Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

[William F. Owen]

I am aware that some Rhodesians after 1980 concluded 'external operations' did not help in their war.(A bigger topic so I shall stop there).

Yes and no. They concluded that their extremely successful attacks so damaged the economies and security of Zambia, Mozambique, and Botswana that the international community stepped in and forced an agreement on them. Tactics failed to serve strategy!

[zealot66]

I pretty much agree with your assesment of Afghanistan, Ken. The books Ive read on our involvement during the soviet occupation pretty much point to leaving the mujahadeen alone to form their own govt as a reason for this mess. In First In, Gary Schroen after orchestrating the initial salvo writes that Iraq was a strategic mistake and basically the wrong war at the wrong time and that we would have to take the train there again. He wrote that in 2005.

As for External Ops in Rhodesia. The only conclusion I can reach regarding people not believing externals held Zanla and the likes off for a long period, is the political outcome. In terms of 'boots on the ground' and living in relative security ( I use that term vaguely) until 1980, fighting an empowered terrorist horde inside the borders would have been a mess of epic proportions. Keeping them defending themselves outside of rhodesia at least slowed down the eventual death by suffocation in hopes of a detente with the West. Or Hoping South Africa would shore them up. That war is a microcosm of many of the things we face now.

[JMA]

This exchange reminded me of an important fact, and that was the degree of independent action expected from the troops on the ground. Because Fire Force operations required a very detailed synchronized ballet of air assault support, close air support, observations posts, paratroopers, and sweep and stop groups, independent action was not expected. In fact, it was more likely frowned upon. Much of the coordination was accomplished through the Mk. 1 eyeball, and restricting movement was a simple means of deconflicting the ever so dangerous geometry of fires.

How "independent" is independent? Yes the Fire Force battle field was generally well choreographed by the Fire Force Commander (FF Cmd). When contact was made it was often at very close ranges where even the use of the 20mm canon from the K-Car would have been potentially dangerous to that particular stick (4-man callsign). These short range contacts were also normally short and sharp. In this 'corporals war' it was the stick commander's skill and aggression which was the critical success factor. By the time he had a chance to call in on the radio the local contact was all but over. Quite often an adjacent or nearby stick would report the contact to the FF Cmd who would then come overhead and at 800 ft and could see what was happening on the ground subject of course to the local tree cover. Over time we got better and better at what and how we did things on Fire Force and integral to the overall success was the ability of the generally 19-20 year old L/Cpls to deal with their local contact situations together with the aggression and skill of the gunner in the stick (armed with a FN- MAG).

[JMA]

For any members who served in the RLI, I have a nagging question, and it's about the quality of the maps that were used.

I haven't been able to put my hands on a map from that era, but considering the degree of dismounted movement that had to be choreographed from the K-Car, I imagine accurate maps must have been critical.

I actually have a second question as well. How frequently did sticks use map grid references to control movement? Was it for those occasions when a pace count and a compass came into play, with the rest of the time spent utilizing terrain association? I've read several accounts of movements across the borders that required long legs which I assume were accomplished through dead-reckoning.

We (ground troops) used no maps during Fire Force (only the pilots did). When dropped the sticks were in the main instructed to move in bounds by the Fire Force Commander (FF Cmd). For example the FF Cmd would say something like. "Can you see the K-Car? OK, walk to wards the K-Car.... now, and in 150m you will come across a road, when you do stop, mark your position and call me." The FF Cmd would say 'now' when the K-Car was in the correct position to indicate the direction the stick was to move. The position when static was marked by putting a map sized piece of white plastic sheeting on the ground. When on the move this would normally be stuffed down the front of the stick cdm's shirt. If one was left overnight in the area the orders and instructions were normally verbal and movement limited due to the proximity of other sticks in the area. On occasion when a map was needed a chopper would drop a marked map to the stick cmd in need.

Why no maps, well first the logistics of having all those maps (for the large operational area) ready for all sticks did not warrant the effort. Secondly the distances were tight. The idea was to close off the area as tight as possible as we did not have enough troops to throw a wide cordon. Yes we lost some kills that way to be sure but with a kill rate of some 80% of gooks contacted we could live with that. The trick for the FF Cmd was to make sure that the sticks did not walk into each other or fire into each other as the distances were a couple of hundred meters here and a couple more there and very often much closer. You should listen to the tape of the 1976 Fire Force contact to get the idea.

[jcustis]

JMA,

First off, welcome to the Council. I'm am keenly looking forward to whatever contribution you might make.

On the point of indepedent operations, I was referring to my understanding that once dropped off in a stop, stick ldrs were not expected to maneuver around at the slightest indication of an adjacent contact, or unverified report of a fleeing terr. I admit that it may have seemed I thought sticks never moved, but I realize that there always had to be some degree of initiave and thought applied. It would have, I imagine, sharply contrasted with current team and squad-level operations seen today.

[jcustis]

I have heard that contact recording, and it is very interesting.

Throughout me read of FF operations materials, i have always focused on anything that indicated the thought that went into deconfliction of the geometry of fires, especially when sticks could not see each other. Did the FF Cmd ever give compass directions, or even azimuths, and direct sticks to restrict their fires to those directions? I'm familiar with the "show map" radio call, mentioned in the Venter book, so I believed at least small sketch maps were used. Thank you for the insight there.

Would you mind answering a series of questions about your equipment and fighting load?

[JMA]

JMA,

First off, welcome to the Council. I'm am keenly looking forward to whatever contribution you might make.

On the point of indepedent operations, I was referring to my understanding that once dropped off in a stop, stick ldrs were not expected to maneuver around at the slightest indication of an adjacent contact, or unverified report of a fleeing terr. I admit that it may have seemed I thought sticks never moved, but I realize that there always had to be some degree of initiave and thought applied. It would have, I imagine, sharply contrasted with current team and squad-level operations seen today.

Happy to be here, thank you.

When dropped off there was always some degree of movement required to move into position. If the FF Cmd wanted a line of flight 'blocked' he would direct a stick to a position where he wanted them and they would take up a position, mark that position and wait there. These sticks would have a good idea of where the other sticks were in relation to them and had a good idea of the limits of their movement was. Positions of stop groups may be adjusted from time to time according to how the action developed. There was no hard and fast rule as the ground and situation dictated the plan. With experience Fire Force Cmds got better at 'reading' the ground and knowing where to put sticks/stops where/when to sweep when to keep certain sticks static etc. It was always a very fluid situation. The action may take a few hours or take all day and extend overnight. If the call-out was based on a sighting of say 10 terrs and they were all accounted for then we would move on. If not we would keep searching the area to find the rest. The OP would remain in place so sometimes it would be a plan to withdraw the FF and let the OP call us back when the survivors came out of hiding. The average kill rate was 80% so as the war got hotter and call outs came virtually every day maybe the FF did not spend the time on searching for the last one or two terrs as we used to do in the early days.

[JMA]

I have heard that contact recording, and it is very interesting.

Throughout me read of FF operations materials, i have always focused on anything that indicated the thought that went into deconfliction of the geometry of fires, especially when sticks could not see each other. Did the FF Cmd ever give compass directions, or even azimuths, and direct sticks to restrict their fires to those directions? I'm familiar with the "show map" radio call, mentioned in the Venter book, so I believed at least small sketch maps were used. Thank you for the insight there.

Would you mind answering a series of questions about your equipment and fighting load?

The recording I'm talking about is this one: http://kiwi6.com/file?id=5i20a1ox5m It is the first part of 6 and is in MP3 format.

That recording was from mid 1976. You will hear stick being warned that a stick was in the "village' to their North and to watch out for them or that a stick (say Stop 3) was approaching them along the river-line from the East. The lie of the land was never as flat as a board so there was normally some protection provided against stray fire into a particular direction. In the event of a particular stick having a contact other sticks in the general line of fire would take cover if necessary. The "crack and thump" and the sound of that fire (which weapon) would indicate what action should be taken. New men would tend to over react to any firing and it was only with experience that they learned to differentiate between "stray" rounds passing over head and those aimed at them. There is specific training needed in this aspect in my opinion. I note much talk of the "Drake Shoot" as a training aid. Yes it really helps and can be repeated in modified form to make sure that troops are applying the lesson. However, there were not to many times where we swept through an area using continuous prophylactic fire into likely cover. In contact yes, troops would (or should have) fired into their arcs but if no fire is being returned it is rather pointless to just keep on firing.

The best instructions for direction were when given in reference to the position of the K-Car (as in "walk towards me.... Now"). But yes often sticks were told to move North, or East etc but never by degrees in my experience. Often the direction of movement was corrected by the FF Cmd either again by reference to his position or by a feature on the ground ("can you see the village ahead of you? OK, then on the right of that village (in relation to the stick) is some thick bush, I want you to move in that direction and clear that bush.")

Of course I will answer questions. The 30 years may have dulled my memory a bit but I'll give it my best shot.

PS: I'm using our terminology in the main so if you need clarity just ask. Like the word "deconfliction" is one I'm not familiar with.

[Graycap]

Thank you for your great informetions and insight.

As a long time lurker of this council I've been infected by Jcustis interest in Rhodesian bush war and I'm trying to find time enough to read all the books ans docs collected (I've found a good copy of Ron Daly Sealous Scouts! ).

I'd like to inform you that the link that you have provided is not working.

I obtain a 0 byte file.

Is it just me?

v/r

[jcustis]

No, it's not just you. I cannot play the file either.

JMA, you asked about any freedom to adjust equipment, and as I said, I'm curious about the fighting kit you carried. What was your standard load for each callout, and what was adjusted based on time of day and threat? Also, how much rifle ammunition and grenades did a trooper carry? Finally, besides the A76 radio, did stick ldrs carry other mission-specific equipment?

[JMA]

No, it's not just you. I cannot play the file either.

JMA, you asked about any freedom to adjust equipment, and as I said, I'm curious about the fighting kit you carried. What was your standard load for each callout, and what was adjusted based on time of day and threat? Also, how much rifle ammunition and grenades did a trooper carry? Finally, besides the A76 radio, did stick ldrs carry other mission-specific equipment?

Let me try to remember.

Riflemen carried a minimum of 100 rounds – five magazines – I carried 9, 4 on the chest and two double pouches on the belt and one on the weapon. (Got down to my last mag one day so I had a personal issue with ammo)
Also one frag grenade and one WP (white phos)
Maybe a smoke grenade or so, maybe a spare radio battery, maybe a spare belt for the gunner. The maybies were not hard and fast nor maybe did everyone insist on grenades being carried. It probably differed from troop to troop and commando to commando.
Two water bottles were standard and some carried a light weight sleeping bag in a roll above the webbing in the small of the back. Those who had spent the night out in winter without generally did carry a sleeping bag and those who had not yet had that experience often did not think it necessary.
Optional also was to carry some army biscuits and some brew kit (I mostly did but many did not bother)
Machine gunners normally carried 500 rounds (10 x 50 rd belts). I did not insist on them carrying anything else and no spare barrel. I seem to remember carrying a 50 rd belt in a kidney pouch from time to time so maybe we spread the load a bit.
Each person carried a shot of Sosegon and a first field dressing. Trained troop medics carried a small medic pack containing bandages, drip-set and some general tablets and ointments. Probably not one per stick universally in all subunits but I seem to remember the term “stick medic pack” so maybe my sticks did.

Other than the A76 radio with a spare battery, I had a compass, a mini flare projector with various colours, a couple of small smoke grenades, and a white plastic sheet to mark my position.

Certainly not overloaded by any manner of means.

I think that was about it. Maybe I will remember other things as we go along.

30 years ago we had no fancy technology but certainly could had used some of the stuff that is available today.

[jcustis]

Some of it may have helped, but at some point, we hit a threshold and returns are diminished. Outside of better communications, and night vision, there probably is little our current equipment would add but weight.

[JMA]

Some of it may have helped, but at some point, we hit a threshold and returns are diminished. Outside of better communications, and night vision, there probably is little our current equipment would add but weight.

Radio comms on Fire Force was never a problem in my experience. The odd radio may go u/s but there was always a spare in the gunship if the need arose.

Night vision equipment on the other hand would certainly have been a major advantage especially for the choppers which departed the scene before last light. Even first generation equipment which was available then was not available to our choppers due to sanctions would have made a huge difference.

GPS equipment and laser or other target marking equipment would have allowed an accurate first time air strike by fixed wing on static enemy with maximum casualties rather than having to try to trap fleeing enemy with a relatively small force.

In many instances thermal imaging from aircraft or drone would have made a significant difference in a number of scenarios.

[JMA]

Some of it may have helped, but at some point, we hit a threshold and returns are diminished. Outside of better communications, and night vision, there probably is little our current equipment would add but weight.

Further comment:
I hear this talk of communications problems. On fire force we had aircraft overhead all the time so I don't know of any problems. The a63 and A76 were fine for that purpose. We analysed our radio issues and found a lot of troubles were self inflicted like a handset going u/s due to the cable getting snagged and then ripped out. That was normally sorted out quickly. Radio failure was a pain and then we needed to put out a yellow dayglo panel instead of the white one and if three cover warranted it to throw a yellow smoke and remain static and expect and watch out for another callsign to come to link up.

The most important thing was that the handset be "hung" high up on the should as close to the ear as possible the radio could be answered first time by being heard over the noise of battle and the choppers overhead. Modern equipment I believe has taken care of this problem.

I don't know much about night vision equipment and how much training would be necessary for troops to fight effectively and with confidence at night. I'm talking about the troops on the ground.

We never had body-armour 30 years ago, but the chopper air-crews did, heavy stuff in those days. I was wondering whether the issue of bady armour is a necessity backed up by historical wound location stats or this with those goggles are more psychological than anything else?

[davidbfpo]

Following another theme I found this website:http://choppertech.blogspot.com and within an untested link to a series of K-Car radio segments: http://choppertech.blogspot.com/2010...-k-car-on.html This link does not work, go to Post 76 for one segment.

I'd not heard of the book 'Choppertech 1976-1980 A Gunner's Reflection of Fireforce in Rhodesia' by Beaver Shaw. All because the book has yet to be published and will be privately published by the author in the second quarter 2010; so there is no review available - info from http://www.booksofzimbabwe.com/store3/erol.html

Hope this helps.

[JMA]

Following another theme I found this website:http://choppertech.blogspot.com and within an untested link to a series of K-Car radio segments: http://choppertech.blogspot.com/2010...-k-car-on.html

I'd not heard of the book 'Choppertech 1976-1980 A Gunner's Reflection of Fireforce in Rhodesia' by Beaver Shaw. All because the book has yet to be published and will be privately published by the author in the second quarter 2010; so there is no review available - info from http://www.booksofzimbabwe.com/store3/erol.html

Hope this helps.

Beaver Shaw's book soon to be published will be a good read to be sure perhaps should be read after Group Captain Petter Boyer's book "Winds of Destruction". I have found that book excellent and it filled in gaps in my knowledge about matters which at my level in those times I was not on the "need to know" list for. (ISBN 141201204 or http://www.amazon.com/Winds-Destruct...ews/141201204X) or in UK http://www.amazon.co.uk/Winds-Destru.../dp/0958489033
I read Beavers blog from time to time because it is also interesting even though its purpose seems to be to promote his book (I will be buying a copy anyway).

As to the MP3 download yes I see there seems to be a problem. 123 downloads at 31 MB at a time and now maybe free site has switched it off. If there is somewhere else to upload the six parts to be housed I can do that.

[JMA]

Thank you for your great informetions and insight.

As a long time lurker of this council I've been infected by Jcustis interest in Rhodesian bush war and I'm trying to find time enough to read all the books ans docs collected (I've found a good copy of Ron Daly Sealous Scouts! ).

I'd like to inform you that the link that you have provided is not working.

I obtain a 0 byte file.

Is it just me?

v/r

I have uploaded Part 1 to the following:

http://www.fileden.com/files/2010/4/...rce1976-01.mp3

There is a 1 Gig download limit so first come first served. Let me know if it works and then we can make a plan with the other 5 parts.

[JMA]

Which is why most units in Iraq and Afghanistan made or make extensive use of vehicles -- lots of vehicles, usually four to six per infantry platoon -- especially issued in excess of normal allowances to generally preclude foot patrols where they are inappropriate.

OTOH, in urban areas and in some mountainous areas as opposed to generally open area, some foot movement is desirable or necessary

The problem in Afghanistan in particular is in the areas of the nation with terrain that is largely mountainous but does have occasional broad valleys. The lack of roads and a conscious and deliberate decision by the US not to use tracked vehicles means that some insertions of infantry units by truck or helicopter are going to occasionally have to cross open ground. More common is foot movement in the mountains themselves where vehicle movement is not possible.

If you have solutions to those two problems, we'd be glad to hear them...

I don't claim to have solutions but I do have comments. When I read some of this stuff bells start ringing and lights go on.

It is pointless patrolling open ground on foot or by vehicle unless the enemy are to be found sitting in the open ground.

If one assumes that movement on foot in the open is merely to cross what the commander sees as a "danger area" and where some degree of tactical maneuver procedure is applied then OK. To sweep through open ground is plain ridiculous.

Vehicles. What good is a vehicle 'patrol' confined to a road which gives many minutes of advanced noise warning to the enemy to clear the roads and standby to fire the IEDs? Crazy.

As a 2Lt I learnt this first hand. Not by getting shot up thank heavens but through the futility of it all. (I wish I could attach images to illustrate my point). I spent days patrolling commercial farmland for signs of insurgents having being briefed off a 1:50,000 map. On the ground all the arable land was plowed and at that time fallow. The only areas of bush were rocky outcrops and low lying river lines. The rocky outcrops were in the main surrounded by open plowed land. (yes giving good vision of any approach but effectively trapping insurgents in the 'island' of bush - later during fire force operations where insurgents made such serious mistakes it resulted in a turkey shoot) the river lines likewise allowed for movement only in two directions - up stream of down stream and we always approached from upstream. I started marking up my maps with all the clear areas and bushy areas where there was some potential for a base camp and handing them in during post patrol debriefings. I was wasting my time. It was about the same time I met a young pilot in the officers mess who had recently finished and air recce course and after I told him my frustrations he told me straight out that it would take him a few hours to 'clear' what had taken me days of patrolling to achieve. I was wasting my time. I wanted to go up with him and see what he saw.

It did not take long for us to get a list of possible camps from these recce pilots and would visit them one by one with the fire force to tick them off one way or the other. The success rate got better as the pilots learnt more and especially when the next day they were taken to the sites to briefly walk the ground to convert what they saw with mark one-eyeball into the reality on the ground. Of course nowadays he could take a night flight over the area with a terminal imaging camera to take a look. It would need some interpretation to ensure we were not going to put an attack in on a herd of cattle (we did a few of those - the troopies loved them as we normally took the cow home to roast on the fire - we call it a braaivleis). So effectively blind routine foot and vehicle patrols were not only dangerous but also pretty pointless and not a productive use of resources.

We could still use the roads as the mines were not command detonated. The Pookie was a wonderful little vehicle which detected landmines. On one move at night to collect patrols along the road running West from Victoria Falls we picked up two landmines which we would otherwise have hit either on the outward journey or on the way back. I guess the insurgents sitting and watching from the North bank of the Zambezi were disappointed their efforts came to naught. Now if they were able to detonate the mines on command it would have been a different story. So if you ask me whether it is sane to travel on roads where at any place and at any time some guy with a cell phone can blow you to hell and back... it is not. You just have to make a new plan to get around.

[JMA]

Which is why most units in Iraq and Afghanistan made or make extensive use of vehicles -- lots of vehicles, usually four to six per infantry platoon -- especially issued in excess of normal allowances to generally preclude foot patrols where they are inappropriate.

OTOH, in urban areas and in some mountainous areas as opposed to generally open area, some foot movement is desirable or necessary

The problem in Afghanistan in particular is in the areas of the nation with terrain that is largely mountainous but does have occasional broad valleys. The lack of roads and a conscious and deliberate decision by the US not to use tracked vehicles means that some insertions of infantry units by truck or helicopter are going to occasionally have to cross open ground. More common is foot movement in the mountains themselves where vehicle movement is not possible.

If you have solutions to those two problems, we'd be glad to hear them...

What would be the typical purpose of a vehicle patrol?

Few roads all in the valleys littered with IEDs...

There may be cases where for inexplicable reasons a resupply has to take place via road in a high IED risk area and that takes one back to the Portuguese in Mozambique and their monthly resupply runs which were normally at walking pace and experienced an ambush or a mine incident virtually every time. Like lambs to the slaughter.

I do agree to a large extent that the military has a 'duty of care' towards their men. I believe that the families of troops killed by IEDs should explore their legal options...

[JMA]

... -- just do not presume that your experience in one war translates well to others. Every war is different. While there are timeless tactical principles that can generally be applied, there are no guarantees that they can always be applied. Or that they'll always work. It is also dangerous to assume from fragmented reporting and a position of less than full knowledge that what appears to have happened actually did happen; often the actuality is totally unlike the initial reports...

Worst thing about wars is not everyone will do it your way. Troops learn that, so they adapt and cope -- just like you did. These kids aren't stupid, they, like you did, are doing what they have to do the best way they can.

Yes exactly, every war is different and that is why historical establishment and equipment tables from some past war, doctrine strategy and tactics from some past wars and all predicated on a very different enemy in very different terrain conditions should be carefully scrutinised and radically changed if necessary.

Simply forcing troops to reinvent the wheel themselves with experience paid for in blood is not in my opinion an intelligent approach nor morally, ethically or even legally defensible.

It is seldom up to the 'kids' to change things that lies with the generals and the colonels. The question is how many 'kids' must die before the generals and the colonels to ring the changes?