Security and Stability in Afghanistan

[BRUZ_LEE]

I just came across the new SENLIS Council Report on AFGHANISTAN.
At first glance it looks like they got it right. In the appendices they even discuss on COIN theory and give excerpts of the new US COIN manual in order to stress the simple fact, that we don't stick to our own doctrine.
Very sadly that especially the UK troops in AFG recurr to sweep operations and bombing campaigns despite their huge COIN experience.
The Canadians who are right now blaming the Germans of not joining the fight in the South of AFG should rethink.

Highly recommended read. You find the report at:
http://www.senliscouncil.net/documents/Full_CI_Report

More discussions on it and more (older) reports at the homepage:
http://www.senliscouncil.net

[Jedburgh]

...Highly recommended read. You find the report at: Countering the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and Making Enemies

Thanks, Bruz - good read.

....and here's more testimony on Afghanistan, this time in front of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 15 Feb 07:

Congressman Mark Kirk - Afghanistan: The Rise of the Narco-Taliban

LTG (R) David Barno - Afghanistan on the Brink: Where Do We Go From Here?

Peter Bergen - Afghanistan 2007: Problems, Opportunities, and Possible Solutions

Anthony Cordesman - Winning in Afghanistan: The Challenges and the Response

[SWJED]

18 February Associated Press - AP Enterprise: Afghan Army Progress Slow by Jason Straziuso.

The Afghan army is struggling with old weaponry, low pay and desertions, yet performs better than the troubled Iraqi army and could defend Afghanistan without U.S. and NATO support in 10 years or less, military officials and analysts say.

The fledgling force's success is viewed as critical to the Western-backed mission of stabilizing Afghanistan, which faced a record number of insurgent attacks last year. Renewed violence expected this spring threatens President Hamid Karzai's government.

Recruitment for the Afghan National Army is being accelerated, and $8.6 billion in new American funding for Afghan security needs will help equip the 32,000-strong force, which U.S. military officials say is proving increasingly resilient in battle.

Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak told The Associated Press that a goal of 70,000 Afghan soldiers has been pushed forward to December 2008 from 2011, and it is hoped to have 46,000 in place by April...

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 23 Feb 07: Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan

Executive Summary

The current study is a follow-up to the 2005 baseline report In the Balance: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan. The report’s conclusions are based on 1,000 structured conversations that took place in half of Afghanistan’s provinces; 13 surveys, polls, and focus groups; 200 expert interviews; and the daily monitoring of 70 media sources and 182 organizations. Three of the report’s main findings are:

- Afghans are losing trust in their government because of an escalation in violence;

- Public expectations are neither being met nor managed;

- Conditions in Afghanistan have deteriorated in all key areas targeted for
development, except for the economy and women’s rights.

The general assessment of the five key pillars is as follows:

Security Afghans are more insecure today than they were in 2005. This is due largely to the violence surrounding the insurgency and counter-insurgency campaigns, and the inability of security forces to combat warlords and drug traffickers. State security institutions have increased their operational capacity and have trained more personnel, but they - particularly the Afghan National Police - have had problems with retention, staff effectiveness, corruption, and general oversight.

Governance and Participation The central government’s institutional and human capacity has improved, but its legitimacy has deteriorated. Sub-national government structures still lack capacity. In their place, militia commanders and local mafias have filled the void, undermining local governance, democratic rights, and service delivery.

Justice and Accountability Traditional, informal judicial structures continue to fill the gap in justice for many Afghans, while the formal justice sector remains inaccessible and corrupt, and is unable to confront impunity, adjudicate land disputes, unravel criminal networks, or protect the rights of citizens.

Economic Conditions High economic growth and a more open business environment have improved the general health of the Afghan economy, yet these benefits have not translated into sufficient employment and income generating activities for the ordinary citizen.

Social Services and Infrastructure Although reconstruction investments by the international community have enhanced social services and infrastructure, deteriorating security conditions, a scarcity of competent personnel and low quality has limited access and its benefits for many Afghans.

Full 118 page report at the link.

[Mondor]

Nothing new here I am afraid. If the government is perceived as not holding up its end of the social contract (providing basic security and other services that the population expects) then the populace will find someone who will. Vigilantism in the US Wild West came about because the state and territorial governments were unable, or unwilling, to provide security. Once the government became responsive to the needs of the local population the vigilantes faded away. Though it took a long time and we still have "local" difficulties that date from that era.

Kabul, or any government for that matter, needs to meet the minimum expectations of its population or it will lose legitimacy and any nominal authority it now has. Once that is gone then the people will find it somewhere else. This is of course how the Taliban came to be. They filled a power vacuum, and provided security and stability when no one else was able too.

[Jedburgh]

29 Mar 07 update of the CSIS 23 Feb 07 report linked in an earlier post in this thread:

Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan

Full 137 page report at the link.