The latest edition of Pegasus reveals that British paratroopers were forced into taking part in an overly aggressive operation against the Taliban which caused serious damage to the British mission before it had even begun. They arrived in Helmand in June 2006 to provide security for a reconstruction programme that would leave the local people happy with the coalition presence and with their own government, thereby sidelining the Taliban.
But they found the then US commander planning a large-scale offensive operation against the Taliban in Helmand province. Brig Ed Butler, the British commander in Helmand, opposed Operation Mountain Thrust taking place in what he foolishly thought was the area under his control, saying that he had his own plan and going in hard at the start of the mission, thereby leaving the local population unhappy with the presence of his troops, was not part of that plan.
Unfortunately, the south had not been handed over to Nato control at this point so the US commander not only ignored the British plea, he told Butler bluntly that he was going in hard with US troops and he didn't care whether the British liked it or not.
“Despite our ‘ownership’ of Helmand and our request to conduct ops in ‘the British Way’ we were unable to prevent Mountain Thrust occurring,” an unnamed senior officer says in Pegasus. “As a result of the threat of unilateral action and in order to ensure our own force protection UK task force’s involvement was forced. This operation forced a change in the security dynamic in a number of areas across the province and played, to a certain extent, into the hands of the Taliban.”
Then with the Americans still in charge, Afghan President Hamid Karzai demanded that the British put troops into the northern district centres of Now Zad, Sangin and Musa Qala. This took up the entire infantry battalion that was supposed to provide the security needed to allow the carefully planned reconstruction programme to go ahead. General David Richards, the British general in charge of Nato forces, was furious.
This was scarcely surprising. Not only did it tie down much needed troops and put back the reconstruction process, it also gave the Taliban some wonderful targets which they could attack, raising their profile immensely, allowing them to claim fraudulently that they were fighting for the local people, and largely justifying their claim to be mounting a major offensive in the south. They could claim some useful successes. The first 14 British soldiers to die in Helmand were all killed at Sangin or Musa Qala.
So a deal was agreed with the local elders in Musa Qala under which the elders would set up a local police force to keep the town under government control, allowing the British to withdraw their troops. The hope was that it would provide a blueprint that would keep the Taliban out of the towns and allow the British infantry to do their real job, providing the security that would allow reconstruction to go ahead and bring the local population on side.
But McNeil has made it clear that he wants such deals to end and the British to take on the Taliban, which will of course continue to ensure that the British troops cannot provide the necessary security for the reconstruction process that just might win over the local people while at the same time providing the Taliban with a stage on which to posture once again as the brave defenders of the Afghan people.
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