The Never Ending Airpower Versus Groundpower Debate

[slapout9]

I still characterize my stint at Airborne school as one of the dumbest things I ever did - I can hear the howls from the ABN community already....

Man that is just low rent

[Tom Odom]

Check the rest of the story. COL Yeager was being a fighter jock, drinking with LTs and CPTs and generally setting a bad example for his subordinates. He was a hero so he couldn't be busted out or passed over for it. So the AF promoted him.

In all fairness, it has not been that long since drinking with the guys was not only acceptable. it was required. That did not change until the early 80s.

I can tell you that a Prop Blast at Fort Bragg or a Friday afternoon happy hour on the Yadkin Road O Club annex was a different world.

Tom

[wm]

In all fairness, it has not been that long since drinking with the guys was not only acceptable. it was required. That did not change until the early 80s.

I can tell you that a Prop Blast at Fort Bragg or a Friday afternoon happy hour on the Yadkin Road O Club annex was a different world.

Tom

OTOH, I can remember being in the O Club in Germany circa 1978-79 and having the Community ADCO (Alcohol and Drug Control Officer) come into the bar at 9:00 PM on a Friday evening and write down the names of everyone still sitting there for a later reporting to the MILCOM commander.

[Tom Odom]

OTOH, I can remember being in the O Club in Germany circa 1978-79 and having the Community ADCO (Alcohol and Drug Control Officer) come into the bar at 9:00 PM on a Friday evening and write down the names of everyone still sitting there for a later reporting to the MILCOM commander.

that was a leg unit

[Ken White]

Check the rest of the story. COL Yeager was being a fighter jock, drinking with LTs and CPTs and generally setting a bad example for his subordinates. He was a hero so he couldn't be busted out or passed over for it. So the AF promoted him.

The fact that he did a good job didn't hurt. As for the drinking with LTs and CPTs -- we can philosophically strongly disagree on that.

Ahhh... The legacy of the WW II AAF, where a screwed up pilot was still a valuable commodity and would probably die on the next mission anyways...

Yes, the AF has issues, but never forget that most of them trace back to Army practices during WWII and the interwar period.

And we can disagree on that. Most of the current AF foibles trace to post 1947, indeed, most to post Viet Nam -- they forgot much of what they learned in WW II.;

[Ken White]

that was a leg unit

[Steve Blair]

Most of the current AF foibles trace to post 1947, indeed, most to post Viet Nam -- they forgot much of what they learned in WW II.;

Gotta second you on this one, Ken. Plus much of the learning they did during WW II was subjective...based primarily on reinforcing the doctrine of strategic bombardment. Stalin's command historians would be proud...

[wm]

that was a leg unit

And damn proud of it too. If it weren't for us legs, the parachute-borne would have nothing to compare themselves to

[wm]

Gotta second you on this one, Ken. Plus much of the learning they did during WW II was subjective...based primarily on reinforcing the doctrine of strategic bombardment. Stalin's command historians would be proud...

Not to disagree, but if the AF issues of today are based on the doctrine of strategic bombing, then why are most of the senior AF leaders fighter jocks?

Seems to me that the real issues started back about 1914. They were significantly enhanced in 1917 by the fact that AEF pilots were trained in combat tactics by the French. BTW, I think I would extend my thesis to the entire US military--we learned a lot of bad habits from our training by the French in WWI and have never really unlearned them. But, that is fodder for a lot of different threads I suspect.

[Steve Blair]

Not to disagree, but if the AF issues of today are based on the doctrine of strategic bombing, then why are most of the senior AF leaders fighter jocks?

Seems to me that the real issues started back about 1914. They were significantly enhanced in 1917 by the fact that AEF pilots were trained in combat tactics by the French. BTW, I think I would extend my thesis to the entire US military--we learned a lot of bad habits from our training by the French in WWI and have never really unlearned them. But, that is fodder for a lot of different threads I suspect.

I didn't say they were based on strategic bombardment...I said that at the end of World War 2 the AF was mainly interested in reinforcing that doctrine. The flip from bomber generals to fighter generals took place in the aftermath of Vietnam...say the mid 1970s or so. That had more to do with the revitalization of TAC during the war than any real conscious change.

Most of our quick training habits actually predate the French and 1914...some have argued that we're still suffering from Root's Industrial-age personnel reforms in the early 1900s. The fact is that the US military has only just recently (as in within the last 50 years or so) started stressing training in a major way. Prior to that the assumption was that training (if there was any) would take place at the assigned unit, not in a centralized location. Odd...but that's how it worked in practice.

[wm]

Most of our quick training habits actually predate the French and 1914

PM sent so as not to hijack the thread.

[johca]

Not to disagree, but if the AF issues of today are based on the doctrine of strategic bombing, then why are most of the senior AF leaders fighter jocks?

There is top AF leadership change in motion.

Air Force's top leaders are fired

Shades of Blue:

..Gates has recommended Michael Donley and Gen. Norton Schwartz to replace Wynne and Moseley,

General Norton Schwartz has a C-130 tactical airlift and special opertions C-130 rated pilot and command and staff of special operations background.

Regarding other post WWII Air Force missions.

There is one in the public domain event in history that is the basis for the novel and movie Ice Station Zebra. Now you know one of the reasons why ARRS C-130s were configured with the Fulton Recovery System.

Reference--To catch a falling star- satellite recovery operations: Film recovery

Spy sat Down

CORONA capsule catcher reminisces

[Van]

I think we are confusing doctrine and culture. Most of my comments have been about the culture of the Air Force, not the doctrine. The Air Force makes an interesting case study, as I have never personally observed, or even heard of an organization whose culture has been so far divorced from its stated doctrine. To add to the fun, there is a huge generational gap between the Cold Warrior senior leadership and the GWOT up-and-coming folks.

The culture of the Air Force was forged in the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell AFB between WWI and WWII, the lessons of WWII, and tempered by SAC through the 1950s and 60s.

The doctrine of the Air Force has been an unending game of catch-up with technological change, and driven by competition for congressional support. Just as the slickest fighter on the planet comes on line (and yes, the F-22 is a very capable weapons system, especially in the air superiority role), most folks are acknowledging that it and the F-35 will probably be the last manned fighters. The Air Force leaderships' rebuttals to the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency manual reflect the competition piece of their doctrine.

The intersection of culture and doctrine produces statements like Airpower's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen.. I'm not gonna get drawn into the argument over the assertion. But if I were to look an AF general in the eye and say "Ground power's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by soldiers", I'd get blown through the door. Any discussion of how ground forces command, logistics, operational art, and tactics has been changed by modern communications and weapons systems would be ignored for the apparent arrogance of the assertion.

Re: the Cold Warrior vs COIN Warrior generation gap; I've seen it personally. The young folk 'get' Joint. Mostly, (there are exceptions, but they are not vocal enough) the older guys don't get Joint. You've got a generation of Captains getting promoted who have never served during peacetime. Northern Watch was certainly combat operations, but just too few of the Air Force were directly involved to really effect the culture. What was important, what got you promoted, and what merited confidence and respect prior to 9/11 is not the same as for the post-9/11 crowd. This isn't just the Air Force, but the gap does appear more pronounced in the AF than in the Army.
I'll go out on a limb and say that the AF future looks pretty bright because of their young warfighters. It's just going to be a little painful getting there.

[Ski]

Unless they continue to slash force structure in order to pay for more expensive operating and procurement costs. Down 40K by 2012 IIRC - to 340K or so overall IIRC.

[Norfolk]

johca wrote:

There is top AF leadership change in motion.

Air Force's top leaders are fired

General Norton Schwartz has a C-130 tactical airlift and special opertions C-130 rated pilot and command and staff of special operations background.

Does this mean that there is a chance that the AF will be able to ditch the Airline uniforms and go back to real Air Force Blues?


Ski wrote:

Unless they continue to slash force structure in order to pay for more expensive operating and procurement costs. Down 40K by 2012 IIRC - to 340K or so overall IIRC.

And with a total planned buy of only some 180 or so F-22s (and maybe 1,200 F-35s for both the attack role and air defence role), it makes you wonder how long even the AF can continue to rationalize such a small Top-Tier Air Superiority force, given the self-cannabilization that necessarily goes with it.

[Entropy]

The doctrine of the Air Force has been an unending game of catch-up with technological change, and driven by competition for congressional support. Just as the slickest fighter on the planet comes on line (and yes, the F-22 is a very capable weapons system, especially in the air superiority role), most folks are acknowledging that it and the F-35 will probably be the last manned fighters. The Air Force leaderships' rebuttals to the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency manual reflect the competition piece of their doctrine.

If the follow-on to the F-22/F-35 begins development in 30 years, maybe. I personally think we'll see unmanned tanks before we see unmanned aircraft personally. There are significant technical challenges in unmanned fighters - a UAV in a permissive environment is one thing, multiple aircraft in a complex, high-speed 3 dimensional air-to-air battle is quite another.

The intersection of culture and doctrine produces statements like Airpower's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen.. I'm not gonna get drawn into the argument over the assertion. But if I were to look an AF general in the eye and say "Ground power's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by soldiers", I'd get blown through the door.

I doubt very much you'd get blown through the door. Do you really think the Air Force believes land forces should be commanded by anyone but an Army or Marine Commander? I think to most in the AF the statement that "Ground power's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by soldiers" is perfectly reasonable and so obvious that it needs no elucidation.

Any discussion of how ground forces command, logistics, operational art, and tactics has been changed by modern communications and weapons systems would be ignored for the apparent arrogance of the assertion.

On the contrary. The AF is a technology-based service. It understands the advantages of technology perfectly well and has adopted a lot of technology the ground force uses like BFT and COP.

Re: the Cold Warrior vs COIN Warrior generation gap; I've seen it personally. The young folk 'get' Joint. Mostly, (there are exceptions, but they are not vocal enough) the older guys don't get Joint. You've got a generation of Captains getting promoted who have never served during peacetime. Northern Watch was certainly combat operations, but just too few of the Air Force were directly involved to really effect the culture. What was important, what got you promoted, and what merited confidence and respect prior to 9/11 is not the same as for the post-9/11 crowd. This isn't just the Air Force, but the gap does appear more pronounced in the AF than in the Army.

I disagree that the gap is more pronounced in the AF. I'm not sure how many AF personnel served in OSW and ONW doing limited combat ops, but I'm sure it was more than the Army. Those rotations were the impetus for the Air Force move to an expeditionary deployment model similar to the Navy/Marine corps.

I was in the Navy in the 1990's and I remember many in the AF b!tching loudly about "grueling" three month rotations - all the while I was doing 6 month rotations about every 18 months. Us Navy guys got a laugh out of that. Sometime in the late 1990's the AF finally got over that garrison mentality and is now a fully expeditionary force.

[Entropy]

Although written for a different purpose, Air Rescue Its Blurred Identity. Past, present and future The attached link has some discussion of the officer/NCO disconnect in the Air Force. It also explores very slightly a little bit on the military purpose of using the NCO as a small team tactical leader.

An interesting paper for me as one just leaving the rescue community after five years. I agree about the limitations of the HH-60G, having deployed with them to Afghanistan. I'd be interested in your take on which airframe you prefer for the next PRV. FWIW, most in my former unit prefer the 101 to both the 47 and 92.

I'm not sure I agree with some of your conclusions though. For instance, I'm not sure what airframes PJ's should employ from beyond the ones they currently do. Also, while there is stress on the HH-60 fleet, we do have enough aircraft to perform CSAR for the CFACC in both theaters as well as ILO Medevac for the land component in both theaters (and it's important to note the CFACC birds do medevac too, but only when the land component, for whatever reason, isn't able to accomplish the mission).

Certainly the aircraft are wearing out much faster than anticipated which only heightens the need for a replacement, which is the AF's #2 acquisition priority behind tankers.

[johca]

I'd be interested in your take on which airframe you prefer for the next PRV

Well, I’m not a fan of the V-22 or the HH-60. I’ve got mission aircrew hours on UH-1, H-3, H-53, C-47 and H-60 helicopters. I was awarded an air medal flying a mission on an Army CH-47 and although I have concerns when it's described as a medium lift helicopter and that perhaps its too large, it is very acceptable and suitable in my opinion to replace the HH-60. On the other hand I don’t believe the other two helicopters got fair consideration, so I’m in the wait and see mode.

The PJs should be able to employ from tactical airlift C-130s. I have mission time to include RSOLL and SOLL I/II missions flying HC-130s, tactical airlift C-130s and C-141s. My opinion is driven in regards to helicopters by the lack of numbers in the inventory and pertinent to the HC-130 in that a flying gas stations primary purpose to air refuel helicopters out weighs risking the limited numbers and high cost of replacing a tanker used to insert a PJ team in a combat threat area. The tactical C-130 or other types of smaller fixed wings make better sense from a risk management and any cost of replacement assessment. Rapid manuever of fuel laden HC-130 tanker puts a lot of stress on wings and other airframe stress points. The numbers in the fleet are such that loss significantly impairs air refueling capability. Putting one at risk to employ a PJ team by parachute into a combat threat location is silly in my opinion.

Prior to 1989 Air Rescue units were called upon to do many special missions. One such mission becoming more openly disclosed in the public internet domain--but not in the paper I wrote and posted--is a event in history that is the basis for the novel and movie Ice Station Zebra. Now you know one of the reasons why ARRS C-130s were configured with the Fulton Recovery System. BTW--the gain of HH-53 in-air-fuelable helicopters in the inventory is what took the Fulton system out of being a first choice recovery method. Also the organizational name change from Air Rescue Service to Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service.

Reference--To catch a falling star- satellite recovery operations: Film recovery

Spy sat Down

CORONA capsule catcher reminisces

Here is part of the USAF Pararescue enlisted speciality classification description from the 2008 AFECD.

PARARESCUE
(Changed 1 Jul 06)

1. Specialty Summary. Performs, plans, leads, supervises, instructs, and evaluates pararescue activities. Performs as the essential surface, air link in Personnel Recovery (PR) and materiel recovery by functioning as the rescue and recovery specialist on flying status as mission crew or as surface elements. Provides rapid response capability and operates in the six geographic disciplines: mountain, desert, arctic, urban, jungle and water, day or night, to include friendly, denied, hostile, or sensitive areas. Provides assistance in and performs survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE). Provides emergency trauma and field medical care, and security. Moves recovered personnel and materiel to safety or friendly control when recovery by aircraft is not possible. Related DoD Occupational Subgroup: 105000.

[Van]

I think to most in the AF the statement that "Ground power's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by soldiers" is perfectly reasonable and so obvious that it needs no elucidation.

Entropy, I'm not buying it. I do not believe that the AF folks who populate ACC and the AOCs would tolerate the arrogant tone of the statement, and I tried it out on an AF officer last night, and was dismissed out of hand. After ten minutes of discussion, it was allowed that perhaps the ground fight, especially in urban environments is as complex as the aerospace fight. And it was the arrogance of the tone of the assertion rather than the content that was the issue.

And where is the line? More than half of the time, airpower will eventually end up under a non-pilot at some echelon. So all air combat operations should be controlled by ACC at Langley AFB, or can the AF live with the soldier commanding MNC-I controlling a slice of air power?

I understand the need for a central ATO, I understand but loathe the reasons behind the limits on the timeliness and flexibility of the ATO process, but this all goes back to underlying issues of culture versus doctrine (and I am well aware of many of the flaws in Army culture and doctrine - most seem to go back to the inherent [and somewhat justifiable] conservatism of ground troops).

[Steve Blair]

I was in the Navy in the 1990's and I remember many in the AF b!tching loudly about "grueling" three month rotations - all the while I was doing 6 month rotations about every 18 months. Us Navy guys got a laugh out of that. Sometime in the late 1990's the AF finally got over that garrison mentality and is now a fully expeditionary force.

Actually, from what I've seen, the 'expeditionary' element of the AF is still pretty much the same high demand, low density units that have always been hit hard by these things (A-10s, AWACS, certain support segments, and transport aircraft). Sure there's been a great deal of talk about the AEF concept, but it still doesn't work right. And they still bitch about 6 month deployments like it's something they never expected to do. Having worked around the Army, it's a thing about the AF that I still haven't re-adjusted to. I guess, to borrow one of Jill's lines from another thread, I haven't drunk the Kool-Aid yet.

The biggest issue I've seen with the AF culture is that to make it past a certain point you really need to swill down the Kool-Aid and say things like "airpower can win a counterinsurgency on its own." Even though I'm tired of having to say it, I'll say it again: there is some amazing thinking and questioning going on at the lower and middle ranks of the AF. But it seems that if you want to make it to (and past) O-6 you have to drink that air supremacy Kool-Aid. I'm hopeful that will change as the combat and joint experience of the AF becomes broader, but even one of their own (who most likely has been banished to Thule by now) came out and said in a letter to editor in Air Force Magazine that the AF wasn't doing near enough to prepare its general officers for higher command positions because they weren't doing enough joint assignments (it's in the June 08 issue...by a colonel at Maxwell in response to an article here that claimed there was a shadowy conspiracy to keep AF generals out of senior positions...don't have an online link at this time). In the same issue, of course, there's an editorial slamming SecDef Gates....