Are we securing the people?

77Marine98 · 10-07-2005

I am a fan of the USMC CAP program but at the same time acknowledge what I read on another thread here that you cannot simply take the Vietnam model; lock, stock and barrel; and plop it down into Iraq. Situational adjustments need to be made. That said, had we utilized a CAP-like program early-on and had sufficient resources to guarantee security going into Phase IV the current sit in Iraq may have looked a bit better. Of course, Monday morning quarterbacking is always a breeze.

**Steve Blair** · 10-07-2005

CAP, Phoenix, and CORDS were all reasonably successful programs in their day (some more than others...I'm a big fan of CAP/CAC), and have lessons that we certainly should study. Note that the key word here is "lesson." All situations are different, but that does not mean that we should ignore what has gone before just because it happened "in the past."

That said, it's also possible to discern successful operational patterns from studying the past. Isolating yourself from the target population has never proven succesful as far as I know. You have to know the terrain and the people, and let them know you within the constraints of prudent security. If you fail in this aspect, you allow your opponent to label you however he likes.

**Ironhorse** · 10-07-2005

See Krepinevich's recent How to Win in Iraq article in Foreign Affairs, advocating an "oilspot" approach.

The CAP approach has some economy of force benefits in some respects. But it can also be a sink hole for forces. Ironic that we couldn't afford to invest the forces into an economy of force operation to preserve and expand our presence.

Has anyone mentioned Shinseki lately?

**CPT Holzbach** · 10-08-2005

Good discussion. Naturally, adjustments need to be made from the original CAP program to fit modern day situations. My experience in Iraq is in Baghdad (Hardly an isolated village. The war here is quite different compared to out west.) I believe the biggest threat to a CAP in a city like this is the VBIEDs, the car bombs. Park one of those outside the platoon's safehouse, and it's a replay of the Marines in Beirut in 1983. As far as the media having a ball with casualties, they do that anyway. Unfortunatly, adopting a CAP program now would ensure a spike in casualties IN THE SHORT TERM. But there's more to security in counterinsurgency than fire power. Information is the best security. The CAP program in Vietnam often forbade the use of supporting artillery entirely. Marines survived through small unit infantry skills, and the protection provided them by the people. They knew when the enemy was coming. In Bing West's The Village, the Marine SQUAD (with the help of the PFs) fought off company and battalion sized elements on more than one occasion, thanks entirely to tip offs from the people, and the threat of rapid reinforcement from nearby Army units. A modern US platoon, supported by an Iraqi Police platoon and an Iraqi Army platoon, in urban terrain (strongly favors the defender), would make very short work of an insurgent force of almost any size. The insurgents here are a far cry from the level of training and skill the Viet Cong and NVA had in infantry combat. Just mustering a sufficiently sized force would be nearly impossible to hide. They would loose any surprise. I dont believe a complete wipe out of a CAP in Baghdad would be a real threat. Stopping car bombs would be the real challenge.

**Strickland** · 10-08-2005

I disagree with the assessments of CAP needing revision to apply to modern times. Yes, VBIEDs, such as the one used against the Marines in Beirut, are a problem; however, the Beirut example is a poor one due to the ROE the Marines were forced to observe in that situation. The VBIED threat can be mitigated by creating stand-off zones, picking suitable locations to reinforce, and by further creating and enforcing traffic laws and regulations. While others are trying to discover the Mr. Wizard way to defeat VBIEDs; how about installing traffic control devices, no parking zones, mass transit, and simple things like one-way streets. I know that this wouldnt cost $5 billion dollars, but it would employ hundreds of Iraqis to make the signs, post them, and then enforce the appropriate laws.

CAP most certainly works in an urban area. Anyone who has conducted urban combat knows how difficult it is to clear a building of a handful of determined foe, thus the idea of wiping out an entire USMC Platoon iby cutting it off is unrealisitc. Does community policing in the US work? Then why would CAP not work in Iraq? Everyone agrees that securing the population is the first priority. How does one do this without freedom of action and freedom of movement? How does one do this if Army organizations such as Movement Control restrict movement in a predictable manner to the same MSRs?

I also agree that the French colonial warfare method of pacification should be employed. Using widely dispersed units to pacify outward towards each other is a good idea.

I would argue that it maybe time to shift areas of operations between the Army and USMC. The Army can take Al Anbar, and the USMC can take Baghdad. I am not implying that there is a performance difference; however, I am suggesting that by shaking things up and giving the enemy something new to thing about might not be a bad thing. In addition, we need to adjust our expectations of the National Guard. Should we expect these folks to perform on the same level as the active duty peers? If they can perform as equals, then why have an expensive large standing army, why not just one we call up when we need it. It is obvious that too much is being expected of these folks. CAPs run by the USMC throughout the city could work.

In the end, whether we call it Small War, Irregular War, Peoples War, etc., it is all Maneuver Warfare. It is all about generating and controlling tempo in order to create advantages to be exploited by spatial and temporal maneuver. It is about being able to maneuver throught the OODA loop faster than your opponent. We need to get everyone on the same sheet of music.

The question remains - how do we attack the enemy COG - the ability to operate in the open without fear of detection or identification?

**Steve Blair** · 10-09-2005

My point was not that CAP needs to be "modernized," but rather that the basic concept be examined and used where and when appropriate and modified IF that is needed. The community policing example is one that I had intended to draw as well. It has been demonstrated time and again that radio cars alone do NOT provide a good picture for law enforcement. Since a fair percentage of SW activity can be seen as law enforcement (or something similar to that), it stands to reason that we should look to the LE community as well for lessons and tactics that might prove useful.

The biggest issue with maneuver warfare is that the USMC sees that it is the way to go, while the Army has not yet reached this point, IMO at least. The beauty of maneuver warfare is that its basics can be applied to almost any sort of conflict you encounter. I would argue that maneuver warfare is a system for approaching any sort of warfare you encounter. It may require adjustments in some particulars, but the profecient user of MW will come out on top in most situations.

DDilegge · 11-18-2005

18 Nov. Los Angeles Times - The Nation.

About 350 Marines here and at Camp Pendleton are being trained as advisors to the Iraqi army, in the hopes that a strategy honed during the Vietnam War can be used to improve Iraq's military and hasten the withdrawal of U.S. personnel....

Split into teams of 11 to 15 men, the Marines will provide monthly evaluations of the Iraqi troops they are embedded with. In many cases, that will mean living outside the security of U.S. bases...

"We have taken a page from Vietnam," Sattler said. In Vietnam, the "combined action platoon" concept brought U.S. and Vietnamese troops together in a counterinsurgency strategy...

Bing West, former assistant Defense secretary in the Reagan administration and author of two books on the Marines in Iraq, said the advisor idea involved a trade-off of "risk of casualties versus [the] reward of better-trained Iraqi soldiers..."

Thomas X. Hammes, a retired Marine colonel and author of "The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century," said he would like the advisor course at Camp Pendleton to be expanded to six or 12 months, including language training...

**GorTex6** · 11-18-2005

A little late in the game aren't we?

DDilegge · 11-18-2005

Originally Posted by GorTex6

A little late in the game aren't we?

1st MARDIV trained up CAP units prior to re-deploying to OIF "II". Much training and educaton went into that effort.

Then "#### happened."

Reader's Digest version here:

- Division arrives in country (Al Anbar - Fallujah, Ramadi)
- Division just settling in and ready to impledment CAP
- Contractors killed and hung from bridge
- Mucho press coverage - outrage - attention from 'above'
- Division conducts MOUT to take Fallujah, Iraqi Bn does not perform well
- Division close to taking Fallujah after hard fought battle
- Division ordered to cease and withdraw by 'higher HQ'.
- Division ham-strung by uncertainty from above
- Maybe Iraqi's need more training before being put in 'harm's way'...

Give the Marines a break - I can attest that the CAP program was intended from day one.

**CPT Holzbach** · 11-19-2005

I think this is a fantatic development. And if these units are intended and organized primarily to fight as CAPs, rather than a whole division with the intention to operate as CAPs, maybe they'll be able to continue mission without too much grief from higher if things get crazy again. And hopefully higher levels will have the confidence in them to take care of themselves if things do go askew. I eagerly await what those guys will have to say about their experiences. Im especially keen to hear how they deal with the IED/VBIED threat when they dont have a fortress FOB to live on. Any word about how long they are supposed to stay?