Beyond the frontline: watching ISIS

[davidbfpo]

A pithy commentary by John Schindler of the US strategy and approach to countering Daesh / ISIS. Try this:

To be blunt, we kill very effectively but we have precious little understanding of how to transform Muslim societies by force.

Link:http://20committee.com/2014/11/14/wh...te-is-winning/

Here are some tasters:

The U.S. military is quite capable of defeating almost any adversary on the battlefield, even Da’ish, though that is not the same thing as producing lasting political outcomes that Americans will like. This is particularly true in the Greater Middle East, where the politico-cultural barriers to Westernization delivered by the barrel of a gun are steep and strong.

It is now time, indeed long overdue, to dispense with magical thinking about what the application of American military power might achieve in any lasting strategic or political sense in the Middle East.

I'd forgotten the Italian pacification of Libya (1928-1932):http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacification_of_Libya

Which today is not an option for the USA or its allies.

Yes there is a thread 'Watching ISIS' into which this will be merged one day. It is worth a thread to alert readers and perhaps respond.

Finally:

A necessary first step is having a genuine debate about what our military can — and cannot — achieve in Iraq and Syria.

[Bill Moore]

A pithy commentary by John Schindler of the US strategy and approach to countering Daesh / ISIS. Try this

Link:http://20committee.com/2014/11/14/wh...te-is-winning/

The “COIN” agenda proved effective at promoting the careers and fortunes of some U.S. Army officers and their think-tank hangers-on, yet quite ineffective at producing strategic victory. It is now time, indeed long overdue, to dispense with magical thinking about what the application of American military power might achieve in any lasting strategic or political sense in the Middle East.

Many of us concur with the author's assessment above. Those of us who tend to agree, also tend to believe that doing COIN for another 10 years wouldn't produce results that are more sustainable than we have today. Doing COIN for another 10 years would do the following: tie our forces down for 10 years, bleed us out economically, and cause us to forfeit higher priority strategic objectives around the globe. That doesn't mean we throw out hard learned lessons about COIN over the past decade, because we will certainly need those lessons in the future. There are elements in our COIN doctrine worth retaining, but our strategic approach to COIN needs a serious relook. The key is to develop realistic policy objectives that advance our interests, and not develop objectives that are beyond our capabilities to achieve.

To be blunt, we kill very effectively but we have precious little understanding of how to transform Muslim societies by force. Indeed, our efforts in that direction usually produce opposite outcomes, which should be easily predictable were we not besotted by lies about how others view us and what we seek to achieve.

In Iraq and Afghanistan our desired goals were to ultimately transform their societies. Obviously we didn't want to put another Saddam or Taliban government back in charge. However, that doesn't mean we had to pursue the neocon view of the world, which is that everyone desires to be like us. We just have to remove the evil forces that are preventing them from doing so. It is clear many people in Iraq and Afghanistan desired something different/better than Saddam and the Taliban, and the more educated may have even desired to move closer to a Western model, but they didn't speak for the masses. We took transformation to the extreme and tried to impose democracy by force. On top of that, we tried to do it on the cheap. The democracy we imposed was little more than mob rule, resulting in continued instability that created the conditions for extremism to grow in Iraq, and return in Afghanistan.

Realizing we over reached is insufficient if we're going to be successful in the future. There must be more salient lessons that we should take from these gallant efforts for the future. Clearly our opposite approach of hands off in Libya didn't fare so well, so is there a middle path that is feasible? In hindsight, what would have been reasonable goals in Afghanistan that would have advanced our interests in the region?

I believe we still think big and pursue grand visions, but we need to slow our roll and accept change takes time, and it will manifest differently in each country. Sustainable change must come from within, it can't be imposed by outsiders. We have this throughout history when Western colonies fought for their freedom, and Eastern European countries were freed from the grasp of the USSR, etc. Imposed change does not endure.

The first feasible step after the fighting is over is to establish order, and that doesn't mean imposing a foreign form of governance, especially a complex democratic government. Putting a strong man in charge is more humane than years of continual factional bloodshed. Then help government and society evolve over time by developing their human capital and other forms of development. Let them see what we and others do, then they'll pick and choose what they want to adapt as their way over time.

Simply put, we have no ability to change Muslim societies unless we are willing to stay the long haul and are eager to kill staggering numbers of people, many of them civilians, in horrible ways.

It is extremely arrogant of us to assume that Muslims would us to transform them anymore than we want Muslims to transform our society. Do we think the only way to achieve our ends is transforming their society? It is time for a complete relook of our approach. Until we develop a strategy that advances our interests, we should become comfortable with the unpleasant fact hat killing those who intend to harm us is a pragmatic course of action. It is not one we should shy away from, but also remaining cognizant that there may be a better way and we should continue to work on determining what that may be.

[Granite_State]

Bill Lind's latest (I know he has both detractors and diehards here at SWC):

https://www.traditionalright.com/the...olympus-d-o-a/


The LAR footnote is an interesting thought experiment, at the least:

A long footnote: In my last column, I noted that the Pentagon should be able to give the pesident the option of sending a small, competent, fast-moving ground force that could rout ISIS in a campaign of days, or, at most, weeks. In theory this force exists, in the form of three Marine Corps Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) battalions. The original concept behind the LAV (I know because I am one of the three people who, as a staffer to Senator Gary Hart, initiated the LAV program; the other two were a Senate Armed Services Committee staffer, Steve Dotson, and a Marine one-star named Al Gray) was to create one or more LAV regiments that could serve as Soviet-style Operations Maneuver Groups in third-world situations. Only once in the 25-plus years since have the LAV battalions been used this way, when they were grouped for an operational advance on Tikrit immediately after the fall of Baghdad. We should not go in on the ground against ISIS, but should the president decide to do so, that would be the way to do it. It would require a commander who knows operational art from pachinko, of which we have very few. But one who could easily do it is Marine four-star General John Kelly. By putting a four-star in charge, the Pentagon would ensure the LAV operational maneuver group got support when it needed it. Pitting regular light cavalry against irregular light cavalry in a campaign of rapid maneuver, the regulars should easily come out on top, if only because their skill at techniques should be much higher. Of course, if the president were to ask the Pentagon for this option, it would immediately say it is impossible, because a success by a small, fast force using maneuver warfare would not justify larger budgets and force structures. At senior levels, the budget war is the only war that matters.

[davidbfpo]

Will McCants (Brookings) explains the motivation of both Sunni and Shi‘a fighters drawn to the Levant battlefield by a common apocalyptic belief:

They fight in the vanguard of the Mahdi, the Muslim savior whom the Prophet Muhammad prophesied would appear in the Levant (the coastal Mediterranean region that includes Syria and Lebanon) at the End of Days to wage a final great battle against the infidels’ armies.

(Later) With the entry of the United States into the field, jihadis anticipate that the ultimate showdown in Dabiq is drawing ever closer. One might expect that the recent entry of infidel armies into Iraq and Syria would lessen the internecine tone of the prophesying and focus attention on the Mahdi’s battle with the infidels. But it has only heightened the sectarian apocalyptic fervor as each sect vies to destroy the other for the privilege of destroying the infidels.

Link:http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/10/t...an-apocalypse/

I have heard Muslims explain this, but Will's explanation is best.

[omarali50]

The Quran has little or nothing to say about the end times (it has a lot to say about the day of judgement and the events of that day, but no details about the times preceding that final day), so Muslim versions of the last days and the battles between the Mahdi and the anti-Christ are based almost entirely on hadith literature, written 200 plus years after the advent of Islam and obviously drawing heavily on Christian sources. While the final confrontations are all in the Levant, the advent of the Mahdi is said (in some hadiths) to be in Khorasan.
http://dailyhadith.adaptivesolutions...%E2%80%99s.htm
Because of this, the Taliban and various Pakistani sponsored Jihadist groups like to believe they are the warriors who will break out of the mountain passes from Khorasan (Central Asia/North-eastern Iran) with the Mahdi among them.
Cynics suspect that the Khorasan hadiths were mostly concocted by the Abbassids to give religious legitimacy to their (central Asian led) revolt against the Ummayad Caliphate (and of course, Abu Muslim and his Central Asian armies carried black banners).
Cynics have a lot of fun things to say about the whole topic

[davidbfpo]

Judge for yourself this Q&A on Der Spiegel:http://www.spiegel.de/international/...-international

[davidbfpo]

In a joint investigation TRAC and the Quillaim Foundation take apart a recent Daesh video of a group execution - all is not what it seems. Shadows added for example and the time track shows gaps.

From TRAC's introduction:

Since its inception, the Islamic State (IS) propaganda machine has repeatedly demonstrated its sophistication and complexity. IS has abandoned the often ramshackle methods of international outreach common to its rivals (e.g. bin Laden's cassette tapes) in favor of meticulously planned, high-quality videos. In one of its most recent releases, Although the Disbelievers Dislike It, IS attempts to provide a graphic cinema-quality experience to its viewers. Nevertheless, upon close examination, it becomes apparent that discrepancies were overlooked in the editorial process, leading to telling anomalies.

There is a video on the TRAC site, which will be graphic.

Link to TRAC:http://www.trackingterrorism.org/art...ry-expansion-0

Link to Quilliam, which is a PDF report (no video, just photos):http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp...anda-video.pdf

One wonders how such a forensic, if not technical analysis can be exploited within the areas Daesh control, shown to those who watch such videos on their radicalisation route and as evidence to support a war crime investigation.

[davidbfpo]

In August 2014 MG Nagata, Centcom SOF commander, stated 'We do not understand the movement...'. Well there is a book coming that aims to do so. The linked article gives a glimpse into ISIS:http://www.theguardian.com/world/201...raining-camps?

The article is worth reading, the sub-title is shorter:

We reveal how the terror group recruits and retains its members through zealotry, rhetoric and obscure theology

Back to MG Nagata:

We do not understand the movement, and until we do, we are not going to defeat it We have not defeated the idea. We do not even understand the ideaa...There is a magnetic attraction to IS that is bringing in resources, talent, weapons, etc., to thicken, harden, embolden IS in ways that are very alarming.

Link:http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...ecruiting.html

The book is due to be published February 17th 2015. From:http://www.amazon.com/ISIS-Inside-Te.../dp/1941393578

In the UK:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Isis-Inside-.../dp/1941393578

[davidbfpo]

A useful, long article on Daesh rules Raqqa, Syria:http://www.nybooks.com/articles/arch...ow-isis-rules/

Interesting to note as those Syrians who can leave go they appear to be replaced by others - many of them not Syrians. For one observer:

ISIS was rapidly becoming the only option for Sunnis in Syria who didn’t want to reconcile with the regime. ISIS may be failing in its attempt to govern, but for such people there is nothing else in sight.

[davidbfpo]

Professor Landis has an extensive review of ISIS:Inside the Army of Terrorand he starts with:

Overall, this book ably accomplishes the task in a concise manner, and is a valuable, compelling read for anyone- general reader or specialist- interested in ISIS. While minor errors exist here and there and one might disagree with some of the authors’ analysis in the detail, the book is extremely well-researched, drawing on an array of sources including much original interview testimony, and the overall conclusions that emerge are hard to contest.

Link:http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/boo...e-army-terror/

[AdamG]

A dozen former French soldiers, mostly from special forces and the Foreign Legion, have joined jihadists fighting in Syria and Iraq, a defense ministry source confirms, as the government readies a new multimillion anti-terror plan.

http://rt.com/news/224983-french-mil...ome-jihadists/

[davidbfpo]

AdamG,

There are infrequent reports on Westerners going to fight alongside the Kurds too. A month ago two ex-UK soldiers were id'd and interviewed & released upon their return at Xmas. Today an Australian local politician has gone (Australian law forbids any citizen fighting abroad).

With the reported success of the opposition (kurds & FSA) in the Kobane pocket, it is easy to think the Kurdish diaspora - mainly in Western Europe, outside the region - may despatch volunteers.

[davidbfpo]

A review article by ICSR's Aaron Zelin that compares the 'wilayat' strategy of Daesh (ISIS) and the 'franchise' model used by AQ. Alongside a quick summary of what is happening where jihadists operate.
Link:http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/...-states-model/

His article was presented at a POMEPS conference this month alongside three others see:http://pomeps.org/2015/01/27/islamis...c-state-memos/

“Jihadi-Salafi views of the Islamic State,” by Joas Wagemakers, Radboud University Nijmegen
“Brotherhood activism and regime consolidation in Egypt, ” by Steven Brooke, University of Texas at Austin
“The ISIS-ification of Islamist politics,” by Khalil al-Anani, George Washington University and John’s Hopkins University SAIS

[omarali50]

An interesting post from Razib Khan "Islam is not a religion of the book"

http://www.unz.com/gnxp/islam-is-not...medium=twitter

I agree with the broad argument. Coming to prediction, I think a lot of real history is made by men (and some women) making models and predictions about what comes next and acting on the basis of these predictions. In the short term (and in the long term we are all dead) that can be the most important thing of all...distant intellectuals (including amateurs like us) have the luxury of sticking to whatever story we happen to like and adding a few bells and whistles to explain all obseved deviances (that is why postmarxists for example will never be out of a job, since all they are selling is entertaining stories to fellow enthusiasts and there are no limits on what can be fitted into the story with a little imagination), but real people are also fighting real wars while we discuss this. To the extent that they believe in a certain model today, they and their competitors can benefit from knowing what that model is. All sides will adjust as models fail and situations change...that is a given. And THAT, i guess, is the point of this post. And a good point it is too...

[davidbfpo]

One of the authors of 'Inside ISIS' Hassan Hassan (See Post 89; who originates from Eastern Syria) is interviewed on:

• ISIS growth in North Africa
• Where ISIS is winning, and where it is losing
• Tactical vs. strategic effects of airstrikes on ISIS
• Influence of Management of Savegery on ISIS actions and propaganda
• Importance of local forces and tribes in fighting ISIS
• Challenges to building those local forces
• ISIS is setting the agenda, but the world needs to change that

Link to a 41 minute podcast:http://middleeastweek.org/home/2015/...nst-them-grows

[davidbfpo]

Unusually Chatham House's quarterly 'International Affairs' has placed this 15 pg article on open access:http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/1...2346.12183/pdf

Near the end is this neat summary:

Since the Islamic Revolution, Tehran has often been described as an irrational, ideologically driven actor, impelled by the notion of martyrdom and an apocalyptical world-view. Yet Iran’s foreign policy proves that it is often driven by national and regime interests. The developments in Iraq and Syria and the Iranian leadership’s response to them illustrate this fact. Indeed, Tehran’s overall strategy, as well as its willingness to engage with Saudi Arabia and the United States, demonstrate that Iran’s foreign policy does not always follow its revolutionary rhetoric.

[OUTLAW 09]

Blast from the past as some of us know this individual up front and personal.

Another Bucca Graduate first class---US intel seems to have never figured out the old AQI command structure especially since he was evidently tied to the Zarqawi network. Our Army Iraq military prison system has produced some of the finest trained jihadi's in Iraq.

Daesh top dog in Libya is an Iraqi: Wisam Abd al-Zubaidi AKA Abu Nabil al-Anbari, Bucca graduate, Zarqawi associate http://almasalah.com/ar/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=47815 …

[SWJ Blog]

After ISIS Execution, Angry King Abdullah Quotes Clint Eastwood to US Lawmakers

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

After Daesh murdered Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kassasbeh who is weaker now? ISIS or Jordan, a coalition member. Three very different articles caught my attention.

First from Haaretz (Israeli) a short report that starts with:

Jordan's King Abdullah vowed a relentless war against Islamic State on their own territory...

Link:http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.640813?

A longer report by Al-Jazeera, which highlights the internal situation as shown in this passage:

Unusually for Jordan, public demonstrations on behalf of the pilot have taken explicit aim at King Abdullah, who many accuse of dragging his country — and Kassasbeh, personally — into a war it has no incentive to fight. Even the pilot’s Bararsheh tribe, whose loyalty has long helped prop up the Hashemite monarchy, has taken to the streets to call Abdullah a "coward" who takes orders from the U.S. It did not help matters that Abdullah was on a visit to Washington on Tuesday when news broke about Kassasbeh.

Link:http://america.aljazeera.com/article...s-revenge.html

The BBC has a multi-part report and Shiraz Maher, of ICSR, comments:

By burning to death Jordanian pilot, militant group Islamic State is leveraging its power to asymmetrically shock its enemies....

(He ends with) The United Arab Emirates has gone a step further and withdrawn from the coalition altogether, citing fears for the safety of its pilots.That is perhaps the most potent weapon Islamic State possess today - the carefully curated asymmetry of fear.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-31129416

There is a parallel thread on the 'Management of Savagery', which helps explain what is happening on our screens - if you view the Daesh video of the pilot's murder - and how it affects us all. Link:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=21675

RIP Muath al-Kassasbeh

[Bill Moore]

David,

U.S. major news networks kneejerk analysis is this event will galvanize the Arab/Muslim world to rise up against IS. It could, but more likely I see it as a event that will get turned against us increasingly over time. This can play out in multiple ways, and I hope by now we learned to how shape the narrative in a way that benefits us. So far though, we have failed repeatedly to develop a narrative that resonates with the intended audience. In fact, it seems the only people convinced that our narrative is right is us.