The Never Ending Airpower Versus Groundpower Debate

[tequila]

120mm - The B1 thing sounds lifted from the standard Israeli tactic in Lebanon and Gaza.

[Loggie]

I got it! We should just draft everybody in the Air Force, Army and Navy and put them in the Marine corps They must be laughing at us because how long have they had the concept of a combined Air, Land and Sea Force adapted to what ever situation they currently face.

When I came to the AF as a newly minted 2d Lt some years back, I was still imbued with 13 years of Marine Corps time behind me. The Air Expeditionary Force concept was just coming online and I made the mistake of observing to my CO (a Major just graduated from the Air Command and Staff College, who in actuality turned out to be a great American) that the AEF looked a whole lot like a MEU, but without the robust organic support structure and rifles. The lecture which followed took me through a textbook litany of the virtues of the AEF and how this (as yet unproven) concept was far superior to the MEU/MEF concept of operations. Fast forward 8 years and the AEF is still teetering on maturity, albeit more effective by a magnitude of 10 than it was then--and 'surprise'; I think they may have picked up some expeditionary operating concepts from the Marine Corps in the intervening years.

What I learned from that short conversation with my new CO was that parochialism was strong in the AF, and that the "not invented here" syndrome was alive and well. It's not an AF unique issue--it's the same in any service, as well as in the joint world (did you know that "joint" is actually spelled "Army"?)

The ILO taskings LawVol referred to have Navy and AF enlisted and officers filling traditional big Army functions (MiTT, convoy, security, etc) AF Lieutenants/Captains were filling Army Company CO positions in Army Trans Bns (until the AF brought them back into the AF fold...); Airmen were manning .50 cals in the back of up-armored security vehicles (and by the way, they were the ones welding the armor to the trucks on days when they didn't have runs scheduled) There are success stories out there that anyone (Doggie, Jarhead, Squid, or Flyboy) would be proud to brag about over a beer (or warm Coke, depending on your locale)

What I see happening at the O-3 to O-5 level (pilots excluded) is that we're starting to gain an understanding of how to operate in a joint environment to achieve common objectives. (Holy Buckets!!!! that sounds like the road to interoperability!) I think,we'll see General officers 20 years from now who'll be significantly less parochial than some serving today.

As far as pilots go, well, I just don't know what to say. The AC-130 and MC-130 pilots I know are great guys (and gals), the airlift pilots can't be paid enough based on what they're actually worth, and the fighter pilots believe they've been anointed by the almighty. Personally I think we should bring back Warrant Officer aviators...but that's another post.

[Bill Moore]

Yes, I concur that bringing back Warrant Officers will solve all of the Air Force's woes, and ensure we have pilots with large enough gonads to provide real CAS. :-)

[John T. Fishel]

This post tells a success story.

When I arrived in SOUTHCOM in 1986, staff officers at Army South refused to acknowledge that the Joint HQ had any authority over them and what they were doing - as one told me directly when I attempted (probably in a much too officious manner) to hold him to SOUTHCOM policies.

In 1992, when I began teaching Joint Ops at Leavenworth, my students were, at best, sceptical. Joint, really, was spelled Army in their minds. Five and a half years later, when I moved on to NDU, my Army students at Leavenworth (along with my Navy, Marine, and Air Force students) understood what Jointness was all about. Mostly, this was because they had lived it and had internalized the changes produced by Goldwater-Nichols. I would add that this included the fighter jocks as well as the heavy army fighters. Even the Navy guys were willing to accept that a CINC would have OPCON of a CBG!

We had come a long way in a decade. My sense is that despite some occasional arrogance and stupidity we have come even further since. Now, if we could just really learn the lessons of Small Wars that have been identified for so long.....

[Mondor]

It seems to me that the folks in the field, or combatant commands, all subscribe to the practice of joint operations and joint commands. After all, it all about accomplishing the mission.

The folks hanging out in MACOMS and Service level organizations are much more likely to have a bit of difficulty grasping the concept. Their world view, i.e. their performance appraisals, a less directly linked to immediate tactical and operational success and more to budget concerns. Not any less committed, just a slightly different perspective that can make them view joint as a dirty, or at least slightly scary word.

[120mm]

I'm pretty much a "task-oriented" guy, so I don't mind the "concept" of "jointness". However, my experience in OIF I made it seems like "Joint", at least in terms of CJTF-7 meant "people a long ways away who have no connection or stake at what was going on in theater interfering with ops while building their own empires." The only thing that I "saw" CJTF do, was to intercept stuff I'd ordered for V Corps, and confiscating 1/3d of it for themselves, or confiscating anything they thought was "neat." They were kind of like an organized crime gang, in spiffy uniforms and with a dessert bar at their mess hall.

My favorite quote of the war was "The 'L' in CJTF-7 stands for Leadership."

I remain a "joint" skeptic, unless you want to talk about direct coordination issues. I've been "joint" for a while now and seldom had difficulty doing direct coordination.

[Van]

Two points with which to stir the pot-

1) AF in COIN works for appropriate tasks and targets. Rolling Thunder I failed and Rolling Thunder II suceeded for the same reason; air power works against the right targets. In RT I, there were no rational, feasible infrastructure targets to engage from the air. In RT II, the war had started moving into semi-conventional operations and the infrastructure could be hit from the air in such a way as to cause significant, relevant effects.

2) GEN Jumper (USAF, RET) said that the future of the AF lies in Space Ops, Comm, and ISR. Space Ops is an essential enabler for Comm, and Intel collection, and without our edge in comm and intel, ground forces would be paying a much higher toll than we already are.

The problem: As important as the AF role in COIN is, it doesn't produce the OPR bullets that pilots want, and it doesn't sing the praises of the radiant sungods of the Fighter community. COIN is by it's very nature a ground operation involving a lot of shaking hands, walking around, and using single rifle rounds to shape the outcome (all at ground level, +/- a few meters). The Army couldn't do it today without the AF, but this is not the way the AF wants to hear it worded.

[jonSlack]

The Hill - Senate language could take away Army’s control of JCA

Questioning whether the Army and Air Force should share the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) program, Senate defense authorizers are directing the Pentagon to assign responsibility to the Air Force for all fixed-wing airlift functions and missions.

The language included in the Senate Armed Services Committee’s version of the 2008 defense authorization bill highlights the debate over the two services’ roles and missions that has been building in Congress and at the Pentagon since Kenneth Krieg, the acquisition czar, directed the two services to enter a joint program for a smaller cargo airplane.

The JCA program, which was intended to replace the beaten-up C-23 Sherpa and C-12 Huron aircraft, has had a rocky start, with a fair amount of behind-the-scenes controversy.

Senate authorizers are directing the secretary of defense, acting through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to make the Air Force responsible for fixed-wing support for the Army’s logistics on the battlefield.

The language accompanies a shift of $157 million from the Army’s budget request for the JCA to the Air Force’s budget line in the Senate’s version of the 2008 defense authorization bill.

[johca]

I provide the following insights from a fellow member of another discussion group to which I subscribe. The author is Edward M. Van Court, MAJ, MI, USAR

…
The Air Force does not understand the Officer/NCO relationship. AF doctrine is written/approved by fighter pilots and fighter pilots seldom work closely with NCOs before they are promoted to field grades. The idea of a LT going to an E-7 or a CPT going to an E-8 for advice or as a sounding board for ideas is utterly alien to them. In the Army, we pretty much take it for granted that we, as officers, will have an experienced NCO working closely with us throughout our career. There are exceptional individuals in the AF who break this mold, but they are just that, the exception and very rarely from the fighter or bomber communities.

Although written for a different purpose, Air Rescue Its Blurred Identity. Past, present and future The attached link has some discussion of the officer/NCO disconnect in the Air Force. It also explores very slightly a little bit on the military purpose of using the NCO as a small team tactical leader.

[Ken White]

in the USAF...

[Cliff]

Although written for a different purpose, Air Rescue Its Blurred Identity. Past, present and future The attached link has some discussion of the officer/NCO disconnect in the Air Force. It also explores very slightly a little bit on the military purpose of using the NCO as a small team tactical leader.

The stuff on the PJs is interesting! I have a few friends who are CROs, it has been interesting to see the dynamic between them. OBTW, the helo community is interesting in and of itself because especially in the Guard/Reserves, there are a ton of former Army WOs flying as officers. Different dynamic.

The quote from your friend in the Army ignores a fundamental reality. In every service except the AF, the majority of the warfighters are enlisted, and the technical experts are enlisted. In the Combat AF (mobility AF is a slightly different story), this ratio is reversed. It would be inappropriate for a fighter dude to go to his Maintenance NCOIC or Life Support NCO and ask him how to employ vs. a High Off-Boresight Helmet Mounted Sight threat.... so he probably won't, that part is correct.

However, the maintenance, life support, and ops support experts in the CAF are enlisted folks.... and trust me, we go to them every day for advice and help. OBTW, in my experience, the lack of enlisted folks makes the pilot MORE likely to listen to the experienced NCOs, not less... he just won't neccessarily ask them about the things a young Capt/LT in the Army might.

Finally, let me just say that there are a few folks flying fighters who give the community it's reputation... but trust me, everyone knows who they are... they oftentimes tend to always have the jet that breaks, or doesn't quite work right... the folks who take care of their enlisted troops and listen to the NCOs tend to fly their butts off. Karma....

V/R,

Cliff

[JHR]

Anybody know anythong about the history and demise of the USMC's "Flying Sgts."?

[Ken White]

(not the AAF). Arnold insisted on college and commissions to attract the 'best and brightest.' So the USAAF went that route and thus so did the USAF when it was formed in 1947. They sort of drug the Navy and Marines along with them and those services phased out the enlisted pilots in the pipeline in 1948. Those that were serving were allowed to continue flying but no replacements were trained. IIRC, the last one flying was a Marine, C-130 rated and he retired in 1973 or 74.

When the Army expanded it's aviation inventory in the late 50s, they wanted to use Enlisted Pilots but the USAF had a fit and the Army compromised with Warrant aviators.

Curiously, the Navy is about to invent that wheel and make some candidates WOs and send 'em to flight school.

Enlisted pilots, pro and con have been argued on this board before; you can Google it.

[Cavguy]

(not the AAF). Arnold insisted on college and commissions to attract the 'best and brightest.' So the USAAF went that route and thus so did the USAF when it was formed in 1947. They sort of drug the Navy and Marines along with them and those services phased out the enlisted pilots in the pipeline in 1948. Those that were serving were allowed to continue flying but no replacements were trained. IIRC, the last one flying was a Marine, C-130 rated and he retired in 1973 or 74.

When the Army expanded it's aviation inventory in the late 50s, they wanted to use Enlisted Pilots but the USAF had a fit and the Army compromised with Warrant aviators.

Curiously, the Navy is about to invent that wheel and make some candidates WOs and send 'em to flight school.

Enlisted pilots, pro and con have been argued on this board before; you can Google it.

IIRC, Chuck Yeager, AVN hero, was a "Flying Sergeant" before they did away with the program and gave him a commission. Then they tasked him to fly the X-1 because he would do it for a AF salary, vice the high priced test pilots. And he was one of the only ones dumb enough to do it!

[Ken White]

IIRC, Chuck Yeager, AVN hero, was a "Flying Sergeant" before they did away with the program and gave him a commission.[

True, he finished flight training about the time they made 'em Flight Officers, Warrants, on the way to a commission.

Then they tasked him to fly the X-1 because he would do it for a AF salary, vice the high priced test pilots. And he was one of the only ones dumb enough to do it!

Dumb enough? Perhaps. Smart enough to get to BG though. That beats a whole bunch of average bears...

And you should remember from your teenage years that the mantra in his, your and my part of the US is "Watch this s..." Who dares, wins. Dumb, maybe but it's a way of life...

[Cavguy]

True, he finished flight training about the time they made 'em Flight Officers, Warrants, on the way to a commission.Dumb enough? Perhaps. Smart enough to get to BG though. That beats a whole bunch of average bears...

And you should remember from your teenage years that the mantra in his, your and my part of the US is "Watch this s..." Who dares, wins. Dumb, maybe but it's a way of life...

His Autobiography remains one of my favorite reads. I never fail to laugh at all of his "West Virginia Good Ol Boy" vs. the USAF stories, and his self-depreciating sense of humor (except for his flying skills).

I also contend that most valor medals in the Army are for successfully doing dumb (but often necessary) things. Dumb isn't always bad ....

I still characterize my stint at Airborne school as one of the dumbest things I ever did - I can hear the howls from the ABN community already....

[Ken White]

...I still characterize my stint at Airborne school as one of the dumbest things I ever did - I can hear the howls from the ABN community already....

On this, don't bet on it -- you may end up commanding one of those A-bone BCT Cav Sqns...

A guy who was a former 1SG of C Trp in one of them would've appreciated your presence.

BTW, thanks for the AKO feed. Much appreciated

[Tom Odom]

I still characterize my stint at Airborne school as one of the dumbest things I ever did - I can hear the howls from the ABN community already....

And then you went Cav....

There is a trend there, yes there is...

[Cavguy]

And then you went Cav....

There is a trend there, yes there is...

Hey!

I resemble that remark .....

And I went to IZ ... twice ...

[Van]

Chuck Yeager ... Smart enough to get to BG though.

Check the rest of the story. COL Yeager was being a fighter jock, drinking with LTs and CPTs and generally setting a bad example for his subordinates. He was a hero so he couldn't be busted out or passed over for it. So the AF promoted him.

Ahhh... The legacy of the WW II AAF, where a screwed up pilot was still a valuable commodity and would probably die on the next mission anyways. Under those circumstances it was cost effective to avoid formal procedings, but the attitudes carried over into peacetime and became part of the culture.

Now Hap Arnold and Billy Mitchell were products of the interwar Infantry mafia dictating that anything with an engine had to be focused on its relation to the dismounts... Sorry, the foot-soldiers, the centerpiece of the military. Arnold and Mitchell were buddies with Patton during the period when he was working on the emerging armor and armor doctrine. That led to him 'checking out' and focusing on his social life and sports while commanding a cav sqdn at Ft. Myers.

Yes, the AF has issues, but never forget that most of them trace back to Army practices during WWII and the interwar period.