Beyond the frontline: watching ISIS

[davidbfpo]

Although the original documents are cited and not displayed a fascinating Der Spiegel article on the ex-Iraqi AF officer who was the strategist for ISIS to gain power and success:http://www.spiegel.de/international/...a-1029274.html

Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi was the real name of the Iraqi, whose bony features were softened by a white beard. But no one knew him by that name. Even his best-known pseudonym, Haji Bakr, wasn't widely known. But that was precisely part of the plan. The former colonel in the intelligence service of Saddam Hussein's air defense force had been secretly pulling the strings at IS for years. Former members of the group had repeatedly mentioned him as one of its leading figures. Still, it was never clear what exactly his role was. But when the architect of the Islamic State died, he left something behind that he had intended to keep strictly confidential: the blueprint for this state.

[CrowBat]

That article is an absolute 'must read'. Explains all the 'whys' and 'hows': it's really so that plenty of events we've seen the last few years are 'making sense'.

Moderator's Note: new thread created for maximum visibility on this Der Speigel article.

[davidbfpo]

Although the original documents are cited and not displayed a fascinating Der Spiegel article on the ex-Iraqi AF officer who was the strategist for ISIS to gain power and success:http://www.spiegel.de/international/...a-1029274.html

amir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi was the real name of the Iraqi, whose bony features were softened by a white beard. But no one knew him by that name. Even his best-known pseudonym, Haji Bakr, wasn't widely known. But that was precisely part of the plan. The former colonel in the intelligence service of Saddam Hussein's air defense force had been secretly pulling the strings at IS for years. Former members of the group had repeatedly mentioned him as one of its leading figures. Still, it was never clear what exactly his role was. But when the architect of the Islamic State died, he left something behind that he had intended to keep strictly confidential: the blueprint for this state.

The article has been commended on Twitter and SWC's Crowbat commented:

That article is an absolute 'must read'. Explains all the 'whys' and 'hows': it's really so that plenty of events we've seen the last few years are 'making sense'.

So I have reposted this, it appeared on the Watching ISIS thread four days ago.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to WoTR for this follow-on article on ISIS and its control strategy. Near the start the author writes:

Lost in this headline-generating exercise is the real value of the article — its description of ISIL’s tactics in infiltrating new territory and implementing a program of discriminate violence designed to establish control over desired areas.

It concludes in part with:

ou ask most observers how a place like Jurf reverted to ISIL control in 2013, they will most likely point to the sectarian nature of the regime of former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki. While this undoubtedly led a significant amount of Sunnis to lose support for the government, it is difficult to measure that impact on ISIL’s campaign in Iraq — particularly because this support for ISIL can be fickle and shallow. I offer an explanation on ISIL’s rise in Iraq that is based on observable data, and one that complements the descriptions of ISIL’s rise in Syria found in the Haji Bakr papers. ISIL took the cities and towns back with an efficient campaign that focused on removing key nodes of a pro-government network and replacing it with its own control apparatus. By wresting control of the key terrain and population centers it desired, it was able to enforce and elicit a basic level of collaboration from the population. Undoubtedly, at this point opportunistic tribes and members assisted the group, but that is exactly what control facilitates and encourages according to Kalyvas’ theory on irregular warfare.

IIRC Kalyvas' theory appears elsewhere here.

Link:http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/isi.../?singlepage=1

[OUTLAW 09]

Although the original documents are cited and not displayed a fascinating Der Spiegel article on the ex-Iraqi AF officer who was the strategist for ISIS to gain power and success:http://www.spiegel.de/international/...a-1029274.html



The article has been commended on Twitter and SWC's Crowbat commented:

So I have reposted this, it appeared on the Watching ISIS thread four days ago.

Not sure just why the der Spiegel is late in this article as it was the GDR MfS that trained the entire Iraqi intelligence officer corp at Baghdad University for over 10 years.

Notice der Spiegel did not mention that small point---wrote a number of intel reports to national level on the MfS training of individual Iraq intel agents but it never seemed to interest them--all virtually all the Sunni intel officers had joined the Sunni insurgency shortly after the arrival of the US in Baghdad.

Many of them had been focused on the monitoring of the Salafists activity inside Iraq and were quite aware of who was who when we arrived so it was not hard to shift alliances.

We never seemed to want to believe this.

[flagg]

I would agree the article is a "must read", but did anyone else notice the gap in it?

How much money was needed to initiate/sustain it all and where did it come from?

Do basic business principals(with some modification) apply to insurgencies?

Start up businesses are historically/notoriously/consistently short of both capital and cash flow.

If you attempt to grow your business TOO fast you are at risk of growing it to death.

While the article covers opportunities for IS to build it's balance sheet(asset seizure) and revenue(cash flow from extortion/standover), it leaves a very big "show me the money" hole.

The Iraqi Central Bank Baghdad office theft in 2003 and the possibly erroneous report of the Iraqi Central Bank Mosul office theft in 2014 come to mind:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0378d4f4-0...#axzz3YjBjr4Vx

Is "Show me the Money!" relevant and critical to this story?

IF so, where did the money come from? Iraqi/organic, Saudi? Qatari? Other?

[CrowBat]

A very good summary about Daesh's financing was published by the ISW quite a long ago, in form of this PDF file: Terrorist Financing and Islamic State

...ISIS, which has renamed itself the Islamic State and unilaterally declared the reestablishment of an Islamic caliphate, was financially self-sufficient for about eight years as a terrorist and insurgent group before committing itself to running a proto-state.

...

And unlike other groups, which are reliant on state sponsors, major donors, or abuse of charity, AQI was financially independent by virtue of engaging in tremendously successful criminal activity enterprises domestically within Iraq.

By September, estimates put ISIS's daily income at around $3 million, giving it a total value of assets between $1.3 and $2 billion, making it the world's best-funded terrorist group. By this standard, ISIS draws more income than many small nations, including Tonga, Nauru, and the Marshall Islands.
...
Prior to the air campaign against ISIS that began in August, the group operated around 350 oil wells in Iraq and 60% of Syria's oil fields. In August, oil production from facilities under ISIS control was estimated at around 80,000 barrels per day. ISIS is believed to sell some 30,000 barrels a day in Iraq and 50,000 in Syria, which go for roughly $40 per barrel on the black market. ISIS only produces around a fifth of the total capacity of the oil fields under its control in Iraq and Syria. Even prior to the conflict, Syria's oil fields were considered old and inefficient, producing only 10% of total capacity. ISIS has tapped into pre-existing black market routes that date back to the 1990s and the smuggling networks that popped up under the Saddam-era oil-for-food program. It uses these to sell extracted crude oil to smugglers, who then transport the oil outside of conflict zones using a variety of means: tanker trucks, vans, jerry cans carried by mules, makeshift pipes, and even rafts when crossing rivers. In one case, Turkish authorities found an underground pipeline as long as 3 miles (4.8 kilometers).

...
...singled out Qatar as an especially "permissive jurisdiction" for terrorist financing. Qatari oversight is so lax, Cohen noted, that "several major Qatar-based fundraisers act as local representatives for larger terrorist fundraising networks that are based in Kuwait." Not wanting to expose sensitive intelligence, Cohen pointed to press reports that Qatar supports not only Hamas but also extremist groups operating in Syria.

...
...Abd al-Rahman al-Nuaymi, a Qatari academic and businessman, to its terror list, noting he "ordered the transfer of nearly $600,000 to al- Qa'ida via al-Qa'ida's representative in Syria, Abu-Khalid al-Suri, and intended to transfer nearly $50,000 more." An equal opportunity terror financier, al-Nuaymi also sent over $2 million per month to al-Qaeda in Iraq (now called ISIS), to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and to al-Shabab in Somalia.

...
...described Kuwait as the "epicenter of fundraising for terrorist groups in Syria." Kuwait is more politically vibrant, and thus more volatile than Qatar. Any meaningful crackdown on terrorist financing would certainly "invite the wrath of powerful Salafist politicians and clerics...as well as the Sunni majority who have criticized the government for not providing enough military support to the Syrian opposition."

...
...More than a third of Iraq's 12,000 archaeological sites are under ISIS control. Excavating and selling artifacts that date back to 9,000 BCE has provided ISIS its second-largest revenue stream after illicit oil sales. Many of these items are smuggled into Europe via Turkey, Iran, and Syria. While it is nearly impossible to estimate the total profits of selling these artifacts, it is known that one lion sculpture from the region sold for more than $50 million

...
...Lastly, ransom payments from kidnappings may comprise nearly 20% of ISIS's revenue. Treasury Undersecretary Cohen has estimated that ISIS has received $20 million in ransoms this year alone. Kurdish forces estimate the group takes in $10 million a month from kidnapping. France may have paid $18 million for four of its captured journalists in April. Internally, ISIS manages a thriving ***-trafficking industry. Estimates of the number of kidnapped Yazidi women and girls forced into marriage or *** slavery range from 2,500 to 4,000. Women are sold at a low price, however, often as low as $10, mainly to attract more ISIS recruits, not as a fundraising mechanism.

Now keep in mind: this is only the known part of related activities, and then primarily related to Iraq. Now add activities of their sympathisers and supporters in various Arab countries, add their cooperation with the Assadist regime in Syria, add even the activity of their sympathisers and representatives inside Iran... to this equotation, and the picture might become quite complete.

[davidbfpo]

A UK C4 News commentary on an ISIS guide to the caliphate, aimed mainly at the UK and the West. In places one wonders if this is 'black' propaganda. It is very short at four minutes:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHzkeh9SZHE

The post title is missing the first 'I' and is not meant to refer to spooks.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/...islamic-state/

The U.S.-trained commander of Tajikistan’s special forces has joined the Islamic State

In late April, the chief of an elite police unit in Tajikistan disappeared. Relatives said Col. Gulmurod Khalimov, who commanded the Tajik Interior Ministry's special forces, had gone on a business trip. Other rumors suggested he had vanished after falling out with colleagues at a high-level meeting.

Now, there appears to be more clarity: Khalimov is in Syria and has defected to the Islamic State.

[Bill Moore]

What? IS is effective at gathering intelligence and conducting deception operations. Who would have thunk it? I'm in shock that we somehow find this new, but I'm beginning to think that we really have forgotten a lot of the basics based on our overreliance of technical intelligence.

http://www.voanews.com/content/islam...s/2798771.html

Experts: IS Skilled at Gathering Intelligence, Adjusting Tactics

We are about 60 to 90 days behind ISIS,” former intelligence officer and military adviser Michael Pregent told VOA, referring to the Islamic State by one of its acronyms.

In addition, according to Jennifer Cafarella, a fellow at the Institute for the Study of War, the extremist group has become adept at misinformation and diversionary tactics.

[SWJ Blog]

ISIS Publishes Manual on ‘How to Survive in the West’

Entry Excerpt:



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[davidbfpo]

Citing the CIS Antiterrorism Center head:

According to the security services, about 2,000 holders of Russian passports are fighting for ISIL. Some experts believe their actual number may near 5,000.

Link:http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=12116

Curious as that would make Russia a significant source of fighters. The bona fides of the website are unknown.

[davidbfpo]

A strategic briefing from the London-based Quilliam Foundation,, that aims to provide an insight into Islamic State's propaganda machine. their key conclusions:

• A “good” image brings real power. IS’ careful and consistent branding exercise has enabled it to attract new recruits and donors, as well as satisfy the needs of current supporters.
• IS’ declaration of the caliphate was a strategic calculation that was long in the making. Now, everything it does publicly is geared towards maintaining its image.
• The brand has been crafted such that it appeals to a range of audiences, not just jihadists. Shrouding its actions beneath religion and history, it promises utopia, camaraderie, empowerment and adventure – these are key drivers for recruitment.
• The campaign against Islamic State is a war of information just as much as it is military. If we are ever to effectively “degrade and destroy” the IS organisation, we must radically restructure our efforts.

Quilliam's President, Noman Benotman, a former Libyan jihadist with LIFG, has a great sentence:

We will never be able to live with the terrorism of IS, so we must figure out a way to defeat it.

Link:http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp...ne-year-on.pdf

[JWing]

I just posted this over in the Iraq thread but thought it should be noted here as well. I just published an interview with Naval War College Prof Craig Whiteside on the revival of the Islamic State. He challenges the conventional wisdom that it was Syria, the Maliki government and Baathists that led to the group's comeback. Here's a link. It's a must read.

[davidbfpo]

A short Israeli article on ISIS that opens with this (with my emphasis):

Although experts on terrorism, security officials and decision makers worldwide concur that IS poses an unparalleled threat, they disagree about the answers to the following four key questions:

• What is the Nature of the Islamic State? Should IS be regarded as a terrorist organization? Does its scope of operations, paramilitary activities, involvement in guerilla warfare and insurgency, and control over vast territories and populations not stretch the definition of a terrorist organization?[1]
• Are the Doctrines of the Islamic State an Innovation? By its actions, is the Islamic State introducing new doctrines and concepts, or is it merely implementing and refining modern terrorism strategies, which aim to spread fear and anxiety to achieve political goals?
• What are the Islamic State’s Aspirations? Are the Islamic State’s aspirations limited to the Middle East, or does it see itself as avant garde, spearheading an operation whose objective is global? Is the Islamic State striving for hegemony and, ultimately, to establish a caliphate in Syria, Iraq and the Levant? Or does it see such a caliphate as only the first step in its drive to establish a global caliphate? In this regard, how does IS differ from Al-Qaeda, if at all?[2]
• What is the Islamic State’s Strategic Situation? Following the successful military campaign of summer 2014 that enabled IS to seize extensive swaths of Syria and Iraq, the organization’s progress seems to have stalled – in part thanks to the establishment of a broad coalition of international allies, whose goal was to halt the organization’s advance and eradicate it. Does this mark “the beginning of the end” for IS? Is it on the brink of disappearing? Or, despite the air and ground military campaign of the international coalition, will the Islamic State recoup its losses and experience a resurgence, pushing past Syria and Iraq?[3]

How we answer these four questions will affect not only our understanding of the nature, aims and activities of the Islamic State; it will also dictate what counter-strategy should be implemented in order to stop, if not trounce, the Islamic State. To this end, I will analyze the essence of the Islamic State and revisit its definition as a “terrorist organization.

Link:http://www.ict.org.il/Article/1424/F...stions-on-ISIS


Cross posted on a RFI thread.

[JWing]

Video of JM Berger discussing his book ISIS The State of Terror

[SWJ Blog]

ISIS and the Family Man

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[davidbfpo]

Professors John Horgan & Mia Bloom are currently researching this subject and have written up a short explanation:https://news.vice.com/article/this-i...hild-militants

Here is a taster:

Our research on conflicts from Sri Lanka to Northern Ireland has taught us that the first priority of terrorist organizations is not figuring out how to destroy their enemies, but ensuring the survival of the organization itself. The Islamic State is far more than a simple terrorist organization, but there can be no doubt that it has embraced the need to groom the next generation.

Children have been involved in Iraqi violence before, a 2007 thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3741

[davidbfpo]

Ben Barry, IISS, gives a short assessment of the region in a video (5 mins) and comments that 700 Malays have gone to ISIS for them to form a battallion - I don't recall seeing that in the public domain before:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFIB...ature=youtu.be

He ends with a bleak forecast.

[JWing]

Cross posting this on this ISIS thread. I just published my 88th interview for Musings On Iraq. I talked with Michael Weiss co-author of ISIS Inside the Army of Terror. We talked about the rise of IS and its recent rebirth. Here's a link.