This issue has come up on a number of threads where it was peripheral; I though it deserved its own discussion.

One view that’s been proposed is that Saudi Arabia is a central front in the GWOT. According to this view, decades of bad governance in Saudi Arabia combined with the perception of Western support for the Saudi government has generated an insurgent situation which expresses itself primarily externally, in the form of terrorist attacks and support for insurgents and anti-Western forces in other countries. This view holds as well that popular resentment toward the Saudi government fuels and enables insurgencies in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and others.

According to this view, the US badly needs to revise its policy toward Saudi Arabia, acting as a mediator between the Saudi Government and its own populace and visibly pressing for reforms, thereby appropriating the al Qaeda agenda.

I could describe this argument in more detail and quote from previous posts, but those who support it are more than able to speak for themselves.

My own view is somewhat different. First, I would question the assumption that the Saudi populace is in a state of insurgency or near-insurgency. There’s no doubt that radical Islamic political beliefs have some quite fanatical adherents in Saudi Arabia, but I see no evidence that the populace at large is on the verge of insurgency.

It seems to me that much of our thinking on Saudi Arabia remains mired in the 1990s, when the oil glut was driving severe economic stress and the US military presence, which continued long after it was necessary, provided a convenient scapegoat. This was the environment that drove the preaching of the “three sheiks”, the radical preachers that provided much of the AQ narrative.

Today’s situation in Saudi Arabia is very different. The massive influx of cash from 5 years of high oil prices has been largely invested domestically, with very visible results. The substance of what one might call the “three sheiks narrative” has collapsed. The sheiks, and AQ, claimed that the US would never leave Saudi Arabia, that Americans would convert Saudis to Christianity, corrupt the women, violate the holy places. They claimed that the US would never allow a fair price for oil, would end up taking control of the oil, would never allow Arabs to prosper, would never treat Arabs with respect. All of these claims are now obviously false and completely useless.

This change is reflected in the content of AQ communications. The 1990s communiqués, most notably Osama’s declaration of jihad, revolve almost entirely around Saudi Arabia; issues such as Palestine are barely mentioned. In the recent releases Palestine takes center stage; the most recent tape does not even mention Saudi Arabia. The implication is that AQ has already lost Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and they know it.

The great irony here is that the rise of China and the surge in oil prices have severely trimmed US power, but they have also given AQ a groin chop from which they may not recover. The surge in oil prices does not seem likely to abate any time soon; prosperity is not conducive to rebellion and the AQ narrative is not very appealing while Gulf Arabs are rolling in cash and receiving deferential (sometimes groveling) treatment from Western leaders.

I do not believe that AQ enables the Iraqi and Afghan insurgencies; I would suggest that AQ is enabled by these insurgencies. Very few Iraqis or Afghans fight because of what’s happening in Saudi Arabia, they fight because of what’s happening in their own countries. The Saudi situation may motivate some foreign fighters, but foreign fighters are hardly the core problem. AQ thrives on the “resistance to foreign intervention” narrative, which provides it credibility that it’s anti-Saudi narrative never gained.

Even if it were desirable for us to promote reform in Saudi Arabia, our ability to do so is quite limited. The Saudis do not depend on us, and we have neither carrots nor sticks to guide their behaviour. On the contrary, they have quite a significant capacity to guide ours: they have oil, and their investments in our economy provide a badly needed support. They certainly don’t need our money, and they face no immediate military threat. If they were threatened – say by Iran – we would come to their aid in any event, simply because it would be in our interest to do so.

I also doubt that our intervention is sought or desired by the Saudi populace, which would probably see any attempt to intervene as further evidence of inappropriate influence, and would likely assume that we were pursuing our own interests rather than theirs.

A good deal more could be said, and probably will be. All other views welcome...