...because he states his strategy in his Posture Statement to Congress not in terms of a "future picture" but as an "evolving posturing of forces" that is realtionship-centric:
The "future picture" strategy applies to situations akin to chess, where you are competing with an opponent to create a particluar endstate (the king being checkmated) it does not apply to Go where a player trying to achieve a predetermined end state will always lose to a competent player that works to maximize his shi or the potential opportunity implicit in his arrangement of stones (forces) and act upon those opportunities when it is most benficial, not in accordance with a particular timetable or to achieve "victory" in a particular area of the board.USPACOM thus embraces a theater strategy that leverages an evolving force posture. In concert with other government agencies, this posture is designed to simultaneously hedge against traditional and asymmetric challenges as well as advance alliance and partner-nation relationships. Extensive analyses clearly indicate a need to build an integrated posture framework that prioritizes adjustments by maximizing strength, balancing and biasing disposition, and sustaining readiness in all sub-regions (Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania).
Col Warden does not look at war as a game of Go, which is very dangerous as that is the game or primary adversary in the Pacific invented. Thankfully, Adm Willard appears to understand this.
Or is he falling victim to outdated thinking? Should he be stating what we want the Pacific security picture ot look like in the future and work back from it? Should he decide what that future picture might be? Can anybody or any group? If we can't state a desired future picture for a region like the Pacific, where does that leave the Warden strategic mandate?
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