jonSlack, thanks for posting. Do you happen to know what happened to the C-123 which was basically a twin engine C-130 seems it would be ideal for this type situation which why it was invented in the first place. My first 4 jumps were from a 123 in 1972. If I remember it also had rocket assisted take for short run ways if needed, it was meant to be a workhorse in 3rd world type environments.
Fairchild C-123 Provider
The C-123 soldiered on into the 1980s, serving with several Air National Guard units, some being fitted with wheel/ski landing gear for use in Arctic conditions.
Today, surplus C-123s are popular with small freight companies throughout the Americas, and a few are even found on the warbird circuit.
I feel like I can't get a break here. I guess we AF guys are damned if we do and damned if we don't.
jonSlack: not [U]just[U] for the sake of getting more involved, but to take up some of the slack. I've read a number of article about the Army being strectched and near the breaking point (not my words), so why not explore ways to help?
Also, I'm not opposed to giving the Army what it needs to get the job done, including fixed-wing assets if necessary. I'm not interested in credit or chest-pounding, I'm just exploring methods of accompliching the mission. If I didn't try to think outside the box, I'd be arguing airpower superiority to groundpower like the airpower zealots do.
slapout9: do you have any more info on this "Air Force Marine Corps" concept? I know the RAF has an infantry regiment, but am unsure of their exact function. Maybe these two things are similar?
--Oh, btw, some of us AF guys are already in a ground role. We call them ILOs (in lieu of). It's guys we send for training to run convoys and not all of them are security forces.
Last edited by LawVol; 02-26-2007 at 02:48 PM.
LawVol, yes I do but a good place to start is with billy mitchell's airpower. It is online at air university, I don't know the link but it should be easy to find. He even talks of non-lethal gas attacks by bombers followed by large para drops to capture cities in tact. I will post more later.
LawVol, I understand what you're trying to do, and in theory and principle it's a great idea. But I'm also looking at it through the lens of the AF's culture and past experiences with small wars.
Lift is a natural fit for the AF, as is CAS. Both areas have been neglected in favor of objectives more in keeping with the institutional culture (in spite of protests by a number of visionary officers). Likewise, they have avoided advisory duties aside from "setting up host nation air forces."
Part of the challenge with AF participation in the ground effort is finding something within their own history that they can use that will not in turn be stretched into something that it is not. This is aimed more at a leadership that often proclaims that the AF is the only service that understands Joint operations and therefore should have control of them all.
I would love to see Security Forces aiding MPs and other organizations in teaching law enforcement techniques and practices, and even providing a rapid reaction force. They do not have a constabulary heritage like elements of the Army and Marine Corps, but that does not mean that they could not be used in a way here. But they would have to "buy in" to the concept and be willing to learn from those that have gone before in terms of tactics and techniques. It may also require some shifts in their basic organization and training.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Misguided arguement
Folks,
This discussion has raged on for a while on this thread, but what is the point. This is not a discussion of air vs ground power it is a discussion of AF vs USA/USMC rice bowls.
Should we not be discussing the need for and interoperatbility of air and ground units? Having been a company commander and FSC calling in JDAM from a B52 I see the validity of precision munitions called by 'precision guided' infantry. Why is this discussion not more about the values and means of intigration of the 4 services, the ability to cross talk and to assist each others missions? There will always be overlap and some conflict in rice bowl type issues yet this arguement should focus more on ways to balance the forces.
The 4 services exist, they have assigned missions. The question is what of those missions need to change to face emerging threats? How much airpower and how much ground? What new concepts can be adapted?
A constabulary force is a good idea, but who wants to pay for it, to recruit it and man it? Is it a realistic goal?
If you follow this thread you'd notice reference to the AF having no real recruiting issues, how would that change (and it would) if they suddenly starting selling an infantry force? This is not AF bashing it is a legit question. How many current blue suits would be willing to lateral move into this new job? I know that when the AF was overmanned by nearly 30k a few years back and the offer of lateral moves to the Army was sent out not many took advantage despite large $ bonuses offered. Again this isn't a slam on the AF it is just that people join the AF for different reasons (excluding Patriotism, Pride and Selfless Service which all services share) than they join the Army, Navy and Marines.
All I am saying is that this parochial argument about who should own what space is not productive, not here anyway. That is a political issue more than anything. We should focus on more tangible arguements, once we can discuss how to fight in new and better ways then we should go back and look at what institutions should be altered, ammended etc. This may sound naive to some but if we are truly trying to find better ways of engaging our common enemy we need to focus on combined arms and balanced attacks.
-T
T: There has been some discussion of what you mention, and I'm sure there will be more to follow. But the question of interoperability often does come down to politics, especially when systems needed for such interoperability do not exist in the needed quantities (airlift springs to mind first here). It's hard to provide mission assist when the assets needed for same do not exist.
I also suspect you will have some difficulty with the emerging threats idea. The U.S. as a whole has never been very good at identifying these. Depending on who you ask you will hear China, Radicalized Islam, Chavez, narco-terrorism...the list goes on. Often the identification of these threats is influenced by politics (either related to budgets or system development).
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
how do air and ground power tackle these issues?
Absolutely true, the issue of threat is often seen in the eyes of the beholder.Originally Posted by Steve Blair
Nice segue: All of these threats require different approaches, each approach has a different human skill, technology and budgetary constraint. Which are interelated-which ones can have dual/multi-purpose tools? Which ones stand alone, with limited interoperability? What constraints do we impose upon ourselves when it comes to utilizing and integrating air and ground forces?
Guderian and Degaulle argued for their favorite platform as did Billy Mitchell. So too the Pete Ellis types for Amphib Ops and the Para-Marines and Commando-Raider crowds. The competition for dollars has always driven the debates. However, the arguments here should not be on who(service) should do what job but what jobs should be done.
-T
Talk
What ever threat we focus on there are still a few constants that everyone will need and we should fund/organize those first. My short list of critical items consists of:
• Providing a common operational picture for Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and NGO players
• Common or federated data architecture.
• Robust and efficient data search capability
• Coordination / restructuring of current organizations to achieve the proper blend of military and civilian capabilities to meet contingency and current operational needs
It is right to learn, even from one's enemies
Ovid
Duuuh Marine Corps
I got it! We should just draft everybody in the Air Force, Army and Navy and put them in the Marine corpsThey must be laughing at us because how long have they had the concept of a combined Air, Land and Sea Force adapted to what ever situation they currently face.
not exactly
Mondor, I see your point and the capabilities you talk about are valid:
BUT, these are internally (all services and gov't orgs as well as NATO etc) focused C4ISR issues not threat based future strategic-operational issues. They are VERY IMPORTANT so dont take this the wrong way. I see them as the difference between Wermacht tanks having radios and French tanks not, it is a battlefield C2 issue.
The debate of Airpower vs Groundpower is esoteric, like the old debate of manuever vs attrition. In war a bit of both are always necessary, we exclude options at our peril. Slapout had it right somewhat with the MAGTF (Marine Air Ground Task Force) concept, but Marines pride is taken in being expeditionary, forcible entry, assault or shock troops, from the sea. While sustained land combat is a skill set it is not the prefered method of employment (look to USMC deployments 7 mos vs USA deployments 12-15 mos).
The Army on the other hand is designed principly for sustained land combat (whatever form it takes). If the Army and AF designed an AGTF it would have to be viewed in this light. Even a constabulary brigade or division can be an AGTF, it is just the mission-purpose and intent would be the driving force for the troop, technology and vehicle mix.
Semper Fi, --T
Although written for a different purpose, Air Rescue Its Blurred Identity. Past, present and future The attached link has some discussion of the officer/NCO disconnect in the Air Force. It also explores very slightly a little bit on the military purpose of using the NCO as a small team tactical leader.
Blair and Troufion are correct when they say that the AF would need to buy it, both at the leadership and individual levels. It would be a tough sell. However, according to an article I read recently, on any given day we have 5000 airmen deployed performing traditionally Army functions. This has hurt our manning as we are still recruiting and retaining personnel.
As for the blue to green program, I don't know what kind of bonuses they are offering now, but when I looked into it they wanted to give me $10k. The AF will give me $40k for four more years. A $30k loss would not play well with my wife.
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