A well presented set of options.
This I liked:
Western political leaders are paralyzed by three “conventional wisdom” worries:
1. Nothing can be done short of a full-scale repeat occupation of Iraq.
2. Nothing we do can fundamentally change the situation, but simply postpone the inevitable collapse, and
3. Nothing we can do will create a stable, new situation sustainable over time.
Col. Warden insists that none of these assumptions are true.Originally Posted by slapout9
This demonstrates a complete misunderstnding of ISIS and their relationship with the large Sunni insurgency and the Sunni population.First, ISSIS is an extraordinarily vulnerable position from the perspective of a system. Warden analyzes that ISIS is especially susceptible to techniques similar to those used in the 100-hour Desert Storm miracle.
Second, the ISIS army has expanded rapidly across a huge territory. That looks impressive on a map. But it means ISIS is not well-established, dug-in, or supplied. As your author interprets it, ISIS is a mile wide but an inch deep. That makes them especially vulnerable with poor supply lines, communications, connections, and preparation.
Third, ISIS have put themselves into a position which is quite vulnerable, in that they stretch across rocky, barren country and desert. This leaves their forces and military equipment far more exposed than over normal terrain.
He has no actual experience in these matters. In Desert Storm there was no attempt to hold territory or to deal long term with the population or Iraq.
I did not see anything helpful in the article.
"I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."
Jon Osterman/Dr. Manhattan
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There are some valuable parts to Warden's stuff, but his biggest shortcoming is that he sees airpower as capable of doing EVERYTHING on its own and being applicable in every situation...even when it's not. Airpower is his hammer, and every situation is a nail...
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Hilarious.
Might work if everything collapses and we can get ISIS into a stadium to celebrate victory...then JDAM the snot out of it.
In the context of the self imposed limitation of 'no boots on the ground' airpower is all that is available.
In the context of that airpower is indeed everything - being the only option available.
That said, feel free to offer a few ideas for other options you see as being available.
Steve,
I have know idea where this idea about Airpower being everything came from but it is NOT TRUE! He has never said that or written that to my knowledge. What he has said and does believe is that many times because of Political Policy in the USA and the advanced technology we have that Airpower will be the "KEY" force in the exact same sense that the Marine Corps believe in designating a "MAIN EFFORT". Take a look at the PPT he delivered in February this year 2014 down under in a place called Canberra.
Please take a look, is this not an excellent approach to WINNING instead of being a mind slave to some older/foreign/loosing doctrine.
http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/Uplo...esentation.pdf
Slap...most of Warden's doctrinal ideas can be traced directly to the Luftwaffe's doctrine of 1936. He also ignores the fact that airpower cannot control terrain, secure a population, or do any number of other things that may be required for actual winning. Can it buy you space? Sure. Can it be extremely effective if you have proper intelligence (which we often do not)? Again, sure. But Warden seems to feel that kinetic airpower is the solution in any and all places. You really might want to read Colin Gray's "Airpower for Strategic Effect" for a wider context on this.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Steve,
I have read it and if you remember I was the person that found Gray's report and posted the link to the PDF download when it first came out.
1-So from memory Gray also points out that America HAS TO BE A HIGH TECHNOLOGY POWER as it relates to our primary warfare method....does he not point that out in the publication?
2-He also points out that one of the things that Airpower has to do in the future is generate the desired Political effect on the ground by using Airpower.....does he not say that somewhere in the document? That is nothing but restating what Warden has said for years.
3-If you look at the PDF I posted from his (Warden's) presentation in Canberra he states as he has done so for years. First you start with the Peace plan you want, then you develop the War plan you need to accomplish those Political objectives and then and only then do you decide if Airpower can accomplish those desired objectives. He does not say nor has he ever said that Airpower is the only solution.
I concur. Air Power is important within the purview of applying a "Parallel Warfare" strategy to a functioning Nation State with a hostile military establishment. It also plays a vital role in CAS. But ISIS is an amorphous entity prosecuting an "unconventional war" that requires counter unconventional warfare methods along the lines of Internal Defense, COIN, etc. I don't think conventional force, even if it does follow COIN doctrine, should be applied to an unconventional warfare situation. Vietnam proves this out, as do the efforts of the Armed Forces in Iraq, which have been wasted along with many lives of brave men and women. The VC today would be called "Terrorists," not "Freedom Fighters." The terms "terrorist, guerrilla, and irregular" are somewhat interchangeable. I make this point only to say that Unconventional Warfare is more suited to Special Forces, and possibly "Light Fighters" conducting "snatch & grab" ops of Tier One personalities for interrogation supported by good, reliable intelligence collection and information constituting "ACTIONABLE INTEL"; PSYOPS, to include "special effects" and perhaps some VOA involvement; and some unspeakable Black Ops. The GWOT should be prosecuted by covert means with very minimal press coverage. Air Power cannot accomplish these things. This is the only way to root ISIS out and destroy it. The prerequisite however, is a friendly pro-American government in Iraq and a well trained Iraqi Army of mixed ethnic and religious backgrounds willing to defend their country in a common cause.
Last edited by novelist; 07-28-2014 at 03:02 AM.
Curmudgy,
Your kidding right!!
No he doesn't know much about insurgencies and he is not interested in holding somebody else's terrain for which they will fight to the death for.......What he does know alot about is WINNING which is what this country needs to start doing instead of holding territory.
Warden apparently thinks,
.Warden championed and perfected the concept of approaching “the enemy as a system.” Rather than throwing armies against armies and air forces against air forces, Warden’s strategies involve analyzing an enemy’s military forces as parts of a much larger whole. In the Persian Gulf Air Campaign, Warden dismantled the enemy’s ability to function. You can incapacitate the functioning of your opponent from a system standpoint
We have tried this for decades and not once was it successful. It sure as hell didn't defeat Iraq during DESERT STORM, but relentless targeting of their fielded forces, along with a decisive ground assault did. Targeting the C2 and other systems were supporting efforts, and the overall impact of that that targeting is not possible to assess. The results of the highway of death, the ground campaign, all combined with a PSYOP effort resulted in mass capitulation.
That was a conventional fight, and even then a systems approach had questionable effect. The insurgency is not a systems of systems that conforms to linear thinking, it is composed of a think and adapting adversary who has dealt with our air power previously. This approach is simply an attempt to script write, much like the flawed EBO concept, where if we do X, then Y will happen.
On the other hand, can airpower disrupt, maybe even halt ISIS in their tracks? It certainty can if we have the intelligence to effectively direct it. Ultimately if the Iraqi government wants to win they certainly need to take and hold their sovereign territory, that isn't conventional, it is simply common sense. They are a legitimate state if they can't control their territory, and if ISIS is controlling it then they're winning. I think ISIS could handle getting pushed back a little by a combination of air and ground forces. Unless they're stupid they'll adapt a Fabian strategy and avoid a decisive battles and wage a war of attrition, I think we been down this road before. If we expect too much from air power, like winning, we'll once again be very disappointed. On the other hand, we should use our air power to the extent possible to disrupt and degrade ISIS. A win by ISIS is not in our interest.
There is a different solution appearing after the ISIS drove back the massive Iraqi attack on Tikrit to a point 25 kms from Tikrit----even the Samarra relief column is not moving much from the sheer weight of IED strikes on the convoys.
In Der Spiegel from today there is an interview with the senior Chief of Staff for the Iraqi ISIS Response Staff who basically states all three ethnic groups must have their own regions and openly critiques the marginalization of the Sunni's by Malalki and he is a Shia.
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/auslan...-a-978172.html
Better Link To Warden Interview
Here is a much better Youtube link to the radio interview of Colonel Warden that goes along with the above listed article. if you listen closely and are familiar with real systems thinking you will find that what people say Warden says as opposed to what he actually says and means is a alot different.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DjyF...ature=youtu.be
No Slap, not kidding. There is a vast difference between interstate combined arms war and instrastate insurgencies. "Winning" in one forum has little or nothing to do with winning in the other.. Only someone who had not been involved in the fight in Iraq or Afgahanistan over the last decade could think otherwise.
You forget that we made short work of the Iraqi Army in 2003-4, yet could not win in the long run. It is the long fight that matters, not the opening palys of the first quarter, as the Colonel likes to think
Last edited by TheCurmudgeon; 06-30-2014 at 05:37 PM.
"I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."
Jon Osterman/Dr. Manhattan
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An interesting thought from Col Warden.
What he should have added is do a 'Sri Lanka' and all will be Quiet on the Iraq Front.
Devastate the whole place so that they are left picking up the pieces for the rest of their lives and never in a position to trouble anyone.
Of course, the UN is in the pocket and Human Rights Pollyannas are under control, right?!
Hakuna Mata!
Last edited by Ray; 06-30-2014 at 06:47 PM.
Ray, Sri Lanka has one advantage that makes it unique ... it is an island. There is no border sanctuary. Not so with Iraq.
Although, turning the area into a wasteland does have its advantages ...
"I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."
Jon Osterman/Dr. Manhattan
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You Just Made My Point!
Curmudgy,
I don't think you had joined this discussion group at the time so you are probably not familiar with some of Warden's earlier comments that I posted from years ago when this Fiasco first started.
1- when we first went into Iraq he warned that we should be careful about being jubilant to soon because "All we have is a beachhead in the middle of 1 billion undefeated Muslims" turned out to be pretty accurate.
2-I posted a copy of a letter to the editor that wrote warning of the dire consequence that would happen when we decided to disband the Iraqi Army which would leave the entire country in an unstable situation. Again turned our to be pretty accurate.
3-But I agree he probably doesn't think much about the way we are thinking of insurgencies because it is not working! Whether we like it or not the " Enemy Is Still A System" and he is smart enough to know that we are not going to turn the Sunni into Democrats nor the Shia into Republicans and have a nice democracy in the Middle East. What is possible is to use American Airpower to support local Arab Armies to achieve our true interest in the region.
1. I don't think the statistical evidence supports the theory that "airpower alone" is a practical strategy; now if we're looking at producing specific political outcomes then I suppose that, in theory, under some conditions airpower alone could be successful. I'm not aware of any examples of this, however.
2. Is ISIS a 'system' or a 'network'? Does the distinction matter? In a system, you destroy a component or sub-component in order to produce failure in the system as a whole. In a network, if you destroy a component or sub-component, the rest of the network still operates. And there is an argument to be made that any organic organization is not a system, but a network.
3. The problem with ISIS is that it represents a fundemental contradiction in American foreign policy in the Middle East and the difficulty is in deciding which component of our policy should be discarded.
When I am weaker than you, I ask you for freedom because that is according to your principles; when I am stronger than you, I take away your freedom because that is according to my principles. - Louis Veuillot
Responses in order of the questions:
1-Your right on this point. Which is why Warden points out in the PPT that the Peace plan comes first then the War Plan then decide if you need an Air plan or an Army,Navy,Marine plan, etc. However the overthrow of Guatamala in 1954 was accomplished by Airpower and Airpower alone after the Army plan failed, but of course that never happened since it was a CIA Air Force that was used.
2-It is a system and it does matter. Simply attacking a personnel Network(Ring #4 IMO) is not going to get you the results you want, especially in War. This is a point that is often overlooked about Warden's rings, he has always maintained that you need to do something to ALL of the rings as close to Parallel as possible depending on your available resources. Attacking in Parallel hellps with the fact that war is the most unpredictable and dangerous activity that man engages in so it is best not to take chances.
3-I pretty much agree with this one, so has Warden, you can hear part of that in the radio interview when he talks about Left over Wilsonian thinking.Which is reference to President Wilson's "we will make the world safe for democracy speech"
You are correct that I am not familiar with his earlier works. They may sway my opinion, but I doubt it.
The reason we are not "Winning" is because we are incapable of achieving the political objective. See http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/dem...obayashi-maru/. You cannot kill or bomb your way out of an insurgency. It is a political beast from start to finish. Military types don't like to think that all problems cannot be solved with high explosives, so they deride this fact, but they cannot change it.
The prescription he offers is not going to "Win" anything but a longer war. That is the reality. Too many people want simple explanations to complex problems. That has been our problem since 2001. I am sorry, but reality is knocking on the door. It is not a pretty reality. It is not one that can be solved by air power. It is just a dark, ugly reality that humans are the way they are.
The good Colonel seems to forget Clausewitz' maxim that war is merely political policy conducted by other means. Bombing is not going to achieve the political policy objective of a democratic Iraq secure within its traditional borders. We screwed the pooch on that in 2003-4.
There are two ways this plays out. Either 1) we replace the dictator we overthrew with a dictator who is capable of viciously suppressing sectarian differences, or 2) the state of Iraq ceases to be. That is the political reality that we have been fighting against for over ten years. Better targeting or thinking of the enemy as a system are merely better tactics. Tactics alone cannot achieve strategic objectives. They certainly cannot achieve the desired political objectives
Last edited by TheCurmudgeon; 06-30-2014 at 11:38 PM.
"I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."
Jon Osterman/Dr. Manhattan
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