US policy with an ally like the Saudis till 2016

[Fuchs]

Experts don't consider the Saudi oil reserves claims reliable. The figures are pretty much made-up - no foreigner really knows how much oil they have.

About "ally"; I remarked years ago that Americans tend to use that word inflationary. That is dangerous, for at times people really believe that a nation with which you had some agreements and which was called an "ally" is really allied - with obligations and all. See Georgia and the nutty idea that they were an ally and the U.S. should somehow intervene...
The inflationary use of the word "ally" also leads to delusions in the "allied" country (again; Georgia!).


Btw; the German government proved its lack of taste, judgement and class in regard to Saudi Arabia just a few weeks ago.

[Bob's World]

Good comments so far.

First, when I suggest we need to "do something" I always direct that finger primarily in the direction of what do we change about ourselves, about our end of the equation, first. We need to evolve from defining our problems as being something we solve in foreign lands while we seek to go about business as usual at home.

Second, the energy driving transnational terrorism is, IMO, primarily coming from a large number of long suppressed nationalist insurgencies that AQ and others tap into to leverage in support of their own agendas of power and control. This is important, because a global effort to leverage many distinct insurgencies does not make a "global insurgency" when done today by NSAs any more than it did in the Cold War when done by the Soviets and the US. Each is unique and must be addressed individually. Also the grievances and issues that create the conditions of insurgency among a populace are much more about perception than fact. More on that last one

Dayuhan relies heavily on "fact;" and Ken raises some challenges to some of the "facts" I quickly laid out to help frame the discussion (I can provide cites), but the important thing to remember is that if the aggrieved populace believes something to be true or significant, then it is. Historically governments challenged by insurgency have tended to grossly discount the grievances of the populace as the conditions of insurgency were growing to noticeable levels, but still very manageable through simple civil adjustments on key points. Even when the insurgency explodes into violent, illegal action the governments tend to cling to their "rightness" on the issues, and to write off the insurgency as the actions of a few misguided malcontents, or on some radicalizing ideology, or some foreign actor, or any combination of the three. Rarely do they recognize that a long series of governmental disconnects have produced a widespread condition of insurgency among the populace from which such movements spring and are sustained.

What are the perceptions of the Saudi people about their government?

what are the perceptions of the Saudi people about the US?

What are the perceptions of the Saudi people about the nature of the relationship between the Saudi Royals and the US?

What aspect of these perceptions are in turn targeted and exploited by NSAs such as AQ?

What small, reasonable changes could the US make on our end to help mitigate these perceptions?

what small, reasonable changes could the Saudis make (beyond the enhanced bribes and security efforts being employed now in response to fears driven by Arab Spring)?

[Ken White]

...Ken raises some challenges to some of the "facts" I quickly laid out to help frame the discussion (I can provide cites)...

Nope. Incorrect. I didn't challenge your facts, I agree with all except the oil and the Saudis being the largest supplier of Furrin Fighters -- I too can provide cites on that -- what I did 'challenge' was the relevancy of any of those facts to your premise.

That's the subject FYI. Then, on other aspects of your comment...

...but the important thing to remember is that if the aggrieved populace believes something to be true or significant, then it is.

Ah, the silver tongued attorney person himself subtly points out that, as I said, those 'facts' don't count for much...

He then asks questions about Saudis perceptions which neither he nor we can answer though we could speculate until the cows RON at the barn.

This OTOH:

What small, reasonable changes could the US make on our end to help mitigate these perceptions?

Seems perfectly reasonable. Except that it asks us to define a policy based on the above speculation.

While this:

what small, reasonable changes could the Saudis make (beyond the enhanced bribes and security efforts being employed now in response to fears driven by Arab Spring)?

is really none of our business.

It is good to advocate dismissal and recasting of Cold War values and practices. It is IMO however rather unwise, perhaps even a bit conflicted, to advocate continued interference in and with other nations just done a bit differently. To me, that seems to be a continuation of the cold war by other means...

[Bob's World]

Actually I believe that such perceptions are easily derived if one simply listens for them. Too often we are so focused on ourselves and what we think is either important or legal, that we do not hear, or rather listen, to the perspectives that are most important to the matter at hand.

As to the internal stability of Saudi Arabia, if it is "none of our business" (IE, we have no vital national interests there), then great, let it burn, because left unchecked, it will indeed burn sooner than later.

The problem is that we do have a vital interest in the stability of that region. For the past 60+ years our approach to that stability has been in the the form of supporting the government while turning a blind eye to growing problems between that government and their populace. Historically such approaches have worked well. "Friendly Dictators" are a proven tool of securing interests in foreign lands.

My contention is that in the current information environment such relationships are obsolete, in that the Cost now exceeds the Benefit. Markets change, and business models must change as well or grow obsolete. We are working to force an obsolete "business model" to work; and the populaces affected by our actions are more than willing to attack us for our troubles.

We need a new "business model."

This in not unlike what Great Britain encountered with their empire. As populaces connected and empowered by the very network of telegraphs, steam ships and railroads built by the British to manage and exploit their empire, employed those same tools to stand up and resist that foreign presence and the illegitimate governments they formed and protected. The Cost of empire came to exceed the Benefit of empire, so the Brits were forced to adopt a new business model (the Commonwealth) and contract the degree of control they sought to exercise over others.

So too the US today with our Containment strategy that is also rooted in exercising controlling influence over others (not to the degree of colonialism, but control-based all the same). We too need a new business model.

Like the Brits we are currently attacking the points of friction in an attempt to force the failing model to work. Like the Brits we are learning the hard way that such efforts are futile.

Instead of nicking away at the edges with efforts to sustain an unsustainable status quo, I recommend that we focus on the heart of the matter with an effort to design and implement a new, more sustainable business model.

Preaching "universal values" won't get us there.

Blindly supporting despots who oversee vital interests for us won't get us there.

Sending the Military from hot spot to hot spot to help suppress those who dare to act out against the current system will not get us there.

We must get in front of the situation and focus on this new system. One that is less controlling. One in which the affected populaces have a greater say. One that by definition must be different than the one that exists today.

Or we can just keep expanding the lists of organizations we deem to be "terrorist" and just keep sending the military out to conduct CT against those organizations, while we continue to spend an ever increasing amount to prop up failing allied governments with development, security force capacity designed for internal threats, etc. If we do this, we will fall and fall hard. This is not inevitable, it is in fact very avoidable. But first we must get to step one, and that is to admit we have a problem internal to ourselves. Currently we dwell in denial. This is like any other form of addiction to self-destructive behavior.

[ganulv]

Gleaning from that information which is publicly available (well, that portion of it which is written in English, at least!) my take is that the U.S. Government seems to have unrealistic expectations of the House of Saud. They—and I use the pronoun with the recognition that it encompasses within its scope plenty of factions at cross-purposes—seem to be either unwilling or unable to aid our (ever “evolving”) counter-terrorism strategy.

As to whether the House of Saud is a good bet to provide stability, my reading of the publicly available stuff is that they are not. The social welfare carrot they have so lavishly funded does not appear to be sustainable and one would suspect that that is going to lead to eventual tensions emanating from the non-Royal Saudi citizenry. But just as serious a threat would seem to be internal to the House, as the members of the family are often portrayed as conniving, petty, back-stabbing simpletons. Not the first time such a charge has been leveled at a ruling family of aristocrats, of course. Nor does a political system even need to be non-democratic to evidence those qualities, as demonstrated by the last few weeks in DC.

A question and two follow-up questions to it for those with a good knowledge of such things—am I correct in assuming that stability in Riyadh is an absolute prerequisite for the continued operation of NSA Bahrain? Are there any plausible alternative locations for a comparable base? And is such a base an unquestionable necessity for U.S. military and political strategy as it now stands?

[jmm99]

This is not aimed primarily at Bob, but at the loose usage of language (unfortunately a too-common usage) in his message:

from BW
... but the important thing to remember is that if the aggrieved populace believes something to be true or significant, then it is.

....then it (the perception) is exactly what - true or significant ?

What is "true", for most of us mortals, is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, or a neat package (a Holy Grail) that we can find if we only search enough. As Pilate asked (with question not answered): "What is Truth ?"

I will take "an important thing to remember" as this: if a substantial population group believes something to be "true", that perception is "significant" to that group; and that perception may or may not be "significant" to third parties. That it is or may be "significant" does not make it "true".

For example, we can find a number of historical examples where a population group believed its magico-religious rite were sufficient to prevent death in war (e.g., the Sudanese Mahdists and Plains Indian Ghost Dancers). Those perceptions were obviously not "true" (certainly not to the lead bullets that were not impressed by magico-religion).

BLAE: I agree with Ken: "Perceptions abound -- and they are often wrong, sometimes dangerously so."

Regards

Mike

As to lawyers, legal strategy and what is "true", see this post and the article "A Theory of Legal Strategy".

[Ken White]

"It is just like man's vanity and impertinence to call an animal dumb because it is dumb to his dull perceptions."

Perceptions abound -- and they are often wrong, sometimes dangerously so.

Actually I believe that such perceptions are easily derived if one simply listens for them...

So it is your perception that is so? Perhaps true, they do in fact seem to be easily so derived -- perhaps too easily -- and those derivations are historically often terribly wrong.

Hopefully you will recall that we Americans historically do quite poorly on assessments of the perceptions held by those in other lands -- and the more different the language and / or culture, the more likelihood of terribly flawed ideas being adopted.

Perceptions are important; they are not reality. People in general are indeed prone to act on their perceptions but it seems to me to be incumbent upon planners and strategists to not fall into that trap themselves...

The problem is that we do have a vital interest in the stability of that region. For the past 60+ years our approach to that stability has been in the the form of supporting the government while turning a blind eye to growing problems between that government and their populace. Historically such approaches have worked well. "Friendly Dictators" are a proven tool of securing interests in foreign lands.

No, they have not worked well, not at all. They merely succeeded in forestalling the inevitable (see Spring, Arab...), generally for the benefit of the supporters of that terribly flawed policy. Your belief and that of many in the policy establishments that they have worked is a very significant contributor to our current and recent past imbroglios -- and even as modified by you, does not bode well for the future which appears to be doing the same thing (define insanity...) with minor tweaks and being (slightly) less controlling in the process...

Controlling is controlling, no matter how sweetly it's couched.

It is interesting to speculate how things might be different if there was not almost a need in our political system as currently modified for the benefit of the political parties and incumbents, the shakers and movers in the policy establishments (plural -- and that's another issue...) to move from crisis to crisis -- or at least event to event...

Might I suggest that we do not really have vital interests there but that we have simply assumed we must have some since we elected to foster oil dependency worldwide? We did that for short term gain and because it was seemingly easy. As many are fond of saying, it's all about choices -- and the US polity is very fond of seemingly easy choices that punt problems a yard or two at a time. We do not have a US foreign policy nor do we have many national interests outside our shores, we have US domestic politics that drive foreign efforts -- and adventures (most of which do not work out that well in this era of 'Super Size Me').

My contention is that in the current information environment such relationships are obsolete, in that the Cost now exceeds the Benefit. Markets change, and business models must change as well or grow obsolete. We are working to force an obsolete "business model" to work; and the populaces affected by our actions are more than willing to attack us for our troubles.

We need a new "business model."

We agree on that and this:

So too the US today with our Containment strategy that is also rooted in exercising controlling influence over others (not to the degree of colonialism, but control-based all the same). We too need a new business model.
...
...while we continue to spend an ever increasing amount to prop up failing allied governments with development, security force capacity designed for internal threats, etc. If we do this, we will fall and fall hard. This is not inevitable, it is in fact very avoidable. But first we must get to step one, and that is to admit we have a problem internal to ourselves. Currently we dwell in denial. This is like any other form of addiction to self-destructive behavior.

Absolutely agree.

We disagree on two points, one you elide and one in which IMO you are a victim of misperception...

You never mention the fact that US domestic politics drive the train of our foreign activities and you never offer solutions or recommendations to fix that major problem. It may be that you believe that is not a correct assessment or that you think that may be correct but is unimportant. I think history proves that it is both correct and quite important (I can provide cites).

You believe we should intrude on other nations when we perceive (there's that word again...) our interests require it. IOW you want to do the same thing but with more finesse (something of which, as I have to keep reminding you, the US government is totally incapable ). A belief or policy based on perceptions can be and likely will be just as flawed as one based on invalid assumptions -- or is that redundant???

[slapout9]

Link to former Senator Bob Graham's new novel. I am trying to find the TV interview he did. It goes all the way back to the end of WW2.


http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...ob-graham.html

[Bob's World]

No, I believe we should fix ourselves first. How we operate internally and how we interact in locations where we have convinced ourselves we have "vital" national interests at stake.

In recent days we have all watched the debate between the Democrats and Republicans. Both profess to be fighting for the American people, yet in reality the Democrats fight to preserve their President in office and the Republicans fight to take him out in the coming elections. All hard decisions are (in their minds) something to deal with "after the election." The problem is that "after the election" like tomorrow, never comes.

Some times I wonder if American politicians appreciate that even our amazing constitution can only protect them for so long. Sad bit of business to watch. Yet for how amazingly F'd up and embarrassing our elected officials are; we still are citizens of a political system that is the envy of much of the world. Little wonder so many Saudis get scarfed up in the middle of the night without warrant or charge; or scoot off to places like Yemen or the FATA to bide their time and plot their return.

But still, if we allow the percept to persist that the Saudi Royals are protected against internal and external challengers by a US insurance policy there will be those who will seek to get us to break that commitment of support. I think much of what we need to do can be done by simply going on record that it is a new era:

1. That we do not care who presides over Saudi Arabia and that we are willing to continue to work with whomever that might be, regardless of how they came to rise to power. But we won't protect that new group either, so they better be snapped in with the people or they will likely soon suffer the same fate at their hands.

2. That we do not care what form of government the Saudi people self-determine.

3. That while we will not act to protect the current or future regime from internal change, we will act to prevent external challenge.

4. That while we will not act to protect the current or future regime from internal change, we reserve the right to act decisively to preserve infrastructure deemed vital to our own national survival and to hold the same in trust until such time as such threatening disputes are resolved (So figure out a way to work this out without forcing our hand to step in).

Meanwhile I think some backroom discussions with the Royals are long overdue. They can listen or not, its their heads. Simple changes, such as putting a little more "justice" into the justice system; or either getting the Royals closer to Islam or acting to bifurcate the "keeper of Islam" role from the Royal job description, would both go a long way toward greater stability.

Some concepts that have worked well elsewhere that might be worth considering are:

1. A parliamentary system similar to Britain's, with the Royals stepping into a similar role.

2. A creation of a "Vatican City" approach to Mecca/Medina to free the KSA to evolve without the friction of having those sites holy to all Muslims within their borders.

The only truly bad idea is to just keep doing what we've been doing and hope it somehow starts to work. Every other idea has some redeeming value, though some are better than others; and any selected by the Saudi people being better than any imposed upon them.

Insurgency is illegal politics. In a land where no legal politics exist, can there be anything but insurgency? The Royals might want to install a legal offramp or two while they are at it.

[Dayuhan]

Second, the energy driving transnational terrorism is, IMO, primarily coming from a large number of long suppressed nationalist insurgencies that AQ and others tap into to leverage in support of their own agendas of power and control.

I'm aware of that opinion, but I'm not convinced that it's fully supportable. AQ has tried to tap into internal resentment. They've also tried, much more successfully, to tap into a widespread and rather generic Muslim resentment toward the west - Bernard Lewis calls it "aggressive self-pity" - and specific anger toward foreign intervention in Muslim lands. Of these, the latter two have been the successful narratives. AQ and its precursor organizations have always drawn their greatest support when they were rallying support against foreign intrusion in the land of the faithful. By contrast, AQ efforts to rally revolution against leaders they dislike have generally gone nowhere: they've achieved strong support from small minorities but never won the populaces and never won anything remotely resembling a critical mass of support. When AQ rallies the faithful to attack the infidel, the cheers ring out, the money flows, and the recruits come running. When they bring the fight home, they don't get much. That doesn't mean people in these countries love their governments, but it suggests that they don't see AQ as a viable domestic alternative, and they certainly don't see AQ as their champion against their own governments.

The belief that foreign fighters travel to combat zones in an effort to free their own countries remains unsupported. Foreign fighters flowed from all the same places to fight the Soviets, and foreign fighters come from many places where governments get no support from the US. "Expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" was a powerful narrative during the crusades, and it remains so today.

On the subject of perceptions, I'd have to agree with Ken: we don't know what they are. I'd add that when we try to assess perceptions we have a powerful tendency to impose our own ideas about what perceptions ought to be, and when we listen we tend to assign the highest priority to the voices we agree with. As in most countries, there's a wide range of variance in perceptions in Saudi Arabia, and many of them are conflicted, contradictory, and vary according to circumstances. Trying to reduce to "oppressed populace struggling for democracy" is simply an imposition of our own values. It ain't that simple by a long shot, and as with most things we don't understand, we're best off staying out of it.

What small, reasonable changes could the US make on our end to help mitigate these perceptions?

Realistically, not much. No matter what our intentions, anything we do will be perceived as an attempt to advance our own interests and gain control of the oil.

what small, reasonable changes could the Saudis make (beyond the enhanced bribes and security efforts being employed now in response to fears driven by Arab Spring)?

Probably a lot, but that's completely outside our control. We have little or no influence there: for an example, how much attention was paid to our prescriptions re Bahrain?

But still, if we allow the percept to persist that the Saudi Royals are protected against internal and external challengers by a US insurance policy there will be those who will seek to get us to break that commitment of support.

We will not break our commitment to protect the Saudis against external aggression... and breaking it wouldn't gain us any points with the Saudi populace anyway. No matter what they think of the royals, they don't want to be ruled by Iraqis or Iranians.

We can't break a commitment to protect the Saudis from internal challengers, because no such commitment exists. It isn't needed, and it's never been asked for. The Saudis don't need or ask for our help or permission to oppress their populace. If there is a perception that we are giving help or permission - and whether or not that perception exists remains an open question - we have to accept that it's an inaccurate perception, and we can't change it by changing the policy. We can't stop doing something we aren't doing in the first place.

I think much of what we need to do can be done by simply going on record that it is a new era:

1. That we do not care who presides over Saudi Arabia and that we are willing to continue to work with whomever that might be, regardless of how they came to rise to power. But we won't protect that new group either, so they better be snapped in with the people or they will likely soon suffer the same fate at their hands.

2. That we do not care what form of government the Saudi people self-determine.

3. That while we will not act to protect the current or future regime from internal change, we will act to prevent external challenge.

4. That while we will not act to protect the current or future regime from internal change, we reserve the right to act decisively to preserve infrastructure deemed vital to our own national survival and to hold the same in trust until such time as such threatening disputes are resolved (So figure out a way to work this out without forcing our hand to step in).

How is that a new era? Doesn't seem all that different... and I suspect that the prevailing reaction from the Saudi populace would be along the lines of "piss off and mind your own business".

Silly to claim that we don't care who runs Saudi Arabia, though. We do care, and everybody knows it. We have to lie on occasion but we should avoid the really obvious ones.

Meanwhile I think some backroom discussions with the Royals are long overdue. They can listen or not, its their heads. Simple changes, such as putting a little more "justice" into the justice system; or either getting the Royals closer to Islam or acting to bifurcate the "keeper of Islam" role from the Royal job description, would both go a long way toward greater stability.

Some concepts that have worked well elsewhere that might be worth considering are:

1. A parliamentary system similar to Britain's, with the Royals stepping into a similar role.

2. A creation of a "Vatican City" approach to Mecca/Medina to free the KSA to evolve without the friction of having those sites holy to all Muslims within their borders.

Ouch. To repeat a point previously made: Ttying to initiate, direct, or control political change in other countries... for me that's kind of a reverse Nike slogan: just don't do it.

What you suggest is, no matter how we sugar coat it, an effort to initiate, direct, and control political change in another country.

You might also want to consider that just because we take something up in the back room doesn't mean it stays there. How long do you think that would stay secret? Do you really want Al Jazeera, Wikileaks, and the rest of the world press trumpeting a "secret" US attempt to tell the Saudis to change their system of government and give them instructions on their relations with Islam and the holy sites?

Granted that past interventions have caused a lot of problems, but we aren't going to change that with more blundering well-intentioned intervention. The answer to bad intervention isn't good intervention, it's less intervention. The perceptions left from the past exist; we can't counter or change them overnight. If we mind our own business, though, those perceptions will gradually change.

PS [edit}. Americans often forget (if they ever knew) that in much of the world, even people who loathe their own governments deeply resent criticism of those governments by foreigners, especially Americans. Even when the Americans are repeating the same points as local critics, it's not perceived as support, it's perceived as self-serving intrusion and as disrespect for the nation and the culture. Again, subtlety is required, and that's not something we do well.