Officers With PhDs Advising War Effort

[Shek]

As a point of reference for what the Army personnel system currently produces, it is nowhere geared towards producing leaders that have an incentive to attend advanced civilian schooling. Despite the press that Petraeus, McMaster, Chiarelli, etc. have garnered for their graduate schooling, they are the exception that chose to do something outside the normal career path and were probably told by many that they were wasting their time.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...les/PUB731.pdf

As for the comment that the social science degrees cannot be tested in the real world, I think it is fair to say that someone like GEN Petraeus performed better than LTG Odierno did back in 2003 when it came time to test what advantage a degree could provide. While theoretical, having a framework to be able to fit the real world into to try and make sense out of events is better than nothing, plus having the critical thinking skills to be able to approach a problem from multiple angles.

[Jimbo]

The 101 vs. 4ID comparison is a false one. The situations that 4ID faced were very different from the 101st. There were things done well in both areas of operation and some things that needed to be fixed.

[Shek]

The 101 vs. 4ID comparison is a false one. The situations that 4ID faced were very different from the 101st. There were things done well in both areas of operation and some things that needed to be fixed.

Jimbo,

No doubt that there were different situations and had units with different organic capabilities. However, having worked for a few weeks alongside 4ID and for a few weeks alongside 101, there was a world of difference, and much further beyond what just the different situations would create. Now, maybe I just got a taste of extremes because of who I worked alongside and so my little view is not necessarily representative, but given all that I've read since and haven spoken with friends from both units, I don't see my experience as having been non-representative in general.

Put a different way, would LTG Odierno have had as much success in Mosul, a situation needing lots of people and cultural skills, and would GEN Petraeus not have done as well in Diyala/Salah Ad Din in a situation where people skills were still as important, but more kinetic skills were required. I'm not envisioning a commander emphasizing "putting the screws to 'em" as being as successful in Ninevah, while on the other hand, I'm thinking that GEN Petraeus' experience as an infantry commander up through the ranks would have equipped him for the fight against the greater numbers of FRE.

Cheers.

Shek

[marct]

Hi Shek,

As a point of reference for what the Army personnel system currently produces, it is nowhere geared towards producing leaders that have an incentive to attend advanced civilian schooling.

Love the oped piece!

As for the comment that the social science degrees cannot be tested in the real world, I think it is fair to say that someone like GEN Petraeus performed better than LTG Odierno did back in 2003 when it came time to test what advantage a degree could provide. While theoretical, having a framework to be able to fit the real world into to try and make sense out of events is better than nothing, plus having the critical thinking skills to be able to approach a problem from multiple angles.

Let me just clarify that for a second. I didn't say that the degrees couldn't be tested in the real world, I said that often you aren't allowed to test it. This goes back to he academic institutions of ethics review boards that pass on all academic research. What that has come to mean, in a lot of the social sciences, is that you are not allowed to test your theories in the real world from inside the academic environment. Because of his test ban, the academic environment in, say, Sociology or Political Science or Anthropology, tends to reinforce a concentration on what you are allowed to do, which is either "theory" or "approved" testing. In the case of Anthropology, that means you can "test" your ideas in some very limited, real world applications - mainly advocacy work. If you aren't operating within the academic environment, that is an entirely different matter.

I certainly agree with you about the value of having theoretical frameworks and, more importantly, the ability to modify theoretical frameworks to match observed reality. As for "critical thinking skills", the have been a major topic of discussion in pedagogical circles up here for the past decade or so. I've been following that debate, and one of the things that struck me most about it was that there didn't really seem to be a coherent definition of what the term meant . I had always assumed that it meant looking at a problem, picking it apart into its component pieces, and then trying to find a solution. Once I hit Grad school, I realized that I was being incredibly naive as a number of my peers proceeded to tell me .

Marc

[Shek]

Hi Shek,

Love the oped piece!

Let me just clarify that for a second. I didn't say that the degrees couldn't be tested in the real world, I said that often you aren't allowed to test it. This goes back to he academic institutions of ethics review boards that pass on all academic research. What that has come to mean, in a lot of the social sciences, is that you are not allowed to test your theories in the real world from inside the academic environment. Because of his test ban, the academic environment in, say, Sociology or Political Science or Anthropology, tends to reinforce a concentration on what you are allowed to do, which is either "theory" or "approved" testing. In the case of Anthropology, that means you can "test" your ideas in some very limited, real world applications - mainly advocacy work. If you aren't operating within the academic environment, that is an entirely different matter.

I certainly agree with you about the value of having theoretical frameworks and, more importantly, the ability to modify theoretical frameworks to match observed reality. As for "critical thinking skills", the have been a major topic of discussion in pedagogical circles up here for the past decade or so. I've been following that debate, and one of the things that struck me most about it was that there didn't really seem to be a coherent definition of what the term meant . I had always assumed that it meant looking at a problem, picking it apart into its component pieces, and then trying to find a solution. Once I hit Grad school, I realized that I was being incredibly naive as a number of my peers proceeded to tell me .

Marc

Marc,

I thought the "fashion tips" metaphor used by Dr. Wong was quite clever, although the message itself is disheartening. Once again, as an Army, in order to close a gap, we implemented a "fix" by starting to award masters degrees for the war college to show that we were "educating" our officers; however, the war colleges don't provide the broadening experience that a civilian graduate school will, and so some of the value of a graduate degree is lost (this isn't saying that they don't receive solid instruction at the graduate level, but a lunchroom conversation over a particular conflictwith other uniformed members isn't the same as one with fellow grad students who may have been with NGOs working a completely different side of the same conflict and can provide a potentially alien perspective).

As far as "critical thinking," I guess that I am also naive as to its true meaning. What I was trying to get at was the ability to look at a problem at from several angles, especially to include those that you disagree with or may not have otherwise ever thought of (e.g. the conservation with a NGO member) so that you can arrive at a solution that has thought through all the possibilities. Thus, as the proverbial saying goes, not all problems look like nails wanting a hammer to fix them

Cheers.

Shek

[marct]

Hi Shek,

I thought the "fashion tips" metaphor used by Dr. Wong was quite clever, although the message itself is disheartening. Once again, as an Army, in order to close a gap, we implemented a "fix" by starting to award masters degrees for the war college to show that we were "educating" our officers; however, the war colleges don't provide the broadening experience that a civilian graduate school will, and so some of the value of a graduate degree is lost (this isn't saying that they don't receive solid instruction at the graduate level, but a lunchroom conversation over a particular conflictwith other uniformed members isn't the same as one with fellow grad students who may have been with NGOs working a completely different side of the same conflict and can provide a potentially alien perspective).

I also thought the fashion metaphor was good - it reminded me of many academics I have worked with .

I think you are right about the war college acting as an internal reinforcer of perceptions. Maybe they would get a better overall "experience" at a civilian graduate school. Honestly, I think it might be better still if they took degrees in civilian graduate schools outside of the US. That way you would get both a civilian "take"on the issue as well as experience in a different culture. It would be interesting to see what the graduate exchange programs are like. By way of example, a couple of my former students have studied in France, while others have studied in England, Australia, the US and New Zealand. The cultural difference alone does seem to make a lot of difference.

As far as "critical thinking," I guess that I am also naive as to its true meaning. What I was trying to get at was the ability to look at a problem at from several angles, especially to include those that you disagree with or may not have otherwise ever thought of (e.g. the conservation with a NGO member) so that you can arrive at a solution that has thought through all the possibilities. Thus, as the proverbial saying goes, not all problems look like nails wanting a hammer to fix them

Point taken ! One of the people in my Ph.D. cohort defined "critical thinking" as the ability to rip anyone's argument apart - that way you could get easy publications, still be perceived as "critical", and get a rep as a great theoretician. That particular one never really impressed me, but I did see a lot of it .

Marc

[120mm]

Again, my experience with 101st in OIF I was generally positive, while my experience with 4ID was universally negative.

On Petraeus, I like the fit of his jib. He is both warrior and scholar, while not being a weakened amalgamation of both. There are few Generals I would trust to collect a good group without just "picking names." Petraeus is one of them.

[Stan]

www.usnews.com
By Julian E. Barnes
10/31/05

The general credits the Army's field training for teaching him to be a creative commander. But his adaptive thinking also comes from his work outside the military. At Princeton, where he earned his advanced degree in international relations, he had a chance to interact with exceptional scholars, many of whom had a very different view of the world and of human nature.

[lirelou]

I appreciated the article despite it's pandering to stereotypes. Just a small comment on Kilcullen. The Australian army is a small, but very professional. It presently counts six active battalions in its structure, and like us relies upon its reserves to meet all its present commitments. Some of my mates felt that in terms of pure manpower, they had only enough men to fully man four of the six infantry battalions. The Aussie Army also has some unique characteristics which make it different from both the British Army, and our own. First of all, Australian infantry officers spend much of their careers within a battalion. This gives them long term exposure to many different levels of battalion operations. In my day (II Corps MIKE Force, 1968), the typical Aussie captain had been a rifle platoon leader, a mortar platoon leader, and often a recce platoon leader, as well as battalion supply officer, transport officer, perhaps intelligence officer, and assistant training officer, before he became a company commander (a Major's position), and many had already commanded companies. They tended to be a few years older than their U.S. counterparts, whose career patterns had taken them in and out of tactical battalions, schools, and non-tactical assignments. Moreover, as the Australian defence forces lacked the enormous logistical power projection capabilities of the U.S. military, both the officers, and especially the warrants, tended to be far more enterprising in seeking solutions outside the traditional chain of command. The men who trained these officers were inevitably the warrants (senior NCOs), and here I would note that the only U.S. service to have an NCO corps which equates to the Aussie Warrants is the U.S.M.C.. These warrants were likewise highly experienced, having spent many years within a battalion, and having held a similar variety of positions ranging from infantryman to BREN gunner, up through section (squad?) and platoon, in rifle, recce, and occasionally mortar platoons. This gave them a grounding in small unit operations that was, in Vietnam, generally lacking within U.S. battalions once the U.S. battalion's original complement had been filled by replacements. In summary, reaching lieutenant colonel in the Australian Army is as much an achievement as making the 0-6 tactical brigade command list in the U.S. Army, and he should have some very solid small unit operational experience that will assist him in his duties. And he not foreign. He's Australian!

[George L. Singleton]

Hi Shek,



I also thought the fashion metaphor was good - it reminded me of many academics I have worked with .

I think you are right about the war college acting as an internal reinforcer of perceptions. Maybe they would get a better overall "experience" at a civilian graduate school. Honestly, I think it might be better still if they took degrees in civilian graduate schools outside of the US. That way you would get both a civilian "take"on the issue as well as experience in a different culture. It would be interesting to see what the graduate exchange programs are like. By way of example, a couple of my former students have studied in France, while others have studied in England, Australia, the US and New Zealand. The cultural difference alone does seem to make a lot of difference.



Point taken ! One of the people in my Ph.D. cohort defined "critical thinking" as the ability to rip anyone's argument apart - that way you could get easy publications, still be perceived as "critical", and get a rep as a great theoretician. That particular one never really impressed me, but I did see a lot of it .

Marc

Marc:

More small humor from "the old coot" kibitzer.

As I was doing by correspondence the sections of my USAF Command and Staff College, which was being monitored and graded at Maxwell AFB in Montgomery, Alabama by an active duty USAF 05 War College Professor, I did two things, a somewhat "fire for effect" to see what happens scenario. My half Irish impish nature, let's say.

1. I quoted in my C&S paper a long article I in fact had written and published in the WALL STREET JOURNAL a few years earlier on the World Bank loaning to the poorest nations and the linked relationship of the Bank for International Settlements in Berne, Switzerland, where all nations have SDRs (special drawing rights to increase any/a nation's money supply/credit instantly for justifiable purposes of economic need when total national productivity or lack of same stoppers doing whatever requires more funding your country just "ain't" got at the moment). *My eclectic background included several years after active USAF duty, before I joined the USAF Reserve program, as an international banker in NYC. That experience was the basis on which I later wrote and published in the WALL STREET JOURNAL the SDR article, while working as a Congressional Budget Officer for the US Department of Veterans Affairs Central Office in Washington.

2. I also noted an article on the decimation of the rain forest in Brazil and it's effect on the regional, even global economy via climatic impact, which in turn affects weather patterns which in turn affect some economic enterprises, all impacing the (old terminology today) GNP and NNP economic measures, both topics woven into total topic of affordability of "a" nation to deal with "guns and butter."

Topic #1 cited in the bibliography the author as "George Singleton, then an International Banking Officer with Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., NYC" , while #2 cited one of my former New York University Sterne Graduate Business School (night division) B-school economics professors.

My C&S course/paper monitor didn't like my use of the WALL STREET JOURNAL as a source for what he accepted as related topic support material but overlooked/didn't notice who the author was (me!) somehow. On rebuttal, with further explination of my paper's goals and purposes, the 05 relented and agreed after all that "maybe" the occasional WSJ financial/economic reference was OK, still not noticing that I was the article's author.

On the Brazilian rain forest decimation, the 05 paper monitor/grader still did not like the analogy, but finally accepted it, as I simply refused to take it out. And, as I did quarterly guest drills with the *Maxwell Base Commander's office to avoid frequent drill only commutes to HQSOCOM at MacDill in Tampa, I used a drill period to go sit down over coffee with the C&S 05 Professor (at that time I was still a reserve 05 myself) and talked him into "my logic and reasoning" to the point he let it go.

*Base CO was a civil engineer by degree and used me to help redesign the entire base runway and road system. My BA was in history and poltical science, but because I had a night school MBA he felt "I must know what I was doing as I was then at the JCS level involved in both J4 and J5 plans!"

Enough long winded blather. Unique thinking, and different experiences can all help solve problems, including war and civil affairs issues, if one has an open mind and can relate the pieces of the puzzle in an understandable and practical outcome manner.

My view is we really wasted huge amounts of time undermanning and not dealing cohesively up front with the civil affairs needs of Iraq after our first few weeks of hot conflict ended there. I will not digress further into what might have been, as that is now pointless, I am sure you agree.

George Singleton

[marct]

Hi George,

Marc:

More small humor from "the old coot" kibitzer.

Not at all! It is "the sharing of relevant experience". Besides that, I'm an Anthropologist and one of the things that we know is that stories are the basis of "learning" because they combine both emotion and logic .

Unique thinking, and different experiences can all help solve problems, including war and civil affairs issues, if one has an open mind and can relate the pieces of the puzzle in an understandable and practical outcome manner.

I totally agree with that. I remember, during the 2nd year of my Ph.D. fieldwork, I was asked to give a "critique" seminar to the career counsellors I was studying. Within 20 minutes, we got into an intense discussion of how to construct their seminars using a model from the study of ritual (actually, a variant of Victor Turner's work). The discussion moved through all sorts of different religious traditions and, by about 25 minutes int it, we were arguing the relative merits of ecstatic rituals vs contemplative ones in training people how to write resumes. There was something surreal about discussing Divine Pomander and The Gospel of Norea in a business boardroom, but the changes made in their seminars reflected that conversation and, in the end, proved much more effective in getting people to write good resumes.

Marc

[George L. Singleton]

Hi George,



Not at all! It is "the sharing of relevant experience". Besides that, I'm an Anthropologist and one of the things that we know is that stories are the basis of "learning" because they combine both emotion and logic .



I totally agree with that. I remember, during the 2nd year of my Ph.D. fieldwork, I was asked to give a "critique" seminar to the career counsellors I was studying. Within 20 minutes, we got into an intense discussion of how to construct their seminars using a model from the study of ritual (actually, a variant of Victor Turner's work). The discussion moved through all sorts of different religious traditions and, by about 25 minutes int it, we were arguing the relative merits of ecstatic rituals vs contemplative ones in training people how to write resumes. There was something surreal about discussing Divine Pomander and The Gospel of Norea in a business boardroom, but the changes made in their seminars reflected that conversation and, in the end, proved much more effective in getting people to write good resumes.

Marc

As a co-founder and past Alabama State Chairman of the Chuck Colson Prison Ministry, there are some (not vast numbers, but some) one-time, non-violent, higher IQ ex-offenders (ex-cons) who could make good enlisted men and women for any/all branches of our services. IN the process they would find a niche in life and could become military "lifers." These men and women are not of any one ethnic or racial background in my experience, but of all colors and backgrounds, bascially all from in the main poorer homes or lack of homes, and in need of remedial reading courses and such.

From experience of 6 years on the Board of the Alabama Department of Youth Services (our juvenile, under age 18 jail system) we found the same thing, young teenage boys and girls, few but some in number there who could benefit the military if remedial reading and a stable environment were available, such as the military.

In the middle of a hot war may seem an odd time to address this topic. But, some small subset of these do not need remedial reading, are actually well educated and just made stupid/dumb one time mistakes, and could be of use and easily/readily trained at the grunt use level right now.

Please don't stop the war to deal with these side issues, but someone in military manpower should be gleaning these inputs and talking to the various service recruiting commanding generals to get something done to get and use the virtually ready to go now teenagers and younger adult ex-cons who made a one time, non-violent huge mistake. They are salvagable and I believe in the main would make good enlisted personnel.

George Singleton