as "total fiction". The SSA also claim that Parker was not an attested member of the Rhodesian Special Branch and he was not a member of the Selous Scouts Special Branch. Rather that he was in fact a Police Reservist. But Peter Stiff, the publisher of the book, has stated that the above claims are not true and that the Parker, was a Reserve Detective Section Officer with SB Selous Scouts at Operation Repulse virtually fulltime as an A Reservist during the last years of the war. All I can say as a avid researcher/historian on Rhodesian matters, I have learned most former Rhodesian Spec Ops types are very closed mouth about their "operational" past and today still remain security conscious. So I feel the "real" truth of the matter will never be known for a long time if ever.

    Over all this book is well documented and has extensive endnotes and bibliography, as well as many never before published photographs.

    With the controversy aside the book still is a required read for the military/intelligence professional.
    and the second:

    Informative, but not what you might be expecting., June 10, 2011
    By Historicool [JMM Lookup, About 1, nothing beyond this]

    This review is from: Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (Paperback)

    This book, aside from detailing several supposed top secret operations that have proven to be controversial claims, the book has the unfortunate honor of being one of the few books about the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. It is important to note, from the start, that this book primarily covers the Special Branch side of the Selous Scouts, which was largely responsible for intelligence processing and more police-focused operations.

    The book begins with coverage of the war in general up until the author joined the Special Branch Selous Scouts including some basic coverage on the war, Selous Scouts operations, and some interesting information on the Operation Repulse and Operation Thrasher areas and events occurring there. This is one of my gripes with this book - namely the coverage of the general war. While the coverage of Selous Scouts operations is entertaining it is overwhelmed by basic information on the bush war that could be found elsewhere. As the reader goes along the information on the Operation areas becomes more plentiful, but again the information is not always related to Scouts operations. Eventually information on Scouts Chem/Bio warfare, and the day to day operations of the Scouts in the later years of the war comes to light, but again, this is information on the Special Branch of things, which is vastly different than information on the Army Scouts. There is also some brief discussions of attacks on religious missions, and opponents of the regime - which has likely caused so much of a stir due to the author's lack of documentation to prove that these were sanctioned ops rather than rogue ones. It's difficult to prove some of these claims due to the country changing hands and the likely destruction of documentation, but the author should qualify these statements a bit more then. Its difficult too when one of his major sources for the book Mac McGuiness later denied saying some of the information attributed to him the book

    The book's latter quarter covers the Scouts and their South African allies attempts to prevent the ZANU-PF from gaining power, then assassination attempts against Mugabe before he can take power. Again, the claims are interesting, but not well proven. Naturally, claims of things like attacks against UANC, etc supporters by Scouts dressed as ZANLA in an effort to get the Brits to disallow the ZANU from the elections, poisonings, etc. do not paint the Scouts in a good light and is bound to elicit vehement denials, but the author should have known to back up his claims strongly or soften them a bit more than he does by saying "I am not sure, but I have good belief based on evidence X and Y to say that the higher ups knew about Operation A or B."

    Overall, it's a decent read, though needs to be taken with a grain of salt. The author adds to the limited information on the Scouts from the perspective of Special Branch, but should have done more (and perhaps his editor as well) to explain some of his more fantastic claims and spent fewer pages on a general accounts of the war. At the same time,his (albeit brief) discussion of SADF Paras a Fireforce units towards the end of the war, the use of Recce's as "D" Squadron RSAS, the use of SADF "Rose" mines (and the attendant dangers to the user as well as the target), and the integration of SAS and Selous Scouts into the South African Recce Commandos is of definite use to those interested in SADF and Rhodesian special units.
    So, from these reviews I glean about the Parker book, " Some will be meaningful, some will be garbage, sift through it all yourself"; and definitely Caveat Emptor.

    Regards

    Mike

  11. #391
    Council Member
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    4,021

    Default Selective Violence By Kalyvas

    One of the sources in Mark O'Neill's Second-party Counterinsurgency is Stathis Kalyvas, his theory and empirical research into selective and indiscriminate violence in irregular civil wars. I've arranged Kalyvas' online materials in chronological order from 1999 through 2009. I've not read all of them (only a quick skim in part only); but I believe what amounts to an online book is worth the slog. On cursory view, the basic idea seems to accord with Jack McCuen (RIP 2010; Birmingham Mich obit, West Point Tribute; I may have posted these before).

    First as to Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War - Wiki

    The Logic of Violence in Civil War is a book which challenges the conventional view of violence in civil wars as irrational. The main argument is that violence only emerges in those disputed territories, and it is generally driven not by the conflict itself, but by previous rancors and enmities among the population.

    The author, Stathis N. Kalyvas (born 1964), is a political scientist known for his analysis of the dynamics of polarization and civil war, ethnic and non-ethnic violence, and the formation of cleavages and identities. He has also researched party politics and political institutions in Europe. He is a professor at Yale University.
    Here are the online publications I found:

    Stathis Kalyvas, Wanton and Senseless ? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria (1999)

    Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (2000)

    Stathis Kalyvas, Leftist Violence During the Occupation (2000), in Mark Mazower, After the War was Over: Reconstructing Family, State, and Nation in Greece, 1944-1960. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 142-183.

    Stathis Kalyvas, "New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction? (2001), in World Politics 54:1, 99-118.

    Stathis Kalyvas, The Ontology of "Political Violence:" Action and Identity in Civil Wars (2003), in Perspectives on Politics 1:3, 475-494.

    Stathis Kalyvas, The Urban Bias in Research on Civil Wars (2004), in Security Studies 13:3, 1-31.

    Stathis Kalyvas, The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil Wars (2004), in Journal of Ethics 8:1, 97-138.

    Stathis Kalyvas, Warfare in Civil Wars (2005), in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (eds.), Rethinking the Nature of War. Abingdton: Frank Cass, 88-108.

    Stathis Kalyvas, Promises and pitfalls of an emerging research program: the microdynamics of civil war (2009), in Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud (editors), Order, Conflict, and Violence (2009)
    From the 2009 article, we get a brief summary of the theory from Kalyvas:

    I operationalize control on a five-zone continuum, from zone 1 (total incumbent control) to zone 5 (total insurgent control). The main prediction is that the distribution of selective violence is likely to be bimodal, concentrating in zones 2 and 4. Incumbents will be most likely to resort to selective violence in areas where they exercise hegemonic, though not total control (which I call zone 2) and insurgents most likely to resort to the same type of violence in similar areas on their side (which I call zone 4). Areas of total control (zone 1 for incumbents and zone 5 for insurgents) will be largely free of violence (though not of repression). Areas of complete contestation and parity where both sides are simultaneously present in equal force (zone 3) will be free of violence. Figure 16.1 provides a graphic depiction of these predictions.
    bimodal camel text.jpg

    "Figure 16.1" - Ken White (see ref.) field expedient method of explaining a bimodal chart (beats Powerpoint, but you have to water and feed the camel ).

    PSV = Peak Selective Violence (by hegemonic party); PIV = Peak Indiscriminate Violence (by non-hegemonic party). The logic is that, if you have hegemonic control, you should have good local intelligence and you can select targets. The non-hegemonic party suffers the converse; either it foregoes violence or has to go with indiscriminate violence.

    Kalyvas does not promise a silver bullet, but rather a hard slog, valley by valley, village by village - with everything being very local.

    Ref. for "Bactrian curve", KW post from 2008, I have whoa'd. Hoist by my own pet...

    I would further submit that your Bactrian curve applies not only to the counselors at Law but to all the categories I cited, including Private and Generals and to most of the world in most things. Scary, huh?
    Good reading.

    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 12-15-2013 at 05:48 AM.

  12. #392
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Mike, I return from West Africa in a week and will attempt to get you a used copy at a fraction of those prices. Will then mail it to you as a belated Christmas pressie. (Might even read it first)

    This because it may help to satisfy your enquiring mind on this matter.

    I will check back in by in-box around the 20th.

    regards
    Mark


    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post

    -----------------------------------------
    Parker, Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (Amazon quoting: 16 Used from $91.35, 6 New from $201.06; it may be "fiction", but it sure is expensive fiction).

    There are only two reviews; I'll snip from both.



    and the second:



    So, from these reviews I glean about the Parker book, " Some will be meaningful, some will be garbage, sift through it all yourself"; and definitely Caveat Emptor.

    Regards

    Mike

  13. #393
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Mike,

    Kalyvas' ideas seem to resonate with me at first glance.

    Clearly in almost all insurgencies there is some commonality in beliefs that leads to the insurgent cause receiving initial (tentative) support from the population.

    However, it reaches a point when the insurgents need to "protect the revolution" by exerting a tight control over the civilian population... including executions.

    I have mentioned the paranoia among insurgents over spies/sell outs/informers (real or imagined) among the rural population. This led to violence/executions being carried out as a warning to the population and to make an example of certain individuals. This I maintain was driven by the insurgents need to survive. Their life expectancy was not good and they knew it. The peasants bore the brunt of their fear and paranoia.

    I will need to read further to fully understand how Kalyvas differentiates between 'indiscriminate violence' and 'selective violence' and (importantly) why there is a need to differentiate between the two.


    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    One of the sources in Mark O'Neill's Second-party Counterinsurgency is Stathis Kalyvas, his theory and empirical research into selective and indiscriminate violence in irregular civil wars. I've arranged Kalyvas' online materials in chronological order from 1999 through 2009. I've not read all of them (only a quick skim in part only); but I believe what amounts to an online book is worth the slog. On cursory view, the basic idea seems to accord with Jack McCuen (RIP 2010; Birmingham Mich obit, West Point Tribute; I may have posted these before).

    First as to Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War - Wiki



    Here are the online publications I found:



    From the 2009 article, we get a brief summary of the theory from Kalyvas:



    bimodal camel text.jpg

    "Figure 16.1" - Ken White (see ref.) field expedient method of explaining a bimodal chart (beats Powerpoint, but you have to water and feed the camel ).

    PSV = Peak Selective Violence (by hegemonic party); PIV = Peak Indiscriminate Violence (by non-hegemonic party). The logic is that, if you have hegemonic control, you should have good local intelligence and you can select targets. The non-hegemonic party suffers the converse; either it foregoes violence or has to go with indiscriminate violence.

    Kalyvas does not promise a silver bullet, but rather a hard slog, valley by valley, village by village - with everything being very local.

    Ref. for "Bactrian curve", KW post from 2008, I have whoa'd. Hoist by my own pet...



    Good reading.

    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by JMA; 12-15-2013 at 03:10 PM.

  14. #394
    Council Member TheCurmudgeon's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Location
    Woodbridge, VA
    Posts
    1,117

    Default

    JMA,

    I am jumping into this thread late. I wish I had a better understanding of Rhodesia but I don't. I actually think that it would be very interesting to do a paper where Rhodesia and South Africa are compared in their transition from colonial state to "modern" state. But that is for another day.

    I have written several pieces for the SWJ. I like this forum because, unlike more academic journals it lets nearly everyone offer their opinions. You do not have to agree. You can violently appose the author's take on the world, but it still gets put out there. I don't think you understand how important this level of unopposed give and take of knowledge is; how rare this is in the world of academics. In addition I get feedback from the audience who has knowledge and experience in the field. This is invaluable to me.

    So please, do not take this out on the editors of the SWJ. They are few and they are well meaning. I personally appreciate this forum. Do not attack Dave and others unless you are willing to become an editor for this forum.

    I feel that you too, have become personally involved in matters here. It is hard to hear that people who you came to respect and love died for an unjust cause. I don't know how to address that or to deal with the fallacious nature of it. I do know that this site is unique in what it offers. Don't throw the baby out with the bath water. This site cannot always be great, but it is good. Sometimes, that is the best we can expect.
    Last edited by TheCurmudgeon; 12-16-2013 at 12:26 AM.
    "I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."

    Jon Osterman/Dr. Manhattan
    ---

  15. #395
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon View Post
    JMA,

    I am jumping into this thread late. I wish I had a better understanding of Rhodesia but I don't. I actually think that it would be very interesting to do a paper where Rhodesia and South Africa are compared in their transition from colonial state to "modern" state. But that is for another day.
    If you want a better understanding you would have to read widely. If you do not have the interest to do so better not to involve yourself in making comments and judgements on the Rhodesians and the Rhodesian war.

    South Arica and Rhodesia were two totally different situations. South Arica was not a colony - the Union of South Africa came into being in 1910. No comparison of note.

    I have written several pieces for the SWJ. I like this forum because, unlike more academic journals it lets nearly everyone offer their opinions. You do not have to agree. You can violently appose the author's take on the world, but it still gets put out there. I don't think you understand how important this level of unopposed give and take of knowledge is; how rare this is in the world of academics. In addition I get feedback from the audience who has knowledge and experience in the field. This is invaluable to me.
    I understand the dynamics of this place well - I have been posting here for a few years now - and am happiest posting in the cut-and-thrust environment of the Council. I find much of the content and posts on the Journal to be too pretentious for my taste - this probably because of the low barrier to entry which allows just about any wannabe to try to 'make a name for himself'.

    So please, do not take this out on the editors of the SWJ. They are few and they are well meaning. I personally appreciate this forum. Do not attack Dave and others unless you are willing to become an editor for this forum.
    They have been sloppy and need to tighten up and apply some discipline. It is quite possible to pass stuff like this garbage from Dzimbanhete around to establish that it has no academic merit and is merely a continuation of propaganda from a bygone era. But yes, the Journal has to be cut some slack on their sloppy editorial implementation while the piece from the Dutch boy that appeared in MR is scandalous.

    I feel that you too, have become personally involved in matters here. It is hard to hear that people who you came to respect and love died for an unjust cause. I don't know how to address that or to deal with the fallacious nature of it. I do know that this site is unique in what it offers. Don't throw the baby out with the bath water. This site cannot always be great, but it is good. Sometimes, that is the best we can expect.
    You are missing the point ... My criticism has been aimed at the Dzimbanhete paper that was published by the Journal. Others have turned this into a general thread on Rhodesia with Outlaw 09 freaking out.

    Those I served with understand we are caught on the wrong side of history. While here and elsewhere I discuss military aspects and seldom if ever allow myself to get drawn into a political debate. Yes I lost dear friends in the war but I am able to sift through the crap and apply the filter of 'from whence it comes'.

    JMA are my real initials and Mark Adams is my real name, I make no secret of my identity and as such don't protect myself with anonymity. I appreciate that serving men may need to be careful if they are commenting on a controversial subject.

    Why you feel the need to defend the right of an individual to write garbage and those who publish it is beyond me. Maybe you should discuss this with someone (seriously).
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 12-16-2013 at 12:43 PM. Reason: Preserve SWJ contributor's anonymity

  16. #396
    Council Member TheCurmudgeon's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Location
    Woodbridge, VA
    Posts
    1,117

    Default

    Mark,

    In the spirit of honesty my name is Stan Wiechnik. My bio is somewhere on this site. I don't want to go all Voltaire on you, but I do like the free give and take this site offers within the realistic limits of what they can do. I would like to make three points:

    1)The editorial staff of this site is limited and they have a lot to do. I know that on one of my articles (Political Legitimacy and Values) it took Dave four days to edit it for presentation on the site. That was simply converting it and correcting some simple errors. I don't know if Dave has any help, but it is a daunting job to edit everything let alone fact checking the information. Dave gets it ready.

    2) on other more academic sites there is a bunch of old "know-it-alls" that have their own agenda. What gets by them is limited. Here, the members of the SWJ community are the editors. We read the papers and make comments. If we think something is BS, we can say it for all to see. Two articles after the one on the Rhodesian conflict was a article entitled "The Rule of Law: A Definition in Socio-Political Terms". While good intended, the author could not find the Rule of Law with both hands. Perhaps it should have never been published. But even in that lacking piece of scholarship were nuggets of interest. He is right that the concept of Rule of Law needs to be expanded and addressed in relation to the specific nature of the society that you are trying to apply it in. It is culturally biased to attempt to foist our ideas on the Rule of Law on others. I made my feeling known in the comments after the article. In essence, you and I are the editors of this journal and we do it by the comments we make after the article.

    3) related to two, because it offers a cornucopia of articles, some good and some bad, ideas get offered here that could not be offered elsewhere. I have two articles I hope get published because they offer a different way of looking at the problem of COIN. They would never get published elsewhere ... no "academic journal" would take the risk. Here it is and open forum. It is for the members of this small community to do the work of looking at ideas for their practical value.

    No, I am not defending a biased article. I can say that, since that article was published here I have learned more about the Rhodesian conflict than I knew before BECAUSE people like you called BS!

    I hope you understand my position. I certainly mean no offense or disrespect.
    Last edited by TheCurmudgeon; 12-17-2013 at 12:28 AM.
    "I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."

    Jon Osterman/Dr. Manhattan
    ---

  17. #397
    Council Member
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    4,021

    Default Just a personal request to both of you,

    not a demand or even "suggestion" (since both of you would tell me to go to hell in that case), please take the continued discussion of SWJ Editorial Policy and Freedom of Speech to PMs.

    Stan, take a look at Kalyvas' large volume of work. It's very much "We-They" and his level 3 equilibrium is much akin to the situation between equally matched chimp groups and equally matched "primitive" human groups. They confront each other, make a lot of noise and don't kill a lot (relative to unbalanced groups).

    Gotta leave for a while.

    Regards

    Mike

  18. #398
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default A little personal research...

    I would appreciate to hear what aspects of the Rhodesian Bush War are of interest to (principally the) US reading public (as represented here).

    Responses will be much appreciated.

    Moderator's Note

    Created as a new thread, which hopefully will get attention and responses - one has been moved (ends).
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 01-24-2014 at 03:52 PM. Reason: Add note

  19. #399
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,150

    Default A loyal, multicultural regiment: The Rhodesian African Rifles (Part 2)

    After a long delay (from September 2013) I have finally read the CSI article: 'The Rhodesian African Rifles: The Growth and Adaptation of a Multicultural Regiment through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980'. Well worth reading, although it naturally lacks any contribution by African members, even if there are few references and wartime quotes.

    I knew the RAR expanded to three battalions by the end and that many of its recruits came from one particular tribe, where there was a strong family tradition of service. The author notes that whenever the RAR stated it was recruiting large numbers offered to service, even if paid 10% of the white Rhodesian pay scale.

    Rightly he asks whether a much larger RAR would have served all Rhodesians better. Majority rule with a largely African military would have been a "game changer".

    Link:http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/car...icanRifles.pdf
    davidbfpo

  20. #400
    Banned
    Join Date
    Mar 2010
    Location
    Durban, South Africa
    Posts
    3,902

    Default

    David,

    I know that a paper was put forward in 1968 after Op Caudron to increase the RAR to two or three battalions. It was turned down. Two reasons for it being turned down were that there was no money in the sanctions limited budget to meet the increased cost and secondly a perceived need - at the time - by politicians not to arm to many blacks. This last supposed reason was ridiculous as by the end of the war up to 80% of the security forces were black.

    It should be noted that the RAR was unique among colonial African battalions formed by the British in that the (white) officer corps were Rhodesians and not Brit expats doing a few years on service out in the colonies.

    This officer corps stayed until the end and were in command when 1RAR put down a ZIPRA insurrection in Bulawayo area called the Battle of Entumbane in 1981. The RAR were loyal to their battalion (and their officers) to the end.

    On the other hand elsewhere in Africa as soon as the Brit expat officers left the units became involved in all sorts of skullduggery working on the basis that 'power comes from the barrel of a gun'.

    Effectively then the RAR example can not be replicated and training of such forces will inevitably lead to providing better trained troops for future political misuse.



    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    After a long delay (from September 2013) I have finally read the CSI article: 'The Rhodesian African Rifles: The Growth and Adaptation of a Multicultural Regiment through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980'. Well worth reading, although it naturally lacks any contribution by African members, even if there are few references and wartime quotes.

    I knew the RAR expanded to three battalions by the end and that many of its recruits came from one particular tribe, where there was a strong family tradition of service. The author notes that whenever the RAR stated it was recruiting large numbers offered to service, even if paid 10% of the white Rhodesian pay scale.

    Rightly he asks whether a much larger RAR would have served all Rhodesians better. Majority rule with a largely African military would have been a "game changer".

    Link:http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/car...icanRifles.pdf
    Last edited by JMA; 01-27-2014 at 10:47 AM.

Similar Threads

  1. The Soviet experience in and leaving Afghanistan
    By Stan in forum OEF - Afghanistan
    Replies: 43
    Last Post: 01-13-2019, 06:10 PM
  2. Replies: 0
    Last Post: 04-21-2009, 03:00 PM
  3. In COIN how do we describe the relationship of the levels of war?
    By Rob Thornton in forum Futurists & Theorists
    Replies: 76
    Last Post: 09-11-2007, 02:45 AM

Tags for this Thread

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •