Gavins Paratroopers

[jkm_101_fso]

Let me see if I can steer this thread in a slightly different direction: why do we need separate parachute and air assault units?

Give parachute units the organic lift they need (or "marry" each parachute brigade with an aviation brigade in garrison per Col. MacGregor), train the troopers in air assault ops, and call it good to go. A lot of this already occurs anyway. I never went to air assault school, yet airmoble operations were routine in my battalion and I had periodic classes in basic rappelling and pathfinder ops.

We don't need to separate them. I'm pretty confident the 82nd does just as many, if not more AA Ops than 101 in Combat and CONUS.

There is absolutely no necessity to be AA qualified to get on a helicopter and get off one...you are correct. AA school or PF school will prep those that need to slingload equipment...even then, some OJT can train anyone to do that job. I know that in 101, the NCO or Officer that signs the 7382-R has to be AA or PF qualified; or at least that was the standard in my BDE.

IMO, in the 70s when the 101st became "airmobile", then eventually "air assault", it was more out of nostalgia of keeping the Division "special"...since they weren't airborne anymore. Air Assault school is more of a right of passage for Soldiers; and a requirement for green tabbers at Campbell.

I've done AA ops with the IRAQI ARMY...so trust me, there is no special qualifications. Although I will admit, their exit from a chinook after landing was just as fast and proficient as any 101 unit I was with!!!

[Ken White]

...However the fact that no one in NATO, that I am aware of, has yet done a unit sized high altitude stand off drop, or is even attempting to develop the capability, suggests to me that the thought in this area may be lacking.

If modern airborne Ops are still focused on dumping sticks of troops along linear DZs at between 250-1,000 ft AGL, then things are not really progressing.

Actually, the troops and units are willing and able (and the technology in the form of MC1-1 and other, newer parachutes is available but the senior leadership, ever overly cautious and worried lest they upset the Mothers of America with a too-high training casualty rate have forbidden the use of the MC1-1 in mass jumps due to fear of in air collisions. That's easily rectified with training but training is (was?) not a US Army priority. not to relieve angst, anyway...

The 82d experimented with the MC1-1 off and on after its introduction in the late 60s. Bottom line, it worked, casualties were slightly higher (IIRC, the extrapolated jump injury rate went from 7.1 per 100K to 7.8 per 100K) In any event, that's the current problem. My belief is that in a major war, that would not be a problem...

You're sort of stuck with a static line for two reasons; training time and cost for free fall and the ability to put a mass of people on the ground quickly.

To address your linear DZ problem -- and it is one -- multiple DZs at random distance and angles and short sticks are a workable and tested tactical solution but they are not used routinely because they are very difficult to plan and the rehearsal and training time required of the Air Crews upsets the USAF.

Again, given a war, most of that peacetime big deal stuff would be essentially not of concern.

[Rifleman]

To address your linear DZ problem -- and it is one -- multiple DZs at random distance and angles and short sticks are a workable and tested tactical solution but they are not used routinely because they are very difficult to plan and the rehearsal and training time required of the Air Crews upsets the USAF.

So, would it be better for the Army to have their own transport for this- maybe a small plane along the lines of the old Caribou?

[reed11b]

So, would it be better for the Army to have their own transport for this- maybe a small plane along the lines of the old Caribou?

I would say yes, especially since strategic drops have little historical success. However in saying yes, you have opened the old key-west accords argument and you have completely destroyed the strategic justification of airborne troops. The C-26 the Army is getting theoretically would fit the bill perfectly, think they could get enough funding to buy them?
Reed

[Ken White]

So, would it be better for the Army to have their own transport for this- maybe a small plane along the lines of the old Caribou?

I don't think they could ever have enough and the size of the bird isn't the issue with oil spot drops. Plus bigger birds get more people more places more quickly and for a strategic role -- or just for a strategic deterrent -- number of troops per aircraft is important and you have the range problem, smaller aircraft = less range. As Reed mentions, unlikely the Army could get enough anyway due to the roles and missions split anyway. That split works okay; just a hiccup every now and then.

Reed:

What strategic drops "...have little historical success?"

The C-26 the Army is getting theoretically would fit the bill perfectly, think they could get enough funding to buy them?

It's a C-27 and the Army's funded for 75. I suspect they'll end up with double that number when all's said and done. That's not really a lot; figure 150 at 85% in operational units = ~125 given worldwide commitments, you might have half of 'em when and where you need 'em and even if, say 65, are used all for troop drop, with door bundles, that's only about 2,500 troops. Tactically and Operationally okay but no strategic threat or deterrent.

[reed11b]

Ken I have decided you were probably once a great smart @$$ SPC, I have decided that you are alright. Even if you are wrong

[Ken White]

Ken I have decided you were probably once a great smart @$$ SPC, I have decided that you are alright. Even if you are wrong

I was never an SPC, That rank came in long after I did, in fact, it came in after I retired. I was a double dipping DAC by the time it arrived. Not to say I wasn't a smart ass corporal though. Couple of times...

And I'm not wrong on the discussion -- that's proven by the fact that the Eighty Twice and two Airplane BCTS exist. Seems to me you've just fallen for the Army 'Heavy Divisions rule' * party line and a have belief that the will to commit the Country to an all out war no longer exists and thus the airborne option isn't necessary in large numbers. Neither of those things I think are true. No biggie...

You didn't tell me what those failed strategic drops were???

* They do -- a lot of places and a lot of the time but not all places and at all times. METT-TC...

[William F. Owen]

Actually, the troops and units are willing and able (and the technology in the form of MC1-1 and other, newer parachutes is available but the senior leadership, ever overly cautious and worried lest they upset the Mothers of America with a too-high training casualty rate have forbidden the use of the MC1-1 in mass jumps due to fear of in air collisions. That's easily rectified with training but training is (was?) not a US Army priority. not to relieve angst, anyway...

Using some of the high performance canopies around today, you hop and pop at altitude ( either static line or drogue stabilised FF) and then fly to a 100m x 100m DZ either using GPS and/or NVG and some kind of low light marker kit.

Each aircraft can dump it's entire load, and deconfliction is really down to how you space the aircraft over the release point. I would figure 90 seconds separation enough. If the bad folks can't hear you coming and you can get 400 infantry on the ground in about 10 mins, then you may have something that gets results.

[Fuchs]

Going to come up with some kind of 21st Century stealth glider, are you?

It's an obsolete concept for personnel insertion since HAHO techniques and helpful tools for their use at night (NVG, GPS) are available.
Pretty much the same concept (just with autopilot instead of parachutist) is possible for load-carrying gliding chutes (up to several tons iirc), covering possible requirements for heavy weapons and motorized vehicles.

Gliders might have had a justification till the 90''s, though - my guess is that training was simply too difficult/expensive and accident rate too high.
Gliders are furthermore very sensitive to ground conditions and slopes.

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About air-mech ideas; there are different facets.

One is that infantry with CAS and little indirect fires is a rather weak combination and might fail to take its objective. A couple of light tanks might help a lot - that was the idea behind Tetrarch, Locust, Sheridan and Buford. Buford (and its upgraded 120mm version Thunderbolt) also gave some serious addition to the paratroopers' capability to defeat armor (which was quite poor till the introduction of Javelin). The Arnhem '44 and Crete '44 scenarios highlight these challenges.

The other air-mech concept in the U.S.Army was published in several papers (and refuted), including ARMOR Magazine iirc.
It was about bypassing obstacles and reds through the air and maneuver not horizontally, but horizontally plus vertically into a position in the enemy's rear. But the tempo challenge (assault quicker than your opponent can use his reserves) and the breakthrough challenge could be avoided to some degree with this concept.
I dislike it for its hardware cost, risk, susceptibility to appropriate defenses and because modern conventional wars like that would likely not have the force densities to really require a breakthrough battle anyway (exceptions like Turkey vs. Greece scenarios prove the rule). Modern vehicle speeds are so high that it's probably a better idea to think about how to close in to vehicle speeds with unit speeds than to call for heavylift helicopters.
This concept was actually not far away from the Arnhem '44 scenario; the real addition was some mechanized maneuvers behind enemy lines (Liddel-Hart alike) in addition to taking (an) objective(s).

And then there's the simply Shinseki-like air-deployability idea, which is afaik pretty much dead in most Western armies.

The German air mechanization concept (Luftmechanisierung) is afaik (I regret to not be very well informed - it seems to still be an informal concept anyway) two concepts:
1) A fire brigade style force to be inserted at crisis points (the classic defensive German paratrooper concept of the Cold War); a concept of diminishing relevance.
2) A Helicopter-centric super-mobile strike force, to form and quickly move a Schwerpunkt. Transport helicopters would form a base, and infantry would only act as Blues team and security force. The forward helicopter base in the 1991 Iraq war might have been an important inspiration.
This idea centered on the Tiger helicopter and certainly took a serious blow when an Apache regiment was shredded over Iraq in 2003 by low tech defenses.
I'm not aware of the present state of German Luftmechanisierung; the helicopters are under procurement, but the extraordinary concepts seem to have been on already eroded feet of clay.
In reality, German paratroopers are today jsut like other infantry being rotated through overseas peacekeeping missions and preparations for overseas missions.

I'd like to learn about the Russian's operational ideas for their BMD-equipped airborne troops.
Afaik they were intended to overrun NATO airbases and important bridges (as well as potential interventions in the Third World) during the Cold War and serve today (together with BTR-equipped motorized and internal affairs ministry troops) as internal quick-reaction force.
I don't know about any really modern conventional war concepts for their employment.

[Rifleman]

It's an obsolete concept for personnel insertion since HAHO techniques and helpful tools for their use at night (NVG, GPS) are available.

Yes, I understand. It was a "tongue in cheek" comment.