US policy with an ally like the Saudis till 2016

[Ken White]

What indeed does one do with an Ally such as Saudi Arabia?

Are they a real ally -- or just a nation with whom we do business, have some common interests and many disconnects? I'd say the latter.

The home of bin Laden.

Well, yeah. Though I'm totally unsure what that has to do with your topic.

The home of the vast majority of the 9/11 attackers.

Yep. Others from various places. Other attackers at other times in total outnumber the Saudis. Though, again, I'm not sure what that has to do with anything...

The home of the vast majority of foreign fighters in Iraq.

Way wrong, I suspect. No way to get really accurate numbers but generally, the Egyptians, Syrians and Sudanese were captured and killed in greater quantities than Saudis -- the foreign fighters in Iraq literally came from all over. As do those in Afghanistan, where Pakistanis and North African Arabs seem to be the most numerous. I think the problem is one of Islamic distaste for the US versus Saudi implacable hatred for us.

The home of one of the most oppressive regimes on the planet.

Yep, oppressive, one of the most so. Shame. Not our concern. We can express distaste but really have no right to do more. None.

The home of the largest proven oil reserves on the planet.

Proven (conservatively). Go to 2 P or 3 P and they drop well down in the tables IIRC. Canada and Russia (plus the US...) might hop out there... .

What in deed does one do.

Depends. Some say:

- Subject them to intense pressures to change their ways, to include military action.

- Buy no oil from them.

- Work with them to achieve change using carrots and sticks.

- Do nothing, they are a business associate, no more.

- Support the Kingdom totally, get more involved with and supportive of Islam.

And ten or so variations between each of those. IOW, there are numerous 'positions' on what should be done. Your problem is that those varied positions are held by and within the Congress of the United States and the current Administration (as well as almost any likely future Administration). i.e. No consensus, ergo, nothing will be done other than incremental nudges. As Martha Stewart, Federal felon says, "this is a good thing..."

It is not our job to interfere with sovereign States and we darn sure do not do it very well. See Korea, Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq.

I was reading a new book yesterday, ran across this line: "He (Lyndon Johnson, POTUS) was unable to make hard decisions -- to mobilize the reserves, to force the South Vietnamese government to reform, to commit fully to the war, or to explain his policy clearly to the American people."

I agree the first, third and fourth were in the President's scope for decisions -- but I cackled at that second item. No US President has ever had the power to make such a decision and if he made it he couldn't enforce it. Yet that attitude -- we want if 'fixed' so it must be fixed is pervasive in US strategic and policy circles. It's foolish hubris. Thinking it's ones job to fix others is as dangerous and wrong as any Cold War missteps.

Dayuhan has it right:

""Our actions are typically seen as conspiratorial attempts to advance our own interests, and our active support can actually discredit a reform agenda. We do not want reformers to be seen as tools of the US.

If we're asking the old "what can we do" question, we have to ask whether we have to do anything. Supporting those who seek change is often a good thing, if we can do it subtly and without seeming to direct or take over the reform agenda (subtlety, alas, has never been one of our strong suits). Trying to initiate, direct, or control political change in other countries... for me that's kind of a reverse Nike slogan: just don't do it.""

[Fuchs]

Experts don't consider the Saudi oil reserves claims reliable. The figures are pretty much made-up - no foreigner really knows how much oil they have.

About "ally"; I remarked years ago that Americans tend to use that word inflationary. That is dangerous, for at times people really believe that a nation with which you had some agreements and which was called an "ally" is really allied - with obligations and all. See Georgia and the nutty idea that they were an ally and the U.S. should somehow intervene...
The inflationary use of the word "ally" also leads to delusions in the "allied" country (again; Georgia!).


Btw; the German government proved its lack of taste, judgement and class in regard to Saudi Arabia just a few weeks ago.

[Bob's World]

Good comments so far.

First, when I suggest we need to "do something" I always direct that finger primarily in the direction of what do we change about ourselves, about our end of the equation, first. We need to evolve from defining our problems as being something we solve in foreign lands while we seek to go about business as usual at home.

Second, the energy driving transnational terrorism is, IMO, primarily coming from a large number of long suppressed nationalist insurgencies that AQ and others tap into to leverage in support of their own agendas of power and control. This is important, because a global effort to leverage many distinct insurgencies does not make a "global insurgency" when done today by NSAs any more than it did in the Cold War when done by the Soviets and the US. Each is unique and must be addressed individually. Also the grievances and issues that create the conditions of insurgency among a populace are much more about perception than fact. More on that last one

Dayuhan relies heavily on "fact;" and Ken raises some challenges to some of the "facts" I quickly laid out to help frame the discussion (I can provide cites), but the important thing to remember is that if the aggrieved populace believes something to be true or significant, then it is. Historically governments challenged by insurgency have tended to grossly discount the grievances of the populace as the conditions of insurgency were growing to noticeable levels, but still very manageable through simple civil adjustments on key points. Even when the insurgency explodes into violent, illegal action the governments tend to cling to their "rightness" on the issues, and to write off the insurgency as the actions of a few misguided malcontents, or on some radicalizing ideology, or some foreign actor, or any combination of the three. Rarely do they recognize that a long series of governmental disconnects have produced a widespread condition of insurgency among the populace from which such movements spring and are sustained.

What are the perceptions of the Saudi people about their government?

what are the perceptions of the Saudi people about the US?

What are the perceptions of the Saudi people about the nature of the relationship between the Saudi Royals and the US?

What aspect of these perceptions are in turn targeted and exploited by NSAs such as AQ?

What small, reasonable changes could the US make on our end to help mitigate these perceptions?

what small, reasonable changes could the Saudis make (beyond the enhanced bribes and security efforts being employed now in response to fears driven by Arab Spring)?

[Ken White]

...Ken raises some challenges to some of the "facts" I quickly laid out to help frame the discussion (I can provide cites)...

Nope. Incorrect. I didn't challenge your facts, I agree with all except the oil and the Saudis being the largest supplier of Furrin Fighters -- I too can provide cites on that -- what I did 'challenge' was the relevancy of any of those facts to your premise.

That's the subject FYI. Then, on other aspects of your comment...

...but the important thing to remember is that if the aggrieved populace believes something to be true or significant, then it is.

Ah, the silver tongued attorney person himself subtly points out that, as I said, those 'facts' don't count for much...

He then asks questions about Saudis perceptions which neither he nor we can answer though we could speculate until the cows RON at the barn.

This OTOH:

What small, reasonable changes could the US make on our end to help mitigate these perceptions?

Seems perfectly reasonable. Except that it asks us to define a policy based on the above speculation.

While this:

what small, reasonable changes could the Saudis make (beyond the enhanced bribes and security efforts being employed now in response to fears driven by Arab Spring)?

is really none of our business.

It is good to advocate dismissal and recasting of Cold War values and practices. It is IMO however rather unwise, perhaps even a bit conflicted, to advocate continued interference in and with other nations just done a bit differently. To me, that seems to be a continuation of the cold war by other means...

[Bob's World]

Actually I believe that such perceptions are easily derived if one simply listens for them. Too often we are so focused on ourselves and what we think is either important or legal, that we do not hear, or rather listen, to the perspectives that are most important to the matter at hand.

As to the internal stability of Saudi Arabia, if it is "none of our business" (IE, we have no vital national interests there), then great, let it burn, because left unchecked, it will indeed burn sooner than later.

The problem is that we do have a vital interest in the stability of that region. For the past 60+ years our approach to that stability has been in the the form of supporting the government while turning a blind eye to growing problems between that government and their populace. Historically such approaches have worked well. "Friendly Dictators" are a proven tool of securing interests in foreign lands.

My contention is that in the current information environment such relationships are obsolete, in that the Cost now exceeds the Benefit. Markets change, and business models must change as well or grow obsolete. We are working to force an obsolete "business model" to work; and the populaces affected by our actions are more than willing to attack us for our troubles.

We need a new "business model."

This in not unlike what Great Britain encountered with their empire. As populaces connected and empowered by the very network of telegraphs, steam ships and railroads built by the British to manage and exploit their empire, employed those same tools to stand up and resist that foreign presence and the illegitimate governments they formed and protected. The Cost of empire came to exceed the Benefit of empire, so the Brits were forced to adopt a new business model (the Commonwealth) and contract the degree of control they sought to exercise over others.

So too the US today with our Containment strategy that is also rooted in exercising controlling influence over others (not to the degree of colonialism, but control-based all the same). We too need a new business model.

Like the Brits we are currently attacking the points of friction in an attempt to force the failing model to work. Like the Brits we are learning the hard way that such efforts are futile.

Instead of nicking away at the edges with efforts to sustain an unsustainable status quo, I recommend that we focus on the heart of the matter with an effort to design and implement a new, more sustainable business model.

Preaching "universal values" won't get us there.

Blindly supporting despots who oversee vital interests for us won't get us there.

Sending the Military from hot spot to hot spot to help suppress those who dare to act out against the current system will not get us there.

We must get in front of the situation and focus on this new system. One that is less controlling. One in which the affected populaces have a greater say. One that by definition must be different than the one that exists today.

Or we can just keep expanding the lists of organizations we deem to be "terrorist" and just keep sending the military out to conduct CT against those organizations, while we continue to spend an ever increasing amount to prop up failing allied governments with development, security force capacity designed for internal threats, etc. If we do this, we will fall and fall hard. This is not inevitable, it is in fact very avoidable. But first we must get to step one, and that is to admit we have a problem internal to ourselves. Currently we dwell in denial. This is like any other form of addiction to self-destructive behavior.

[ganulv]

Gleaning from that information which is publicly available (well, that portion of it which is written in English, at least!) my take is that the U.S. Government seems to have unrealistic expectations of the House of Saud. They—and I use the pronoun with the recognition that it encompasses within its scope plenty of factions at cross-purposes—seem to be either unwilling or unable to aid our (ever “evolving”) counter-terrorism strategy.

As to whether the House of Saud is a good bet to provide stability, my reading of the publicly available stuff is that they are not. The social welfare carrot they have so lavishly funded does not appear to be sustainable and one would suspect that that is going to lead to eventual tensions emanating from the non-Royal Saudi citizenry. But just as serious a threat would seem to be internal to the House, as the members of the family are often portrayed as conniving, petty, back-stabbing simpletons. Not the first time such a charge has been leveled at a ruling family of aristocrats, of course. Nor does a political system even need to be non-democratic to evidence those qualities, as demonstrated by the last few weeks in DC.

A question and two follow-up questions to it for those with a good knowledge of such things—am I correct in assuming that stability in Riyadh is an absolute prerequisite for the continued operation of NSA Bahrain? Are there any plausible alternative locations for a comparable base? And is such a base an unquestionable necessity for U.S. military and political strategy as it now stands?

[jmm99]

This is not aimed primarily at Bob, but at the loose usage of language (unfortunately a too-common usage) in his message:

from BW
... but the important thing to remember is that if the aggrieved populace believes something to be true or significant, then it is.

....then it (the perception) is exactly what - true or significant ?

What is "true", for most of us mortals, is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, or a neat package (a Holy Grail) that we can find if we only search enough. As Pilate asked (with question not answered): "What is Truth ?"

I will take "an important thing to remember" as this: if a substantial population group believes something to be "true", that perception is "significant" to that group; and that perception may or may not be "significant" to third parties. That it is or may be "significant" does not make it "true".

For example, we can find a number of historical examples where a population group believed its magico-religious rite were sufficient to prevent death in war (e.g., the Sudanese Mahdists and Plains Indian Ghost Dancers). Those perceptions were obviously not "true" (certainly not to the lead bullets that were not impressed by magico-religion).

BLAE: I agree with Ken: "Perceptions abound -- and they are often wrong, sometimes dangerously so."

Regards

Mike

As to lawyers, legal strategy and what is "true", see this post and the article "A Theory of Legal Strategy".

[Ken White]

"It is just like man's vanity and impertinence to call an animal dumb because it is dumb to his dull perceptions."

Perceptions abound -- and they are often wrong, sometimes dangerously so.

Actually I believe that such perceptions are easily derived if one simply listens for them...

So it is your perception that is so? Perhaps true, they do in fact seem to be easily so derived -- perhaps too easily -- and those derivations are historically often terribly wrong.

Hopefully you will recall that we Americans historically do quite poorly on assessments of the perceptions held by those in other lands -- and the more different the language and / or culture, the more likelihood of terribly flawed ideas being adopted.

Perceptions are important; they are not reality. People in general are indeed prone to act on their perceptions but it seems to me to be incumbent upon planners and strategists to not fall into that trap themselves...

The problem is that we do have a vital interest in the stability of that region. For the past 60+ years our approach to that stability has been in the the form of supporting the government while turning a blind eye to growing problems between that government and their populace. Historically such approaches have worked well. "Friendly Dictators" are a proven tool of securing interests in foreign lands.

No, they have not worked well, not at all. They merely succeeded in forestalling the inevitable (see Spring, Arab...), generally for the benefit of the supporters of that terribly flawed policy. Your belief and that of many in the policy establishments that they have worked is a very significant contributor to our current and recent past imbroglios -- and even as modified by you, does not bode well for the future which appears to be doing the same thing (define insanity...) with minor tweaks and being (slightly) less controlling in the process...

Controlling is controlling, no matter how sweetly it's couched.

It is interesting to speculate how things might be different if there was not almost a need in our political system as currently modified for the benefit of the political parties and incumbents, the shakers and movers in the policy establishments (plural -- and that's another issue...) to move from crisis to crisis -- or at least event to event...

Might I suggest that we do not really have vital interests there but that we have simply assumed we must have some since we elected to foster oil dependency worldwide? We did that for short term gain and because it was seemingly easy. As many are fond of saying, it's all about choices -- and the US polity is very fond of seemingly easy choices that punt problems a yard or two at a time. We do not have a US foreign policy nor do we have many national interests outside our shores, we have US domestic politics that drive foreign efforts -- and adventures (most of which do not work out that well in this era of 'Super Size Me').

My contention is that in the current information environment such relationships are obsolete, in that the Cost now exceeds the Benefit. Markets change, and business models must change as well or grow obsolete. We are working to force an obsolete "business model" to work; and the populaces affected by our actions are more than willing to attack us for our troubles.

We need a new "business model."

We agree on that and this:

So too the US today with our Containment strategy that is also rooted in exercising controlling influence over others (not to the degree of colonialism, but control-based all the same). We too need a new business model.
...
...while we continue to spend an ever increasing amount to prop up failing allied governments with development, security force capacity designed for internal threats, etc. If we do this, we will fall and fall hard. This is not inevitable, it is in fact very avoidable. But first we must get to step one, and that is to admit we have a problem internal to ourselves. Currently we dwell in denial. This is like any other form of addiction to self-destructive behavior.

Absolutely agree.

We disagree on two points, one you elide and one in which IMO you are a victim of misperception...

You never mention the fact that US domestic politics drive the train of our foreign activities and you never offer solutions or recommendations to fix that major problem. It may be that you believe that is not a correct assessment or that you think that may be correct but is unimportant. I think history proves that it is both correct and quite important (I can provide cites).

You believe we should intrude on other nations when we perceive (there's that word again...) our interests require it. IOW you want to do the same thing but with more finesse (something of which, as I have to keep reminding you, the US government is totally incapable ). A belief or policy based on perceptions can be and likely will be just as flawed as one based on invalid assumptions -- or is that redundant???

[slapout9]

Link to former Senator Bob Graham's new novel. I am trying to find the TV interview he did. It goes all the way back to the end of WW2.


http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...ob-graham.html

[Bob's World]

No, I believe we should fix ourselves first. How we operate internally and how we interact in locations where we have convinced ourselves we have "vital" national interests at stake.

In recent days we have all watched the debate between the Democrats and Republicans. Both profess to be fighting for the American people, yet in reality the Democrats fight to preserve their President in office and the Republicans fight to take him out in the coming elections. All hard decisions are (in their minds) something to deal with "after the election." The problem is that "after the election" like tomorrow, never comes.

Some times I wonder if American politicians appreciate that even our amazing constitution can only protect them for so long. Sad bit of business to watch. Yet for how amazingly F'd up and embarrassing our elected officials are; we still are citizens of a political system that is the envy of much of the world. Little wonder so many Saudis get scarfed up in the middle of the night without warrant or charge; or scoot off to places like Yemen or the FATA to bide their time and plot their return.

But still, if we allow the percept to persist that the Saudi Royals are protected against internal and external challengers by a US insurance policy there will be those who will seek to get us to break that commitment of support. I think much of what we need to do can be done by simply going on record that it is a new era:

1. That we do not care who presides over Saudi Arabia and that we are willing to continue to work with whomever that might be, regardless of how they came to rise to power. But we won't protect that new group either, so they better be snapped in with the people or they will likely soon suffer the same fate at their hands.

2. That we do not care what form of government the Saudi people self-determine.

3. That while we will not act to protect the current or future regime from internal change, we will act to prevent external challenge.

4. That while we will not act to protect the current or future regime from internal change, we reserve the right to act decisively to preserve infrastructure deemed vital to our own national survival and to hold the same in trust until such time as such threatening disputes are resolved (So figure out a way to work this out without forcing our hand to step in).

Meanwhile I think some backroom discussions with the Royals are long overdue. They can listen or not, its their heads. Simple changes, such as putting a little more "justice" into the justice system; or either getting the Royals closer to Islam or acting to bifurcate the "keeper of Islam" role from the Royal job description, would both go a long way toward greater stability.

Some concepts that have worked well elsewhere that might be worth considering are:

1. A parliamentary system similar to Britain's, with the Royals stepping into a similar role.

2. A creation of a "Vatican City" approach to Mecca/Medina to free the KSA to evolve without the friction of having those sites holy to all Muslims within their borders.

The only truly bad idea is to just keep doing what we've been doing and hope it somehow starts to work. Every other idea has some redeeming value, though some are better than others; and any selected by the Saudi people being better than any imposed upon them.

Insurgency is illegal politics. In a land where no legal politics exist, can there be anything but insurgency? The Royals might want to install a legal offramp or two while they are at it.

[motorfirebox]

Are they a real ally -- or just a nation with whom we do business, have some common interests and many disconnects? I'd say the latter.

I think I'd say that they are not our ally, but that we are theirs.

[Ken White]

I think I'd say that they are not our ally, but that we are theirs.

We are or will be if we feel like it at a given time but will drop or ignore them totally if it suits us. In the meantime, they are simply a habit, foolishly foisted on us by FDR -- and as any American knows, if Franklin did it, it must be honored and retained -- even if what we have done to it since wildly exceeds any ideas of FDR.

In discussing relationships with nations, people are prone to equate a nation's actions and reactions with those of humans. Bad mistake. Nations don't have morals or a conscience (nor do many humans but that's another thread... ).

The whole Middle East involvement thing is a habit -- and not a good one. We should've moved on forty plus years ago.

That statement also applies, broadly, to oil...

The US national polity is a bundle of conflicts. There is little political continuity but due to inertia and lack of imagination plus an arcane budgeting system, entirely too much policy continuity. Things get started for good reason and usually fairly sensibly -- but they then take on a life of their own and morph in strange and wondrous ways -- and they become habitual -- no matter how stupid they have become.

However with respect to 'friends' and 'allies' there really are none other than temporarily when convenient. We, like Palmerston's Britain, only have interests. That's as it should be...

[Bob's World]

Concur on the interests focus.

(Eric Wendt recently published a piece called the "Green Beret Volckmann Program." The one fault I have with it is that he rationalized the need in terms of dealing more effectively with AQ. I would (do, and will) argue that such a program has great merit, but must be focused and prioritized by where we assess our greatest interests to lie. Friends and enemies come and go, or just switch hats, but interests are indeed much more durable.)