Quote Originally Posted by pvebber View Post
There are several different lines of argument... ...How effectively does Col Warden make his historical case to defend his theory?
The last I will leave to Fuchs, as he has done a bang up job so far
Agree with all but your last line. Warden's historical examples aren't perfect, but Fuchs' aren't much better.

Has COL Warden read Joint doctrine lately?

When required to employ force, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and adversary vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. JP 3-0

Simultaneity is a key characteristic of the American way of war. It refers to the simultaneous application of power against key adversary capabilities and sources of strength. The goal of simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an adversary’s collapse by placing more demands on
adversary forces and functions than can be handled. This does not mean that all elements of the joint force are employed with equal priority or that even all elements of the joint force will be employed. It refers specifically to the concept of attacking appropriate adversary forces and functions in such
a manner as to cause confusion and demoralization.
The COL's desires seem to be esconced in current doctrine, with the exception of attributing exculsivity of action to airpower.
Note the focus on forces in the above paragraphs- that is what Warden is arguing against. Additionally, I would say that joint doctrine is not always (or even often) neccessarily followed. Additionally, the JFC is normally an Army commander, and the Army doctrine is very force centric.

Unconstrained, airpower provides the vehicle to directly achieve strategic ends without the need for other forces.

What if the strategic ends require interpersonal contact between human beings? Say to gain the support of a potential ally? Why can't land or naval forces be positioned so as to take simultaneous action that directly achives stragic ends? This key premise is actually an assumption, as no evidence is provided that it is true, and it is fairly easy to conjecture situations where it is not true. (for example if your desired end state is to enforce a strategy based on interdiction of maritime contraband how does one do board and search of potential interlopers with airpower?)
Again, Warden isn't saying that land or naval power won't work, or can't help- he is saying that airpower can be more effective in many situations. The fact that airpower can work doesn't mean that land or seapower can't.

Strategy is about conceiving a desired endstate, identifying means to achieve it, implementing a course of action, and deciding when you are done.

Again, right out of Joint doctrine.

b. The design and implementation of leverage and the ability to know how and
when to terminate operations are involved in operational art and are discussed in Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations.” Because the nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations or groups, it is
fundamentally important to understand that termination of operations is an essential link between national security strategy, NMS, and end state conditions — the desired outcome. This principle holds true for both war and MOOTW. JP 3-0
I agree, I don't think Warden would argue. He is saying that the language we use tends to drive us to a certain strategy. Your example cited puts the termination or desired outcome at the end... Warden is say

Okay, quibble time- MOOTW is out, your JP 3-0 must be out of date.

From JP 3-0, 17 Sept 2006, (Inc change 1 13 Feb 08), page I-3:

Theater strategy is determined by CCDRs based on analysis of changing events in the operational environment and the development of options to set conditions for success.
Warden argues that strategy should start at ends, then work backwards. The Joint Ops Planning Process starts at the ends and theoretically works backwards. But a few paragraphs after the one you cite we have this:

Commanders strive to end combat operations on terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners. The basic element of this goal is gaining control over the enemy and/or gaining influence over a relevant population.
Warden would say that control drives us to strive for decisive battle to seize control of terrain, when we might be able to achieve our objectives by influencing the enemy's will. Subtle differences, but Warden is saying that attrition and battle are a part of our basic mentality in the US military.

The Army's Military Decision Making Process is similar, although even more force/terrain centric- as it probably should be. The first steps of Course of Action Development are "assess relative combat power", then Generate Options which consists of making COAs...

A good COA can defeat all feasible enemy COAs while accounting for essential stability tasks.
FM 5-0, March 2010, B-14 to B-15

In other words, the COA is developed based on the enemy forces expected actions. Again, the Army tends to drive most joint planning because they are most of the people involved.

Opponents are complicated entities that can be simplified by a systems analysis. (e.g. Five rings model).

Here is where things start to get contentious. The issue is "complicated" vs "Complex".
Agree on that!

When some of the "five rings" anaysis of Gulf War 1 are looked at, the sample centers of gravity (see http://www.venturist.com/Prometheus%...%20Summary.htm) are given as:

Saddam Hussien (dead),
the electrical system non-functional,
roads and bridges unable to support mobility,
military officers demoralized or defecting,
air defense unable to interfere with US operations.
With the exception of affecting military officers, those are all complicated, but not complex systems that can be modeled, simplified and decomposed into a subset of vital nodes. Physical systems that those that can be effectively approached from a systems analysis perspective.
No argument there, Desert Storm was a relatively un-complex setup, especially since our objectives were fairly simple (eject Iraq from Kuwait, make sure they could defend themselves but not attack neighbors post-conflict).

Truely complex systems - most notably social systems - are largely opaque to the sort of systems analysis that is required to predict what an effect will do. Complex systems also have a characteristic of irreducibility - they can be decomposed only so far before any resulting model is no longer useful, and you will not no until after the fact that you have exceeded the irreducibility threshold.
True. Humans are complex. But you can still determine ways to affect them.

Centers of Gravity can be identified in the system which, if affected quickly and and simultaneously, allow the state of the system to be changed to a new, more desirable state.

Another charateristic of complex systems is that the output can not be predicted from a given set of inputs. You can "set the dials and pul lthe levers" of a complex system the same way, and even if you have modeled it with 100% accuracy, you will get different outputs. When dealing with complex systems there is no way to no way to establish a requisite list of CoGs and no way to be certain that doing something to one COg will have a positive feedback one time and a negative feedback the next. This is the fundamental problem with "effects-basd warfare" in general. In every case Ive seen thee is no "theory of action" that connects the action taken, to the desired result - it is simply a matter of "guilt by association" or "correlation equals causality" (until it doesn't).
I guess my point is, what alternative do we have? Also, I think Warden's argument on the time element is critical... because humans are involved, and provide most of the complexity and a lot of the uncertainty on effects you refer to above, psychology matters. If you can successfully hit someone so quickly and in so many places that they can't react, the likelihood of them reacting in the way you want is increased, because they don't have time to change their actions or adjust.

Were it possible to create a "strategic effects machine" we would have figured it out by now in Afghanistan. Alas there is no "CoG analysis" that tells what levers to pull and dials to turn to create teh desired end state. You can lament "trail and error" but you can desire a magic strategic endstate computer all you want, but what we know about complex system theory says its impossible. Energent behavior is "emergent" becasue by definition it is not predictable.
What was our desired endstate in Afghanistan? I think Col Warden would argue that putting in extensive troops in on the ground in the first place was part of where things went wrong... He also says that airpower may not be the answer (yet), but that we should try and figure ways to use it to achieve our ends.

The COIN scenario is obviously the most difficult to apply Warden's system to... but then again, have Design, JOPP, MDMP, or FM 3-24 been completely successful in AFG?

On to the next one... good points!

V/R,

Cliff