Are we securing the people?

[Steve Blair]

This was recognized as far back as the USMC Small Wars Manual (which documented experiences from the inter-war years) and even the Army's operations in the Philippeans around the turn of the century. It was later validated by the CAP program launched by the Marines in Vietnam.

Local intel, fed to the people on the ground by locals who have lived around them and grown to trust them, is vital to any operation like this. When Intel has to flow up the chain, and then somehow make its way back down the chain, information is lost. And if troops aren't out among those they're supposed to protect, it creates an impression that the people either can't be protected or aren't worth protecting.

[Hansmeister]

This wasn't happening very much in the beginning, but now we are engaging much more in take&hold operations, vs previously using sweep&destroy.

The main reasons we don't follow the USMC SWM principles of putting platoons into villages to secure them are two-fold. First, Iraq is a heavily urbanized country in which such a strategy would be less successfull. Secondly, the risk that an individual unit could be overrun by a determined enemy is much higher, creating a potential PR nightmare. Just imagine if one platoon, operating independently in an Iraqi village, was wiped out by insurgents. The press would have a field day with a report of 50 US soldiers dead in a single battle.

[Steve Blair]

Understandable, and that's where the disconnect comes in. Obviously the CAP doctrine/idea needs to be developed and modified to make it work in an urban area. But the choice is still there: do you go for PR or do you try to actually secure the populace? You can't really do both at the same time, since the route for PR is avoiding risk, while securing the populace involves risk. IMO, anyhow.

If past conflicts provide any examples, it is very difficult for an insurgent force in a village setting to wipe out an entire platoon when it's backed by modern fire support. The press is a reality of modern conflict, but if we let them dictate the course of action we're in trouble.

[Hansmeister]

Well, we are in trouble because of the nature of our media. In many ways we have to treat our own media as if it were part of the enemy. The adversarial and sensationalistic role of the modern media makes it impossible to act without considering the impact media reporting will have on the greater conflict.

In the information age the media is critical to achieving victory, and sadly we don't have a media that is on our side.

You're are of course right that a platoon backed with modern fire support can't be beaten by insurgents, but if we would spread hundreds of platoon-size element throughout Iraq to work in local districs it would be impossible to provide proper fire support to them all.

Incidentally, we do have a model that would work in Iraq that we're currently practicing in Afghanistan: the Provincial Reconstruction Team, or PRT. These teams are made up of several hundred soldiers, including infantry, engineers, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, SF, and intel, as well as IGOs and NGOs. We need to establish similar structures in Iraq, but the problem is that we are suffering a severe shortage in those specialized fields, which would only allow a very limited number of PRTs.

Given our constraints our current deployment, as imperfect as it might be, is probably the only feasable approach.

[Martin]

Sirs, beware that I am not a Soldier and that my experience is limited.

With that said, a similar scenario has been documented before. The book Stalking the Vietcong (Stuart A. Herrington) talks about Cpt. Herrington's experiences with the Phoenix program in Vietnam.

Among other themes is the social and political interaction at village level, and how that pertains to intelligence gathering. Similarities also go on from both infiltration of the indigenous forces and the violent threat of the insurgents, to show how the enemy motivation could be understood and therefore exploited in defection programs.

Issues such as being overrun are present, too.


Other than that, I'd like to express a concern about surveillance of cell phones (and phones in general). More I will not say, minding my lack of knowledge.

Martin

[77Marine98]

Sirs, beware that I am not a Soldier and that my experience is limited.

With that said, a similar scenario has been documented before. The book Stalking the Vietcong (Stuart A. Herrington) talks about Cpt. Herrington's experiences with the Phoenix program in Vietnam.

Among other themes is the social and political interaction at village level, and how that pertains to intelligence gathering. Similarities also go on from both infiltration of the indigenous forces and the violent threat of the insurgents, to show how the enemy motivation could be understood and therefore exploited in defection programs.

Issues such as being overrun are present, too.


Other than that, I'd like to express a concern about surveillance of cell phones (and phones in general). More I will not say, minding my lack of knowledge.

Martin

Martin, regardless of your background or experience you surfaced a Vietnam era program that worked well, but was vilified in the press and has since become an urban legend. We should study what Phoenix and CORDS did in Vietnam as a harbinger for future operations in that we may most certainly find particular aspects that may be useful, and go figure, successful. Vietnam was not the “total” failure some would like us to believe it was. Of particular note are the lessons we might learn if only we studied them.

[77Marine98]

I am a fan of the USMC CAP program but at the same time acknowledge what I read on another thread here that you cannot simply take the Vietnam model; lock, stock and barrel; and plop it down into Iraq. Situational adjustments need to be made. That said, had we utilized a CAP-like program early-on and had sufficient resources to guarantee security going into Phase IV the current sit in Iraq may have looked a bit better. Of course, Monday morning quarterbacking is always a breeze.