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Thread: Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

  1. #161
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    ... one may have to cross open ground on foot or by vehicle to get from one's current location to the possible location of the evil enema. What then?Well, we can agree on that. That answers my question and trashes your objection, though... :... While I certainly agree with your statement and I'm sure many folks in Afghanistan also agree, there are times when one has to cross open areas; there are times when one has to travel on roads that are highly probably going to have mines or IEDs. .
    By any definition open ground is classed as a 'danger area' which requires tactical maneuver and the positioning of troops/weapons in positions ready to provide covering/supporting fire immediately they be needed. In any war, in any terrain, in any theater it is surely poor/weak/incompetent leadership not to select lines of advance so as to avoid 'danger areas' and if unavoidable to use appropriate tactical maneuver to prevent troops being caught in open ground by enemy fire.

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    Quote Originally Posted by qp4 View Post
    Or he's out of his mind pissed off that he's risking being shot to walk across the battlefield screaming at someone to get down so he doesn't get hit.

    Schmedlap hit it in that the modern Army dismounted teams are trained enough to know when to get down and/or find cover without being told.

    There are references above to companies being pinned down. I'm not sure from what war those references are from, because the US Army (and I'm thinking the Marines also) haven't maneuvered companies in a situation to be pinned down in a very long time.
    I asked the question earlier somewhere as to whether "crack and thump" demonstrations are a regular part of training and the answer was for the best units yes, for the rest maybe.

    So now in a situation where whole raw units are brought in at the same time for a 'tour of duty' it is likely that the vast majority of the soldiers have had no combat experience. So how would they have the experience to know what constitutes 'effective enemy fire' and what constitutes the odd stray or way off target round passing overhead?

    It must surely be a concern that raw troops can decide for themselves when to take cover or even open fire (when not at very close range) ... and yes that IS the corporals job being to command his section and not just look after himself. Surely?

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    Default Crack and thump... and beyond

    Our training isn't great (In my opinion) but it is adequate; you asked about crack and thump training -- in US usage that is purely a technique for range estimation. It was taught in WW I and until post Viet Nam -- the ranges in Viet Nam were so short and the number of weapons being fired in most fights made it ineffective. It is often be taught in units and as you inferred, good units will do it and as units go through cycles due to personnel turnover, most are good at one time or another. It may be taught in institutional training now, they've added a bunch of stuff in the last few years. I doubt it, a real fire fight doesn't pose much need for it though it is handy for scouts and to estimate range to artillery or mortars.

    So you asked about an esoteric technique which has some value but not enough to warrant spending initial entry time on it for the value derived.
    Not sure mediocrity should ever become acceptable... under any circumstances.

    Yes well I should have elaborated. Yes the basic 'crack and thump' takes you only so far. (probably as far as the fieldcraft manual envisaged). Here is what the Canadian fieldcraft manual states:

    CRACK AND THUMP

    24. When a bullet passes near, one hears two noises: first, the crack of the bullet passing, then the thump of the weapon being fired. The crack is heard before the thump because the bullet travels faster than sound. The thump indicates the direction of the weapon. The
    distance to the weapon can be estimated by timing the interval between the crack and the thump. The further away the weapon, the longer the interval between the crack and the thump. The time between the crack and thump at the following ranges is:

    a. 300 metres — 2/3 of a second;

    b. 600 metres — 1 1/3 seconds; and

    c. 900 metres — 2 seconds.

    25. Judging the distance to an automatic weapon is slightly more difficult. The last crack and the last thump must be picked out in order to establish the correct automatic weapon range. If the distance is great and the bursts are short, all the cracks of one burst will be heard, followed by the thumps.
    Now having found that we needed to train troops in understanding and correctly reacting to the 'crack' we had to take this a stage further and beyond what the fieldcraft manual narrowly envisaged.

    Follow this quote from Nick Downie - Brit SAS trained turned war TV camera man. (Who incidentally worked with Lord Richard Cecil the journalist killed while covering operations in Rhodesia:

    The standard tactic when 'assaulting' a known or suspected guerilla position is the sweep-line method described above. The advance is carried out at a slow walk, with little or no prophylactic fire, and, unless there is a particularly sinister-looking piece of scrub, the men depend on good observation and fast reactions. If anything moves, or they glimpse a patch of clothing, they will fire perhaps five or six aimed shots, or, in the case of a machine-gunner, a one-second burst. These contacts take place at a range of between two and ten yards. The killing is usually done by one man alone, although occasionally the next man in the line will join in if he too can see the target. As someone opens fire, everybody else pauses. The ones nearest the firing may flinch at the sudden noise, but most of the others do not even turn their heads.
    The sweep-line waits while the body is checked and the weapons removed, and the advance then continues at the same measured pace. Once an enemy presence is confirmed, the Rhodesians continue sweeping back and forth until they are certain that all the guerrillas are either dead or have escaped.
    Look at the bold type. It was important for all troops to be absolutely comfortable with the type of 'crack' and when the 'crack' indicated something personal. Clearly we could not accept ever man jack deciding when he felt like taking cover and opening fire. It was all about control and discipline and the stick commanders from L/Cpl to Lt had to enforce that. When more than one stick was joined together to sweep an area (normally under a sgt or officer) it was even more important to keep the line straight and maintain the impetus of the advance.

    How did we carry out this training? I can only speak for myself.

    The textbook crack and thump dem was carried out under basic training to teach first the crack and thump sounds and then to judge distance to weapon based on the interval and then to try to locate the shooter by the location of the thump. That was done.

    What we needed to our troops to be able to differentiate between was the differences of crack from our weapons and theirs AK / RPD. Easy lie on the shooting range or in the bush and have those weapons fired over your head. This with the variant of shooting from very close but not directly over ones head to note the difference (in other wards note yes a weapon has been fired at close range but not at you.)

    To indicate when it had really become personal we fired over the heads of troops at probably not more than two foot. Starting with high shots and working down closer until the 2 ft 'experience' when yes the soldier could start to dance around without having been ordered to do so.

    OK, so part one, to differentiate between their weapons and ours. Two, at close range is the fire in your direction or in someone else's. If not in your direction hold your ground. And three when it moves from a sound to a 'sensation' then he can take the appropriate action.

    To us on Fire Force where contact was made at extremely close ranges this training was vital, as said, to keep the line straight and maintain the impetus of the advance.

    This training however would be valuable to all infantrymen likely to come into contact with the enemy.

    What you did not ask about was live fire training, of which we do a great deal, in initial entry institutional training, in unit sustainment training and heavily in pre-deployment training as well as in refresher training conducted in theater. I suspect US troops fire far more than most armies and there's plenty of training wherein the troops learn to diffrentiate near and far misses from the thud of a hit -- even if they don't do crack and thump routinely to ascertain the approximate range to a fired weapon...
    I made a note to avoid this topic with you because of the comment you made which seemed to accept a 1-2% casualty rate during training.

    Yes there will be some unintended positive consequence arising from live firing exercises. (depending on the type of firing done)

    I my case It was a specific outcome that was required and therefore the training was tailor made to achieve the desired aim.

    Which unit, which army shoots more or less is unknown to me. We shot a lot despite being continually on operations and enjoying plenty of action.

    It is not a concern to me that troops can decide for themselves -- occasionally with a little NCO assistance -- to seek cover; in fact, I wouldn't have it any other way. You have to give troops responsibility, no need to treat them like children. We tend to value life so we encourage taking cover then deciding whether one needed to do that. It takes about two firefights for the average person to sort that out properly. As they say, it isn't rocket science . It would concern me a great deal if NCO direction was constantly needed on that and other basic skills. In a real firefight, there's way too much noise and confusion for commands to be heard so the troops have to know what to do. We do generally get them to that point before deploying them.
    That is obviously a personal opinion.

    I couldn't find the US doctrine online and wasn't prepared to pay for a copy of the Brit manual so I settled for the Canadian manual which is available online.

    Lets go to Section Battle Drills : Battle Drill Two - Reaction to Effective Enemy Fire (page 5-2-4):

    Execution. Effective enemy fire in this situation is enemy small arms fire which would cause casualties if the section continued on its course.

    9. Sections must continue the advance in spite of the noise of fire directed at someone else and regardless of stray rounds amongst them. Most soldiers instinctively drop to the ground when under fire. This action is generally wrong because the enemy usually opens fire when a target is in a place offering little or no cover. The best course is to react effectively, as taught in this battle drill.
    So it is then agreed (subject to confirmation through sight of the US doctrine) that the 'every man for himself' any time he likes is generally not a good idea. We on the same page now?

    I could go on here Ken but I do believe that it is you who is out of step with the doctrine.

    To turn your other argument on its head we had a very low casualty rate with a very high kill rate. The doctrine worked, it was not negotiable and the young kids were able to hold their nerve.

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    Ters allowing a sweep-line to roll them up like that is of course every infantrymen’s dream. I’d like to think that if I was the wearer of that patch of clothing, I wouldn’t be waiting for the sweepline to shoot first. And once that sweep-line becomes established SOP, more competent ters will come up with appropriate ambush techniques.

    Also, continuous air support with choppers overhead (and low) is probably not something that many other foes would passively endure, even ignoring availability. Blackhawk Down anyone?

    That’s not to devalue your/Rhodesian experiences and tactics. I think I can safely say that most here are fairly impressed with it; I know I am. And there is bound to be a lot that can still be learned from it. But again…..context.
    Yes and no. The simple point of departure is that the sudden violent envelopment of the contact area by the fire force trapped, separated and maybe isolated the insurgents.

    Only the K-Car overflew the contact area at a height of 800-1,000 ft. Sure it was fired on often and often hit but because of the green tracer one was able to get a good idea from where the fire was coming from (or the ground troops could assist with the location). Once located the ‘brave’ man who fired on the aircraft was history in seconds (the 20mm HE saw to that). So by a process of natural selection the ‘brave’ died first and the fleetest of foot and the ones who crawled into a hole and hid there survived. After the initial contact sweeps of the area would locate those hiding away and then it was not always a simple ‘turkey shoot’ if he was seen he was dead. If he fired from very close range when he realised he was about to be found he was dead too, but could take one of us with him. The third possibility was that they just lay there. Dead already from the gunship? Paralysed by fear? I don’t know. All I know is that a desperate man with an AK at 2-5 metres can be pretty lethal.

    We tried to keep the trooping-choppers away from overflying the contact area. Where that failed and they overflew a group they would get seriously shot up. One chopper got 56 hits, the tech/gunner took three bullets as did the one other passenger and the pilot protected by his armoured seat got minor Perspex fragments in his face and just made a 'hard' landing back at base.

    Often the initial contact was ferocious. With the K-Car engaging opportunity targets and the first callsigns on the ground getting into punch-ups straight away. As I said once all the ‘brave’ guys had been accounted for the sweeps were often merely mopping up the contact area to find those not yet accounted for.

    If you listen to that Fire Force tape you will see in part 6 almost two hours into the scene the group is finally cornered by the sweep line and they bolt into a stop group with predictable results. Up to that point the concern was that they had got away.

    On Op Dingo (the attack on the Chimoio base housing 4,000) the ten K-cars all had hits from small arms and some from anti-aircraft gunfire with one pilot being shot through his helmet and having his forehead grazed. The pilots stayed on station some joisting with the AAA and others having a turkey shoot. One troop carrying chopper was damaged and limped back to the admin base and the 6 para Dakota aircraft were taken on by AAA while running in for the drop. The book by Group Captain Petter-Bowyer “Winds of Destruction” is essential reading. We got 1,200 kills that day for 2 KIA and six wounded. While in any mans language that is a turkey shoot there were moments when things got pretty hairy.

    The bottom line is that the Allouette III chopper could take hits so the crews donned flak jackets, stayed overhead and did the business. We had good days when we had a turkey shoot and then we had bad days when we had to earn our pay and sadly lost some friends along the way.

    The other important factor was that we accounted for some 84% of insurgents contacted on fire force. These included virtually all the ‘brave’ guys and didn't leave too many ‘leaders’ left to figure out what to do next time.

  5. #165
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    Default Question of TTPs

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    ...the sudden violent envelopment of the contact area by the fire force trapped, separated and maybe isolated the insurgents.
    Please excuse my ignorance in this theatre JMA, I have only read Chris Cock's book on the subject and even then have some trouble recalling the way the fire-force tactics worked.

    I'm interested in how you guys enveloped a target. A quick internet search tells me that a four man 'sweep' element would be positioned by the K-car as a cut-off. Was this ever done as a standard drill, i.e. a first wave isolates the target by deploying into a cut-off prior to an assault, was this reactive or was the deployment of a cut-off dictated by situation?
    '...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
    Donald Kagan

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Yes and I was 95% through a lengthy response when my computer crashed. So Ill try again tomorrow. Sorry.
    The quick answer is that I do not have a strong position either way over this issue based on calibre only.

    We used the 7.62 x 51mm and they used the 7.62 x 39mm which we called long and intermediate respectively.

    I was not able to carry out or get sight of any test results indicating the wound ballistics differences between the two.

    We did some tests with claymore mines some of which were locally made using ballistic clay but to me such tests would be important when deciding on a weapon for use in a theatre. We really did not have much of a choice but I was not unhappy with the hand we were dealt.

    In fact the penetration dems we put on from time to time to prove to troops that our weapons were superior were never absolutely convincing to me one way or the other.

    To me the knock down effect of the FN was a big plus. You hit him once and know you got him good. None of this ‘he keeps on coming at you’ stuff. Then again our guys when hit by an AK would go down too.

    We had no weight problem with the FN and the ammo that I can remember. The FN weight was fine and we (again my commando) did not allow slings and did “Pokey Drill” (rifle dexterity drill ) everyday after muster parade.

    100-200 rounds of ammo was no problem either for young fit and reasonably strong men.

    I had no issue with the weight or the length of it but found that we had to make sure that the correct butt length was issue to riflemen.

    Can’t remember any stoppage issues either. Maybe when you know you are going to have to use the thing you damn well keep it clean.

    I carried a G3 for a short while as a test and had no strong opinion one way or tuther except that it seemed to come in one butt length (or maybe the ones we got for trial did).

    I carried an AK on a few special ops and found it a bit ‘light’ after the FN. Also I noted that the change lever (safety catch) was on the wrong side of the weapon and that the first click was auto which may account for why the first shots were uncontrolled bursts going way to high. Seems the thinking is the TB like to fire on auto or is it that they fire after the first click? (which is understandable).

    The SAS carried the RPD as the MG of choice so maybe they have more light to shed on the matter which hopefully would be a decision based on more than just the weight issue.

    We (my commando) did not want to mix up weapons so as to prevent not being able to identify whether it was friend or foe firing. I have recently seen a photo of other RLI paras before an op where one had an RPD, so clearly not everyone agreed with our position.

    We loved the MAG… and the gooks feared it (as a number of interrogation reports confirmed).

    If there is any music in war it is the sound of bursts of 2-3 rounds from a MAG with the gas set low.

    At twice the weight of the RPD theMAG certainly delivered.

    A platoon and in our case a troop was broken down into callsigns of four called ‘sticks’. In 1973 we still had 5 man sticks as the choppers could carry 5 pax. After the added weight of the armoured seat and the fact the Alouette III pulling too much power at the average altitudes they settled on 4 man sticks. So there was no tactical or operational reason for the use of 4 man sticks. (thought that might be interesting).

    We carried one MAG per 4 man stick. So the standard 9 man section divided into to sticks one commended by the section commander (corporal) and the other by the lance corporal. The platoon commander and platoon sergeant picked up there sticks from the pl HQ element and any extras from the sections. So theoretically a standard infantry platoon would have 8 MAGs (2 per section and two in Pl HQ – it gets a little confusing with the RAR [Rhodesian African Rifles] as they had the post of Platoon Warrant Officer – a kind of WO3 position.)

    The RAR also loved the MAG I remember the case of 5 sticks of RAR being attached to one of the fire forces and out of the 20 that arrived there was 13 MAGs. There we have an illustration of the psychology o that weapon. The positive psychology of that 20 man sweep line having 13 MAGs and the negative psychology of being on the receiving end of that fire power.

    In knowing your enemy we knew that when operating against groups of insurgents always outnumbering us we had to take the initiative right from the first seconds through a high volume of fire. The MAG helped to achieve this. With well trained troops when coming under effective enemy fire we tend to take cover and get our heads down. With the other lot when they got freaked out they would jump up and take off. That is exactly what we wanted and those that were not instantly killed became gunship fodder as they ran.

    I did training on the Bren in 1973/4 and found it to be fine. The argument I think had by then advanced to being between magazine fed and opposed to belt fed. The decision had already been taken to phase it out so I was not even considered.

    In the fire force context the MAG was nearly always fired from the hip unless static in a stop position. Some of the big boys were known to fire it from the shoulder from time to time. One of my gunners a Scotsman (ex-Scots Guards) used to load a 100 round belt (2x50) when on fire force as I used to get him to clear the bush ahead of us when necessary and I suppose also to let any lurkers know what’s coming their way. He wrapped the belt over his left arm somehow.

    So effectively we needed the firepower down to stick level.

    What if no MAG available per stick? Then I would go for 2 x RPD per stick.

    Gunners carried 500 rds as standard and on other ops we would up it and share out the extras. Depending on the type of op we would up it to 800 or 1,000 rds.

    Did training on UZI and Sten in 1973 but neither were ever considered a contender. Did see some police carrying them, mainly the UZI, but maybe if needed in house clearing or whatever a folding but AK would have done the trick. (just an opinion)

    Finally I had the unfortunate experience when on a scene and was sent to sort a sniper out and the approaching 40 man sweep line had not be warned. As we went into reorg the sweep line took us on and get your head down took on a whole new meaning (10 MAGs firing). Holy s**t! From then on I could understand how and why the gooks just up and took off when under intense fire.

    They hit my gunner in the arm but thankfully that was all. That we survived was probably due to the need for those troops in the sweep line to have another Drake Shoot to improve their bush shooting.

    That’s it for now.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Chris jM View Post
    Please excuse my ignorance in this theatre JMA, I have only read Chris Cock's book on the subject and even then have some trouble recalling the way the fire-force tactics worked.

    I'm interested in how you guys enveloped a target. A quick internet search tells me that a four man 'sweep' element would be positioned by the K-car as a cut-off. Was this ever done as a standard drill, i.e. a first wave isolates the target by deploying into a cut-off prior to an assault, was this reactive or was the deployment of a cut-off dictated by situation?
    Yes Chris' book is a good troopies eye view of matters.

    But this article with a view diagrams will help you to understand things a lot clearer.

    http://www.jrtwood.com/article_fireforce.asp

    Also once read download this MP3 file and listen to a recording of part of a fire force call out. Only the commander (c/s 39) and the aircraft transmissions can be heard.

    http://www.fileden.com/files/2010/4/...rce1976-01.mp3

    Enjoy

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    Default X-Ref to another thread

    The new member JMA has added many posts on another thread, so please visit there:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...?t=9942&page=8

    I have now (18th April 2010) copied most of the posts in the above thread to this thread. Some may appear a little out of order.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 04-18-2010 at 11:11 AM. Reason: Add second paragraph
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Being able to pass the APWT was proven to have no benefit to shooting conducted under stress. This was confirmed by trials. Most empirical evidence seems to indicate that a "good enough" standard of shooting is all that is required.
    I look at it this way. If a soldier can't group (from the prone position) 5 rounds within 4 inches @ 100m or 1 inch @ 25m then you do two things. You fire his instructor and take his weapon away and issue him with a machette.

    All he will do is make the contact area more noisy and be a greater danger to you than the enemy.

    Once qualified to marksman level in the equivalent of APWT then the real training can begin.

    Remember there is basic training and recruit training and then there is ETS training (exercise trained soldier). In most armies the basic training does not flow directly into being inserted into unit already in a war situation.

    In Rhodesia we did and that made the training people get a lot smarter. And in many instances the training instructors were NCOs rotated out of ops to do the training and subsequently were 100% operationally current.

    There's sub calibre devices, TPTP rounds, and today you even have simulators.
    OK, but that is not live firing. So can we agree then that the live ammo allocated to training will be fired by the selected crews who in turn are probably selected as a result of using the other stuff?

    Well IIRC Moltke said that in war only the simple succeeds. My whole point is to keep it all very simple. My take is to massively reduce "musketry" to simple operational shooting skills and spend the rest of the time and budget on the other platoon weapons.
    Ok, lets agree on the basics here and they are , aiming , holding, breathing and squeezing. Once this is mastered at the 'entry level' say by score a 4" group @ 100m etc etc then we introduce light variation, moving targets, making the shooter out of breath before having to shoot etc etc. What goes and what stays and what gets added?

    But yes... I think I can see where you are coming from. More kills are propably made by weapons other than rifles and so concentrate on where the difference will be made.

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Concur. Reducing hand held dispersion is the basis of all else. If he can hit a Fig-11 5-second exposure, at 150m, from standing, firing as many rounds as it takes to get 1 hit, I'm happy as well.

    B'Ezrat Ha Shem! Yes, we agree.
    There was at one time a raging debate in Rhodesia over the "one aimed shot" school of thought and the "double tap" school. In the end I just said to my guys to do what works for them.

    What about a Fig 11 moving zig-zag at 50m?

    What about jungle-lane shooting?

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    My experience on Jungle Lanes is that one aimed shot does not work. If the one aimed shot misses, you are going to need to do another very quickly.
    Rapid multiple shots seems to work much better. "FFF" "Fire till the F**ker Falls.

    Another issue I have with "jungle lanes" is that what you are doing in them, has to work within the Contact Drill SOP you are using.
    "Rapid multiple shots" equals... a series of single shots... or a series of double taps?

    My biggest worry with jungle lanes was that they were one at a time per instructor. Too time consuming.

    We tried to get 'stick' jungle-lanes going but found location, safety and that they were pretty quickly 'shot out' almost insurmountable problems.

    Maybe just settle for one objective and that is the shooting training with the appropriate post engagement response as in "take cover" with the instructor acting as the stick or section commander.

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    Default Moderator's Note

    There are several threads on the Rhodesian experience (Posts x and Views) and I have locked up all the others adding a note in the last post to use this thread:

    Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia (43; 7.5k): http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...read.php?t=868

    New Book and DVD on the RLI (10;1.5k):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7853

    Selous Scouts (7; 1.5k): http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6013

    Rhodesians at War (1; 1k):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3564

    Rhodesian Cover or Drake Shooting (5; 1.2k):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2464

    Rhodesian Farmers Defensive Arrangements (2;4.3k):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2467

    Outside the Africa Forum are numerous threads where 'Rhodesia' appears and I've added a few here:

    MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Amrs Lethality in Afgh. :http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9942

    Vertical envelopment and the IED :http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9473

    Greys Scouts/cavalry in modern small wars:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3407

    An Interview with Peter Godwin (re BSAP & COIN):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8683

    IIRC a number of book reviews appear too, but I suspect most books on Rhodesia appear in these threads.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 04-13-2010 at 07:22 PM. Reason: Add a thread, another and that caption in Post No.1
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    Default RLI & Selous Scouts

    Yesterday I watched a newly purchased DVD 'Rhodesia Remembered' made by the RLIRA (UK Branch), which can be ordered via the RLI website:http://rhodesianlightinfantry.org/ Note available in the RSA and UK, so unsure if it will work on US VD, although the cover says 'All Regions DVD'.

    The DVD has three parts: RLI History, The Trooper (Laying up RLI Colours and unveiling statue) and The Nkomo Assignment.

    In the later Lt.Col. Ron Reid-Daly, who moved from the RLI to create the Selous Scouts and an ex-RN helicopter pilot Mick Borlace, who flew in the RRAF and became an undercover agent, talk generally about the scouts.

    At one point Reid-Daly refers to the increasing flow of nationalist guerillas into Rhodesia ended the flow of intelligence, provided by the BSAP SB and ground cover, so the scouts were born (I shall have to check my books on this point). Then adds words similar to '68% of the kills involved the scouts'. A figure I don't recalls seeing before; Jon C, Rhodesian, JMA and others any comment?
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    Default 68 Percent

    David, this one is a hornets nest lol!

    Mmmm . . . yes . . . being acutely aware of the friendly rivalry between the RLI and the Selous Scouts on the one hand, the Selous Scouts and Special Branch on the other, and with the Airforce demanding a fair bite of this particular cherry too, this perhaps is an area where an “angel” should fear to tread!

    While the Scouts deserved their fine reputation (I'm fishing for more beer here), they were regarded by everyone other than an ex Selous Scout as being “just” another edge of the sharp-pointy-bit at the tip of a far bigger intelligence driven Rhodesian “spear.” Special Branch (SB) were regarded generally as the brains behind the Scout effort, so perhaps it could be argued that SB should take the larger credit for the “68 percent”? This thought pleases my two ex-SB friends a lot, and gets me lots of beer. It does however leave my other very large and formerly very hairy friend feeling a little unhappy . . .

    And whatever the real figure, of the “68 percent” of kills that may or may not have involved the “Selous Scouts,” the vast majority of those were either offed by the RLI, or the side-mounted 20mm canon of a Rhodesian Airforce K-car, as too were a good chunk of the remaining 32 percent that had no Scout involvement at all. The Airforce will of course swear to you that they were responsible for a HUGE number of kills . . . . . especially inside other peoples countries, but as I was once bombed by them I generally dispute this unless they are buying, in which case I agree with everything they say.

    Whatever the truth, I get drunk a lot.

    On a more serious note, “Uncle Ron,” founder of the Scouts is not very well at the moment, so banter aside I'd like to add that he is greatly admired and respected by many, and we wish him well in his present, and probably his greatest fight.

    I.R.

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    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    Zealot66,
    I am aware that some Rhodesians after 1980 concluded 'external operations' did not help in their war.(A bigger topic so I shall stop there).
    Who might these Rhodesians be?

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    Thank you JMA!

    Downloaded right now.

    Everything works fine.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Graycap View Post
    Thank you JMA!

    Downloaded right now.

    Everything works fine.
    Great. Just shout if you need a translation.

    Part 2 is here:

    http://www.fileden.com/files/2010/4/...rce1976-02.mp3

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    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    Yesterday I watched a newly purchased DVD 'Rhodesia Remembered' made by the RLIRA (UK Branch), which can be ordered via the RLI website:http://rhodesianlightinfantry.org/ Note available in the RSA and UK, so unsure if it will work on US VD, although the cover says 'All Regions DVD'.

    The DVD has three parts: RLI History, The Trooper (Laying up RLI Colours and unveiling statue) and The Nkomo Assignment.

    In the later Lt.Col. Ron Reid-Daly, who moved from the RLI to create the Selous Scouts and an ex-RN helicopter pilot Mick Borlace, who flew in the RRAF and became an undercover agent, talk generally about the scouts.

    At one point Reid-Daly refers to the increasing flow of nationalist guerillas into Rhodesia ended the flow of intelligence, provided by the BSAP SB and ground cover, so the scouts were born (I shall have to check my books on this point). Then adds words similar to '68% of the kills involved the scouts'. A figure I don't recalls seeing before; Jon C, Rhodesian, JMA and others any comment?
    Lets accurately define the claim. It is claimed that 68% of all kills internally were as a result of call outs initiated by Selous Scout call signs on the ground or by action of the Selous Scouts themselves.

    It would have been simple matter for the Scouts to tally up all Fire Force kills where their call signs had initiated the call out and add them to their kills from other actions and work the percentage against the daily totals for the whole country. 68% is not really able to be challenged by anyone who does not have the stats in front of them.

    Further stats issues. The Scouts kept record of their call-outs and the results. For example if they called out the fire force on a group of say 20 terrs and the result was 16 or 17 kills then the kill rate was between 80-85%, for the RLI. Their view was certainly they wanted a RLI Fire Force to react to their call outs, often requesting confirmation of the address group of the Fire Force responding.

    In addition the kill rate in contacts where Fire Force was not involved was 18.5% and as a simple comparison the Brit SAS in Malaya achieved a kill rate per contact of 13%.

    We have touched on matters relating to these stats elsewhere but we probably need to mention that there was another successful method of locating the enmy camps and that was through air reconnaissance using the good old mark 1 ‘eyeball’. A few ‘naturals’ emerged the most notable being Cocky Beneke, an Air Force pilot, who its appears was advantaged by a minor colour vision defect to see under the tree cover what other pilots could simply not. A number of successes resulted from a small but skilled number of recce pilots.

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Yes Chris' book is a good troopies eye view of matters.

    But this article with a view diagrams will help you to understand things a lot clearer.

    http://www.jrtwood.com/article_fireforce.asp

    Also once read download this MP3 file and listen to a recording of part of a fire force call out. Only the commander (c/s 39) and the aircraft transmissions can be heard.

    http://www.fileden.com/files/2010/4/...rce1976-01.mp3

    Enjoy
    Not sure how much following that link clarified matters for you.

    The envelopment of a target area was often not quite that. If the Fire Force comprised a K-Car and 3 G-Cars (3 x 4 man sticks) with 20 paras (5 x sticks) following the a Dak (Dakota-DC3) one could rarely seal off an area. The trick was to get a complete and detailed briefing from the call-sign on the ground and select the likely escape routes given the line of approach of the aircraft. The troops in the para-Dak would then be dropped in a cultivated field somewhere close by and ferried in closer by chopper. The Allouette III was great as it could get into a tight LZ and you had to get the pilot, the fuel line or the tail rotor to really put it on its ass.

    There was a lot of skill required by the Airborne Commander and the K-Car pilot (the senior pilot) to work the deployment to its best tactically.

    I never heard of the paras being dropped in a stop line on the ground where they stayed. It always required movement or ferrying to get into position. And the need for paras was only there because there were not enough choppers to lift enough troops in.

    Later in the war there was a increase in the number of choppers through South Africa sending in (I think) 27 choppers and crews so the 'Jumbo' Fire Forces were established (jumbo only in the Rhodesian context) with two k-Cars and 5 G-Cars each with a para Dak (DC3) and two Lynx (Cessna 337 Skymaster) aircraft. The second K-Car was normally what was termed and alpha-fit where insted of the 20mm cannon there were four .30 Browning MGs side mounted. The alpha-fit was actually more lethal than the 20mm cannon because when there was tree cover the rounds would explode on contact with very little resulting penetration and when the ground was soft the rounds would penetrate fractionally before exploding with the resultant limited shrapnel spread. (A 7.62mm minigun would be similar to the alpha-fit)

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Not sure how much following that link clarified matters for you.
    Thanks for the link/s JMA - that and the content on the related RLI thread provides a lot of good info. I need to read more about the entire period to get an understanding of it though - I still am very ignorant of the guerrilla situation, tactics, aims etc so my current knowledge of fire-force tactics is rather flimsy. It will require a few more books for me to make get to grips with the how's and why's of the war.
    '...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
    Donald Kagan

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