Page 4 of 9 FirstFirst ... 23456 ... LastLast
Results 61 to 80 of 303

Thread: Beyond the frontline: watching ISIS

Hybrid View

Previous Post Previous Post   Next Post Next Post
  1. #1
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,366

    Default

    Bill,

    I think many Western observers expect the Jordanian public to react as they did after the hotel bombings in November 2005, when polling found a marked shift against AQ:
    In a survey of over 1,000 Jordanians by the survey firm Ipsos, conducted for the Jordanian newspaper Al Ghad, as reported by the New York Times, two-thirds of Jordanians asked said they had changed their view of Al Qaeda after the bombings. More than 87 percent also said they considered Al Qaeda a terrorist organization, and almost as many said that Al Qaeda’s acts of terror did not represent Islam. In previous surveys in Jordan, Al Qaeda had enjoyed approval ratings upward of 60 percent.
    Link not id'd as wrong source on footnote

    As one article suggested will the two executed become martyrs, in Jordan or elsewhere.

    I doubt any local, official message will become known easily. Does the Jordanian state do info ops anyway or just rely on fear?
    davidbfpo

  2. #2
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    3,169

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    Bill,

    I think many Western observers expect the Jordanian public to react as they did after the hotel bombings in November 2005, when polling found a marked shift against AQ:
    Link not id'd as wrong source on footnote

    As one article suggested will the two executed become martyrs, in Jordan or elsewhere.

    I doubt any local, official message will become known easily. Does the Jordanian state do info ops anyway or just rely on fear?
    I thought fear was an info op?

    This can unfold many ways, right now I would classify it as an event that multiple sides will leverage to support their narrative. It is hard for us to accept that IS could leverage this event to their advantage, but based on our collective experience of watching the competition in the information domain over the last few years we should recognize the narrative may not unfold in our favor.

    Three letter agencies should promote a narrative that exploits this event in ways that resonate. The State Department, based on their continuously nave statements that resonate with no one should probably just stay quiet beyond condemning the event (follow the do no harm rule).

  3. #3
    Registered User
    Join Date
    Feb 2015
    Posts
    1

    Default

    It would be nice if we could amplify or support a locally produced (and believed) narrative. Any US produced IO campaign will only work at home, and only if it's any good.

    Have we tried injecting false narratives into the ISIS IO machine?

  4. #4
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Mar 2009
    Posts
    11,074

    Default Anonymous Now Targets ISIS Members

    Anonymous Now Targets ISIS Members

    Entry Excerpt:



    --------
    Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
    This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

  5. #5
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Mar 2009
    Posts
    11,074

    Default Some Questions for Those Pushing for US Troops Against ISIS

    Some Questions for Those Pushing for US Troops Against ISIS

    Entry Excerpt:



    --------
    Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
    This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

  6. #6
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Mar 2009
    Posts
    11,074

    Default What ISIS Really Wants

    What ISIS Really Wants

    Entry Excerpt:



    --------
    Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
    This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

  7. #7
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Mar 2009
    Posts
    11,074

    Default ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group

    ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group

    Entry Excerpt:



    --------
    Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
    This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

  8. #8
    Council Member AdamG's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Location
    Hiding from the Dreaded Burrito Gang
    Posts
    3,096

    Default What ISIS Really Wants

    The Islamic State is no mere collection of psychopaths. It is a religious group with carefully considered beliefs, among them that it is a key agent of the coming apocalypse. Here’s what that means for its strategy—and for how to stop it.
    Graeme Wood
    March 2015
    http://www.theatlantic.com/features/...-wants/384980/

    Initial post for maximum visibility.
    A scrimmage in a Border Station
    A canter down some dark defile
    Two thousand pounds of education
    Drops to a ten-rupee jezail


    http://i.imgur.com/IPT1uLH.jpg

  9. #9
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    New York, NY
    Posts
    1,665

    Default

    A very interesting article.

    Best read in counterpoint with this article by JM Berger:

    Enough about Islam: Why religion is not the most useful way to understand ISIS

    Argues that ISIS is more usefully analyzed as a Sunni Muslim identity group:

    And to be sure, religion matters to ISIS. A lot. But the concept of an exclusive identity matters far more, to the point that ISIS will engage in virtually unlimited theological gymnastics to justify it.

    For identity-based extremist groups, one function of extreme religious observance is to serve as an identity marker, a signal to establish who is part of the in-group and who is part of the out-group.

    Religion is therefore of primal importance in the narrative created by an extremist group’s adherents, but a group’s extremism does not naturally proceed from its claimed religious basis.
    Last edited by tequila; 02-19-2015 at 05:57 PM.

  10. #10
    Council Member AdamG's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Location
    Hiding from the Dreaded Burrito Gang
    Posts
    3,096

    Default CIA chief says ISIS has 'snowballed'

    Temporary separate thread for maximum visibility.

    CIA Director John Brennan said Friday that the Islamic State had “snowballed” beyond Iraq and Syria, estimating that at least 20,000 fighters from more than 90 countries have gone to join the militant group, several thousand of them from Western nations, including the United States.

    Brennan’s statement marks a change from the narrative the Obama administration has been pushing on the success of the fight against ISIS.
    http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015...-overinflated/
    A scrimmage in a Border Station
    A canter down some dark defile
    Two thousand pounds of education
    Drops to a ten-rupee jezail


    http://i.imgur.com/IPT1uLH.jpg

  11. #11
    Council Member AdamG's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Location
    Hiding from the Dreaded Burrito Gang
    Posts
    3,096

    Default

    The war in Syria has attracted roughly 100 foreign fighters from the Caribbean who could easily make their way to the United States, said the top U.S. military commander for the southern hemisphere.
    http://www.defenseone.com/threats/20...Border/107421/
    A scrimmage in a Border Station
    A canter down some dark defile
    Two thousand pounds of education
    Drops to a ten-rupee jezail


    http://i.imgur.com/IPT1uLH.jpg

  12. #12
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Mar 2009
    Posts
    11,074

    Default ISIS For The Common Man

    ISIS For The Common Man

    Entry Excerpt:



    --------
    Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
    This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

  13. #13
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,366

    Default An absolute 'must read': ISIS follows the Baathist design for control

    Although the original documents are cited and not displayed a fascinating Der Spiegel article on the ex-Iraqi AF officer who was the strategist for ISIS to gain power and success:http://www.spiegel.de/international/...a-1029274.html

    amir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi was the real name of the Iraqi, whose bony features were softened by a white beard. But no one knew him by that name. Even his best-known pseudonym, Haji Bakr, wasn't widely known. But that was precisely part of the plan. The former colonel in the intelligence service of Saddam Hussein's air defense force had been secretly pulling the strings at IS for years. Former members of the group had repeatedly mentioned him as one of its leading figures. Still, it was never clear what exactly his role was. But when the architect of the Islamic State died, he left something behind that he had intended to keep strictly confidential: the blueprint for this state.
    The article has been commended on Twitter and SWC's Crowbat commented:
    That article is an absolute 'must read'. Explains all the 'whys' and 'hows': it's really so that plenty of events we've seen the last few years are 'making sense'.
    So I have reposted this, it appeared on the Watching ISIS thread four days ago.
    davidbfpo

  14. #14
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,366

    Default Complementing the Haji Bakr papers

    Hat tip to WoTR for this follow-on article on ISIS and its control strategy. Near the start the author writes:
    Lost in this headline-generating exercise is the real value of the article — its description of ISIL’s tactics in infiltrating new territory and implementing a program of discriminate violence designed to establish control over desired areas.
    It concludes in part with:
    ou ask most observers how a place like Jurf reverted to ISIL control in 2013, they will most likely point to the sectarian nature of the regime of former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki. While this undoubtedly led a significant amount of Sunnis to lose support for the government, it is difficult to measure that impact on ISIL’s campaign in Iraq — particularly because this support for ISIL can be fickle and shallow. I offer an explanation on ISIL’s rise in Iraq that is based on observable data, and one that complements the descriptions of ISIL’s rise in Syria found in the Haji Bakr papers. ISIL took the cities and towns back with an efficient campaign that focused on removing key nodes of a pro-government network and replacing it with its own control apparatus. By wresting control of the key terrain and population centers it desired, it was able to enforce and elicit a basic level of collaboration from the population. Undoubtedly, at this point opportunistic tribes and members assisted the group, but that is exactly what control facilitates and encourages according to Kalyvas’ theory on irregular warfare.
    IIRC Kalyvas' theory appears elsewhere here.

    Link:http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/isi.../?singlepage=1
    davidbfpo

  15. #15
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Nov 2013
    Posts
    35,749

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    Although the original documents are cited and not displayed a fascinating Der Spiegel article on the ex-Iraqi AF officer who was the strategist for ISIS to gain power and success:http://www.spiegel.de/international/...a-1029274.html



    The article has been commended on Twitter and SWC's Crowbat commented:

    So I have reposted this, it appeared on the Watching ISIS thread four days ago.
    Not sure just why the der Spiegel is late in this article as it was the GDR MfS that trained the entire Iraqi intelligence officer corp at Baghdad University for over 10 years.

    Notice der Spiegel did not mention that small point---wrote a number of intel reports to national level on the MfS training of individual Iraq intel agents but it never seemed to interest them--all virtually all the Sunni intel officers had joined the Sunni insurgency shortly after the arrival of the US in Baghdad.

    Many of them had been focused on the monitoring of the Salafists activity inside Iraq and were quite aware of who was who when we arrived so it was not hard to shift alliances.

    We never seemed to want to believe this.

  16. #16
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Dec 2009
    Posts
    115

    Default

    I would agree the article is a "must read", but did anyone else notice the gap in it?

    How much money was needed to initiate/sustain it all and where did it come from?

    Do basic business principals(with some modification) apply to insurgencies?

    Start up businesses are historically/notoriously/consistently short of both capital and cash flow.

    If you attempt to grow your business TOO fast you are at risk of growing it to death.

    While the article covers opportunities for IS to build it's balance sheet(asset seizure) and revenue(cash flow from extortion/standover), it leaves a very big "show me the money" hole.

    The Iraqi Central Bank Baghdad office theft in 2003 and the possibly erroneous report of the Iraqi Central Bank Mosul office theft in 2014 come to mind:
    http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0378d4f4-0...#axzz3YjBjr4Vx

    Is "Show me the Money!" relevant and critical to this story?

    IF so, where did the money come from? Iraqi/organic, Saudi? Qatari? Other?

  17. #17
    Council Member CrowBat's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jun 2010
    Location
    Haxbach, Schnurliland
    Posts
    1,563

    Default

    A very good summary about Daesh's financing was published by the ISW quite a long ago, in form of this PDF file: Terrorist Financing and Islamic State
    ...ISIS, which has renamed itself the Islamic State and unilaterally declared the reestablishment of an Islamic caliphate, was financially self-sufficient for about eight years as a terrorist and insurgent group before committing itself to running a proto-state.

    ...

    And unlike other groups, which are reliant on state sponsors, major donors, or abuse of charity, AQI was financially independent by virtue of engaging in tremendously successful criminal activity enterprises domestically within Iraq.

    By September, estimates put ISIS's daily income at around $3 million, giving it a total value of assets between $1.3 and $2 billion, making it the world's best-funded terrorist group. By this standard, ISIS draws more income than many small nations, including Tonga, Nauru, and the Marshall Islands.
    ...
    Prior to the air campaign against ISIS that began in August, the group operated around 350 oil wells in Iraq and 60% of Syria's oil fields. In August, oil production from facilities under ISIS control was estimated at around 80,000 barrels per day. ISIS is believed to sell some 30,000 barrels a day in Iraq and 50,000 in Syria, which go for roughly $40 per barrel on the black market. ISIS only produces around a fifth of the total capacity of the oil fields under its control in Iraq and Syria. Even prior to the conflict, Syria's oil fields were considered old and inefficient, producing only 10% of total capacity. ISIS has tapped into pre-existing black market routes that date back to the 1990s and the smuggling networks that popped up under the Saddam-era oil-for-food program. It uses these to sell extracted crude oil to smugglers, who then transport the oil outside of conflict zones using a variety of means: tanker trucks, vans, jerry cans carried by mules, makeshift pipes, and even rafts when crossing rivers. In one case, Turkish authorities found an underground pipeline as long as 3 miles (4.8 kilometers).

    ...
    ...singled out Qatar as an especially "permissive jurisdiction" for terrorist financing. Qatari oversight is so lax, Cohen noted, that "several major Qatar-based fundraisers act as local representatives for larger terrorist fundraising networks that are based in Kuwait." Not wanting to expose sensitive intelligence, Cohen pointed to press reports that Qatar supports not only Hamas but also extremist groups operating in Syria.

    ...
    ...Abd al-Rahman al-Nuaymi, a Qatari academic and businessman, to its terror list, noting he "ordered the transfer of nearly $600,000 to al- Qa'ida via al-Qa'ida's representative in Syria, Abu-Khalid al-Suri, and intended to transfer nearly $50,000 more." An equal opportunity terror financier, al-Nuaymi also sent over $2 million per month to al-Qaeda in Iraq (now called ISIS), to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and to al-Shabab in Somalia.

    ...
    ...described Kuwait as the "epicenter of fundraising for terrorist groups in Syria." Kuwait is more politically vibrant, and thus more volatile than Qatar. Any meaningful crackdown on terrorist financing would certainly "invite the wrath of powerful Salafist politicians and clerics...as well as the Sunni majority who have criticized the government for not providing enough military support to the Syrian opposition."

    ...
    ...More than a third of Iraq's 12,000 archaeological sites are under ISIS control. Excavating and selling artifacts that date back to 9,000 BCE has provided ISIS its second-largest revenue stream after illicit oil sales. Many of these items are smuggled into Europe via Turkey, Iran, and Syria. While it is nearly impossible to estimate the total profits of selling these artifacts, it is known that one lion sculpture from the region sold for more than $50 million

    ...
    ...Lastly, ransom payments from kidnappings may comprise nearly 20% of ISIS's revenue. Treasury Undersecretary Cohen has estimated that ISIS has received $20 million in ransoms this year alone. Kurdish forces estimate the group takes in $10 million a month from kidnapping. France may have paid $18 million for four of its captured journalists in April. Internally, ISIS manages a thriving ***-trafficking industry. Estimates of the number of kidnapped Yazidi women and girls forced into marriage or *** slavery range from 2,500 to 4,000. Women are sold at a low price, however, often as low as $10, mainly to attract more ISIS recruits, not as a fundraising mechanism.
    Now keep in mind: this is only the known part of related activities, and then primarily related to Iraq. Now add activities of their sympathisers and supporters in various Arab countries, add their cooperation with the Assadist regime in Syria, add even the activity of their sympathisers and representatives inside Iran... to this equotation, and the picture might become quite complete.

  18. #18
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,366

    Default SIS and the 'Costa' caliphate: what a militant claims the 'holiday' state is like

    A UK C4 News commentary on an ISIS guide to the caliphate, aimed mainly at the UK and the West. In places one wonders if this is 'black' propaganda. It is very short at four minutes:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHzkeh9SZHE

    The post title is missing the first 'I' and is not meant to refer to spooks.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 05-21-2015 at 12:32 PM.
    davidbfpo

  19. #19
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Mar 2009
    Posts
    11,074

    Default ISIS Publishes Manual on ‘How to Survive in the West’

    ISIS Publishes Manual on ‘How to Survive in the West’

    Entry Excerpt:



    --------
    Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
    This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

  20. #20
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Mar 2009
    Posts
    11,074

    Default ISIS and the Family Man

    ISIS and the Family Man

    Entry Excerpt:



    --------
    Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
    This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

Similar Threads

  1. Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)
    By SWJ Blog in forum Middle East
    Replies: 903
    Last Post: 12-31-2014, 11:08 PM
  2. PBS FRONTLINE: Gangs of Iraq 17 April 07
    By Tom Odom in forum The Whole News
    Replies: 12
    Last Post: 04-19-2007, 06:29 PM

Tags for this Thread

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •