A quick read from Lightfighter, originally posted in 2003:

Soldier's Load

by CPT Bob Mahowald

On the modern battlefield, light infantry soldiers are asked to conduct a wide veriety of missions in constantly changing conditions. Light infantry companies are capable of full spectrum operations, transitioning quickly from search and attack, to military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), and then to support and stability operations (SASO). Today’s infantryman has a multitude of tools to help him accomplish each of these missions: weapons, demolitions, body armor, radios, handheld GPS systems, shoulder-fired anti-armor and anti-bunker weapons, anti-personnel mines, mortar rounds, and the list goes on. With all of this gear carried on individuals’ backs, it is easy to see why Light Infantry often seems to be an oxymoron.

Light infantry leaders have several factors to balance: keeping their soldiers alert, protecting them from both the enemy and the elements, and furnishing them with the right equipment to accomplish the mission—all of which influences the soldier’s load. Infantry leaders, beginning with commanders, must rationally and dispassionately determine what loads their units will carry and then ruthlessly ensure that soldiers adhere to these packing lists.

When deciding what type of loads their soldiers will carry, a commander must analyze the packing list based on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civil considerations (METT-TC). This can be daunting given the number of items carried by today’s light infantryman and the complexity of the tasks he is asked to accomplish.

For a starting point, leaders need a methodology to begin breaking down their unit’s loads for analysis. In his article The Problem of Individual Military Equipment, Major A. N. Hvidt, an officer in the Danish Army, offered the following framework for separating a soldier’s equipment into two separate groups.

1.
Personal kit and carrying equipment which do not directly or indirectly inflict losses on the enemy, but serve one purpose only, namely to keep the soldier alive and protect him against physical and climatic stress, as well as the consequences of enemy activity.



1. Weapons with accessories which can be characterized as “active equipment.” This category today includes all kinds of equipment such as signal, pioneer, transport and similar gear.[1]



Leader’s can then apply their METT-TC analysis to each group, adding or discarding items based on their current and foreseen needs, all the while focusing a critical eye on the equipment their troops carry. Is their load tailored for the mission at hand, but flexible enough to support likely follow-on missions? Is the load modular, allowing soldiers to drop their rucksacks at chance enemy contact and fight on with only those truly mission essential items or cache portions of their load until needed? Can soldiers survive with the equipment they are carrying without their fighting abilities being degraded?

Through unit packing lists, commanders can dictate the precise weight carried by each individual, but only if soldiers unequivocally hold fast to the prescribed packing list. Individuals must not be allowed to make additions or substitutions without approval at some higher level. Additionally, packing lists must be tailored for each duty position.

For instance, squads and teams can reduce weight by sharing certain items. Ounces can be shaved by carrying only one entrenching tool and sleeping bag for every other man, eliminating personal “junk” food, and sharing a single tube of toothpaste and can of shaving cream within a team.

There are some items we carry only out of habit or tradition. Most units still carry their M9 bayonet—at a cost of 1.8 lbs.—but never employ them. I would argue that the bayonet does not serve a practical purpose, but rather a sentimental one.

Trends at the Joint Readiness Training Center show that many units begin their rotations with overloaded soldiers. Most are able to identify this problem after their initial movements and enemy contacts and make arraignments to reduce their loads through elimination, caches, or company trains. The question remains, however, why were these load problems not addressed while the unit prepared for combat in the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB)? In WWII, Korea, or Vietnam, soldiers had years of collective combat experience to help them determine what was absolutely essential for them to carry. When weighted down with unnecessarily cumbersome loads, soldiers would simply fall back on their expertise and discard the equipment they did not need. Today however, American military campaigns are measured in days, not years. By the time light infantrymen in combat learn what they truly must carry and what is superfluous, the conflict may well be over. These lessons must be learned before men find themselves in combat, and the only way to do this is through tough, realistic training.

A common reason leaders give at JRTC to justify the loads they are carrying is that they simply cannot trust their resupply system. This is equivalent to admitting that their unit has failed to adequately train on logistical tasks at their home station. Each and every field problem a unit conducts is an opportunity to stretch, strain, and improve their logistical tail. Company executive officers and first sergeants must become experts in how to request, transport, receive, and distribute supplies. By forcing soldiers to survive for extended periods of time with only the load they will carry in combat, units will learn to trust that their basic needs will be met, and their mental and physical stamina not wasted.
Scientific study has shown that a soldier can carry 30% of his body weight and still maintain the stamina he will need to engage the enemy. This means a 170-pound soldier would carry a load of 51 lbs. For each additional 10 lbs. carried, the soldier will lose 15% of his agility. When a load reaches 45% of a soldier’s body weight (76.5 lbs. for a 170 lbs. soldier), his ability to functions drops dramatically and his risk for becoming a casualty increases.[2]

These weights pale in comparison to weights recorded at JRTC. For example, here are some average weight loads by position:[3]

Duty Position

Ave. Individual Weight (lbs.)

Equipment Weight (lbs.)

Ruck Weight (lbs.)

Total Weight Carried (lbs.)

Rifleman

169.09

41.70 (24%)

51.20

92.90 (54%)

Machine Gunner

171.67

56.87 (33%)

51.92

108.71 (63%)

RTO

171.76

28.32 (16%)

70.54

98.86 (59%)



A soldier’s load carry capacity can be increased through training, but only by 10 to possibly 20 percent at best. Even with rigorous conditioning, each of these soldiers listed above would exceed their maximum carry capacity.[4]

Leaders need to understand the risks they are taking when their soldiers carry these loads into combat. A leader can assume tactical risk by analyzing his mission and deciding that the benefit gained by carrying excessive loads outweighs the proven dangers of such an action. An ignorant leader, however, heaps accidental risk upon his unit when he overloads them without conscience consideration.

American infantrymen are smart, tough, and resourceful. Their will to fight and the skill with which they accomplish their missions are unparalleled. Commanders are responsible for training their units to these high standards, remaining capable of closing with and destroying an enemy at any time. Carefully managing individual loads within a unit helps to preserve both its individual and collective combat power. A commander who effectively manages his soldiers' loads--in concert with sound tactics, detailed planning, and determined leadership--will ensure that his unit arrives at its decisive point ready and able to accomplish its mission.


There are several excellent resources for studying soldier’s load. Field Manuals 7-8 (Infantry Platoon and Squad), 7-10 (The Infantry Rifle Company), and 21-18 (Foot Marches) all offer doctrinal guidance for crafting and managing soldier’s load. Perhaps the best source is a book written in 1950 by S.L.A. Marshall, The Soldier’s load and the Mobility of a Nation. This is an excellent text and should be required reading for all infantry leaders.