US policy with an ally like the Saudis till 2016

[Dayuhan]

Similarly our blind support of the Saudi family is helping to push elements of the Saudi popualce into the hands of AQ. Again, who else is going to help them??

Is AQ helping "elements of the Saudi populace", or is it the other way around? AQ has traditionally drawn support from the Saudi populace when it has taken the role of resistance to foreign occupation of Muslim lands. AQ's efforts against the Saudi government have drawn much less support: they've developed a very small core of vigorous opposition, but failed to gain traction with the broader populace or to gain anything close to the critical mass needed to drive a credible insurgency. AQ's efforts to generate a Saudi insurgency in the 90s fell flat, despite highly conducive conditions (economic crisis and a prolonged US military presence). That doesn't mean the Saudis love their government, but it strongly suggests that very few Saudis see AQ as a desirable alternative.

Similarly, it does not excuse US foreign policy that has in many cases empowered and enabled these same governments to act with the impunity that sped them on their collision course with their own populaces.

You have yet to demonstrate that anything the US has done has "enabled or empowered" the Saudis to act as they do toward their populace. The Saudis don't need our help or approval to oppress, and they would do it no matter what we said or did. The comment above suggests that without US help the Saudis would be forced to take a more accommodating stance toward portions of their own populaces, which seems an unsupportable contention that presumes a dependence that is not in fact there. The danger in assuming that we enable or empower is that it implies that we can force policy changes by ceasing to enable or empower. That's not the case in Saudi Arabia, and basing policy on the assumption of influence or dependency that does not in fact exist is a good way to devise ineffective policy.

the comparison of Iran in the 70s vs Saudi Arabia today is not a strain at all. In fact, it is shockingly on point. The more you research the topic the more you will see that to be true. Or you can just wait a few years and read it in the newspaper if we continue on our current track.

I've looked into the topic. Been looking at it for well over a decade, since I started spending time there. Oddly, I started out from a frame that is not too different from yours. Had to change my mind. Embarrassing, but it happens.

I think political disruption and forced change is ultimately likely in Saudi Arabia. I do not think it's going to involve AQ. I doubt that it will happen in the next few years. I don't think anything the US says or does is going to have any bearing on it. We do not have the capacity to change - or even significantly influence - Saudi domestic policy.

[Bob's World]

Well I will agree with Dayuhan that AQ is largely moot. They do not create insurgency with either their actions or their ideology. They are opportunists who seek to leverage the conditions of insurgency that already exist. Those conditions are shaped by the perceptions of distinct and significant populace groups within a wide range of countries that are primarily Sunni Muslim in religion, and Arab in ethnicity. That is their core target audience. Obviously others who buy in to their message and mission get on board as well. Those popular perceptions are based on how those populace groups feel about certain key aspects of their governance situation and their perceived lack of effective legal options for addressing the same.

The Saudi people, like people across the Middle East, will either pressure their government to evolve or will openly revolt (violently or non violently, that is a tactical choice) because of how they feel about their government, not because of how they feel about AQ.

For the US, the critical question is not how we perceive our role, it is how these same populaces perceive our role. This is where the material questions lie for the US; and there are shocking similarities between Iran-US in the 1970s to Saudi Arabia-US today. Just something for Americans to consider. As Ken points out, we were not all that reliant on Iranian Oil, so when we got PNG'd from that country by the revolutionary government we could simply buy more oil from our remaining "friends" in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and our new friend (a guy named Don Rumsfeld was sent by Reagan to make nice with a guy named Saddam and offer any help we could provide in Saddam's new war with Iran) in Iraq, etc. If we are PNG'd by a revolutionary government in Saudi Arabia we will not have the same options. In fact, we will be much like the Brits were when they were PNG'd by Iran in the early 50s.

In the evolving conflict-competition ecosystem the nature of conflict remains fairly stable, but the characteristics are evolving on the back of evolving technologies (primarily of the Information variety), and what worked for centuries in many cases is becoming obsolete today. It is my opinion that "friendly despots" are obsolete. (and like "friendly fire," are not all that "friendly" either).


Yes, there are millions of differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Noted. It is the critical similarities that cause me to raise the red flag.

[Ken White]

If we are PNG'd by a revolutionary government in Saudi Arabia we will not have the same options. In fact, we will be much like the Brits were when they were PNG'd by Iran in the early 50s.

We could shrug our shoulders, recall that we buy Saudi Oil not because we must but because it was cheap at one time -- and then and now it enables us to keep a nominal economic interest for blundering about in the region. We could easily get by with no middle eastern oil.

The real question is whether we need to keep blundering there. We could also easily get by with no middle eastern turmoil...

It is my opinion that "friendly despots" are obsolete. (and like "friendly fire," are not all that "friendly" either).

Agree they are obsolete and that they aren't really friendly -- but then, neither are we...

[Bob's World]

All true. It comes down to our risk tollerence and degree to which we are willing to relinquish control.

Historically, when the US was a small, developing country, and the Middle East was dominated by the Ottomans primarily, and major European powers secondarily, we were able to build tremendous influence by working within the frameworks established by the Ottomans (Trade, Schools and hospitals ok, even the odd raid to mitigate KFR operations, but don't come in preaching or looking to establish any type of colonial presence). We were always going to be an outsider, but as outsiders went we were far away and less inclined to attempt to estabish colonial controls, and all worked fairly well.

As WWII worked to disrupt European Colonial Controls, FDR's message of "end of colonialism" and free trade was well received by the populaces and governments of the region as well.

It was only as we got into the Cold War, and began creating states, manipulating, changing, and backing governments that the tide began to turn...tolerated to a degree while the Soviet threat existed, but less so ever since that faded.

I don't know if we can take our hand completely off the reins in all cases, but certainly a much lighter hand is necessary in all. But we see the Cold War as the normal we measure by. So much of our national and international systems were designed by the West to promote the West, with the US in the lead, all in the name of winning a Cold War that is long over. Thus the "good Cold Warrior" syndrome. We need to break this, but that is about changing ourselves, and we are still hard set on changing others...

[Dayuhan]

Well I will agree with Dayuhan that AQ is largely moot. They do not create insurgency with either their actions or their ideology. They are opportunists who seek to leverage the conditions of insurgency that already exist.

AQ leverages a good deal more than conditions of insurgency. AQ plays on a huge and widespread generic resentment of "the West" that runs back to the colonial period and beyond; what Bernard Lewis calls "aggressive self-pity". They play on anger at Israel and western support for Israel, and most effectively at all they play on anger at foreign military forces occupying Muslim land. The rallying cry and recruiting pitch for foreign fighters is "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful", not "break American support for your own government".

I feel at times as though you dismiss driving factors behind AQ that don't involve insurgency because you're determined to fit AQ into an insurgency-based model, rather than adapting the model to circumstances where it does not entirely fit.

The Saudi people, like people across the Middle East, will either pressure their government to evolve or will openly revolt (violently or non violently, that is a tactical choice) because of how they feel about their government, not because of how they feel about AQ.

For the US, the critical question is not how we perceive our role, it is how these same populaces perceive our role.

The feelings of the Saudi populace about their own government and their perceptions of the Saudi-US relationship are not nearly as monolithic as you make them out to be. They run across a wide range, as perceptions within a populace typically do. I think you may be imposing your own perceptions and assuming that they are shared by the populace.

As I said, I think in the long term a popular eruption is possible in Saudi Arabia, but I don't see it on the near horizon. As long as the oil and the money keep flowing, I suspect they'll carry on a good deal longer than you think, not because the government is loved, but because fear of instability, disunity, and foreign intervention is for many people greater than the fear of tyranny. The devil you know, and all that.

This is where the material questions lie for the US; and there are shocking similarities between Iran-US in the 1970s to Saudi Arabia-US today.

On a superficial level, yes. When you get to details the differences are so numerous that a comparison is pointless: they are unique cases and must be managed as such.

As Ken points out, we were not all that reliant on Iranian Oil, so when we got PNG'd from that country by the revolutionary government we could simply buy more oil from our remaining "friends" in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and our new friend (a guy named Don Rumsfeld was sent by Reagan to make nice with a guy named Saddam and offer any help we could provide in Saddam's new war with Iran) in Iraq, etc. If we are PNG'd by a revolutionary government in Saudi Arabia we will not have the same options. In fact, we will be much like the Brits were when they were PNG'd by Iran in the early 50s.

The danger is not that the Saudis will stop selling us oil. As long as the Saudis are selling oil into the world market there will be oil for the US to buy. The danger is that instability will significantly impair production capacity and reduce output, a risk that's shared equally by all consumers.

Ken says this:

We could shrug our shoulders, recall that we buy Saudi Oil not because we must but because it was cheap at one time -- and then and now it enables us to keep a nominal economic interest for blundering about in the region. We could easily get by with no middle eastern oil.

But we have to recall that our interest with Middle East oil, often misinterpreted, is less in keeping that oil flowing to us than it is in keeping it flowing. As long as it flows, there will be oil to buy. If the flow is cut, there will be a lot less oil to buy, and the price - for everyone on the buy side - will be a lot higher. As long as the Gulf remains a key producer and the home of the world's only surplus production capacity, the US will have an interest, even if we don't buy a single drop from the Gulf.

It is my opinion that "friendly despots" are obsolete. (and like "friendly fire," are not all that "friendly" either).

Very likely so... but again, our cold war reflex tends to assume that "friendly despots" refers to despots installed and/or maintained by us, indebted to us and to some degree controllable by us. In SDaudi Arabia we deal with a rather different situation. These despots are outside our control and we have no influence at all over their domestic policy. If we urge reform (as we do regularly) they ignore us. Call them friends or something else, we have to deal with them. We will defend them from foreign aggression, not because we're friends but because it is in our interest. We will sell them arms, not because we're friends but because their money keeps much of our defense industry afloat.

Any policy suggestions built on the assumption that the Saudis are a dependency or a client state that will hop when we say hop and reform when we tell them to are flawed from the start, because they don't have to, and they won't.

It comes down to our risk tollerence and degree to which we are willing to relinquish control.

If we're speaking of Saudi Arabia, we have no control to relinquish.

[Bob's World]

http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth...844479817.html

This short article provides a glimpse into the very critical topic of succession of Saudi government and perceptions that are evolving, exposing, challenging, questioning, etc in this age of information empowered populaces.

No telling where this all leads, but at some point, and I suspect that point is near, the wheels will come off

[davidbfpo]

The Indpendent's ME writer, Patrick Cockburn, has a stinging article today:

Mass murder in the Middle East is funded by our friends the Saudis
World View: Everyone knows where al-Qa'ida gets its money, but while the violence is sectarian, the West does nothing

Link:http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/...s-8990736.html

Religious hatred is now rare in the West, rightly he asks can we remain blind?

I do wonder, as a profound non-expert on KSA and the region, whether the gradual bloody wars in Iraq and Syria could deliver a jihadi refuge and one day see them attack us. Or the KSA itself has a violent revolution. There appears to be little official consideration - in public - what would we do then.

[davidbfpo]

Almost a year later Patrick Cockburn's writing on the region has been spotted again. This article is taken from his forthcoming book and the headline gives you a hint:

Why Washington's war on terror failed: the underrated Saudi connection

Link:https://www.opendemocracy.net/opense...udi-connection

[davidbfpo]

Via Vox a short article 'The CIA finally declassified its report on Saudi links to 9/11. Here's what it says.':

The report claims no conclusive answer, but states it found no evidence that "the Saudi government knowingly and willingly supported the al-Qaeda terrorists." However, its sources speculated that rogue Saudi officials may have been involved — a long-running suspicion.

Link:https://www.vox.com/2015/6/13/877556...d-saudi-arabia