To clarify, when asked to address a problem as a whole, rather than a single niche component of the problem that this thread focuses upon, I offer more comprehensive positions. By focusing my answer on the question I apparently have created the perception that all of those other aspects do not matter. They do.
Still not a comprehensive answer, but to clarify that when I say "governance" I do not mean "government." Equally, when I say the problem is governance, I do not mean that there must be some massive development of institutions or infrastructure, or radical change of form or function to reduce the negative energy in the system. From a paper where I included a section on why we need to shift from objective tactical metrics to more subjective strategic metrics to gain a better sense of if we were helping a place to make true progress:
Tactical definitions and tactical metrics undermine strategic progress: Our doctrinal definitions focus our efforts on the symptoms of insurgency rather than upon the fundamental nature of insurgency. Similarly, our metrics for assessing progress are largely tied to tactical measures of progress. Overtime we have increasingly compromised critical strategic factors in order to maximize our tactical effectiveness. Night Raids are a classic example of this, designed to maximize objective tactical gains, but at the expense of strategic principles. Sums of tactical gains do not equal strategic success.
Recommendation: Reframe the entire operation to promote the following perceptions: sovereignty – is governance IAW the expectations of the affected populations; legitimacy – do the affected populations recognize the right of this governance to affect them; justice – how do the people feel about the rule of law as applied to them; respect – do people feel they are treated equally to similarly situated populations more closely aligned with governance; lastly, empowerment – do people across the population perceive they have trusted, certain, legal and culturally relevant means to shape the governance that affects them. These are subjective and in the perspective of those affected.
When sides from along religious lines, and one side aligned with governance perceives themselves to have these things, and those not aligned with governance perceive themselves to not have these things, it sets the stage for a far more exploitable, passionate, and ruthless form of conflict than when the lines are not based in religion.
As to the role of the military, be that the military of some intervening power or that of the host nation, I offered this in another paper:
• Engage the threat: There are limits to the positive effects military activity can provide. Too much or too inappropriate and one is likely to add negative energy to the system, rather than take energy away. One must design and conduct tactical actions for strategic effect. The military also provides a critical supporting role to civil governance in three important ways as it works to indirectly reduce the negative energy in the system:
o Mitigate the negative impacts of poor governance and TCO/VEO activities on relevant populations
o Temporarily suppress or disrupt the symptoms of the threat (networks, activities, individuals, etc.)
o Create time and space for civil authorities to act directly to reduce the energy in the ecosystem
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