Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

[jcustis]

Mr. Charles (Chuck) Melson just informed me that he will be in attendance at the unveiling of the new RLI book, The Saints next month.

I'm going to stop by his office (he is the Chief Historian for the Marine Corps) and see if I can get him to carry a copy of Fireforce and get a signature from Chris Cocks, or at least pass on an invitation to Cocks to visit the SWC and share some of his thoughts on the business of prosecuting the nastier end of COIN.

[Rhodesian]

The Rhodesian military issued restricted maps of excellent quality, although my own stick often came across “recently” erected fences which farmers had put up, and which weren't marked on them. I don`t think the maps were updated that regularly, and in my experience at the end of the war, they were at least a few years out of date. While on a few night patrols my stick occasionally came across unmarked fences which shouldn`t have been there. We used to take the red filter off a pen-light torch and inspected the age of the barbed-wire etc, and they were all obviously only a few years old or less, and so probably not a problem.

My stick only genuinely got lost once, in a very hilly region at night where we had no horizon to work with. We eventually saw a light and walked in on it, and it turned out to be a hotel we all knew of. “Unfortunately” we "just had to" spend the rest of the night there, in front of a fire-place with a pile of logs, and a full blown steak supper and a few free beers.

Actually it was very funny when we first arrived and went straight into the Cocktail Bar, camo`d top to bottom, stinking from a few days patrol, and armed to the teeth. The bar was fully of Ladies and Gents in their best evening finery, and the conversation in the room completely died as we walked in with our FN`s pointing at the ceiling. We smiled our bestest smiles , and I said, "Good evening, mine`s a Lion" (a type of beer), and we promptly fled to go find the manager. Although we apparently scared the hell out of everyone , they all seemed quite glad to have 4 RLI "troopies" on the premises, as long as we stayed out of their bar and didn`t stink the place up any further! It certainly beat freezing our butts off out in the middle of an African winter when the temperatures can drop easily below freezing, especially in that mountainous area. We never did tell our Troop (Platoon) Officer where we were that night, and the other two sticks of our Troop basically slept in the mountains and froze. Ag man what a shame.

My father also had an interesting experience while on patrol with PATU (Police Anti-Terrorist Unit), when in the middle of the night his “sixth-sense for trouble” kicked in and he told his stick leader to leave a fence crossing for 10 minutes or so. Sure enough a terrorist gang of some 20 guerrillas came marching down the fence line, using it to walk in on the farmhouse they intended to attack. The terrs had a bad day.

On night marches it was usual to take a bearing every 20 minutes or so, pick a star on that bearing and then walk on it until running into expected objects like fences, windmills, roads etc. I can`t honestly remember using “paces” as a means of measure, but it was decades ago now. I do remember my stick frequently used maps for grid references, but the savanna allows a lot of “general” position fixing using “gomos” or hills, river bends etc. If in need of chopper support, all our Alouette IIIs had Direction Finding equipment fitted and all that was required was for us to key the mic for 15 seconds with a hand over the mouth-piece when commanded to. They would then fly in on that bearing and we would call when they flew over head. Alternatively a smoke grenade is useful too. Our Troop Officer also insisted that all the soldiers within the call-sign be aware of the sticks position on a map, just in case, and we generally stopped every hour for five to ten minute breaks and checked the position. Sticks on a “follow up” however generally did so “on the run,” and there wasnt a lot of time for those sort of niceties, which is why the DF kit on the Allo`s was so useful.

As for Mozambique, I am lead to believe those maps were pretty good too, largely due to the fact that there was a lot of cooperation between the Portuguese and Rhodesians prior to 1975. I can`t speak on Zambia, no idea. For more detail on “external” maps you would need to speak the Stick Leaders who used them.

Some time ago I found the following web page which shows some maps of border regions with Mozambique, some dated 1975. The scale is far larger than those normally used by us, but at least these give a general idea.

http://eusoils.jrc.it/esdb_archive/E.../lists/czw.htm

And while I think of it, farmers sometimes also put up power lines and telephone cables which were a hazard to low flying choppers, especially in valleys. These weren`t marked either, and a few choppers hit them and went in, killing all on board, including one with a lot of high ranking officers.

Sorry not really much info for you

I.R

[JMA]

For any members who served in the RLI, I have a nagging question, and it's about the quality of the maps that were used.

I haven't been able to put my hands on a map from that era, but considering the degree of dismounted movement that had to be choreographed from the K-Car, I imagine accurate maps must have been critical.

I actually have a second question as well. How frequently did sticks use map grid references to control movement? Was it for those occasions when a pace count and a compass came into play, with the rest of the time spent utilizing terrain association? I've read several accounts of movements across the borders that required long legs which I assume were accomplished through dead-reckoning.

We (ground troops) used no maps during Fire Force (only the pilots did). When dropped the sticks were in the main instructed to move in bounds by the Fire Force Commander (FF Cmd). For example the FF Cmd would say something like. "Can you see the K-Car? OK, walk to wards the K-Car.... now, and in 150m you will come across a road, when you do stop, mark your position and call me." The FF Cmd would say 'now' when the K-Car was in the correct position to indicate the direction the stick was to move. The position when static was marked by putting a map sized piece of white plastic sheeting on the ground. When on the move this would normally be stuffed down the front of the stick cdm's shirt. If one was left overnight in the area the orders and instructions were normally verbal and movement limited due to the proximity of other sticks in the area. On occasion when a map was needed a chopper would drop a marked map to the stick cmd in need.

Why no maps, well first the logistics of having all those maps (for the large operational area) ready for all sticks did not warrant the effort. Secondly the distances were tight. The idea was to close off the area as tight as possible as we did not have enough troops to throw a wide cordon. Yes we lost some kills that way to be sure but with a kill rate of some 80% of gooks contacted we could live with that. The trick for the FF Cmd was to make sure that the sticks did not walk into each other or fire into each other as the distances were a couple of hundred meters here and a couple more there and very often much closer. You should listen to the tape of the 1976 Fire Force contact to get the idea.

[jcustis]

It appears that a few points of clarification are in order regarding published works mentioned in this thread.

Alexandre Binda is the author of The Saints, and Chris Cocks is the compiler/editor. There may have been confusion with so much mention of Cocks, who most certainly penned an excellent work with his Fireforce.

As for Assignment Selous Scouts by Jim Parker, it appears that it is not endorsed by the Selous Scouts Association. Although I am just realizing that there is indeed a S. Scouts Assoc. in existence, and I am enjoying my read of Parker's book, I offer this information up for folks to digest as they see fit.

Copies of The Saints are for sale from Amazon.co.uk, and I just picked up mine for a modest $111.00

[BoonDock]

Alexandre Binda is the author of The Saints, and Chris Cocks is the compiler/editor.

Chris is also one of the owners/partners in the publishers of the book, 30 degrees South Publishing http://www.30degreessouth.co.za/

All the best
John

[taldozer]

I have seen a lot of chat here on different book here are two I recommend also on the Rhodesian and South African Bush Wars. Both books focus on singleton and small team (2-man) recce operations by the Selous Scouts and the SA 5 RECCE. They are “Only My Friends Call Me Crouks” by Dennis Croukamp (S. Scout) and “Journey Without Boundaries” by Col André Diedericks (SA RECCE). The later just came out on the coat tails of Crouks book. Crouks book gives some outstanding insight to the Selous Scouts and by far one of the best books on the Rhodesian Bush War to date, while Andre book is also a valuble insght to SA 5 Recce. Both books are currently avalible. I have links to them on my Selous Scouts website.

Cheers,
T. A. L. "Dozer"

[jcustis]

T.A.L.,

Welcome, and kudos on keeping that outstanding site up. You may vaguely remember, but you gave me a very good hook-up in the way of the RSF COIN manual.

I've been giving that Croukamp book a look, but haven't gotten around to picking it up. I'm currently reading Assignment Selous Scouts, plus a ton of unrelated works so that may have to wait.

[taldozer]

If you get the time and have to pick from the two, do read “Crouks” first. I enjoyed reading “Assignment” but It got unfavorable remarks from the S. Scouts Association. I really enjoyed the perspective gave on pseudo ops, but I personally did not agree on some of his political points made in the book, but again I was not their and only know what I have read else were. Overall I give the book 4 out of five stars. Just my .02 cents! And I do recall the COIN Manual that was a little while ago. I hope it helped out. I have four different Rhodesian COIN manuals and I am currently editing all four together with various added comments and references, and to as well show how some of the doctrine changed as new versions became available.

[jcustis]

Hmm..PM sent sir.

[jcustis]

I checked up on my Amazon.co.uk order for The Saints, and was disappointed to see that the ship date had changed from a end of July suspense, to the first freaking week of January 2008.

Question for Alex Binda, did the initial printing sell completely out already?

[baluraj007]

hello folks.. does this unit still recruits. foreinirs into this unit.. I am very excited.. let me know whats the max age for this.. quickly

[Tom Odom]

hello folks.. does this unit still recruits. foreinirs into this unit.. I am very excited.. let me know whats the max age for this.. quickly

Since Rhodesia ended with the beginning of Zimbabwe, you are out of luck for this one.

Tom

[BoonDock]

I have seen a lot of chat here on different book here are two I recommend also on the Rhodesian and South African Bush Wars. Both books focus on singleton and small team (2-man) recce operations by the Selous Scouts and the SA 5 RECCE. They are “Only My Friends Call Me Crouks” by Dennis Croukamp (S. Scout) and “Journey Without Boundaries” by Col André Diedericks (SA RECCE). The later just came out on the coat tails of Crouks book. Crouks book gives some outstanding insight to the Selous Scouts and by far one of the best books on the Rhodesian Bush War to date, while Andre book is also a valuble insght to SA 5 Recce. Both books are currently avalible. I have links to them on my Selous Scouts website.

Cheers,
T. A. L. "Dozer"

Hi "T.A.L.",
I dunno about "on the coat-tails".. but I did just release Andre Diederick's book "Journey without Boundaries". (http://www.justdone.co.za/catalog/pr...roducts_id/141)

Also of possible interest to readers of this topic is Charlie Warren's story "Stick Leader; RLI". Chris Cocks used one or two of the stories from Charlie's book in his book "The Saints". (http://www.justdone.co.za/catalog/pr...products_id/33)

Also BTW.. you really need to update some of the links on your site which point to my old sites at the Univ of Stellenbosch which haven't been active for about 3 years now. The Roll of Honour is now at http://www.justdone.co.za/ROH/.
All the best
John

[zealot66]

My primary research over the last 3 years has been the Rhodesian conflict and the Border War of SA. I think one of the chief errors of the bush administration was prostrating ourselves to an imaginary border in pakistan. Who the hell is pakistan ? Who the hell were the Cambodes or Pathet Lao ? track your prey, follow its spoor and kill it. External operations were the only thing that kept rhodesia alive as long as it did and the only thing that kept Soviets, Cubans and Swapo from kicking down the door of south africa was action on and across the Angolan border. However, the Marxists went in the back door anyway....

Hopefully the Taliban holds up in Helmand and wants to get their martyrdom in the spring. And we should disregard a two faced Pakistan and track down every insurgent in the valley and get rid of them. There should be no safe place. It sucked the blood from us in Vietnam and its doing it now too.

[davidbfpo]

Zealot66,

My primary research over the last 3 years has been the Rhodesian conflict and the Border War of SA.... External operations were the only thing that kept rhodesia alive as long as it did ....

I am aware that some Rhodesians after 1980 concluded 'external operations' did not help in their war.(A bigger topic so I shall stop there).

"Boots on the ground" raids and drone attacks across the Durand Line have also been criticised, IIRC David Kilcullen is one critic and Bruce Hoffman has commented at the peak of drone attacks in one part of the FATA the training of Zavi, the alleged NYC bomber, was not affected.

'External operations' appear to be an easy option, with a limited, short-term impact and meet IMHO the agenda of domestic political needs.

In the Pakistani context this is made even more complex, if not confusing by US drone attacks coming from bases within Pakistan, with an apparent official, if denied, Pakistani input to targeting.

[William F. Owen]

I am aware that some Rhodesians after 1980 concluded 'external operations' did not help in their war.(A bigger topic so I shall stop there).

Yes and no. They concluded that their extremely successful attacks so damaged the economies and security of Zambia, Mozambique, and Botswana that the international community stepped in and forced an agreement on them. Tactics failed to serve strategy!

[zealot66]

I pretty much agree with your assesment of Afghanistan, Ken. The books Ive read on our involvement during the soviet occupation pretty much point to leaving the mujahadeen alone to form their own govt as a reason for this mess. In First In, Gary Schroen after orchestrating the initial salvo writes that Iraq was a strategic mistake and basically the wrong war at the wrong time and that we would have to take the train there again. He wrote that in 2005.

As for External Ops in Rhodesia. The only conclusion I can reach regarding people not believing externals held Zanla and the likes off for a long period, is the political outcome. In terms of 'boots on the ground' and living in relative security ( I use that term vaguely) until 1980, fighting an empowered terrorist horde inside the borders would have been a mess of epic proportions. Keeping them defending themselves outside of rhodesia at least slowed down the eventual death by suffocation in hopes of a detente with the West. Or Hoping South Africa would shore them up. That war is a microcosm of many of the things we face now.

[JMA]

Zealot66,
I am aware that some Rhodesians after 1980 concluded 'external operations' did not help in their war.(A bigger topic so I shall stop there).

Who might these Rhodesians be?

[JMA]

Which is why most units in Iraq and Afghanistan made or make extensive use of vehicles -- lots of vehicles, usually four to six per infantry platoon -- especially issued in excess of normal allowances to generally preclude foot patrols where they are inappropriate.

OTOH, in urban areas and in some mountainous areas as opposed to generally open area, some foot movement is desirable or necessary

The problem in Afghanistan in particular is in the areas of the nation with terrain that is largely mountainous but does have occasional broad valleys. The lack of roads and a conscious and deliberate decision by the US not to use tracked vehicles means that some insertions of infantry units by truck or helicopter are going to occasionally have to cross open ground. More common is foot movement in the mountains themselves where vehicle movement is not possible.

If you have solutions to those two problems, we'd be glad to hear them...

I don't claim to have solutions but I do have comments. When I read some of this stuff bells start ringing and lights go on.

It is pointless patrolling open ground on foot or by vehicle unless the enemy are to be found sitting in the open ground.

If one assumes that movement on foot in the open is merely to cross what the commander sees as a "danger area" and where some degree of tactical maneuver procedure is applied then OK. To sweep through open ground is plain ridiculous.

Vehicles. What good is a vehicle 'patrol' confined to a road which gives many minutes of advanced noise warning to the enemy to clear the roads and standby to fire the IEDs? Crazy.

As a 2Lt I learnt this first hand. Not by getting shot up thank heavens but through the futility of it all. (I wish I could attach images to illustrate my point). I spent days patrolling commercial farmland for signs of insurgents having being briefed off a 1:50,000 map. On the ground all the arable land was plowed and at that time fallow. The only areas of bush were rocky outcrops and low lying river lines. The rocky outcrops were in the main surrounded by open plowed land. (yes giving good vision of any approach but effectively trapping insurgents in the 'island' of bush - later during fire force operations where insurgents made such serious mistakes it resulted in a turkey shoot) the river lines likewise allowed for movement only in two directions - up stream of down stream and we always approached from upstream. I started marking up my maps with all the clear areas and bushy areas where there was some potential for a base camp and handing them in during post patrol debriefings. I was wasting my time. It was about the same time I met a young pilot in the officers mess who had recently finished and air recce course and after I told him my frustrations he told me straight out that it would take him a few hours to 'clear' what had taken me days of patrolling to achieve. I was wasting my time. I wanted to go up with him and see what he saw.

It did not take long for us to get a list of possible camps from these recce pilots and would visit them one by one with the fire force to tick them off one way or the other. The success rate got better as the pilots learnt more and especially when the next day they were taken to the sites to briefly walk the ground to convert what they saw with mark one-eyeball into the reality on the ground. Of course nowadays he could take a night flight over the area with a terminal imaging camera to take a look. It would need some interpretation to ensure we were not going to put an attack in on a herd of cattle (we did a few of those - the troopies loved them as we normally took the cow home to roast on the fire - we call it a braaivleis). So effectively blind routine foot and vehicle patrols were not only dangerous but also pretty pointless and not a productive use of resources.

We could still use the roads as the mines were not command detonated. The Pookie was a wonderful little vehicle which detected landmines. On one move at night to collect patrols along the road running West from Victoria Falls we picked up two landmines which we would otherwise have hit either on the outward journey or on the way back. I guess the insurgents sitting and watching from the North bank of the Zambezi were disappointed their efforts came to naught. Now if they were able to detonate the mines on command it would have been a different story. So if you ask me whether it is sane to travel on roads where at any place and at any time some guy with a cell phone can blow you to hell and back... it is not. You just have to make a new plan to get around.

[JMA]

Which is why most units in Iraq and Afghanistan made or make extensive use of vehicles -- lots of vehicles, usually four to six per infantry platoon -- especially issued in excess of normal allowances to generally preclude foot patrols where they are inappropriate.

OTOH, in urban areas and in some mountainous areas as opposed to generally open area, some foot movement is desirable or necessary

The problem in Afghanistan in particular is in the areas of the nation with terrain that is largely mountainous but does have occasional broad valleys. The lack of roads and a conscious and deliberate decision by the US not to use tracked vehicles means that some insertions of infantry units by truck or helicopter are going to occasionally have to cross open ground. More common is foot movement in the mountains themselves where vehicle movement is not possible.

If you have solutions to those two problems, we'd be glad to hear them...

What would be the typical purpose of a vehicle patrol?

Few roads all in the valleys littered with IEDs...

There may be cases where for inexplicable reasons a resupply has to take place via road in a high IED risk area and that takes one back to the Portuguese in Mozambique and their monthly resupply runs which were normally at walking pace and experienced an ambush or a mine incident virtually every time. Like lambs to the slaughter.

I do agree to a large extent that the military has a 'duty of care' towards their men. I believe that the families of troops killed by IEDs should explore their legal options...