US policy with an ally like the Saudis till 2016

[tequila]

This, I think, will be of concern in the next few years.

...

In July, Richard C. Holbrooke, the Obama administration's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, said the Taliban was reaping the bulk of its revenue from donors abroad, especially from the Persian Gulf.

Other U.S. officials have noted that the Taliban received substantial financial help from Gulf countries during the 1990s, when Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates -- along with Pakistan -- were the only nations that gave diplomatic recognition to the Taliban government ...

[davidbfpo]

Tequila,

It is worthy of note that the UAE contributes to ISAF. IIRC Special Forces at one point. ISAF's webpage shows 25 troops: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf

As always there are different aspects to their role: a 2007 report of a defector: http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2...138362757.html and a 2008 BBC report: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7318731.stm

There are no Saudi troops in ISAF.

davidbfpo

[Bob's World]

http://news.yahoo.com/ny-judge-al-qa...002608127.html

I recommend we send this bill to the King.

It was due to our policy of preserving his family in power that created the causal linkage between his oppressive regime at home and the decision of a handful of Saudi insurgents working with AQ to attack the US to advance their ultimate goal of bringing the Saudi reign down.

Now, granted, that is an arrangement that US officials entered into and sustained of their own free will; but the only thing we seem less willing to do than recognize the role of Saudi governance in the birth and growth of AQ, is to recognize the role of US-Saudi foreign policy in the same.

[Dayuhan]

It was due to our policy of preserving his family in power that created the causal linkage between his oppressive regime at home and the decision of a handful of Saudi insurgents working with AQ to attack the US to advance their ultimate goal of bringing the Saudi reign down.

Have we ever preserved the Saud family in the face of a domestic threat? The hypothesis that American support has allowed the Saudis to avoid evolutionary changes that would have been necessary without that support seems to me historically insupportable.

Both the description of the 9/11 terrorists as "insurgents" and the causative link you suggest remain largely speculative... part of the picture doubtless, but only one part. Exaggerating that part and focusing on it to the exclusion of the many other parts does not improve our understanding of the entire picture.

[Ken White]

It was due to our policy of preserving his family in power that created the causal linkage between his oppressive regime at home and the decision of a handful of Saudi insurgents working with AQ to attack the US to advance their ultimate goal of bringing the Saudi reign down.

You may have seen something that purports to be proof of that. I have not and I therefor question the validity of the "causal linkage" portion that statement. It smacks of a standing broad jump at a convenient conclusion...

Had you said contributed in part, I would likely have just kept driving but "causal linkage" smacks of more positivism than seems warranted. I don't think this -- or the whole 'governance is the cause of it all' thing -- is nearly as simple as you'd like...

[Bob's World]

You may have seen something that purports to be proof of that. I have not and I therefor question the validity of the "causal linkage" portion that statement. It smacks of a standing broad jump at a convenient conclusion...

Had you said contributed in part, I would likely have just kept driving but "causal linkage" smacks of more positivism than seems warranted. I don't think this -- or the whole 'governance is the cause of it all' thing -- is nearly as simple as you'd like...

Actually, much of this is very simple, it is just inconvenient. Complexity if vastly over-rated and over-sold of late.

As to Dayuhan, the Saudi's are a major purchaser of US military hardware, yet while certainly their Wahabist doctrine makes them a sworn enemy of Shia Iran, that is their problem and not ours. They employ the majority of what they buy for internal purposes, as they know (as do the Iranians) we will come running if any true external threat should emerge. So, yes, protecting the Saudi regime has been a central component of our Middle Eastern foreign policy since at least 1944.

bin Laden and most of the 9/11 attackers, and the core of AQ are Saudi for a reason. They hate the Saudi regime and the US for a reason. We can ignore it or address it. So far ignoring it is not working.

We've invested Billions, perhaps Trillions in "complex." Would it kill us, given the failure of that to do much more than kill a bunch of individuals while at the same time stimulating the overall organization to grow and become more wide-spread and durable, to switch to cheap, simple, and smart for a change??

The nature of US - Saudi relationship; and the nature of Saudi governance, is the core of the war on terrorism. I stand by that. I have yet to see anything that would prove that wrong, but I am open to informed arguments on the topic.

[Ken White]

bin Laden and most of the 9/11 attackers, and the core of AQ are Saudi for a reason. They hate the Saudi regime and the US for a reason. We can ignore it or address it. So far ignoring it is not working.

We've invested Billions, perhaps Trillions in "complex." ...become more wide-spread and durable, to switch to cheap, simple, and smart for a change??

The nature of US - Saudi relationship; and the nature of Saudi governance, is the core of the war on terrorism.

Aside from the fact I suspect the reasons for things are not as clear cut as you wish to assume -- ask any kid why he joined the US Army...

Trillions are not necessary; cheap, simple and smart are desirable, no question. Dogmatism is cheap but it isn't smart.

I thought you disliked the term "war on terrorism?"

We're not going to agree on this aspect, we never have. While I agree that Saudis have taken advantage of us and agree that our relationship with them needs change, they are far from the only opponent out there. It is possible to over-simplify things...

Poor governance is not the only cause of insurgency.

My perception, right or wrong, is that you've got some bad cases of tunnel vision and while we agree on many things, we still do not agree on those two things. That's okay, we can disagree. The good news I'm not going to influence anyone in a position of power. You may. I suggest one thing only...

Be careful.

[Dayuhan]

the Saudi's are a major purchaser of US military hardware, yet while certainly their Wahabist doctrine makes them a sworn enemy of Shia Iran, that is their problem and not ours.

The issue between the Saudis and the Iranians is not just about Wahhabi vs Shi'a, it's about two regional powers glaring at each other across a whole lot of a very valuable resource. It is our problem, like it or not, because if a fight breaks out the price of oil will go to the stratosphere and stay there. The US desire to keep Gulf oil out of the hands of Iran (or in prior days Saddam) has nothing to do with support for the Saudis. It's self defense.

Saudi arms purchases are not US aid to Saudi Arabia. If anything it's Saudi aid to the US: those purchases do a great deal to keep our defense industries viable, and the Saudis could easily buy the stuff elsewhere.

They employ the majority of what they buy for internal purposes...

When was the last time you saw Saudi F15s or M1s used against domestic opponents. They probably would if they thought they had to, but they haven't had to: they've never faced an internal threat that required more than a police response... a very ugly police response, yes, but not one that requires any help from the US. The Saudis don't need our help to manage their populace, and they sure as hell aren't going to ask our permission or pay attention to our objections.

as they know (as do the Iranians) we will come running if any true external threat should emerge. So, yes, protecting the Saudi regime has been a central component of our Middle Eastern foreign policy since at least 1944.

Protecting the Saudi regime against external aggression has been a central component of our Middle Eastern foreign policy. We haven't had to protect them from domestic dissent.

bin Laden and most of the 9/11 attackers, and the core of AQ are Saudi for a reason. They hate the Saudi regime and the US for a reason. We can ignore it or address it. So far ignoring it is not working.

They hate the US for a wide variety of reasons, and they're pursuing a variety of goals, many of which are proactive, not responsive. You focus on one small portion of that picture, because it fits the model you're trying to present.

Would it kill us, given the failure of that to do much more than kill a bunch of individuals while at the same time stimulating the overall organization to grow and become more wide-spread and durable, to switch to cheap, simple, and smart for a change??

The nature of US - Saudi relationship; and the nature of Saudi governance, is the core of the war on terrorism. I stand by that. I have yet to see anything that would prove that wrong, but I am open to informed arguments on the topic.

You've seen a number of informed arguments, but you've already made up your mind.

Would you care to elaborate on "cheap, simple, and smart"? The suggestions you've made in the past have typically been based on the premise that the US has far more influence on Saudi domestic policy than the US actually has, and that's a very risky premise. Any plan based on urging or encouraging the Saudis to change the way they govern is really pointless from the start. It might feel good, but it will have no more effect on the Saudis than the periodic European criticisms of US policy have on us. Neither will it be appreciated by th Saudi populace: no matter how they feel about their own government, they hate it when we lecture them. It doesn't come off as support for the populace, it comes off as arrogant, patronizing, contempt for their nation and culture.