Ukraine: military (Aug '14 to mid-June '15) closed

[Dayuhan]

This seems a strange and self-defeating move, if true, simply because it hurts a lot more people in Russia than outside of it. The last thing most governments would want to sanction is their own imports of cheap food. People will overlook many things in the grip of nationalism, but the stomach is pretty close to home.

https://ph.news.yahoo.com/russia-ban...231321612.html

Russia bans all U.S. food, EU fruit and veg in sanctions response; NATO fears invasion

MOSCOW/DONETSK Ukraine (Reuters) - Russia will ban all imports of food from the United States and all fruit and vegetables from Europe, the state news agency reported on Wednesday, a sweeping response to Western sanctions imposed over its support for rebels in Ukraine.

The measures will hit consumers at home who rely on cheap imports, and on farmers in the West for whom Russia is a big market. Moscow is by far the biggest buyer of European fruit and vegetables and the second biggest importer of U.S. poultry....

... U.S. poultry has been ubiquitous in Russia since the early days after the Soviet Union, when cheap American chicken quarters sold at street markets were called "Bush's legs" after the president.

On the invasion side, I'm starting to wonder about the point at which it might be advisable for the Ukraine to call a pause, offer a safe return for Russian fighters and a limited amnesty for local rebels, and even offer a degree of local autonomy... obviously not the kind of autonomy Putin wants, with the east having veto power over foreign policy and other features that would give Russia control, but a substantial carrot. Offering Russian Ukrainians the kind of linguistic and cultural recognition that the French enjoy in eastern Canada might be a start, and could be managed without seriously compromising Ukrainian sovereignty.

The idea is not to give in, of course, but to offer enough of a carrot to undercut any Russian contention that peacekeeping forces are necessary. Obviously this is not a move that the US or the EU can take, the Ukrainians have to be on board and up front.

Dayuhan---rouge yes if the following comment is valid---when Russia annexed the Crimea they used the NATO/US response to both Kosovo and Libya as examples of no UN cover and the West running amok --so they will use the same argument hey the UN did not go along with us and we now will use exactly the same arguments the West used before when they did not use the UNSC--Russia tends to forget that in both countries there had been an ongoing irregular fight that Russia blocked all UN actions on.

If selective interpretation if rules and precedents makes a rogue state, there's a lot of rogue states out there.

I don't see how terms like "rogue" (still less "rouge") are really very useful. Does the term get us any closer to a strategy to get the Russians to stop doing what they're doing?

Dayuhan--here is the problem Russia/Putin are having---they want an urgent UNSC meeting on humanitarian reasons in the Ukraine and quote they ar in contact to the ICRC about the problem with the Ukrainians terrorizing proRussians in Donetsk.

THEN along comes their own irregulars and captures three ICRC reps and their drivers and the DNR actual Russian leader Girkin in a voice intercept says thrown them in a hole--check the link for the voice intercept.

Seems like Putin cannot control the ghosts he called up.

Yes, we see this, we see the contradictions and inconsistencies, and we see that Putin has got himself into a corner. What do you think the US should do about it at this point?

The problem with this thread is that Outlaw is making the running and offering his take on the situation given the facts (and his career experience) at his disposal... and there are a few Obama apologists chirping from the bleachers.

Actually I have yet to see Outlaw make a concrete statement of what he thinks the US did wrong, what he thinks should have been done instead, and what he thinks the US should be doing now. Haven't heard that from you either.

I don't think the US government's course has been ideal, but I don't see what other realistic options they had under the circumstances. I don't think a Republican administration would have played it much differently under the circumstances.

What is clear is that Russia would not have attempted what they have - in annexing Crimea and invading eastern Ukraine - unless they were sure they would get away with it.

Nobody is ever sure. They obviously believed they would get away with it enough to take the risk. In Crimea they were right. In the Eastern Ukraine maybe not so right, remains to be seen.

Putin correctly assessed the US ability to influence the EU to the extent of presenting a unified front against the aggressor is a thing of the past.

A thing of the past? What past is that? When has the US ever had the power to dictate policy to Europe? If a "united front" is dictated by one party, it's not a united front. The united front of the cold war, to the extent that it existed, was not dictated by US influence, it was there because the US and Europe had similar perceptions of the threat and how it could be countered.

Putin correctly believed that if he grabbed Crimea fast enough he could impose a fait accomplii before the US and the EU could work through their disparate agendas and come up with a response. That worked for him. In the Eastern Ukraine he apparently believed that he could get the same result gradually, through proxies. That doesn't seem to be working out so well.

While the incremental sanctions may be having some effect as they are increased they are a day late and a dollar short in preventing the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of eastern Ukraine (and the shooting down of a commercial airliner). That I suggest how the reaction to Russian actions should be assessed. Will they lead to the restoration of the pre-invasion status quo with appropriate reparations?

We have no way of knowing if any alternative policy would have prevented any of these things. Assessing what might have been is at best speculative, especially when nobody seems willing to say what would have been a better (and realistically practical) course of action.

I don't think it's likely that the status quo ante will be restored in any exact way. Whether or not the new status quo favors Russia remains to be seen. If they gain Crimea but see the rest of the Ukraine end up in firmly pro-Western hands that is hardly a win.

Once this has been achieved steps should be talken to ensure Russia is in no position to repeat this terriorial aggression ever again.

What do you think those steps should be?

[OUTLAW 09]

dayuhan/AP---here is where the conversation gets sidetracked deliberately most of the time by AP on the term rouge.

I stated a number of times use the somewhat simiplied term rouge state as defined by Wikipedia as a basis and then expand or reduce in the debate.

There are three core reasons that must be filled in order to be defined a rouge state---and I do not use it in the neo con way.

If you then look at the definition and one notices that word WMD is used as one of the three reasons I would and have argued the shooting down of a civilian airliner and killing 298 with a SAM is in fact the usage of WMD---just as the random shelling of civilian targets by the Russian irregulars via the BM21 and 27s are also in fact the reflect the use of WMD.

This is where JMA is coming from and I have actually shifted to the same view after watching Putin the last six months.

Had the west gone immediately to the sanctions that were just handed out Putin would have side stepped and stopped as it has shown him that yes even the west is willing to be hurt economically in the process.

But by dragging it out and appearing indecisive Putin continued on---and that is where JMA is coming from--there was absolutely no decisive actions taken by the EU nor for that matter Obama and company.

The only one who saw the West's weakness's but was then throttled back by the WH was the NATO Commander Breedlove who called it exactly right straight from the beginning.

See Putin thought the response by the West to the Crimea was weak, he believed there would be far more support from his fellow Ukrainian Russians than actually did occur and he made the fatal mistake of really believing his own propaganda so in the end he has to move on the Ukraine as he literally maneuvered himself into a corner and has been unwilling to accept the exit shown him six different times by both the EU and the US.

The world I am afraid at least in power politics is still defined by perceptions and in the case of Putin's his perceptions are running counter to reality.

So whether you or AP like the word rouge that is exactly what the actions being taken by Putin really reflect.

By the way so me based on the Wikipedia rouge definition just how many more countries could you name using that definition-none--Dayuhan you are wrong on the comment and thus this is why these comments from you and AP go nowhere.

I would argue Putin totally miscalculated and had no Plan B thus invasion is fast becoming his Plan B if he wants to be reelected.

If you had access to Russian media and spoke Russian you would have been amazed at the outpouring of comments yesterday in Russia simply saying we need to protect even with the Army our fellow Russians in the Ukraine---sound vaguely similar to the Crimea?

So much for Putin's view that Russia also protects Slavs.

[Dayuhan]

dayuhan/AP---here is where the conversation gets sidetracked deliberately most of the time by AP on the term rouge.

The term is rogue. R-o-g-u-e rogue. Rouge is a sort of make-up. I know it's petty but seeing the word misspelled 50 times a day is making the copy editor in my brain a little crazy, and if you're going to use it that often you might as well spell it right.

I stated a number of times use the somewhat simiplied term rouge state as defined by Wikipedia as a basis and then expand or reduce in the debate.

There are three core reasons that must be filled in order to be defined a rouge state---and I do not use it in the neo con way.

My question was whether the use of the term actually gets you anywhere in terms of defining responses. Whether rogue or not-rogue, Putin appears to have specific goals and to have calculated that the benefits of pursuing those goals will exceed the cost. He may be rogue. He may be wrong in his calculations. He is not crazy or irrational.

The problem the US and the West face is how to change that calculation without making an even larger mess. If the term "rogue" doesn't help in defining a response, it's not worth arguing over... or misspelling.

Had the west gone immediately to the sanctions that were just handed out Putin would have side stepped and stopped as it has shown him that yes even the west is willing to be hurt economically in the process.

But by dragging it out and appearing indecisive Putin continued on---and that is where JMA is coming from--there was absolutely no decisive actions taken by the EU nor for that matter Obama and company.

Possibly... we have no way of knowing what would have happened in any hypothetical scenario. It doesn't really matter, because the nature of a coalition of peers is that it takes time to negotiate a response that's suitable to all parties. Peer coalitions do have certain advantages, but speed of action and rapid decision making in anything but a major threat situation are not among them. As Putin astutely recognized, there was never going to be a rapid decisive coordinated response. If he assumed that there would never be a coordinated response, he may have been wrong, but he was right in assuming there wouldn't be a rapid one.

It is quite useless to speculate on what might have happened if the US and the EU had produced a rapid, decisive, and fully coordinated response, because it was never going to happen from the start. That's not a consequence of eroding US power, it's just the nature of the US/EU relationship.

By the way so me based on the Wikipedia rouge definition just how many more countries could you name using that definition-none--Dayuhan you are wrong on the comment and thus this is why these comments from you and AP go nowhere.

It was meant as a mildly amusing way of pointing out a persistent spelling error. The definition is of course quite correct, given the spelling.

I would argue Putin totally miscalculated and had no Plan B thus invasion is fast becoming his Plan B if he wants to be reelected.

On this I agree... the question is what can be done to adjust his calculations of cost and benefit I've already pointed out one possibility: for the Ukrainians to offer a cease-fire, amnesty, and a degree of autonomy as a way of pulling the rug out from any claim that peacekeeping forces are necessary. I don't think that's an ideal solution by any means, but if the Ukrainialn forces move into urban areas to root out the separatists it's going to be an engraved invitation to Putin for an invasion under the guise of peacekeeping. Better to not hand them the invitation.

Again, though, the US can only recommend that: I don't think the Ukrainians are taking orders from the US or EU on this.

If you have specific suggestions for what the US, EU, or Ukraine might do at this point to move things toward a better outcome, I'd love to hear them.

If you had access to Russian media and spoke Russian you would have been amazed at the outpouring of comments yesterday in Russia simply saying we need to protect even with the Army our fellow Russians in the Ukraine---sound vaguely similar to the Crimea?

That doesn't surprise me at all. The question is how long those sentiments would remain if things don't go according to plan. The US public was all fired up about the Iraq war early on when things were going their way. Didn't last very long.

[AmericanPride]

If you then look at the definition and one notices that word WMD is used as one of the three reasons I would and have argued the shooting down of a civilian airliner and killing 298 with a SAM is in fact the usage of WMD---just as the random shelling of civilian targets by the Russian irregulars via the BM21 and 27s are also in fact the reflect the use of WMD.

And... I addressed this by raising questions about the implications of classifying conventional weapon systems as "weapons of mass destruction". So - the next time a U.S. drone kills dozens of people in a wedding party, or a U.S. warship downs a civilian airliner, will you argue that the U.S. is a 'rogue' country recklessly using weapons of mass destruction?

On this I agree... the question is what can be done to adjust his calculations of cost and benefit I've already pointed out one possibility: for the Ukrainians to offer a cease-fire, amnesty, and a degree of autonomy as a way of pulling the rug out from any claim that peacekeeping forces are necessary. I don't think that's an ideal solution by any means, but if the Ukrainialn forces move into urban areas to root out the separatists it's going to be an engraved invitation to Putin for an invasion under the guise of peacekeeping. Better to not hand them the invitation.

At this point, this is probably the most realistic outcome with the highest possibility of restoring stability in the region. Kiev needs to find a way to reintegrate the opposition into the political process - that will isolate the radicals and undermine Russian justifications for intervention. What does Ukraine's political landscape look like if it exterminates the armed opposition?

See AP a rouge country having and threatening the use of nuclear weapons and yes in the early stages of the Crimea nuclear threats were in fact issued by members of the Duma

Is that like U.S. Representative Tom Tancredo calling for the nuclear destruction of Mecca and Medina during the GWoT? There are reckless blowhards in every country. So - if we accept your argument that Russia is a rogue, reckless, criminal, irrational country carelessly throwing around threats of nuclear weapons, why is your proposed response to further provoke it? If there's no connection between the country's interests and its behavior, how can you be certain that escalated sanctions or increased U.S. military presence in eastern Europe won't be met with a nuclear first strike? The very ideas of deterrence and sanctions are premised on the assumption that the targeted state is a rational actor and will respond in a way desired by the other state(s).

[AmericanPride]

I don't think it's likely that the status quo ante will be restored in any exact way. Whether or not the new status quo favors Russia remains to be seen. If they gain Crimea but see the rest of the Ukraine end up in firmly pro-Western hands that is hardly a win.

I agree with this assessment. There's a couple of outstanding questions:

o What will Ukraine's post-war political landscape look like? Will it be inclusive of ethnic Russian interests (and what are those interests)?

o What will be Ukraine's relationship with EU and NATO? What kind of security and economic guarantees will be extended to Ukraine from those organizations?

o Assuming a Ukrainian victory over the insurgents, where will the defeated fighters go? This region has a history of roaming armed brigades so if defeat seems imminient, will they withdraw to Russia (or Crimea) and establish a base in exile? Will Russia disarm them or keep them on a low burn for future political leverage?

o What will Russia's political landscape look like? The conflict thus far seems to have strengthened the nationalists and realists in his administration - there seems to be a very distant hope that any liberal (read: Western) influence on policy will ever return. If defeated in Ukraine and sanctions continue, will this trigger a political crisis in Moscow (I doubt it)? Who could come to power afterwards?

o What relationship does the U.S. and Europe want with Russia post-conflict? And how will the outcome affect Russia's perspective on other international security issues (i.e. Syria, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Central Asia, etc)?

I classify the conflict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine as two different conflicts even though the belligerents are the same. The reason is that IMO Russia's intention in Crimea and eastern Ukraine are very different: it just so happens that Russia executed two wars (one direct, one proxy) simultaneously against the same adversary. Crimea is materially important for strategic and political reasons, and Russia's political claims are least nominally valid in comparison to the ones made regarding eastern Ukraine (why didn't Russia annex Donetsk after the region's independence referendum?). The conflict in eastern Ukraine, however, I think is aimed at keeping Russian interests at the bargaining table when Ukraine's political crisis is finally resolved and, failing that, weakening Ukraine to the extent that it cannot seriously impede Russian security interests in Europe.

[Dayuhan]

I agree with this assessment. There's a couple of outstanding questions:

Most of these questions are of course unanswerable. For one thing the government of the Ukraine will play a major role in determining the post-conflict landscape, and their positions are not yet clear. The US and the EU will have very substantial influence over the post-war Ukraine, which will be an economic dependency for years to come, but I personally think it would be a bad idea for the US/EU to degrade Ukrainian sovereignty by dictating policy. It will be a fairly delicate bit of balancing.

o What will Ukraine's post-war political landscape look like? Will it be inclusive of ethnic Russian interests (and what are those interests)?

We don't know. Part of the problem will be differentiating between ethnic Russian interests and Russian national interests... for example, the Russian demand for autonomy with a veto over foreign policy decisions is clearly intended as a Russian level over possible NATO membership and other links tot he West, and is incompatible with Ukrainian sovereignty. At the least the ethnic Russia community could be offered recognition of their language as official, as the Quebecois got in Canada. It would help a great deal if the ethnic Russians can develop a moderate leadership that can articulate expectations and desires of the community without being controlled by Putin. Whether or not that is possible we do not yet know.

o What will be Ukraine's relationship with EU and NATO? What kind of security and economic guarantees will be extended to Ukraine from those organizations?

Ukraine will be effectively dependent in economic terms. The extent of the assistance they receive, and the conditions attached to that assistance, will have to be carefully worked out.

o Assuming a Ukrainian victory over the insurgents, where will the defeated fighters go? This region has a history of roaming armed brigades so if defeat seems imminient, will they withdraw to Russia (or Crimea) and establish a base in exile? Will Russia disarm them or keep them on a low burn for future political leverage?

Ideally you'd send the Russians back to Russia and let Putin deal with them, and allow at least the rank and file of the local insurgents to stay without penalty. Of course that is hypothetical and the governments in question will have a lot to say about it. There may be some agitation among ethnic Russians for full scale relocation to Russia. There is some precedent for this: much of the ethnic Russian population of Kazakhstan has returned to Russia. Whether the Russians would be amenable, or how it could be done in a way that doesn't look like ethnic cleansing, is anyone's guess. My guess is that it will be handled badly and make a mess.

o What will Russia's political landscape look like? The conflict thus far seems to have strengthened the nationalists and realists in his administration - there seems to be a very distant hope that any liberal (read: Western) influence on policy will ever return. If defeated in Ukraine and sanctions continue, will this trigger a political crisis in Moscow (I doubt it)? Who could come to power afterwards?

Not possible to know or control.

o What relationship does the U.S. and Europe want with Russia post-conflict? And how will the outcome affect Russia's perspective on other international security issues (i.e. Syria, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Central Asia, etc)?

I think the risks to "the relationship" are in many ways overrated. The commercial interests on both sides are too strong to repress out of enduring pique, and I'd expect trade relations to be renewed pretty quickly if the conflict is resolved. If the resolution of the conflict is handled in a way intended to inflict outright defeat (or emasculation) of Russia, we can expect them to disrupt our strategic interests to the greatest extent of their ability. Of course that doesn't have to happen.

I classify the conflict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine as two different conflicts even though the belligerents are the same. The reason is that IMO Russia's intention in Crimea and eastern Ukraine are very different: it just so happens that Russia executed two wars (one direct, one proxy) simultaneously against the same adversary. Crimea is materially important for strategic and political reasons, and Russia's political claims are least nominally valid in comparison to the ones made regarding eastern Ukraine (why didn't Russia annex Donetsk after the region's independence referendum?). The conflict in eastern Ukraine, however, I think is aimed at keeping Russian interests at the bargaining table when Ukraine's political crisis is finally resolved and, failing that, weakening Ukraine to the extent that it cannot seriously impede Russian security interests in Europe.

The problem here is that "Russian security interests in Europe" seem to require an allied or at least neutral Ukraine, and short of outright conquest that no longer appears to be achievable. How that sorts out is anybody's guess. The west cannot promise a neutral Ukraine, because that would intrude on the sovereign right of the Ukraine to choose its own alliances. If the Ukraine goes firmly pro-west, even without Crimea, the only ally the Russians have on their western border is Belarus, and that's a shaky ally at best. If Russia can't control the eventual transition out of Lukashenko's rule, they may be left with exactly the situation they want to avoid: the West on their doorstep with no buffer. What Russia will try to do about that is, of course, up to them.

[JMA]

... and allow at least the rank and file of the local insurgents to stay without penalty.

This stuff is straight out of cloud cuckoo land. I give up.