“…I know it when I see it.”
“…I know it when I see it.”
What Sparks' doesn't get - from our about page:
“Small Wars” is an imperfect term used to describe a broad spectrum of spirited continuation of politics by other means, falling somewhere in the middle bit of the continuum between feisty diplomatic words and global thermonuclear war. The Small Wars Journal embraces that imperfection.
Just as friendly fire isn’t, there isn’t necessarily anything small about a Small War.
The term “Small War” either encompasses or overlaps with a number of familiar terms such as counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, support and stability operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and many flavors of intervention. Operations such as noncombatant evacuation, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance will often either be a part of a Small War, or have a Small Wars feel to them. Small Wars involve a wide spectrum of specialized tactical, technical, social, and cultural skills and expertise, requiring great ingenuity from their practitioners. The Small Wars Manual (a wonderful resource, unfortunately more often referred to than read) notes that:
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The “three block war” construct employed by General Krulak is exceptionally useful in describing the tactical and operational challenges of a Small War and of many urban operations. Its only shortcoming is that is so useful that it is often mistaken as a definition or as a type of operation.
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Originally Posted by SWJED
Dave, then start with Gavin without Sparks. Gavin called them Brush fire wars...and he also said that the USMC would be in an excellant position to fight them because of their forward deployment as a Sea based force. I met Gavin 3 times before his death(at his second home in Winter Park,Fl.) and he always spoke highly of the USMC in person and in his writings. I guess my point is don't throw the baby out with the bathwater.
I am certainly no defender of Mike Sparks, (who ever and how ever many people he may be) and he/they is/are his/their own worst enemy/ies, but the issues he/they raises are sometimes deserving of careful study. (and some are moon screamer out there!)
The M113 fiasco is his best known effort. Some of issues Mike raises (usually in error and usually over stated) ask some very serious questions about issues that reside at the very heart of military thought, and its relationships with technology and industry - and even though he comes off as some ranting extremist, a lot of his ideas, stripped of their emotional and abusive content, are more main stream than is comfortable for many.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
If I may venture an opening line:
"Small Wars are neither small or wars in terms of relative and conventional understanding. Despite the fact that both the words are inaccurate and misleading, but they are useful...."
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Having to give credit where credit is due, Mike Sparks is at least due that as well as a few other things. As to the Moon Screamers, it goes without saying that if such flubs didn't occurr with depressing and unsettling regularity, then Sparks et al. wouldn't have much credibility. Extremes beget their opposites.
Giving credit where credit is due: Sparks' proposal to mechanize the combat support companies in parachute battalions doesn't seem outlandish to me. Some airborne forces have light tracked armor but the US makes do with up-armored Hummers.
I believe Sparks' idea was that the company's vehicles could continue to be used as platforms for crew served weapons (like the Hummers are now), transport one of the rifle companies, or serve as something like a cav troop of sorts for the battalion commander. I may not be understanding that exactly right, but I think that's more or less what he envisioned.
So, assuming that the M113 isn't the best option for that role, what light tracked armor would be suitable that can be airdropped? The German Weisel? Something else?
There are some cav types on this board who should have some good ideas. I never experienced anything heavier than leather personel carriers or the old 1/4 ton jeeps, so I have no idea what can or can't be airdropped and what the logistical problems are.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
On Airborne Cavalry
I've served in heavy and light (airborne) units in combat.
With tongue partially in cheek, here's my voice- platform is irrelevant.
For an airfield seizure, scouts should jump in (dismounted) prior to main body (old LRSD mission). Scouts survey subsequent drop zones for enemy activity providing brigade commander accurate picture of DZ.
After infantry seizes airfields, planes land and reconnaissance vehicles exit the aircraft...no air drop...just a landing. Then, scouts mount and expand the BCT's terrain.
I know this is short, but it's valid. Too many old NCO's traded stories of failed efforts to drop an LRAS and scout HMMWV. The initial shock of an airborne seizure provides the needed time to land recon vehicles....
Oh BTW, the M113 is not a recon vehicle. I'd prefer a Harley or a gater with a .240 mounted over an M113.
I think we had it right with the XVIIth Airborne concept: 82nd BCT seizes airfield followed by a mechanize IRC from 3ID (tank platoon/bradley platoon with HQ) concept.
It works.
v/r
Mike
Last edited by MikeF; 08-03-2008 at 09:34 PM.
Concept in the 70s was to LAPES (low altitude parachute extraction system) an M551 Sheridan battalion in for the "heavy element" rather than heavy drop, which was tried and did work but not as reliably as LAPSE. That is if the C130 crews got LAPES approach --speed, altitude, and attitude of AC correct. This concept goes back into the 50s and 60s. According to global security LAPES is no longer an active TTP
Of course we were no where near as well equipped for this as the Soviets with the BMD and BMP. They had a larger tolerance for drop associated losses.
Best
Tom
Scouts without...
Can't talk to either of them but my steed in the early 60s was an M151 that survived ten heavy drops -- and I can put a 151 most places you can put a track and a lot of places you won't put either a no ground clearance Gator or a heavy Harley...That said, the 113, particularly with a Soucy track, is a good scout vehicle, it's small, fast, reliable and fairly quiet. The 114 was even better in it's recommended upgrade -- the problem is that the US Army does not want a Scout vehicle. Every attempt to buy one has foundered.Oh BTW, the M113 is not a recon vehicle. I'd prefer a Harley or a gater with a .240 mounted over an M113.
The Armor community is too wedded to the northern Europe end of WW II version of reconnaissance -- "We're too impatient to do recon by stealth, we just got out looking for trouble and to do that, you have to have Armor." There's some merit to that idea in some situations but it doesn't have to be that way and it's rarely the best way.True -- for some situations; METT-TC again rears its pretty little head...I think we had it right with the XVIIth Airborne concept: 82nd BCT seizes airfield followed by a mechanize IRC from 3ID (tank platoon/bradley platoon with HQ) concept...It works.
I was somewhat involved in the original Mike Sparks group discussion on this, and I am certainly not claiming credit for anything, but what it came down to was that it simply made no sense to try and drop an M-113 equipped infantry battalion. What did seem to have merit was adding a small number of M-113s to provide whatever basic capability they brought to the party.
What is an M113?? There is vast difference between the original A1 and the some of the stuff that has recently been prototyped by RAFAEL and others. Some iterations are incredibly capable, but they tip the scales at >18,000kgSo, assuming that the M113 isn't the best option for that role, what light tracked armor would be suitable that can be airdropped? The German Weisel? Something else?
There are some cav types on this board who should have some good ideas. I never experienced anything heavier than leather personel carriers or the old 1/4 ton jeeps, so I have no idea what can or can't be airdropped and what the logistical problems are.
Personally, for modern operations, I think it is generally waste of time to airdrop an AFV. Yes, everyone can come up with a mission where it may have to be done, but I submit they are/will become incredibly rare and the effort does not match the reward.
That being said, there is massive and obvious merit in creating a reasonably armoured vehicle that is as light as possible, with a reduce signature and small logistic foot print. For various reasons the M113 is not an ideal starting point. Personally I favour the UK CVR-T as the basis for future thinking in relation to tracked vehicles.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I would question airborne operations above an LRS/SOF team level at all.
If you boil away all the hype, the best reason I can think of to retain airborne cabilities, is that it preserves the only light infantry the US Army is apparently capable of keeping. If you take away the airborne-specific requirements, our "light" infantry goes to war in 10 foot tall, 140 ton vehicles that cannot travel off-road. WITH reflective belts on, of course.
(I am being partially sarcastic, of course.)
IMO, we can project power properly, or we cannot. The US will never actually put a large unit at risk, doing Airborne ops properly, so they serve no practical purpose, except to preserve the "Airborne Spirit", IMO.
Now that I've ticked off my Airborne friends, it's time to go after my fellow Cavalrymen: Frankly, it's been about the vehicle for too long. Recon needs to become a mission.
I would recommend that CAV be divorced, permanently, from the Armor community, and become it's own deal. I'd tear MI completely down, and restructure collection, analysis and dissemination into a new branch.
I've found more than once, that there is a bit of "Sparky" in me, as well....
Last edited by 120mm; 08-06-2008 at 05:16 AM.
You're entitled to your opinion
even if you are wrong...I've discovered that use of the word never with respect to the US is not a good idea. We have surprised a number of people over the years by doing things we were not supposed to do. As I just told Reed on another thread, Omar Bradley in 1949 said there'd never be another major amphibious operation -- and a year so later, there I was at Inchon...IMO, we can project power properly, or we cannot. The US will never actually put a large unit at risk, doing Airborne ops properly, so they serve no practical purpose, except to preserve the "Airborne Spirit", IMO.
Never's not a good word.
Be that as it may, a lot of folks question parachute units just as you do. I've been listening to 'em for about fifty or more years -- and the units are still here because, as expensive as they are, they offer a capability that cannot at this time be matched in any other way. As to the "Airborne Spirit" there's some truth in that; not least in that the kids know three things; they stand an excellent chance in a combat jump of never getting to the ground alive (and they'll still go); they are probably going to fight outnumbered and surrounded and the other guy better watch out (Hey, long as they believe, who am I to argue...); and like Privates in every Army in the world, they get covered up with manure daily; like Privates in every Army in the world, they dig out and smile -- they just know they do it faster and smile bigger than most.As an old Cav Guy (whose last TCPC run was in an M41A1C...), I totally and wholeheartedly agree with that.Now that I've ticked off my Airborne friends, it's time to go after my fellow Cavalrymen: Frankly, it's been about the vehicle for too long. Recon needs to become a mission.
All true, but the current military view of parachute operations does seem to be stuck in a pretty archaic paradigm - and that may have to change, I see military parachuting in dire need of change. Things have come on a lot since 1944 or even 1983.
Having said that, troop carrying gliders went away for reasons that I never really understood, (Bang to bust in < 10 years) so I think some more thinking may be called for on my part!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
You may indeed
need to take a look at current doctrine. Having left reasonably good and functional airplanes (with occasionally marginal crews...) for a good many of the years between the two you cite, I'm pleasantly surprised at todays approach; different as day and night, as they say. No one is looking at Division drops, and only rarely at Brigade sized ops. Nor does anyone want to do a drop on a potentially hot DZ -- or indeed do a drop at all if it can be avoided. Still, particularly in HIC there is a worthwhile capability.
Well less than ten, really -- only about four or five with any real use. Four problems with the concept led to that; lack of controllability as they slowed and neared the ground resulting in excess dispersion (among other things); difficulty in arriving at a successful merging of strength and lightness in gliders (and a concomitant light load -- except for the Gigant) -- and the high casualty count on assaults (all in WW II except Eban Emael; good op, bad precedent) resulting from those two problems; the training and use of the Glider Pilots (the Germans, UK, US and USSR used three different solutions, none was entirely satisfactory); lastly, the use of towing aircraft wasn't a terribly efficient use of airframes. IIRC, there was a post WW II study and the towing aircraft suffered far more kills per capita in ops with Gliders than did pure drop aircraft.Having said that, troop carrying gliders went away for reasons that I never really understood, (Bang to bust in < 10 years) so I think some more thinking may be called for on my part!
The only big Glider with useful capacity was the Me 321 Gigant. It didn't do at all well as a Glider and later had engines added and was the first good large military transport. The US tried two big ones, the CG 13 and CG 16 but neither was successful. We also tried an un-engined C47 Dakota as an XCG 17 Glider -- it didn't work either.
Todays manufacturing can probably fix the strength / weight issue and the towing aircraft problem may be addressable with todays power capability but the other two difficulties will remain. Could be solved, I suppose but I'm not at all sure there's any value added. The only real use for parachute unit capability is entry into denied space at medium to long distances and those distances mitigate against towing Gliders.
Going to come up with some kind of 21st Century stealth glider, are you?
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
Never never land
KenThe only big Glider with useful capacity was the Me 321 Gigant. It didn't do at all well as a Glider and later had engines added and was the first good large military transport. The US tried two big ones, the CG 13 and CG 16 but neither was successful. We also tried an un-engined C47 Dakota as an XCG 17 Glider -- it didn't work either.
Don't forget that the C-123 airframe was originally concieved as a glider.
Agree strenuously that never is a word doomed to failure when it comes to military operations. The 101st air assault was a modern application of earlier theories and attempted ops. I wondered in 1992 what would have happened with XVIII Anb Corps had CINCENT Stormin Norman not outlawed all mention of airborned operations. The bridges would have been classic targets.The C-123 Provider was designed originally as an assault glider aircraft for the United States Air Force (USAF) by Chase Aircraft as the XCG-20 (Chase designation MS-8 Avitruc)[1]. Two powered variants of the XCG-20 were developed during the early 1950s, as the XC-123 and XC-123A. The only difference between the two was the engine. The XC-123 used two Pratt & Whitney R-2800-CB-15 air-cooled radial piston engines, while the XC-123A used two General Electric J47-GE-11 turbojets, the same as those on the Boeing B-47 Stratojet. It was initially well regarded for tactical troop transport for its ruggedness and reliability and ability to operate from short and unimproved airstrips, which meant the low slung turbojets, prone to ingesting foreign objects, were dropped in favor of the more conventional option. The XC-123A had its engines replaced with R-2800s and was redesignated YC-123D.
And there is no substitute for having the capacity to put troops on the ground in weird places when time is critical. Just having the card in one's military deck is of tremendous benefit.
Tom
Nah! I'm happy risking my effort on far less exotic endeavours, and researching the doctrinal and intellectual blocks to designing decent armoured vehicles is likely to be far more achievable and useful!Going to come up with some kind of 21st Century stealth glider, are you?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Concur without question. I would never agree to the total loss of the ability to deploy infantry units via parachute.
However the fact that no one in NATO, that I am aware of, has yet done a unit sized high altitude stand off drop, or is even attempting to develop the capability, suggests to me that the thought in this area may be lacking.
If modern airborne Ops are still focused on dumping sticks of troops along linear DZs at between 250-1,000 ft AGL, then things are not really progressing.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Let me see if I can steer this thread in a slightly different direction: why do we need separate parachute and air assault units?
Give parachute units the organic lift they need (or "marry" each parachute brigade with an aviation brigade in garrison per Col. MacGregor), train the troopers in air assault ops, and call it good to go. A lot of this already occurs anyway. I never went to air assault school, yet airmoble operations were routine in my battalion and I had periodic classes in basic rappelling and pathfinder ops.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
Actually something like this was attempted with the 11th AAD(Test)...otherwise known as the First Cavalry Division. The original concept called for an entire brigade to be airborne qualified (meaning that MacGregor's idea isn't all that new), and the Howze Board plan had a great deal more fixed-wing aviation than ended up in the final model. The airborne brigade was scrapped due to a shortage of paratroopers (by about mid-1966 if not sooner). The 173rd also had a hand in developing some airmobile techniques that later became associated with the First Cav (and other units).
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
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