Keys to a Successful Surge

[SWJED]

Keys to a Successful Surge - Max Boot, LA Times.

While politicians debate whether more U.S. troops should be sent to Iraq, just as important is how those troops will be utilized. In the Boer War, a "surge" of soldiers helped. In the Vietnam War, it didn't. The difference is that the British had a sounder strategy. I

n formulating the right strategy, there is no better guide than a slim 1964 volume, "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice." Its author was a French officer named David Galula, who saw service not only in World War II but in postwar China, Greece, Hong Kong and Algeria. If there is a Clausewitz of counterinsurgency, Galula is it.

Although much has changed in recent decades, most of his admonitions still apply, which is why so many are echoed in the new Army-Marine counterinsurgency field manual. U.S. forces have gotten better at this demanding type of warfare in Iraq, but even now they're still falling short, often through no fault of their own, in carrying out many of Galula's key precepts...

Much more at the link...

[bismark17]

Thanks for posting this! This is a great post with something to say about even our own "justice" system. Max Boot is becoming a must read in this arena.

[Mike in Hilo]

Concur this is an excellent piece....The less than relevant VN reference could have been left out of the argument, especially since it is not exactly accurate:--A troop surge in Viet Nam didn't help? Really?--Then who decimated those VC main force units and PAVN divisions 1968-69, thereby giving pacification even a modest chance? Problem was, of course, this sine qua non merely "helped."

Boot's point about an ally reluctant to lock up the bad guys sadly rings a bell from the old CORDS days, when, as advisers with limited leverage, we never did manage to get our counterparts' wholehearted commitment to Phoenix, the program to neutralize the VC infrastructure...

Cheers,
Mike.

[slapout9]

Agree with Bizmark and Mike it's just like clearing an area and not being able to hold it. It dosen't do anything in the long run and if you lock people up one day and let them out the next it will not do anything in the long run.

[Jedburgh]

....another look at the "surge". I missed this one when it first came out a couple of weeks ago. This is a pdf copy of Andrew Krepinevich's presentation to the Senate staff on 28 Feb 07:

The "New" COIN Doctrine and the Baghdad Surge: Formual for Success?

I'll just pluck out his conclusions:

...
• FM 3-24 provides a classic method of coping effectively with insurgency—the Roman Model is ruled out, yet it’s not clear the “classic” model prescribed here can work for the US, either

• The history of US COIN in Iraq is characterized by a number of significant failures to follow the doctrine prescribed in FM 3-24

• Particularly worrisome is the sluggish pace of adaptation—in some critical aspects, the war is still being conducted on a “business-as-usual” approach

• The Surge—originally proposed in 2005—might have worked in 2004; barring exceptional leadership and more than a little luck, it’s is perhaps the last, best hope to turn things around, but it is far more of a long shot than it need have been

• The Surge confronts two critical—and perhaps insurmountable—barriers to success: Uncertain support from the Iraqi government and its security forces; and demands on the Home Front for quick results in a war that is protracted in nature

• We have not worked through the consequences of “Plan C” (Withdrawal); nor have we developed a way for dealing with these kinds of conflicts in the future...

[Old Eagle]

Andy made a presentation at a recent conference I attended and, as usual, was very persuasive.

When commentators, in any forum but particularly in the media and in politics, talk about "the surge" they do disservice to the COIN operation now being executed in Iraq. It's not about the numbers, it's about winning the COIN fight over time. By focusing on the numbers, detractors develop a target that can be exploited in public opinion. That allows them to duck the bigger COIN issues that they will never grasp. Unfortunately, as Andy points out, there are major issues over which we have limited control, the biggest being the the competency and commitment of the central government in Baghdad.