Airpower Jumping Off In Syria

[Bill Moore]

First off Slap I read Warden's book, and reread sections from it rather recently and find it to be even more inaccurate and misleading in the way he represents war, and prioritizes targets using the five rings. What worked in Desert Storm was targeting the 5th ring, his ground forces, and everything else accomplished little beyond imposing costs. Imposing costs is not the same is compelling someone to quit, and difference isn't slight.

No I cant afford it and neither can the nation. To much time, money and people have been ruined and wasted on a process that is not working.

We're all frustrated, but attempting to replace our CT and COIN strategies, which admittedly have failed miserably with a 5 rings strategy will simply result in more frustration because we're ignoring the basics of war. I'm not sure how you switch from a few posts back describing how this bombing campaign is exactly line with Warden's 5 rings strategy, and then when you realize it is not only failing, but making things worse, then claim it isn't Warden's strategy and the Army planned it? Are you attempting to make rational arguments, or are you blindly defending a model? Only you can answer that.

Never said they did and certainly Warden never said that.

Many times you have written it is all about the system. I admit Warden correctly identified the limits of viewing the adversary as a system in his book, but I haven't seen that from you in your posts. Design thinkers use system theory also, but most know it is flawed, and as long as you realize it is one approach to gain some understanding, but not complete understanding it is a viable "tool," but when it is taken to the level that it was in EBO, that A+B=C we are setting ourselves up for failure.

What I do believe is what General Dempsey has said the plan is : We are going to use Air power to support a local Arab Army which may take between 1 and 3 years. So don't blame Warden for a plan he had nothing to do with.

You wrote:

It is General Dempsey's plan and he is Army the last time I checked.

It is time to move past the debate on Warden's five rings, it isn't the answer to our challenges. There may be parts of it that are relevant that can be incorporated, but anytime we try to impose a template on a complex problem without understanding the strategic context, and worse not knowing what we're trying to accomplish, we will have started down the road to nowhere.

[AmericanPride]

Slapout,

The problem with systems approaches, including Warden, is that systems are incredibly resilient and once untethered from their known foundations (i.e. assumptions), respond (and escalate) in unpredictable ways. Systems usually are not destroyed outright but instead adapt to changing circumstances. And even when systems appear to be destroyed, they manifest or express themselves in surprising forms. This necessarily results in repeated reciprocal escalatory actions that quickly test (or break) the parameters of the political object defining the conflict.

We (the U.S.) should be considering how to bring the conflict to a close (read: the exit strategy) rather than embarking on open-ended campaigns with limited results and unpredictable end-states. The U.S. counter-terrorism strategy is very effective at killing terrorists (and those in their immediate vicinity) but not so much in reducing the long-term threat of terrorism. This is the percent increase from 2006 to 2012 in terrorist attacks per country from Global Terrorism Database:

Afghanistan: 420.21% (282 to 1,467)
Iraq: 71.80% (837 to 1,438)
Syria: 17,500% (1 to 176)
Yemen: 6,140% (5 to 307)

How will exclusive use of air power reverse this trend?

[slapout9]

Slapout,

The problem with systems approaches, including Warden, is that systems are incredibly resilient and once untethered from their known foundations (i.e. assumptions), respond (and escalate) in unpredictable ways. Systems usually are not destroyed outright but instead adapt to changing circumstances. And even when systems appear to be destroyed, they manifest or express themselves in surprising forms. This necessarily results in repeated reciprocal escalatory actions that quickly test (or break) the parameters of the political object defining the conflict.

We (the U.S.) should be considering how to bring the conflict to a close (read: the exit strategy) rather than embarking on open-ended campaigns with limited results and unpredictable end-states. The U.S. counter-terrorism strategy is very effective at killing terrorists (and those in their immediate vicinity) but not so much in reducing the long-term threat of terrorism. This is the percent increase from 2006 to 2012 in terrorist attacks per country from Global Terrorism Database:

Afghanistan: 420.21% (282 to 1,467)
Iraq: 71.80% (837 to 1,438)
Syria: 17,500% (1 to 176)
Yemen: 6,140% (5 to 307)

How will exclusive use of air power reverse this trend?

AP,
I had to do a double take to see who this was at first. Warden calls this the Hysteresis effect, which means...... well exactly what you said and he consistently pounds that point home when he talks about the whole system of war planning.
As for the answer to your question of course it can. The Rhodesian Fire Force is an excellent example. People of confuse Air power with an Airplane or Air Force which is understandable but it is not the same.

Here is a good example of the Army Air power!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjBSJV0yHA8

[AmericanPride]

Slap,

I think the point of divergence is determinng whether this strategy is good policy or good politics. I think it's good politics but bad policy - and not because airpower does not have a legitimate role in warfare, but that airpower in this circumstance will be insufficient for the high bar the U.S. has set for its political goals. And for this reason, the U.S. has once again fallen into a commitment trap: because of the bad policy, it will become good politics to increase U.S. commitment when it's apparent the policy is not working.

So I think this is less about airpower's legitimacy and more about policy selection and decision-making. And when we combine this approach with our theoretical understandings of resistence movements, interstate conflict, it becomes quickly evident that there are very few 'good' policies available to the U.S.

[slapout9]

Slap,

I think the point of divergence is determinng whether this strategy is good policy or good politics. I think it's good politics but bad policy - and not because airpower does not have a legitimate role in warfare, but that airpower in this circumstance will be insufficient for the high bar the U.S. has set for its political goals. And for this reason, the U.S. has once again fallen into a commitment trap: because of the bad policy, it will become good politics to increase U.S. commitment when it's apparent the policy is not working.

So I think this is less about airpower's legitimacy and more about policy selection and decision-making. And when we combine this approach with our theoretical understandings of resistence movements, interstate conflict, it becomes quickly evident that there are very few 'good' policies available to the U.S.

I don't think we are diverging at all. The more I find out the more I think you are correct.

[slapout9]

First off Slap I read Warden's book, and reread sections from it rather recently and find it to be even more inaccurate and misleading in the way he represents war, and prioritizes targets using the five rings. What worked in Desert Storm was targeting the 5th ring, his ground forces, and everything else accomplished little beyond imposing costs. Imposing costs is not the same is compelling someone to quit, and difference isn't slight.

Which book did your read. The Air Campaign or Winning In Fast Time? Cause I think you are confusing some things.

We're all frustrated, but attempting to replace our CT and COIN strategies, which admittedly have failed miserably with a 5 rings strategy will simply result in more frustration because we're ignoring the basics of war. I'm not sure how you switch from a few posts back describing how this bombing campaign is exactly line with Warden's 5 rings strategy, and then when you realize it is not only failing, but making things worse, then claim it isn't Warden's strategy and the Army planned it? Are you attempting to make rational arguments, or are you blindly defending a model? Only you can answer that.

That's right and I will answer it. I did not start the thread as a Warden thread(If you notice I always put his name in the title if I want to do that) it was simply to comment on Airpower in Syria. Which I thought would generally follow his guidelines but when I began to see through open sources which is all I have (sorta) I saw things are very different. This happened around post 6 or 7 when I said we need to do Hash Tag Bombing!

I am short on time but will respond to the rest later.

[slapout9]

Bill,
here is the rest of the response to your post.

Many times you have written it is all about the system. I admit Warden correctly identified the limits of viewing the adversary as a system in his book, but I haven't seen that from you in your posts. Design thinkers use system theory also, but most know it is flawed, and as long as you realize it is one approach to gain some understanding, but not complete understanding it is a viable "tool," but when it is taken to the level that it was in EBO, that A+B=C we are setting ourselves up for failure.

EBO is gone as it should be and I said that when it happened, complexity with no benefit. However it is all about the System and I will always stand by that just a scientific fact. But the problem usually is you have to be able to accurately identify what is inside the system, which as you point out is constantly changing because it is a living system. You like the ASCOPE model anPeopled so do I for that matter, but they are all the same thing. People equipment,weapons,information,locations and finally actions against something or somebody. The SALUTE spot report model would work well with dynamic as opposed to deliberate targeting if that makes more sense to you. There is a poster here named "evwebber" or something like that but his avatar is aircraft carrier and his tag line is "All models are wrong. Some are useful. when he first posted I made a big deal about what a great line that was because it is very true.

It is time to move past the debate on Warden's five rings, it isn't the answer to our challenges. There may be parts of it that are relevant that can be incorporated, but anytime we try to impose a template on a complex problem without understanding the strategic context, and worse not knowing what we're trying to accomplish, we will have started down the road to nowhere.

Again I think your are missing something. there is always an a larger External System(Strategic Context if you will) and then a smaller internal/organizational system in focus(often the enemy system). So IMO the answer is not to move on but review of the entire process.