The Never Ending Airpower Versus Groundpower Debate

[Mondor]

What ever threat we focus on there are still a few constants that everyone will need and we should fund/organize those first. My short list of critical items consists of:

• Providing a common operational picture for Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and NGO players
• Common or federated data architecture.
• Robust and efficient data search capability
• Coordination / restructuring of current organizations to achieve the proper blend of military and civilian capabilities to meet contingency and current operational needs

[slapout9]

I got it! We should just draft everybody in the Air Force, Army and Navy and put them in the Marine corps They must be laughing at us because how long have they had the concept of a combined Air, Land and Sea Force adapted to what ever situation they currently face.

[120mm]

Well, provided that the USAF was initially split off from the Army because of Strategic bombing, and strategic bombing is DOA, it makes you wonder why we don't become purple, completely.

[Mondor]

I got it! We should just draft everybody in the Air Force,Army and Navy and put them in the Marine corps

When everyone is special, no one is.

[Loggie]

I got it! We should just draft everybody in the Air Force, Army and Navy and put them in the Marine corps They must be laughing at us because how long have they had the concept of a combined Air, Land and Sea Force adapted to what ever situation they currently face.

When I came to the AF as a newly minted 2d Lt some years back, I was still imbued with 13 years of Marine Corps time behind me. The Air Expeditionary Force concept was just coming online and I made the mistake of observing to my CO (a Major just graduated from the Air Command and Staff College, who in actuality turned out to be a great American) that the AEF looked a whole lot like a MEU, but without the robust organic support structure and rifles. The lecture which followed took me through a textbook litany of the virtues of the AEF and how this (as yet unproven) concept was far superior to the MEU/MEF concept of operations. Fast forward 8 years and the AEF is still teetering on maturity, albeit more effective by a magnitude of 10 than it was then--and 'surprise'; I think they may have picked up some expeditionary operating concepts from the Marine Corps in the intervening years.

What I learned from that short conversation with my new CO was that parochialism was strong in the AF, and that the "not invented here" syndrome was alive and well. It's not an AF unique issue--it's the same in any service, as well as in the joint world (did you know that "joint" is actually spelled "Army"?)

The ILO taskings LawVol referred to have Navy and AF enlisted and officers filling traditional big Army functions (MiTT, convoy, security, etc) AF Lieutenants/Captains were filling Army Company CO positions in Army Trans Bns (until the AF brought them back into the AF fold...); Airmen were manning .50 cals in the back of up-armored security vehicles (and by the way, they were the ones welding the armor to the trucks on days when they didn't have runs scheduled) There are success stories out there that anyone (Doggie, Jarhead, Squid, or Flyboy) would be proud to brag about over a beer (or warm Coke, depending on your locale)

What I see happening at the O-3 to O-5 level (pilots excluded) is that we're starting to gain an understanding of how to operate in a joint environment to achieve common objectives. (Holy Buckets!!!! that sounds like the road to interoperability!) I think,we'll see General officers 20 years from now who'll be significantly less parochial than some serving today.

As far as pilots go, well, I just don't know what to say. The AC-130 and MC-130 pilots I know are great guys (and gals), the airlift pilots can't be paid enough based on what they're actually worth, and the fighter pilots believe they've been anointed by the almighty. Personally I think we should bring back Warrant Officer aviators...but that's another post.

[Bill Moore]

Yes, I concur that bringing back Warrant Officers will solve all of the Air Force's woes, and ensure we have pilots with large enough gonads to provide real CAS. :-)

[John T. Fishel]

This post tells a success story.

When I arrived in SOUTHCOM in 1986, staff officers at Army South refused to acknowledge that the Joint HQ had any authority over them and what they were doing - as one told me directly when I attempted (probably in a much too officious manner) to hold him to SOUTHCOM policies.

In 1992, when I began teaching Joint Ops at Leavenworth, my students were, at best, sceptical. Joint, really, was spelled Army in their minds. Five and a half years later, when I moved on to NDU, my Army students at Leavenworth (along with my Navy, Marine, and Air Force students) understood what Jointness was all about. Mostly, this was because they had lived it and had internalized the changes produced by Goldwater-Nichols. I would add that this included the fighter jocks as well as the heavy army fighters. Even the Navy guys were willing to accept that a CINC would have OPCON of a CBG!

We had come a long way in a decade. My sense is that despite some occasional arrogance and stupidity we have come even further since. Now, if we could just really learn the lessons of Small Wars that have been identified for so long.....

[Mondor]

It seems to me that the folks in the field, or combatant commands, all subscribe to the practice of joint operations and joint commands. After all, it all about accomplishing the mission.

The folks hanging out in MACOMS and Service level organizations are much more likely to have a bit of difficulty grasping the concept. Their world view, i.e. their performance appraisals, a less directly linked to immediate tactical and operational success and more to budget concerns. Not any less committed, just a slightly different perspective that can make them view joint as a dirty, or at least slightly scary word.

[120mm]

I'm pretty much a "task-oriented" guy, so I don't mind the "concept" of "jointness". However, my experience in OIF I made it seems like "Joint", at least in terms of CJTF-7 meant "people a long ways away who have no connection or stake at what was going on in theater interfering with ops while building their own empires." The only thing that I "saw" CJTF do, was to intercept stuff I'd ordered for V Corps, and confiscating 1/3d of it for themselves, or confiscating anything they thought was "neat." They were kind of like an organized crime gang, in spiffy uniforms and with a dessert bar at their mess hall.

My favorite quote of the war was "The 'L' in CJTF-7 stands for Leadership."

I remain a "joint" skeptic, unless you want to talk about direct coordination issues. I've been "joint" for a while now and seldom had difficulty doing direct coordination.

[TROUFION]

Mondor, I see your point and the capabilities you talk about are valid:

What ever threat we focus on there are still a few constants that everyone will need and we should fund/organize those first. My short list of critical items consists of:

• Providing a common operational picture for Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and NGO players
• Common or federated data architecture.
• Robust and efficient data search capability
• Coordination / restructuring of current organizations to achieve the proper blend of military and civilian capabilities to meet contingency and current operational needs

BUT, these are internally (all services and gov't orgs as well as NATO etc) focused C4ISR issues not threat based future strategic-operational issues. They are VERY IMPORTANT so dont take this the wrong way. I see them as the difference between Wermacht tanks having radios and French tanks not, it is a battlefield C2 issue.

The debate of Airpower vs Groundpower is esoteric, like the old debate of manuever vs attrition. In war a bit of both are always necessary, we exclude options at our peril. Slapout had it right somewhat with the MAGTF (Marine Air Ground Task Force) concept, but Marines pride is taken in being expeditionary, forcible entry, assault or shock troops, from the sea. While sustained land combat is a skill set it is not the prefered method of employment (look to USMC deployments 7 mos vs USA deployments 12-15 mos).

The Army on the other hand is designed principly for sustained land combat (whatever form it takes). If the Army and AF designed an AGTF it would have to be viewed in this light. Even a constabulary brigade or division can be an AGTF, it is just the mission-purpose and intent would be the driving force for the troop, technology and vehicle mix.

Semper Fi, --T

[Mondor]

My position is that if we do not address these internal issues then we will continue to be in a reactive mode to strategic-operational issues. How can we determine the relevance of our actions to a potential future threat if we do not have a good grasp on what we are doing ourselves? I guess the old maxim “know your enemy as you know your self” is the root of the problem. We do not know, communicate and share data amongst, ourselves, so how can we know the enemy? Difficult to win in COIN when you have no idea what you opponent is up to.

The data and organizational argument ties into the air V. ground argument in a direct way. Until we are able to communicate with ourselves and targeted external groups (NGOs, non-NATO forces…) we will not be able to bring the correct tools to bear on a situation as quickly as we should. It is very much a pro tailored task force argument.

Imagine a PRT that has State, US Mil (air and ground), Coalition, Host Nation, and NGO members/partners. Each is able to view a common operational picture and the organization is tasked based, and may even have a (shock, gasp) civilian lead.

After reading this I realize I am probably off topic. I need to compose my thoughts on this in a thesis level of effort paper and not in the Air V. Ground discussion.

[Jimbo]

Mondor,

I am working the issue you bring up. You can forget the NGO integration on a team. The key to any of this in any role is identifying your core competnecies as an organization, and developing them in people within the organization that enables them to particiapte in a construcitve manner. This means that more is not always better. As far as the USAF goes, I think a lot of us have weighed in with some things that the USAF could do in COIN.

[TROUFION]

Mondor,

Good point with the PRT angle. Regardless of the systems that do the intergrating the point of creating a multi-purpose task force, tailored to the mission at hand is excellent.

The idea of a task force that integrates air and ground combat units with logistics, multi-national units, government support units (indigenous-local, UN, DOS, DOJ etc) is right on. Liaisons (with cellphones) for NGO's is about all you can expect from most of these. NGO's do not generally want to associate with the gov't forces as it violates their neutrality rules.

[slapout9]

Mondor, I hear what you are saying about special but have we gone overboard. We have Airborne units,Special forces,Rangers,SEALs,Recon, USMC in general plus Air Force PJ and even the Coast Guard has rescue swimmers. If you get to special I think you end where you talked about nobody is special. Anyway just a thought.

TROFION, relative to a force/organization for COIN why don't we let a COMBINED ARMS team CLEAR, let the MP's HOLD, and let the ENGINEERS build under a USA Military government and when it is stable enough, turn it over to the civilian host nation government with a letter saying we fixed now don't screw it up?

[jonSlack]

TROFION, relative to a force/organization for COIN why don't we let a COMBINED ARMS team CLEAR, let the MP's HOLD, and let the ENGINEERS build under a USA Military government and when it is stable enough, turn it over to the civilian host nation government with a letter saying we fixed now don't screw it up?

Clear: IA with US MiTTs and Coalition combined arms.

Hold: Combination of IA with MiTTs, IP with MiTTs, and combined arms battalions all sync'd in their shared AO with US Commanders of the combined arms unit serving as the OIC of the AO.

Build: As much as possible should be rebuilt by local Iraqis with any required technical oversight and guidance provided by Engineers (Do US Army Corps of Engineers sourced MiTTs with the Iraqi equivalent of USACE and local civil building code enforcers exist?). However, large infrastructure projects will probably require coalition military Engineer units (Horizontal, vertical, prime power, well drilling...).

[Mondor]

NGO's do not generally want to associate with the gov't forces as it violates their neutrality rules.

I agree with the NGO statement. In the field they do not want to be associated with any military force. Some of them are rabid anti-military and will not associate with military types even at the cost of the lives of the folks they are trying to help. However, folks like MSF would probably like to get information on demographics, roads, and medical data (outbreak points, reports of communicable diseases...), if not directly from us then through a third party such as the IRC or UNHCR. So probably no "embedded" NGO bodies, but a council of interested parties would be feasible. I know something like this worked in the Balkans and in the early days in Afghanistan.

[marct]

However, folks like MSF would probably like to get information on demographics, roads, and medical data (outbreak points, reports of communicable diseases...), if not directly from us then through a third party such as the IRC or UNHCR. So probably no "embedded" NGO bodies, but a council of interested parties would be feasible. I know something like this worked in the Balkans and in the early days in Afghanistan.

I was at a talk by the Norwegian Foreign Minister yesterday, and that is the model (a multi-state NGO council) that they are using - a single point source for NGO development aid. He did, however, note that one of the problems that that model has is that they have no security elements embedded in it and no budget for security elements. This is one of he factors that has een making it hard for NGOs to operate in areas like Darfur, and also in many of the UNHCR run refugee camps.

Believe it or not, one of the biggest problems with NGOs is bureaucratic, i.e. they all have their own reporting forms / structures, and so much time and energy is tied up in host countries filling in the forms, they frequently will refuse new aid.

On using UNHCR, I would advise against it. They are overly bureaucratic and, on the whole, dedicated to image presentation and fundraising rather than any actual work on the ground. Their record speaks for them in this sense. For example, consider the refugee camps in Uganda, which are under UNHCR "oversight". Their mandate includes granting a recognition of refugee status that will be accepted internationally for purposes of immigration fast tracking, but they take years to do this processing. In fact, they are so poor at it that the birth rate in the camps exceeds their processing rate.

Marc

[johca]

I provide the following insights from a fellow member of another discussion group to which I subscribe. The author is Edward M. Van Court, MAJ, MI, USAR

…
The Air Force does not understand the Officer/NCO relationship. AF doctrine is written/approved by fighter pilots and fighter pilots seldom work closely with NCOs before they are promoted to field grades. The idea of a LT going to an E-7 or a CPT going to an E-8 for advice or as a sounding board for ideas is utterly alien to them. In the Army, we pretty much take it for granted that we, as officers, will have an experienced NCO working closely with us throughout our career. There are exceptional individuals in the AF who break this mold, but they are just that, the exception and very rarely from the fighter or bomber communities.

Although written for a different purpose, Air Rescue Its Blurred Identity. Past, present and future The attached link has some discussion of the officer/NCO disconnect in the Air Force. It also explores very slightly a little bit on the military purpose of using the NCO as a small team tactical leader.

[Ken White]

in the USAF...

[Cliff]

Although written for a different purpose, Air Rescue Its Blurred Identity. Past, present and future The attached link has some discussion of the officer/NCO disconnect in the Air Force. It also explores very slightly a little bit on the military purpose of using the NCO as a small team tactical leader.

The stuff on the PJs is interesting! I have a few friends who are CROs, it has been interesting to see the dynamic between them. OBTW, the helo community is interesting in and of itself because especially in the Guard/Reserves, there are a ton of former Army WOs flying as officers. Different dynamic.

The quote from your friend in the Army ignores a fundamental reality. In every service except the AF, the majority of the warfighters are enlisted, and the technical experts are enlisted. In the Combat AF (mobility AF is a slightly different story), this ratio is reversed. It would be inappropriate for a fighter dude to go to his Maintenance NCOIC or Life Support NCO and ask him how to employ vs. a High Off-Boresight Helmet Mounted Sight threat.... so he probably won't, that part is correct.

However, the maintenance, life support, and ops support experts in the CAF are enlisted folks.... and trust me, we go to them every day for advice and help. OBTW, in my experience, the lack of enlisted folks makes the pilot MORE likely to listen to the experienced NCOs, not less... he just won't neccessarily ask them about the things a young Capt/LT in the Army might.

Finally, let me just say that there are a few folks flying fighters who give the community it's reputation... but trust me, everyone knows who they are... they oftentimes tend to always have the jet that breaks, or doesn't quite work right... the folks who take care of their enlisted troops and listen to the NCOs tend to fly their butts off. Karma....

V/R,

Cliff