Are we securing the people?

[CPT Holzbach]

I do not believe we properly secure the people of Iraq against insurgent retribution. In order to win, we must get actionable intelligence. In order to get the intel, we've got to make the people feel safe giving it to us. In order to make them feel safe, we've got to be able to respond quickly if an informant is in danger. We've got to foster a climate of safety in the neighborhoods. I believe that by living on FOBs, detached from the people, we fail to do this. We should be living in the towns and cities in platoon sized elements, with Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police platoons attached to each US platoon. Intelligence is not processed through a lumbering S-2 chain, but passed directly to the platoon leaders on their cell phones, the numbers to which will be common knowledge amongst the people. Flex whatever patrol is out at the time to investigate. This company size element would be like the local police precinct. Comments?

[Steve Blair]

This was recognized as far back as the USMC Small Wars Manual (which documented experiences from the inter-war years) and even the Army's operations in the Philippeans around the turn of the century. It was later validated by the CAP program launched by the Marines in Vietnam.

Local intel, fed to the people on the ground by locals who have lived around them and grown to trust them, is vital to any operation like this. When Intel has to flow up the chain, and then somehow make its way back down the chain, information is lost. And if troops aren't out among those they're supposed to protect, it creates an impression that the people either can't be protected or aren't worth protecting.

[Hansmeister]

This wasn't happening very much in the beginning, but now we are engaging much more in take&hold operations, vs previously using sweep&destroy.

The main reasons we don't follow the USMC SWM principles of putting platoons into villages to secure them are two-fold. First, Iraq is a heavily urbanized country in which such a strategy would be less successfull. Secondly, the risk that an individual unit could be overrun by a determined enemy is much higher, creating a potential PR nightmare. Just imagine if one platoon, operating independently in an Iraqi village, was wiped out by insurgents. The press would have a field day with a report of 50 US soldiers dead in a single battle.

[Steve Blair]

Understandable, and that's where the disconnect comes in. Obviously the CAP doctrine/idea needs to be developed and modified to make it work in an urban area. But the choice is still there: do you go for PR or do you try to actually secure the populace? You can't really do both at the same time, since the route for PR is avoiding risk, while securing the populace involves risk. IMO, anyhow.

If past conflicts provide any examples, it is very difficult for an insurgent force in a village setting to wipe out an entire platoon when it's backed by modern fire support. The press is a reality of modern conflict, but if we let them dictate the course of action we're in trouble.

[Hansmeister]

Well, we are in trouble because of the nature of our media. In many ways we have to treat our own media as if it were part of the enemy. The adversarial and sensationalistic role of the modern media makes it impossible to act without considering the impact media reporting will have on the greater conflict.

In the information age the media is critical to achieving victory, and sadly we don't have a media that is on our side.

You're are of course right that a platoon backed with modern fire support can't be beaten by insurgents, but if we would spread hundreds of platoon-size element throughout Iraq to work in local districs it would be impossible to provide proper fire support to them all.

Incidentally, we do have a model that would work in Iraq that we're currently practicing in Afghanistan: the Provincial Reconstruction Team, or PRT. These teams are made up of several hundred soldiers, including infantry, engineers, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, SF, and intel, as well as IGOs and NGOs. We need to establish similar structures in Iraq, but the problem is that we are suffering a severe shortage in those specialized fields, which would only allow a very limited number of PRTs.

Given our constraints our current deployment, as imperfect as it might be, is probably the only feasable approach.

[Martin]

Sirs, beware that I am not a Soldier and that my experience is limited.

With that said, a similar scenario has been documented before. The book Stalking the Vietcong (Stuart A. Herrington) talks about Cpt. Herrington's experiences with the Phoenix program in Vietnam.

Among other themes is the social and political interaction at village level, and how that pertains to intelligence gathering. Similarities also go on from both infiltration of the indigenous forces and the violent threat of the insurgents, to show how the enemy motivation could be understood and therefore exploited in defection programs.

Issues such as being overrun are present, too.


Other than that, I'd like to express a concern about surveillance of cell phones (and phones in general). More I will not say, minding my lack of knowledge.

Martin

[Strickland]

I do not believe we properly secure the people of Iraq against insurgent retribution. In order to win, we must get actionable intelligence. In order to get the intel, we've got to make the people feel safe giving it to us. In order to make them feel safe, we've got to be able to respond quickly if an informant is in danger. We've got to foster a climate of safety in the neighborhoods. I believe that by living on FOBs, detached from the people, we fail to do this. We should be living in the towns and cities in platoon sized elements, with Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police platoons attached to each US platoon. Intelligence is not processed through a lumbering S-2 chain, but passed directly to the platoon leaders on their cell phones, the numbers to which will be common knowledge amongst the people. Flex whatever patrol is out at the time to investigate. This company size element would be like the local police precinct. Comments?

This was the original question/quote from this thread. Upon review, I have the following comments: 1. There were 872 American KIA in Iraq in 2004. (iraq has a total population of 26 million) 2. There were 1360 homicides in Texas in 2004. (Texas has a population of 21 million) 3. Most of the Iraqi provinces are relatively safe; however, just as with Harlem, SE DC, South-Central LA, East St Louis, and others, there are certainly places in the US that ARE NOT SAFE. While we have too few troops in Iraq to provide the appropriate level of security, we should not forget that to most outsiders, US crime figures generate a perception of "civil war."

[sabers8th]

I was in Al Anbar in 03-04 with the Army which was subsequently relieved by the Marines. Since leavign have followed the area of and on since leaving. I hae read articles about the employment of the CAP platoons there but they seem to be overshadoewd by reoccurent Operations to pacify the area that the MArines have seem to lost complete control of... I am not saying we did a outstanding job but if you compare the casualty figures from our entire stay in Iraq to the Marines first month look something like this. Army 3 KIA with @ 100 WIA for one unit compared to Marines 10 KIA first month and 60 serious WIA first month. When we were relieved by the Marines the overall impression from myself is that they really did not have ahandle with what was going on there...... And unfortunately they paid for it. My 2 cents being a former 0311 it was very dissapointing to see them like that.