The Never Ending Airpower Versus Groundpower Debate

[LawVol]

Criticism is one thing, questioning someone's dedication simply because they make a different choice is quite another. I'll always welcome constructive criticism, but that's not what I'm reading.

120mm: I found your last three sentences quite humorous in their rather sophomoric attempt at framing the rules of a debate. Let me see if I get this straight. I read criticism of my branch of the service and by rising in its defense I validate it? I guess I should saying nothing? But then this simply validates it as well. Silence is acquiescence. Sorry, but it doesn't work that way. Of course, those three sentences could simply make you feel better about your argument. In my experience, statements such as these come from a position backed by emotion and feeling rather than facts. It's akin to the argument in political circles right now that if you criticize anything about the war, you're unpatriotic or somehow providing aid and comfort to the enemy. My comments are based in fact and from having spent a number of years on active duty in two different branches of the service.

To address your "criticisms" specifically:
1) You are absolutely right. I have never seen an officer's club or golf course on an Army base. But what is this? (http://www.theleafchronicle.com/news...on/204061.html) Brace yourself, it seems like the Army has established a golf course in Mosul. I wonder where the money came from? I think all branches waste money. Sure, I'd like to stop it and if you have a solution, let's hear it. It would certainly be more constructive than picking and choosing the facts.

2) Ahh, leadership, the sin qua non for any argument disparaging the USAF. I find it remarkable when I hear this argument from people who haven’t actually served in the USAF. Just as my time as an Army-brat doesn't give me any special insight into the leadership qualities within the Army, neither does the fact that you have an uncle retired from the USAF give you any special insight on the USAF as a whole. I've never actually heard the flying is leadership comment (perhaps it has the same mythic qualities as the GPS comment from the same post). However, I would say two things. First, it apparently came from a new lieutenant. Enough said I think. Second, there are leadership roles within a flying squadron and those pilots are responsible for their plane and others. Every mission has a lead. Maybe it’s similar with tanks? I don't know, I wouldn't presume to make such an unequivocal statement since I've never driven a tank (I assume you've never flown an F16?).

3) I'm not a personnel guy but I do know that some of these volunteers are trying to get in to career fields that are already overmanned or in danger of being so. Besides this is driven by funding issues (or maybe we built an extra golf course).

4) There is a deference to the checklist, I'll give you that (see I can admit problematic issues with the USAF; I don't see my branch as perfect like some apparently think theirs is). However, it isn't as prevalent as some think. We're working it. We're being forced to because the current threat isn't what we're normally geared to.

5) There is some truth here. USAF leadership (read pilots) views the world through an airpower-centric lens. It's what they know and what they are comfortable with. Other branches are just as guilty. The older guys see airpower as solely lethal and try to make the fight fit the capability rather than adapting your capabilities (or uses of those capabilities) to the fight. Some of the younger generation are moving away from this (I've actually written on this (January issue of Armed Force Journal)). The over-reliance on lethal power, however, isn't confined to the USAF. I've read a little about the perceived over-reliance on lethal power by the 4th ID in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Baghdad. I wasn't there, but I've read it is several places (I think Fiasco mentions this if memory serves). Most of us that frequent this site realize the hearts and minds aspect of COIN, but that is not shared by a great number of people in all branches of the US military. So I guess some house cleaning is due everywhere.

[Jimbo]

I will weigh in with my observations based on experience:

March 1998 PAC Site B/Ali Al Slem AB, KU: While constructing and guarding a Patriot Missile Site during DESERT THUNDER I, I take two of my squads over to Ali Al Salem AB to get a hot meal (we haven't had one in about 35 days, other than T-rats). Come up to the first chow hall we find, when we beigin to enter, I am informed that the facility is only for USAF personnel and that we need to go the Army Chow Hall. Find the Army Chow Hall (just set up) and receive MRE's.

June 2002 PAFB/FT Carson, CO: My Company was providing the FORSCOM Fly-Away Heavy Immediate Ready Company (Tanks/Bradleys/men via C-17/C-5). My vehicles and pallets are in a hanger on the flightline. I have my men providing guards. On a Sunday morning at 1030 AM I receive a call from my BDE executive office wanting to know why the USAF security police at PAFB have called him to reprt that civillians are crawling around my equipment. I put on my uniform drive to PAFB and ask my guards what the hell was going on. One of my guards gave a tour of the equipment to two off-duty USAF SP's and their kids. The off-duty SP's were the civilians that SP office called my higher about. So instead going over and asking what was goign on, the USAF P's assumed the worst and called my BDE HQ (they had my home number as well, but why solve problems at the lowest level possible).

MAY 2, 2003 Ouja, IZ: 4ID is in the Tikrit area. There is very little in the way of air going on. Things arebusy, but not busy enough to involve the Air Force. The BN S-3 asks the CCT, who are attached to the battalion, if they would like to help out in the TOC, namely many radios and such since they aren't doing much at the time. The AF NCO's think it would be cool because they are bored out of their minds. The AF Captain (A-10 driver, '97 USAFA grad) tells the BNCDR and S-3 in front of the rest of us that he and his men were to highly trained to do that sort of thing, and that they would not help man the TOC. It didn't go well, and the AF NCO's ended up feeling really bad for their ALO putting them in a bad spot.

Since Saddam was on the lose in the area, there was a level of violence out of the locals that did not receive much news until late in 2003. The paintbrush that 4ID gets painted with, tends to be held by journalists who did spend much time in the units AO. Nobody did things perfectly in 2003, but there appears to be a lot of criticism by writers who never spent a lot of time up there.

September 2005, Taji, IZ: USAF provides MiTT personnel to serve as advisors to Iraqi Army Base Defense Units (BDU). The team is led by an AF Captain (USAFA grad again). The BDU has responsibility for the perimeter and the ECP's and a certain distance out from the perimeter (1-2 K's). AF Captain says that his team will not take part in any activities that involve going outside the wire, and he determines that the ECP is outside the wire. The reult is that the other MiTT personnel on the camp are having to spend their not out on ops with theri own IA soldiers babysitting the BDU Iraqis at an ECP because this AF Captain says it is not his lane. In a nu7t sheel, Army/USMC/Navy MiTTs who are responsible for other Iraqi untis on the camp (meaning training/ops) are having to spend their time helping the BDU Iraqis that are on the gate, while the USAF advisor team does little else.

There are plenty of good people in the USAF, the problem tends to be that the USAF is kind of like the kid with nicest toys in the sandbox, he wants to play with everybody else as an equal, but he has some issues with sharing.

For the record both of great uncles were B-17 drivers in the ETO. Scheinfurt-regensburg/Cologne?Berlin, etc. Multiple DFC's.

[Jimbo]

As for USAF and COIN there is a huge role. The problem has to do with what gets budgeted for procurement. Airlift and ISR are two of the biggest uses of airpower followed closely by CAS. The USAF has procured a good mix of aircraft for this, but not in good quantities. The USAF ha for some reason been keen to kill of the A-10, but it continues to prove its usefulness. The more interesting example I find is the C-17. C-17 procurement was based on the mathematics of cargo capacity not sortie rate. So even though the 2 C-17's can carry what 3 C141's (whatever it is/the math escapes me at this time) did, the isue now come up of hours on airframes with the C-17 having a higher than forecasted usage rate. Personally, my concern is the apparent inability of the USAF to figure out its tanker procuremtn plan.

[Steve Blair]

What I really think you're missing, LawVol, is the disconnect between some of the people in the AF and how the AF acts when it is on the policy stage. Jimbo brings out some good examples, and I could reel off many others from the historical perspective. What it often comes down to is the AF's institutional inability to deal with any situation other than the one they feel is ideal or desired. They have also had an historical tendency to claim that they have the only true understanding of joint service or operations (take a look at "Air Force Roles and Missions: A History" if you don't believe me...it has an interesting spin on this).

As an organization, the AF tends to swing from one extreme to the other. SAC's dominance of the AF from its first days until the 1970s is one example, the rise of fighter pilots from the early 1970s to today another. There are some fine thinkers and doers within the AF (easy to see if you look at the Air University's paper collection), but this thought does not seem to rise up to the higher levels. As a result you get JAG generals claiming that airpower CAN win a COIN situation by itself, and in an earlier generation you got claims that one E-3 served the same deterrent purpose as a carrier battle group.

What can the AF do to change this perception? For one they should take a long, honest look at the real situation we face today and come up with some real answers. We need tanker capability and airlift. Period. Even the AF has admitted that their main role in an Africa Command would be lift. There should be the same level of focus on this as there is on the "next generation" bomber. They could also focus more attention on their personnel issues and consider cutting programs instead of people next time budget decisions need to be made. They could also stop the "airpower won the war" record. The AF, like all other services, is a supporting arm. It supports national goals. It cannot win everything on its own, any more than the Army can win everything on its own.

As a historian I understand this is a difficult thing for the AF to deal with based on its own history and culture. Tilford makes some interesting comments about this in his book "Setup."

[Entropy]

BTW, the Rand monograph linked in Tom's opening post to this thread was revised and updated. Here's the new link to Learning Large Lessons, The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Some USAF units are leading the way in COIN Opns.

Worked closely in zone with an ESFS that was assigned to my Infantry Battalion in OIF. That ESFS conducted itself very well essentially carrying out a textbook COIN Operation in the area.

Both airpower & ground tactical air elements have a place in our national future.

[120mm]

120mm: I found your last three sentences quite humorous in their rather sophomoric attempt at framing the rules of a debate. Let me see if I get this straight. I read criticism of my branch of the service and by rising in its defense I validate it? I guess I should saying nothing? But then this simply validates it as well. Silence is acquiescence. Sorry, but it doesn't work that way. Of course, those three sentences could simply make you feel better about your argument. In my experience, statements such as these come from a position backed by emotion and feeling rather than facts. It's akin to the argument in political circles right now that if you criticize anything about the war, you're unpatriotic or somehow providing aid and comfort to the enemy. My comments are based in fact and from having spent a number of years on active duty in two different branches of the service.

Actually, LawVol, I don't know a soldier who will get his hackles up if you criticize the Army. In fact, he'd probably throw out a few of his own in good humor. I can criticize the Navy and Marines, and I get back either good-humored repartee or a throw-away line. In my experience, though, if you criticize the Air Force, Airmen will come out of the walls with a response similar to yours. It wasn't meant to be a "sophomoric attempt" at anything, I was stating it as a "fact". And I am serious about suggesting it has to do with the criticism being to close for comfort. Speaking of sophomoric, you only have to be in a locker room for about 30 seconds before you learn that the guy who takes offense the quickest has something to hide.

To address your "criticisms" specifically:
1) You are absolutely right. I have never seen an officer's club or golf course on an Army base. But what is this? (http://www.theleafchronicle.com/news...on/204061.html) Brace yourself, it seems like the Army has established a golf course in Mosul. I wonder where the money came from? I think all branches waste money. Sure, I'd like to stop it and if you have a solution, let's hear it. It would certainly be more constructive than picking and choosing the facts.

The problem being, the Air Force has done it from it's inception, and as a modus operandi. Hell, some pretty senior AF officers have gone on record joking about it. I would be willing to bet that the "golf course" was done by soldiers on their own spare time and for little or no funds expended.

2) Ahh, leadership, the sin qua non for any argument disparaging the USAF. I find it remarkable when I hear this argument from people who haven’t actually served in the USAF. Just as my time as an Army-brat doesn't give me any special insight into the leadership qualities within the Army, neither does the fact that you have an uncle retired from the USAF give you any special insight on the USAF as a whole. I've never actually heard the flying is leadership comment (perhaps it has the same mythic qualities as the GPS comment from the same post). However, I would say two things. First, it apparently came from a new lieutenant. Enough said I think. Second, there are leadership roles within a flying squadron and those pilots are responsible for their plane and others. Every mission has a lead. Maybe it’s similar with tanks? I don't know, I wouldn't presume to make such an unequivocal statement since I've never driven a tank (I assume you've never flown an F16?).

I work with the victims of AF "leadership" every day. The AF enlisted men I know are of two flavors. Those that are completely pissed off by some stupid #### that their "leadership" has done to them, and those who aren't very bright.

3) I'm not a personnel guy but I do know that some of these volunteers are trying to get in to career fields that are already overmanned or in danger of being so. Besides this is driven by funding issues (or maybe we built an extra golf course).

These are two sets of personnel trying to get into the same "shortage" career field. One guy WANTS to be a widget gobber, but cannot (though he is perfectly qualified) and the other guy DOESN'T WANT to be a widget gobber, but is being FORCED to become one. And for some insane reason, they just can't swap....

4) There is a deference to the checklist, I'll give you that (see I can admit problematic issues with the USAF; I don't see my branch as perfect like some apparently think theirs is). However, it isn't as prevalent as some think. We're working it. We're being forced to because the current threat isn't what we're normally geared to.

5) There is some truth here. USAF leadership (read pilots) views the world through an airpower-centric lens. It's what they know and what they are comfortable with. Other branches are just as guilty. The older guys see airpower as solely lethal and try to make the fight fit the capability rather than adapting your capabilities (or uses of those capabilities) to the fight. Some of the younger generation are moving away from this (I've actually written on this (January issue of Armed Force Journal)). The over-reliance on lethal power, however, isn't confined to the USAF. I've read a little about the perceived over-reliance on lethal power by the 4th ID in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Baghdad. I wasn't there, but I've read it is several places (I think Fiasco mentions this if memory serves). Most of us that frequent this site realize the hearts and minds aspect of COIN, but that is not shared by a great number of people in all branches of the US military. So I guess some house cleaning is due everywhere.

But especially for the service with the history of expending the most and getting the least in return.

[Steve Blair]

Before we get too deep here, keep one thing in mind: reliance on firepower is an American military tradition going back many years. It's not any more exclusive to the Army than it is the Air Force. I did read your article, LawVol, and found it very well-informed. The problems I see deal with the overall AF cultural mindset that tends to keep the sorts of changes you discuss locked down tight and subordinated to a "bigger picture" that may or may not be relevant to the real world picture.

If you haven't read them, I'd strongly suggest you pick up Tilford's "Setup" and "The 11 Days of Christmas" by Michel. Both give an interesting insight into the mindset I'm talking about. Both are also written by former AF officers.

[Bill Moore]

I love a good debate, and although you may have felt some of my statements were shot below the belt, they are based on years of working with the Air Force in varying capacities, so they are not unfounded. I could list tens of examples, but won't unless challenged again. I would argue that the Air Force has a serious perception problem they need to work on; however, when your recruiting incentive is based on we're more a corporation than a military service (my words, not the Air Force's, but in short it is quality of life, what can the Air Force do for me, etc.), then you have a hard time selling the point that the Air Force has a warrior culture. There is always a danger when you speak in generalities, because like everyone else in this council I have worked with a number of professional Air Force officers and NCOs, and even commented in a previous post on the unsung heros flying the wings off the C17s (probably receive minimal recognition in the Air Force) to support the war effort. You have seen numerous posts from soldiers and marines here, and I'm sure you have heard complaints elsewhere, and generally where there is smoke there is fire, maybe not as bad as the smoke would indicate, but none the less there is some fire.

If the Air Force is looking for ways to contribute to small wars I would love to discuss it, but as you may recall (I need to find the article), a high ranking Air Force officer went on record shortly after the initial phase of the Afghanistan conflict ended, stating the Air Force won the war? First off we're a long ways from winning that war, second the Air Force played a critical role in breaking the back of the conventional Taliban forces, so the Northern Alliance to take the ground, and eventually push their conventional forces out of Afghanistan, but it was a "joint/interagency/multinational effort", so to further state that the only thing Special Forces did was provide security for the Air Force's TAC P's is simply silly. If that came from a drunk Air Force junior enlisted guy I could understand it, but coming from a senior officer who represents the culture and values of the Air Force it means something else entirely, and this is exactly what irks so many of us.

I concurred with your comments on projecting out for the defense of U.S. interests in the air and space, and understand it is expensive to maintain the technological edge, and I think the Air Force can provide more than just lift in the support of small wars, but the fire support aspect needs to be more along the lines of A10s, than B1 bombers. We all know in our system that every service needs to make it arguments for their slice of the pie, but they need to logical and honest, not an attempt to rewrite history.

[slapout9]

Law Vol, answer this. Why does the Air Force pass laws to prevent the Army from owning fixed wing aircraft, while the Navy and USMC can have them?
Why is the air force doing everything possible to cut the Army out of the missile business when it was proven beyond any doubt in the 1950's that there is nothing a plane can do that an Army missile can not do better and cheaper and safer. Do you remember Desert Storm when the Air Force could not find or hit the mobile SCUD missiles using 1950's style mobile lauchers? The only place for the Air Force is back under the Army like it used to be and should be.

[Steve Blair]

Again, guys, let's keep this reasonably civil.

We do need a separate air force for a number of reasons, not the least is preserving the capability to provide hard-hitting deep strike (such as that provided by manned bombers and ICMBs with conventional warheads). I also like the idea of having a service with the full-time job of dealing with air superiority. That said, we also need a force that can provide real CAS and not just lip service to the concept. We also need a robust airlift capability, which is one of the most under-rated jobs in the AF no matter how much they tout the legacy of the Berlin Airlift.

I think many in the Army command structure feel betrayed by the lack of attention to CAS by the higher levels of the AF, although this was called for by the Key West Agreement. There is also some lingering bad feeling about the lack of tactical airlift. By the same token, the AF has yet to shed the "everyone's against us" mindset that helped them form their own service in the first place.

Perhaps we would be better served if the Navy and Marines got to operate A-10s and the Army was allowed to operate a limited airlift fleet, freeing the AF to focus on air superiority and other concepts that are of more corporate value to them. Of course, this would also lead to the defense budget being adjusted, but you can't have everything.

As I've said before, there are good people in the AF. Many of them. But I'm not sure that they as an organization have left the Cold War or even the legacy of WW2's strategic bombing campaigns. The Army has similar pains, though they are struggling to make changes. Perhaps this is what throws the AF into a darker light. In Vietnam both services refused to change with a deep determination. This time around the Army's actually looking at itself and making changes (possibly not the right ones, but that's a different thread). Perhaps that's part of the problem.

[Steve Blair]

Law Vol, answer this. Why does the Air Force pass laws to prevent the Army from owning fixed wing aircraft, while the Navy and USMC can have them?

This one's pretty simple. The navy refused to give theirs up, and retaining them was part of the deal for them supporting the creation of the AF. Likewise, the Marines managed to keep their aircraft through the same deal, and resisted several attempts before the Korean War to eliminate the Corps altogether.

[slapout9]

By Steve Blair Again, guys, let's keep this reasonably civil.

Steve, Ok I am for declaring civil war against the Air Force.

[LawVol]

You'll never hear me say the AF is perfect. I will welcome any constructive criticism aimed at improving the AF and assisting it in making a better contribution to our security. However, when the discussion turns to unwarranted criticism of the dedication of Airmen in general, I have to say something because that type of critisism is not warranted. After all, aren't we all on the same team? At least that's what I routinely hear when others call an airpower advocate to task for ignoring ground contributions. Although I almost always enjoy a combative debate, I'll follow Bill Moore's example and resist the temptation unless challenged.

Steve Blair hit the nail on the head. Our leadership (and no I don't mean the lone guy in a jet) is stuck in the Cold War mindset. As a result, they view war through that prism and ignore all else. I agree that this is a fault. However, there is a new breed coming along that sees the need for change in AF thinking to meet the challenges of small wars. Just recently a Viper driver told me that he believes airlift plays a more important role than he in small wars. For those that understand the pecking order in the AF flying community, you know this is a huge statement. I've also had these conversations with rated leadership and essentially been told to shut up and color. It'll take time, but we'll get there. Those dedicated junior officers will make sure we do.

The change in mindset that Bill Moore speaks of is beginning to happen. The steps have been small, but at least its in the right direction. We're adding more combat skills training and placing more emphasis of physical training. It's a start.

Bill Moore, I'll take you up on your offer. I've been toying with an idea and your thoughts (as well as anyone else's) would be welcome. I think we can all agree that security is job one in a post-conflict environment and many argue that a constabulary-type force could be what is needed. If such a force had been in place and functioning just prior to the looting after the fall of Baghdad, we might have a different Iraq.

Since the Army and Marines aren't trained in law enforcement, we could adapt Air Force security forces to handle this job. They already have law enforcement training that could be adapted to account for the differences between military and civilian law. This serves at least tworposes: (1) it provides a much needed reduction in the mission for Army and Marines (yes, I realized they are extremely overtasked) and (2) it puts a ifferent face to the indigenous population. Let me explain. As we know, infantry is trained to fight an dwin battles. This often requires maximum firepower downrange. This also creates a mindset that isn't necessarily conducive to the hearts and minds campaign (please don;t read this as a swipe at infantry as it isn't intended). By using AF in a constabulary role, the public sees a different uniform that clearly demonstrates differing roles. While the constabulary force is employed in fighting crime and maintaining law and order, the infantry would be used as backup as needed to handle insurgent groups and to secure the borders against foreign intrusion. I would also augment the constabulary with teams to assist in setting up the court system and try cases. Thus, the law enforcement would initially be done by US military but transition to civilian control as people are trained and ready.

Thsi is a nut shell description. I actually have some other ideas to fill it out, but you get the idea.

[slapout9]

Since the Army and Marines aren't trained in law enforcement, we could adapt Air Force security forces to handle this job. They already have law enforcement training that could be adapted to account for the differences between military and civilian law.

What!!!!! LawVol you never heard of the Military Police or CID? However me and Bubba really like ya for two reasons; you got guts to stand up for your service and you come from Tenn. Which means there is hope for you. Maybe you could one day become an Army helicopter pilot. And for your listening pleasure.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZenN39fP98