The Never Ending Airpower Versus Groundpower Debate

[slapout9]

Someone needs to get Robinson on SWJ/C!

Absolutely!

[Rank amateur]

The real problem with the air power weenies is there enduring quest to show that air power is an effective political or coercion/influence tool.

Dropping a bomb on Khadafy's kid seemed to change Khadafy's attitude and his political policies.

[William F. Owen]

Dropping a bomb on Khadafy's kid seemed to change Khadafy's attitude and his political policies.

Anomalies do not make a trend, and I submit that the Colonels change of stance can be traced to few more things than the loss of one child.

[Bill Moore]

If you carefully read both articles, it is hard to find a particular item to take issue with. While normally critical of MG Dunlap's articles, this one seemed reasonable (with a couple of exceptions noted below). To me he seemed to be making a defense to pre-empt the Taliban from effectively using their propaganda to ground one of our most effective asymmetrical advantages in this fight.

While none of us like it, there will be times when innocent civilians are killed, just as innocents are frequently killed accidently in ground battles. I think the number of civilian deaths caused by air power combined with bad intelligence is definitely unacceptable and the procedures need to be scrutinized, but to the point of grounding the air assets (which contrary to MG Dunlap's proposal, I doubt that is even seriously being considered).

If you accept the argument that we need to get out and protect the population in the rural areas, that implies numerous small unit outposts (and a logistical nightmare), that on occassion may need fire support to help hold their position. The best fire support for ground troops is generally artillery, but due to range restrictions that won't always be available, so our air assets remain critical.

MG Dunlap's tone, and his inappropriate use of one signal intercept where the Taliban talk about air is typical of his style of chest thumping for air power, and giving it more than its due is provocative, I still found little to debate.

The Chief's response was well written, but we obviously interpreted MG Dunlap's article differently (then again, he obviously has insights on the air force we don't based on where he sat, I can only refer to the article), and in the end he supported the use of air power when "appropriate". Perhaps the issue is defining "appropriate" use of air power in Afghanistan.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

about the kid, the bank, and the cops was spot on. I also took him to task from a different perspective: the analogy to Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh...

Airpower is not the panacea to fighting insurgencies
(Part I)

Charlie Dunlap seems to be the 21stCentury doppelganger of Billy Mitchell and Curtis LeMay combined. His op-eds intone an unvarying paean to the supreme glories of airpower as being the solution to all of America's military issues.

Well, almost.

In his September 17, 2008 op-ed in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution he takes the Taliban to task for their efforts (understandable) to emasculate our vast air power capability by giving it a bad rap in the press. Many of our foes fear our arsenal, and rightly so, thus they will naturally do anything to mitigate its effect. The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) called it “grasping the belt;” when engaged with US forces they tried to establish themselves as close as possible to our troops, knowing that any artillery or close air support called in would be “danger close.”

According to Dunlap the Taliban has begun “frenzied efforts of their propaganda machine” to excoriate the US Air Force and its supposedly indiscriminate use of bombs to kill innocent women and children. He quips that “the Taliban's depraved moral code helps. They shamelessly intermingle with civilians in order to use them as human shields. Their lack of morality also gives them license to falsely allege civilian casualties when they can't orchestrate them.” Dunlap seems to miss the point that they must do that to mitigate our superiority in weaponry. “Unfortunately, the media seems quick to report whatever claim is made.”

Unfortunately the media also reports real civilian casualties, which are often incurred during air strikes. Whether it is 1 or 100, civilian deaths in a COIN campaign only strengthen the insurgents.

While I agree with the point of his overall assessment, Dunlap then backs his argument by making a false analogy in which he equates the Taliban’s strategy to the sieges of Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sahn. An interesting metaphorical usage, considering these were two very conventional battles that albeit were in part lost or won due to airpower, they were also set piece battles in wars which both had strong counterinsurgency aspects and in which the counterinsurgents ultimately lost.

As Paul Harvey would say, here’s the rest of the story:

The genesis of DBP was a year earlier, November 1952, when the French had executed a similar operation at Na San, 150 air miles west-northwest of Hanoi. They established it as a ‘base aéro-terrestre’ to support Operation Lorraine. Giap attacked the camp during two nights but the French were able to successfully defend the post, inflicting heavy casualties upon the Viet Minh battalions. Later the French withdrew the garrison, mostly by airlifting them out.

Giap learned that he needed heavier artillery (he employed mortars and 75mm recoilless rifles at Na San) and that unless he could seize high ground around the post (Na San was on a plateau) he should avoid attacking entrenched camps. The French believed they had found ‘la formule’ for enticing Giap to attack these type posts, whereupon French firepower would annihilate the Viet Minh units.

Operation Castor was Na San writ large. It was launched in November 1953 in the mountainous northwestern region of Tonkin to interdict the Viet Minh LOCs for their offensive in northeastern Laos. The French also were hopeful that they could bring about a battle on their terms, one in which they could bring the full power of their air and artillery against Giap’s main force.

On 20 November the French executed an airborne drop into the valley of Dien Bien Phu, the aim of which was the capture of an old Japanese airstrip. The French set up the DBP ‘base aéro-terrestre’ to serve as an anchor for mobile strike operations against the Viet Minh sanctuary as well as a supply point for GCMA units operating in the mountains (GCMAs were French Special Forces units).

The French expected that Giap’s reaction to this incursion would be to attack the base, where upon, as at Na San, the French would crush him. They believed that the aerial lifeline between Hanoi and DBP would be sufficient to sustain the forces in place.

However, several factors doomed the French strategy at DBP. In the first place the distance between Hanoi and Na San was 150 air miles while the distance between Hanoi and DBP was 180 miles, which meant longer transit times for aircraft. Na San’s airfield was on a plateau with few high points nearby whereas DBP was in a valley, with several dominating high points. In 1952 Giap’s artillery consisted mostly of mortars, recoilless rifles and old Japanese 75mm howitzers. By 1954 the Viet Minh had received from China 105mm howitzers (also the primary artillery piece used by the French) and Soviet 12.7mm and 37mm anti-aircraft guns.

The French were aware of these massive increases in Viet Minh fire power but were confident that their counter battery efforts and air support would quickly neutralize any Viet Minh artillery, which they believed would be easily spotted in their reverse slope positions. This was not to be. At DBP Giap had defied convention by placing his artillery in positions on the forward slopes of the overlooking hills. Plus, he had them placed in positions dug into the slopes from the rear, so only the barrel protruded from the aperture. By not disturbing the foliage the Viet Minh artillery was perfectly hidden from French observation.

The actual “siege” commenced on 13 March 1954 with a massive bombardment of the French positions (the French artillery chief, Col. Piroth, who had assured his leadership that his guns would silence the enemy’s, committed suicide shortly thereafter). In the ensuing weeks the Viet Minh tightened the noose by systematically capturing French hilltop positions. 26 March proved the last day French aircraft could use the airfield, from then on re-supply would be by parachute drops. Viet Minh anti-aircraft fire forced the French transports to drop from higher altitudes (around 600 to 900 feet was most accurate, the new altitude was set at 8,000), thus decreasing the accuracy of the drops. As the perimeter shrank more and more supplies dropped into Viet Minh hands. French attempts at aerial interdiction of the Viet Minh supply lines were no more effective than similar US efforts to interdict the Ho Chi Minh trail a decade later. On 7 May, after 54 days of grueling combat, the garrison was over run.

The defeat broke the French government's will to continue the Indo-China War and peace accords were signed dividing Vietnam into a communist dominated north and a democratic south. The two countries were separated by a "Demilitarized Zone."

Thirteen years later, in the fall/winter of 1967, the PAVN, under Giap's command, began a series of assaults against US Marine positions near the DMZ. By mid-January 1968 the PAVN had several division sized units in the vicinity of the Marine’s airfield at Khe Sanh, located in northwestern South Vietnam, near the DMZ. This was viewed by Gen Westmoreland and others as an attempt to repeat DBP. However, there were those, in particular Marine Corps Gen Krulak, who viewed the operation as an elaborate feint to draw US military attention and resources away from the Tet Offensive, which commenced 1 February.

Unlike DBP, at Khe Sanh the PAVN were successfully repulsed in their attempts to capture the high ground located north and northwest of the main base. Westmorland committed a huge amount of air power to relieve pressure on the Marines, and kept forces ready in I Corps for relief of the post. Giap broke off his attacks after 77 days of combat. Again, while it was an American tactical victory, the strategic result has come under considerable debate.

Yet at Khe Sanh several factors were significantly different from the siege of DBP. Khe Sanh was much closer to supply bases (45 miles versus 180 miles at Dien Bien Phu). At Khe Sanh the Marines held onto the high ground, and their artillery and air support forced the PAVN to position their own artillery at a much greater distance, decreasing their accuracy. At Dien Bien Phu the French artillery (six 105mm howitzer batteries and one battery of four 155mm howitzers plus mortars) were only sporadically effective while the Viet Minh had the advantage of providing nearly direct fire into the French encampment.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

What was airpower’s ultimate contribution to these battles?

At Dien Bien Phu primarily it was logistical. The Viet Minh were careful not to attack the French in broad daylight, choosing instead to attack at dusk and fighting through the night, thus mitigating the effects of French close air support. By employing their anti-aircraft assets closer and closer to the airfield, the Viet Minh shut it down, forcing the French garrison to rely on airdrops. With a shrinking perimeter and drops from higher altitudes fewer supplies reached the French troops, although Giap’s forces certainly benefited from many miss-drops.

At Khe Sahn tactical air was certainly a force multiplier, as was the strategic employment of air strikes against the PAVN supply routes (which the French employed too little effort to at DBP), but the “air bridge” of supplies was also key, and the PAVN were never able to completely shut down the airfield.
Regardless, in both cases, the combat was predominantly infantry fighting hand-to-hand on hilltops around the posts.

So what do the air power lessons of Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh have to do with our present COIN operations in Afghanistan (and Iraq): In my opinion pretty much nothing. Both were battles fought in sparsely populated areas where non-combatant casualties where of no real concern.

Dunlap does correctly discern that the Taliban’s tactics are so designed that “they will achieve a tremendous victory on the battlefield of public opinion.”

Exactly, this is why COIN operations are as much political as they are military. John Paul Vann in Vietnam observed: “This is a political war and it calls for discrimination in killing. The best weapon for killing would be a knife, but I’m afraid we can’t do it that way. The worst is an airplane. The next worse is artillery. Barring a knife, the best is a rifle — you know who you’re killing.”

The Air Force’s contribution to COIN is predominantly in the ISR realm (and logistical) and is certainly invaluable. Tactical air has its use as well, but must be employed very judiciously in order to avoid any non-combatant injuries.

Ultimately, by using examples of set piece battles in arguing his case for airpower’s use in COIN, Dunlap is metaphorically comparing apples to oranges.

[William F. Owen]

Charlie Dunlap seems to be the 21stCentury doppelganger of Billy Mitchell and Curtis LeMay combined. His op-eds intone an unvarying paean to the supreme glories of airpower as being the solution to all of America's military issues.

You're not kidding! - Excellent posts by the way

Air is essential to successful COIN operations. You can't work without it, but that does not mean dropping bombs, or firing any weapon from the air.

Additionally the the USAF is seriously worried by things like GMLRS, GPS guided 155mm, and Army UAVs, dropping 55kg PGMs. All spells bad news for the "into the blue" boys as they become increasingly irrelevant, to the kinetic end of the business.

His idea that "some civilian casualties are acceptable" is just ludicrous, and to my mind means he has fundamentally missed the point. That they may occur, might be unavoidable. That is not the same thing.

John Paul Vann in Vietnam observed: “This is a political war and it calls for discrimination in killing. The best weapon for killing would be a knife, but I’m afraid we can’t do it that way. The worst is an airplane. The next worse is artillery. Barring a knife, the best is a rifle — you know who you’re killing.”

Which is why GP Infantry are the decisive arm across the spectrum of terrain and conflict. The are best enable by a sound approach to combined arms, some of which require the air environment.

[Bill Moore]

William and Umar I agree with what you written up to a point, but given the terrain, rural population, and size of Afghanistan, our requirement is to get riflemen (whatever nationality, preferably Afghani) everywhere that matters (throughout the rural population). It is unrealistic to assume we provide fire support with the King of battle (artillery) throughout the country. Assuming you agree with this, and assuming the Taliban (and other hostile groups) are capable of massing sufficiently to challenge smaller outposts, do you agree we still need airforce bombers/fighters/gunships for firesuppot? At least until we have sufficient ground mounted fire support systems?

Using the air force offensively in a COIN is normally counter productive, it has proven to be counter productive in Afghanistan, but I still think they provide a defensive fire and psychological asset that is valuable (if properly used).

[LawVol]

In reading Robinson's response to Dunlap's op-ed and some of the posts here, I can't help but notice the mischaracterization of Dunlap's words to support a somewhat opposite point of view. Robinson begins his article by suggesting that Dunlap implies that the US should or does target innocent civilians. Others here have posted comments indicating that Dunlap think civilian casualties are acceptable. I fail to see this as a reasonable interpretation of Dunlap's comments and am reminded of the tenor of a presidential campaign rather than a serious debate on the efficacy of airpower in a COIN environment.

"We can never forget that every civilian death is heartbreaking." "No force in the history of warfare has ever worked harder or spent more time and resources to limit civilian casualties than has the U.S. military and its coalition allies." These comments from Dunlap would seem to counsel against targeting of civilians and emphasize the US military's commitment to mitigate such casualties. These comments, however, are ignored. What is apparently pounced upon (here I can only make a guess as to the support Robinson relies upon) is his statement that "so long as they are not excessive under the circumstances, international law tolerates the tragedy of civilian deaths." While some may not like this, it is an accurate statement of international law. However his reference to this being a "tragedy" would indicate that he is not, as some claim, arguing that we should target civilians. He then even provides the justification for this rule of international law by outlining the consequences of prohibiting all attacks where civilians might be killed.

I also didn't read this piece as advocating airpower as the solution to all of America's military issues. He may (or may not) have made such arguments in the past, but this piece doesn't do that. Rather it seems to argue that we should not take airpower completely off the shelf.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Assuming you agree with this, and assuming the Taliban (and other hostile groups) are capable of massing sufficiently to challenge smaller outposts, do you agree we still need airforce bombers/fighters/gunships for firesuppot? At least until we have sufficient ground mounted fire support systems?

Using the air force offensively in a COIN is normally counter productive, it has proven to be counter productive in Afghanistan, but I still think they provide a defensive fire and psychological asset that is valuable (if properly used).

While the USAF's major contribution to COIN lies, IMHO, in the realm of ISR and transportation, there are still valid uses for the offensive use of bombers/fighters/gunships (particularly gunships). The key is the judicious use of these very powerful assets.

It is not so much as to whether the TB, or others, is capable of ‘massing sufficiently to challenge smaller outposts,’ it is. The difficulty is that most insurgents use the Maoist formula of ‘swimming amongst the people’ for protection. That is one of the toughest parts of COIN, separating the wheat from the chaff. When TB or AQ forces are in the "open" (by open meaning we are 100% sure there are only combatants present) then air power needs to be in the ground commander's tool kit, since arty may not be available. This is particularly relevant for SF units since they are often operating far from a firebase.

LawVol: I agree that Dunlap does not advocate the specific targeting of civilians and in this specific op-ed does not offer airpower up as "as the solution to all of America's military issues." However, Dunlap’s op-eds tend to lean well on that side of most of his arguments.

There is no one I know of on this forum that would ever want to take airpower completely off the table. However, whether we mis-drop a bomb, mis-target arty or mortars, or drive through a crowd either shooting indiscriminately or acting menacingly (to the latter I refer primarily to a certain brand of contractor) we are losing credibility in the eyes of the very people we are supposedly protecting.

While ‘winning hearts and minds’ may seem a bit trite and over-used these days, we do greater harm to ourselves through these acts. Dunlap, and his ilk, seem to miss that point. This is a war of ideas…one of the the ideas being our side is the better one and that the locals should be on it. Air power is impersonal at best.

In his latest op-ed Dunlap takes the TB to task for using the equivalent of ‘human shields’ to protect themselves from our airpower (and artillery as well). That comes under ‘no s**t.’ If I was in the same situation, confronted with a nation who’s ability to rain fire and death down upon me almost at will, I would probably do the exact same thing. All the more reason to be as exceptionally careful as possible when having a very large piece of ordnance dropped on people.

[Entropy]

I think I'm with Bill and Lawvol for the most part on this one. I don't agree with a lot of what Gen. Dunlap has said in the past, and especially don't agree with the way he said it, but in this case I don't find a whole lot objectionable.

I like to go to the Vanity Fair article on the Korengal Valley from earlier this year because it gives an accurate picture, IMO, of the kinetic airpower issue in Afghanistan. Some relevant quotes:

Around the same time as the checkpoint shooting, coalition air strikes killed seven Afghan children at a mosque compound in the southeastern part of the country. Reaction was predictably outraged, but almost lost in the outcry was the testimony of survivors. They allegedly told coalition forces that before the air strike al-Qaeda fighters in the area—who undoubtedly knew they were going to be bombed—had beaten the children to prevent them from leaving.

“We had surveillance on the compound all day,” a nato spokesman explained. “We saw no indication there were children inside.”

ISTM this is the kind of thing Gen. Dunlap is really addressing in his latest article. And speaking of that checkpoint shooting, there is this:

American forces are far more sensitive to humanitarian concerns than the Russians were—and far more welcomed—but they still make awful mistakes. In June, jumpy American soldiers in Korengal shot into a truck full of young men who had refused to stop at a local checkpoint, killing several. The soldiers said they thought they were about to be attacked; the survivors said they had been confused about what to do. Both sides were probably telling the truth....According to Colonel Ostlund, there was a possibility that the Taliban had paid the driver of the truck to not stop at the checkpoint when ordered to. By the colonel’s reasoning, the Taliban would win a strategic victory no matter what: either they would find out how close they could get a truck bomb to an American checkpoint, or there would be civilian casualties that they could exploit.

Air strikes that kill civilians seem to get all the press back here in the states, but the problem of civilian causalities is certainly not confined to that realm. Robinson's point about discernment and discrimination do not apply solely to air forces.

An equally good and relevant article is about the same unit from about the same time and the whole basis of the article was an attempt to explain an increase in air strikes in Afghanistan. I'm not going to quote it because the entire thing deserves a read or a re-read. It's simply the best article I've yet seen on how kinetic air power is used in Afghanistan and how simplistic statements that "air power is good" or "air power is bad" paint over the complexities of the conflict. The VAST majority of kinetic air power is CAS or other fires in direct support of the ground forces who are in contact with enemy forces. Strikes that are completely independent of the ground element are exceedingly rare. Even in the latest incident in Azziband in western Afghanistan (which killed between 7 and 90 civilians depending on who you believe) the air strike was in coordination and support of a SOF ground force who supposedly had adequately surveilled the target.

I might therefore suggest that the problem of air strikes killing civilians is not a problem itself but a symptom of a different problem. Calls for reducing or eliminating kinetic air power as a tool may assuage the symptom but will not eliminate the root problem. The problem is, depending on who you ask, variously, lack of adequate ground forces, risk-aversion, poor intelligence, etc. Are those the real problems and, if so, what's the alternative?

Here's a simplistic assessment of how I see things: As an airman who's been to Afghanistan, from my perspective it's the the ground forces in theater that want air strikes since it's the ground force that has laid out the requirements for air assets to be on station in X amount of time with a Y capable ordnance package. It's that same ground force that authorizes the actual strikes (and then there is the huge amount of Apache gunship support that too often goes unrecognized - those guys and gals do some amazing work). Then I come here and read from the ground experts how bad air strikes are and get to read John Paul Vann quoted for the umpteenth time. To me, there appears to be a disconnect within the ground forces about what you want the air forces to do. So again, what's the alternative? We're simply not going to the kind of ground force increases that we'd all probably like - forces that would have allowed us to quickly MOUT or cordon Azzizabad in a timely manner, for example. Intelligence is always going to be a problem.

Umar says we need to be "exceptionally careful." Well, great, but that assumes that we are not being exceptionally careful now and regardless, how does "exceptionally careful" translate into TTP's or alternatives? I mean the air forces in theater are so sensitive on this topic that they've actually, on occasion, overridden orders to drop from the local ground force commander because of collateral damage concerns. But that is rare - the air component should not be in the business of constantly second-guessing requests for support from the men who are fighting and dying on the ground. But as an airmen the issue is both confused and sensitive because when an air strike goes wrong it's the air forces that get the blame when all we're doing, in the end, is providing a requested service and trying to help our brothers and sisters on the ground.

Wilf,

Additionally the the USAF is seriously worried by things like GMLRS, GPS guided 155mm, and Army UAVs, dropping 55kg PGMs. All spells bad news for the "into the blue" boys as they become increasingly irrelevant, to the kinetic end of the business.

I'm going to raise the BS flag on this one and ask you to provide one shred of evidence to support that assertion. Most people I know in the Air Force wonder what has taken the Army so long to get with the precision program. Most people I know in the Air Force wonder why it took the Army almost 11 years to get the GPS 155 into the field. Most people I know in the Air Force understand that artillery and kinetic air power are complimentary. Most people I know in the Air Force are not worried in the least about Army precision munitions (increased arty precision does not negate its mobility range and logistical limitations), but maybe you can explain why they are and provide some evidence.

[William F. Owen]

I'm going to raise the BS flag on this one and ask you to provide one shred of evidence to support that assertion. Most people I know in the Air Force wonder what has taken the Army so long to get with the precision program. Most people I know in the Air Force wonder why it took the Army almost 11 years to get the GPS 155 into the field. Most people I know in the Air Force understand that artillery and kinetic air power are complimentary. Most people I know in the Air Force are not worried in the least about Army precision munitions (increased arty precision does not negate its mobility range and logistical limitations), but maybe you can explain why they are and provide some evidence.

Raise away. What you say may well apply to most people you know. This was not intended as a categoric statement, and is not just my view but the view of several US Army officers, I know and meet in the course of my job. I submit, that the logic stands in the absence of evidence. I am talking about COIN and not Combat operations.

GMLRS and GPS-155 can do things that previously required air power. I understand that CAS and Indirect fire should be complementary. Yes, CAS has the range the logistic autonomy. I suggest that rational and sensible application of mature technologies is shifting the emphasis.

I think the USAF is aware of that and maybe hoping to re-emphasise their role in the kinetic side of life of CLOSE Support, where their real and required utility is in in things non-kinetic - transport, ISTAR, and Comms.

I do not think it far fetched to suggest that the USAFs proselytising of air power, can force them to threats where no such threat should exist. - and if the USAF tell me that they are in no way concerned, about the rise of surface to surface tactical PGMs, forgive me for remaining sceptical.

[Entropy]

I submit, that the logic stands in the absence of evidence.

Really? Then try this slightly amended logical argument on for size:

"Additionally the the Army is seriously worried by things like SDB, GBU-49, and USAF UAVs, dropping all kinds of PGMs. All spells bad news for the "Army Strong" artillery boys as they become increasingly irrelevant, to the kinetic end of the business."

Logic without evidence rarely results in a valid assertion. The argument above is as equally flawed as the original.

[reed11b]

Really? Then try this slightly amended logical argument on for size:

"Additionally the the Army is seriously worried by things like SDB, GBU-49, and USAF UAVs, dropping all kinds of PGMs. All spells bad news for the "Army Strong" artillery boys as they become increasingly irrelevant, to the kinetic end of the business."

Logic without evidence rarely results in a valid assertion. The argument above is as equally flawed as the original.

What your (in bad taste) revision of Wilf's quote fails to acvknowledge is that COIN fighting can be done without aircraft, but not the other way around. Defensive snarling does not a good counter-argument make either.
Reed

[Entropy]

What your (in bad taste) revision of Wilf's quote fails to acvknowledge is that COIN fighting can be done without aircraft, but not the other way around. Defensive snarling does not a good counter-argument make either.
Reed

Didn't mean at all to come across as snarling (I did put a wink in there!), though I admit that in my lengthy post last night I was defensive and in a sour mood. In general, I do not like arguments that boil down to service parochialism unless they have some measure of substance behind them. Being based largely on perception, they are too easy to make and my alteration of Wilf's original comment was meant to demonstrate that. How can Wilf or some Army officers possibly know that the Air Force is "worried" about Army PGM's? Without any evidence, they can't. In the same way, how can I possibly know or reasonably claim the Army is "worried" about USAF PGM's? I can't. Both arguments, lacking any substance, have an equal measure of validity, which is to say hardly any.

Furthermore, what need is there for me to acknowledge that COIN fighting can be done without aircraft when the original comment was about aircraft and artillery in the current conflict? I agree completely that COIN fighting doesn't require aircraft and would add that it doesn't require artillery or a lot of other things either. Or rather, those things are unnecessary in theory, but not in actual practice in Iraq and Afghanistan.

[William F. Owen]

Being based largely on perception, they are too easy to make and my alteration of Wilf's original comment was meant to demonstrate that. How can Wilf or some Army officers possibly know that the Air Force is "worried" about Army PGM's? Without any evidence, they can't. In the same way, how can I possibly know or reasonably claim the Army is "worried" about USAF PGM's? I can't. Both arguments, lacking any substance, have an equal measure of validity, which is to say hardly any.

My original post may have lacked the necessary level of semantic precision to usefully present my hypothesis, thus it was legitimately challenged.

I don't "know" that the USAF is "worried" about the Army's increasing level of autonomy when it comes to close supporting precision fires. I don't "know" that they are worried about a lack of competent peer competitor air threats, but I suspect that want to the wider world to realise they exist, and thus the F-22 is required.

The majority of the USAF's advocacy of "air power" has been based on demonstrating it's relevance and importance. Anytime that this relevance is challenged, it seems to cause to concern, and thus generate literature reinforcing their position.

[reed11b]

I would argue that one can imply the AF's concern over legitamcy based on there increase in non-recruiting based PR advertisment. Anyone rember the Chinese Sat killer commercial? Also completly mis-leading. AF PR is starting to approach the MC's in size and scope. Unlike the the AF, however, the MC is a very small organization that has always needed to fight for it's existance.
Reed

[Entropy]

The majority of the USAF's advocacy of "air power" has been based on demonstrating it's relevance and importance.

So your position, if I'm interpreting correctly, is that USAF air power advocacy is mainly for the purpose justifying service "relevance and importance" and not, say, an honest difference of opinion about the effective use of military force in defense of the US and its interests? That would imply, ISTM, that the USAF is acting in an intentionally dishonest manner - I therefore hope that my reading is incorrect.

Anytime that this relevance is challenged, it seems to cause to concern, and thus generate literature reinforcing their position.

What would one expect when relevance is challenged? You recently wrote an excellent article on MW which seemed to generate "literature" by MW advocates. It only seems natural that criticisms generate responses. And frankly there's a big difference between legitimate challenging and what often appear to me as thinly disguised arguments that the USAF, as a service, is uniquely expendable (And sometimes, these arguments aren't disguised at all, even thinly).

However, I've said before the USAF has done a poor job of explaining itself and has been too reactionary in responding to criticism. It has done a poor job of responding to legitimate criticism in part because there is so much that isn't legitimate. That's where, IMO, a lot of service defensiveness comes in. Even I, who learned about "air power" in the Navy and who used to laugh at the AF people bitching about deployments, I am surprised at the number of people who seem revel in their disdain for the USAF. I'm surprised at the number of people I encounter or read that really believe the AF should just be "given back" to the Army. So if the AF acts defensive and feels it must legitimize itself more than the other services (possibly even the Marines!), then at least consider there is some basis for it given that there are many who think the service should not exist at all.

I don't "know" that they are worried about a lack of competent peer competitor air threats, but I suspect that want to the wider world to realise they exist, and thus the F-22 is required.

Or maybe their perspective is simply different from yours? Why the need to impugn intent and assume the reason for the F-22 is a desire to want the "wider world to realize they exist." I don't even understand what that means - the AF wants to the world to know they exist?

Getting back to the question of arty vs kinetic air power, here's my take on recent history:

The USAF simply learned the value of precision fires before the Army did. I attribute this mostly to the almost daily air operations over Iraq in the 1990's where precision became important for a variety of reasons - an experience the Navy shared but the Army did not. So when OIF came around, the AF and Navy were ahead of the curve of the artillery people in this department. As a result, air power did supplant artillery in many cases when precision became a critical aspect of fire support. Now the Army has taken on those lessons and the pendulum is swinging back into balance. Artillery can never supplant kinetic air power and neither can kinetic air power supplant artillery, though in specific instances, one will be preferable to another. Neither the Army nor the AF need fear they are losing relevance. Obviously, employment is situation dependent and I think in the case of Afghanistan kinetic air power will continue to play a more prominent role than artillery simply because of the geographic and logistical realities.

Reed11b said:

I would argue that one can imply the AF's concern over legitamcy based on there increase in non-recruiting based PR advertisment. Anyone rember the Chinese Sat killer commercial? Also completly mis-leading. AF PR is starting to approach the MC's in size and scope. Unlike the the AF, however, the MC is a very small organization that has always needed to fight for it's existance.

I'm not sure what your point is here. Advertising is what it is and I'm not sure what metrics one can use to differentiate between recruiting and PR advertisement. My sense is that most ads have some of both.

I'm curious what evidence you are basing your assertion about the scope of AF PR as compared to the MC, or the Army or Navy for that matter?

[Ken White]

So your position, if I'm interpreting correctly, is that USAF air power advocacy is mainly for the purpose justifying service "relevance and importance" and not, say, an honest difference of opinion about the effective use of military force in defense of the US and its interests? That would imply, ISTM, that the USAF is acting in an intentionally dishonest manner - I therefore hope that my reading is incorrect.

Or is it simply an accusation of excessive belief and parochialism as opposed to intentional dishonesty?

The USAF simply learned the value of precision fires before the Army did. I attribute this mostly to the almost daily air operations over Iraq in the 1990's where precision became important for a variety of reasons - an experience the Navy shared but the Army did not. So when OIF came around, the AF and Navy were ahead of the curve of the artillery people in this department.

Need to dig in the history a bit, the Army has been into trying to get precision fire since early in WW II. They got it in the 50s and 60s with a number of missiles; getting that precision with tube Artillery and the acceleration therefrom is infinitely more difficult. There were abortive experiments in the 1950s and the M712 Copperhead started development in the early 60s, took until the 80s to get fielded and it worked great -- but it cost too much (~$500K/rd) -- so the Army developed Excalibur as a cheaper solution.

As a result, air power did supplant artillery in many cases when precision became a critical aspect of fire support. Now the Army has taken on those lessons and the pendulum is swinging back into balance.

Not totally correct, I think -- availability was a BIG factor...

Artillery can never supplant kinetic air power and neither can kinetic air power supplant artillery, though in specific instances, one will be preferable to another. Neither the Army nor the AF need fear they are losing relevance...

True.

I'm not sure what your point is here. Advertising is what it is and I'm not sure what metrics one can use to differentiate between recruiting and PR advertisement. My sense is that most ads have some of both.

I'm curious what evidence you are basing your assertion about the scope of AF PR as compared to the MC, or the Army or Navy for that matter?

True again, all the services are less than brutally honest in their advertising -- including the Army and the Guard and Reserve.

[Entropy]

Interesting thread. Haven't we done this before???

Yes, this is the "neverending" thread after all.

As Rob Thorton said in another thread, "Man - seems like we retake this hill every so often."