Right of the bat you confirm that "rogue state" is a political definition. So - let's look at your definitions of a "rogue state":
The characteristics are problematic. Why? They do not offer any objective value to understanding the behavior of states. Sure - they provide good political commentary, hence the "controversy" of using the term in the first place. If you were to compare the U.S. list of rogue states with all the states in the international community that meet the three characteristics you provide, there is a significant discrepency. The implied definition excavated from your statement is that a rogue state is a state that does not conform to the currently established norms of international conduct in the U.S.-led international system. Now - the real question is this: why is that relevant?1. Ruled by authoritarian regime
2.Sponsor terrorism
3.Proliferation of WMD
That's a qood question. I'd have to double check, but there's something like over 100 definitions of weapons of mass destructing between local, state, federal, and international law. In some of those definitions, large explosives are classified as WMD. Now - what are the legal implications of classifying conventional military systems as WMD? If the Buk, why not the Patriot missile system? If the BM 21, why not HIMARS?Heck AP we define a home made bomb in Boston as WMD these days so why not a Buk or BM 21/27?
That is a presumption with which I disagree. More often the case, the presumption is the result of a failure of analysis by the one making the presumption.A common presumption applied to rogue states is that they do not necessarily behave rationally or in their own best interests.
Regime type (authoritarian, democratic, etc) does influence state behavior but authoritarian states are not less 'rational' than democratic states. They are responding to different stimuli in their domestic politics.In political theory it is generally believed that a stable nation, ruled by a leadership that is subject to broad scrutiny (though not necessarily democratic scrutiny), will tend to act in its own best interests and will not take actions that are directly contrary to its own interests, particularly not to its own survival. Rogue states, however, may not be subject to this assumption and, as such, relations with them may be more complicated and unpredictable.
You answered your own question. I highlighted it in bold. The nationalists and realists have gathered strength during the second Putin administration, pushing the technocrats and liberals (what's left of them) aside. As I've stated in previous posts, the Russian elite is gaining in confidence and capability, and there's also disenchantment with the dissonance between Russia's ascribed and perceived status. So - if Russia has the means, motive, and opportunity, how are they acting irrational?Would argue that Russia has not acted rationally since the Georgia events –actually even before that in their direct violation of the INF. Why did they violate the INF—it came out yesterday in a number of press releases after the US charges—the treaty hurts Russia, the treaty is not good for Russia etc. The underlying assumption by the hardliners is ---that was done under weak SU leaders and we are strong thus want to change it now.
The basic tenant of realist IR theory is: "the strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must." Why would Russia "acceptable responsibility" for actions for which they do not want to accept responsibility, and why is Russia's decision to not accept responsibility any more objectionable than any other powerful state that refuses to accept responsibility?now we have rouge nation who is redefining the concept of ethnicity/culture/language as a smokescreen for imperialistic nationalistic expansion under the guise of “we want to play again with the big boys” BUT we do not want to play “big boy games” meaning accept responsibility for our actions in the international relations game.
Yes - as described in this post and previous posts, Russia has the motive, means, and opportunity to act as a spoiler in the international system. Motive - insecurity caused by the difference between perceived and ascribed status. Means - improving military capabilities relative to other great powers. Opportunity - Georgia, Ukraine, et. al. Again, if all three are present, how is the Russian elite acting irrationally?Now ask yourself the following question and I would like you now to answer it since you wanted a definition of rouge state---does this sound like the actions of a sane, rationally clear thinking participant country in either Europe or Eurasia? Or a sane rational acting country at all?
And so here we come full cycle. It's clear that Russia has the motive, means, and opportunity to act as a spoiler. But why now? As I've discussed in previous posts, states are concerned with relative power with other states. There's a perception (not completely unfounded, and certainly not helped by U.S. politics) that the U.S. is in retrenchment. That does not necessarily mean U.S. power is diminishing. It just means that U.S. capabilities are diminishing or is perceived to be diminishing relative to other major powers (namely China and Russia, and to a smaller extent, Japan, India, Germany, and perhaps a few others).Rouge has been now answered. Debate concluded.
But what's the context of this retrenchment? It follows a period of unilateral policies that have aggravated and sowed distrust in the international community through the Bush Doctrine. The retrenchment of military capabilities could not be patched over through diplomatic efforts because the trust and goodwill simply did not exist. So now - after 8 years of the Bush doctrine championing the U.S.' right to unilaterally act as it pleases internationally, we have the Obama doctrine which attempts to preserve the less objectionable aspects of the Bush era while also simultaneously withdrawing from many foolhardy commitments. But that has only opened the opportunity for states like Russia, chomping at the bit to get back in the game as you said, to act. The U.S. escalated conflict through the War on Terrorism and other Bush doctrine policies; now we're trying to de-escalate. However, other states, namely Russia, have taken our cue (Iraq, Syria, Libya, and so on), and have also decided to escalate. That's the problem and why we're caught in this compromising foreign policy position.
Now - you've said that Russia is an irrational state. That's clearly not the case. They have the means, motive, and opportunity. You've also said that Russia is a "rogue state" - well, that's a matter of perspective since "rogue" implies the existence of an overarching international regime of norms and institutions to which one is bound. If the strong do what they can, and Russia has the means to do what it can, how is it a "rogue" state for acting in its own interests?
Lastly - my concern here has never been defining Russia's aggression. Russia is clearly interfering in the affairs of another state. My dispute with you is (1) your claim that this interference is irrational, (2) that this interference is uniquely objectionable compared to the behavior of other states, including the U.S., and (3) that the U.S. priority should be the salvation of Ukraine, regardless of the consequences to the U.S.-Russian dyadic and the overall stability of the international system.
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