Beyond the frontline: watching ISIS

[davidbfpo]

Carrying out beheadings and other extreme acts is unthinkable for most people, but the right cocktail of factors can make anyone an extremist, says neuroscientist Prof Ian Robertson

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/1...-savagery.html

[davidbfpo]

An analysis 'The Islamic State’s Vulnerability' by:

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and an adjunct assistant professor in Georgetown University's security studies program.

Link:http://warontherocks.com/2014/09/the...lnerability/#_

He ends with:

The Islamic State’s many weaknesses will soon become apparent, if they aren’t already. This doesn’t mean that the group will inevitably collapse; and even if it does, its collapse might just mean that its fighters are driven back into the hands of an old familiar foe, al-Qaeda, or other Syrian and Iraqi non-state actors. The United States should approach this fight strategically, understanding both the Islamic State’s weaknesses and also the broader context of the fight.

[davidbfpo]

Two contributions to assessing ISIS. First this in the NYT 'ISIS’ Harsh Brand of Islam Is Rooted in Austere Saudi Creed' and looks at the theological or ideological aspects.

Link:http://mobile.nytimes.com/2014/09/25...html?referrer=

The second is an email based exchange between SME, with the title 'Around the Halls: What is ISIS' Strategy?' hosted by Brookings:http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/iran-...-isis-strategy

The final comment by Charles Lister is a good read, especially on the reaction of 'moderate' Syrian groups - hardly encouraging.

[davidbfpo]

A reasonable check list on The American Conservative, by former DoS "whistle blower" Peter van Buren:

A guide to the spin, empty gestures, and behind-the-scene players that will determine the fate of America's re-entry into Iraq.

Link:A guide to the spin, empty gestures, and behind-the-scene players that will determine the fate of America's re-entry into Iraq.

Elsewhere I've read comments by ret'd US military leaders that it will take up to three years to rebuild the Iraqi state forces and the FT has an excellent article (behind a reistration wall) using the fall of an army base as an illustration:http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ceb48014-4...#axzz3EoJ2hviA

[AmericanPride]

ISIS reportedly has a powerful social media component. How much of that is driven by disaffected (or bored) wealthy sympathizers or their youth in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere? One of the things that strikes me about Saudi Arabia is that their analogy of the youth living in their mother's basement is actually quite widespread - except their youth are much more socially isolated but by virtue of their wealth have virtually unlimited access to social media.

[CrowBat]

I can't say where the 'youth' or 'wealthy sympathizers' (in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere) are living, or if they are disaffected or simply bored. But, from monitoring several Arab forums that are (at least in theory) dedicated to 'defence'-related issues, I would say there are indeed a lot of them. And some of them are actually serving (whether in Saudi or in other of local militaries).

Although some of moderators are - time and again - trying to curb corresponding activity (i.e. postings with pro-Daesh content), most of the times they're letting them do, and the 'sympathizers' are returning and posting their stuff. Alternatively, they're posting derogatory remarks on activity of US and allied militaries, like LOLs about RAF Tornados returning from a mission over Iraq without firing a single shot, two nights ago; or, congratulations for Daesh claim to have shot down one of French Rafales during their first sortie over Iraq (apparently related to the extremists actually downing one of Iraqi UAVs).

One of the things that strikes me about Saudi Arabia is that their analogy of the youth living in their mother's basement is actually quite widespread - except their youth are much more socially isolated but by virtue of their wealth have virtually unlimited access to social media.

One of bizzare issues about the Saudi society is that marriages got extremely expensive: even quite wealthy families simply can't afford them. Major reason is that brides are going at very high prices, literally.

That said, there is plenty of 'clandestine socializing' (outside, though with help of social media), while the amount of access to the social media is actually much more curbed (by security authorities) than usually thought.

For example, it's easier to arrange a (clandestine/private, of course) meeting by driving your car - slowly, very slowly - around some mal with semi-opened windows, so the girls can drop their 'business cards' with telephone numbers, then via the social media. Something similar can be said about the ways Saudi atheists are arranging their meetings too (being an atheist is worse than being a non-Moslem in Saudi Arabia).

I would say that plenty of activity related to supporting extremists is taking place in similar fashion too.

[davidbfpo]

A short,, thoughtful article by Alireza Doostdar, an Assistant Professor of Islamic Studies and the Anthropology of Religion at the University of Chicago Divinity School:https://divinity.uchicago.edu/sighti...ireza-doostdar

A few passages:

We see ISIS as a unitary entity because ISIS propagandists want us to see it that way. This is why it is problematic to rely on doctrines espoused in propaganda to explain ISIS’ behavior....Focusing on doctrinal statements would have us homogenizing the entirety of ISIS’ military force as fighters motivated by an austere and virulent form of Salafi Islam. This is how ISIS wants us to see things, and it is often the view propagated by mainstream media.... But ISIS emerged from the fires of war, occupation, killing, torture, and disenfranchisement. It did not need to sell its doctrine to win recruits. It needed above all to prove itself effective against its foes.