The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[Fuchs]

What else is war about?

Most warfare is not about directly breaking will, but about doing something that has an indirect effect on the enemy leadership's will, around several corners.

Hmm, how do you think the Wehrmacht, or say the Iraqi Military in 1991 felt about this? Pretty secondary quality huh...

It's secondary quality because it requires a huge amount of effort and damage in order to reach the real goal very indirectly.

This time "indirect" does not mean "smart", it means "poorly aimed".

The meagre quality becomes more visible if you assume that the same would have been attempted with a copy of the Iraqi air force, negating the extreme disparity in resources. Hint: The Wehrmacht failed in 1940 against the British with pretty much the same as the U.S.A.A.F. attempted in 1942-1944.

Can you explain why you think this is a misunderstanding, or a surrender?

He offers so many targets to attack that I can only conclude he failed to find the real lever.

Warden's strategy worked out pretty well for us in Desert Storm - it pretty much allowed the US to achieve its objectives. I know that many folks in the ground services scoff his theories... but then again, he is an airpower strategist. He is pretty well respected in the USAF, and his theories are taught at the USAF professional schools.

None of this is really an argument in itself, especially not the firs ton, for his actual proposal for Desert Storm had been rejected in favour of a less fancy one - and that one produced some interesting and unanticipated effects.

I think part of the problem with Col Warden's theories is that people want to use them like an Army FM on the Military Decision Making Process, like a cook book rather than a guide.

I think there's plenty of airpower strategy out there - the doctrine is fairly well established.

V/R,

Cliff

There's almost always something "well established". Infantry and cavalry doctrine were "well established" in 1913.

The actual air power in use was
- successful in Iraq 1991 with an extreme resource disparity in near-perfect terrain
- semi-successful at most with various punitive strikes during the 1990's
- successful in Yugoslavia 1999 with an extreme resource disparity, yet still thoroughly embarrassed tactically, technically and strategically.
- successful in Afghanistan 2001 with a total resource disparity that didn't even encounter noteworthy resistance
- successful in Iraq 2003 with 'beyond extreme' resource disparity in very good terrain, but still with major gaffes
- failing in Iraq 2003-2007 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy
- failing in Afghanistan 2005-2011 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy (probably even with a negative net effect!)


Well, if I go to a funfair and easily pling all targets there, and tomorrow I go into the wilderness with a shotgun and miss almost all the rabbits, hitting many trees, squirrels and cats instead - does this mean that my marksman skill is well established and satisfactory?


The only thing that's well established is the orchestration/'synchronisation' of strike packages.
Airpower strategy of the last two decades has been a joke; I saw only a primitive application of brute force.
The whole idea of elegance is totally gone missing because too many resources were at hand for too many conflicts.

---------------------

Just an example; scenario 1999 Kosovo Air War against Yugoslavia, what I would have done:
(1) negotiate an electricity embargo against Yugoslavia by all neighbours, employ observers along the high voltage power lines.
(2) Take out all powerplant turbine rooms in Yugoslavia (save for the one of the nuclear power plant; instead cut its nodes in a safe distance) with a single B-2 sortie (JDAMs were already available).

Offer a deal:
Yugoslavia re-establishes autonomy for Kosovo and accepts foreign (military) police forces of its choice (no more than 50% slavs, though) as reinforcements for a mostly prejudice-free maintenance of security in Kosovo.
NATO repairs the damage ASAP and asks the neighbours to lift the electricity embargo.

How many months would they have accepted a life with electricity restricted to hospitals, the upper class residence area of Belgrade and state buildings? In resistance to what? Basically a gift!
I guesstimate they wouldn't have accepted it for much longer than they endured the resistance-provoking bombardment.

THIS is elegant strategy.

[Cliff]

Most warfare is not about directly breaking will, but about doing something that has an indirect effect on the enemy leadership's will, around several corners.

OK, but Warden is arguing that we should try to focus on the ultimate object... getting the enemy to do what we want - IE, "War is politics by other means" as CvC would say.

It's secondary quality because it requires a huge amount of effort and damage in order to reach the real goal very indirectly.

Uhhh, this may have been true before... but not anymore. While World War II did require a lot of effort, Allied Force, OEF and OIF required much less effort. The cost in lives is much less on both the friendly and enemy sides. Do you really think that a NATO ground invasion of Kosovo and Serbia would have been less effort, less cost, and less casualties than Allied Force resulted in?

This time "indirect" does not mean "smart", it means "poorly aimed".

Uhh, Warden is arguing for the direct approach as opposed to attacking fielded forces... how is this poorly aimed?

The meagre quality becomes more visible if you assume that the same would have been attempted with a copy of the Iraqi air force, negating the extreme disparity in resources. Hint: The Wehrmacht failed in 1940 against the British with pretty much the same as the U.S.A.A.F. attempted in 1942-1944.

You are correct, the USAAF didn't have an adequate force until early 1944, and in early 1944 it was used on France and the intended areas of landing, not for strategic attack. Once it was unleashed on Germany mid 1944 it did some real damage. The Iraqi Air Force had 700 aircraft and was (for the time) a fairly credible Soviet-style force. I'm not saying they weren't outnumbered, they were. But the real key was in training, maintenance, technology, etc. You are essentially arguing that airpower was not effective because it worked too well...

He offers so many targets to attack that I can only conclude he failed to find the real lever.

Did you read the paper? Warden is suggesting selecting targets on the inner rings carefully so that you don't have to attack so many targets, the exact opposite of what you are saying above.

None of this is really an argument in itself, especially not the firs ton, for his actual proposal for Desert Storm had been rejected in favour of a less fancy one - and that one produced some interesting and unanticipated effects.

Warden's initial plan was not used, but because LtGen (at the time LtCol) Deptula was kept to be one of the key planners. He ended up writing the final plan.

There's almost always something "well established". Infantry and cavalry doctrine were "well established" in 1913.

This is just silly, Fuchs. What would you recommend airpower doctrine change to? What do you see as the major flaws in the current system?

The actual air power in use was
- successful in Iraq 1991 with an extreme resource disparity in near-perfect terrain
- semi-successful at most with various punitive strikes during the 1990's
- successful in Yugoslavia 1999 with an extreme resource disparity, yet still thoroughly embarrassed tactically, technically and strategically.
- successful in Afghanistan 2001 with a total resource disparity that didn't even encounter noteworthy resistance
- successful in Iraq 2003 with 'beyond extreme' resource disparity in very good terrain, but still with major gaffes
- failing in Iraq 2003-2007 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy
- failing in Afghanistan 2005-2011 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy (probably even with a negative net effect!)

Why is airpower failing in Iraq and Afghanistan? I think it has done more to enable the land forces than anything else. OBTW the drone program has been pretty effective. How would the Army/Marines have done with no airborne ISR, airlift, CAS, AAR, etc?

Well, if I go to a funfair and easily pling all targets there, and tomorrow I go into the wilderness with a shotgun and miss almost all the rabbits, hitting many trees, squirrels and cats instead - does this mean that my marksman skill is well established and satisfactory?

Very few targets have been missed. Warden is arguing that improvements can be made to make airpower more effective in COIN - you won't find me arguing with that. But you seem to think that past failures mean the concept is doomed. By your methodology, we should have declared failure in Iraq and withdrawn in 2007... good plan.

The only thing that's well established is the orchestration/'synchronisation' of strike packages.
Airpower strategy of the last two decades has been a joke; I saw only a primitive application of brute force.
The whole idea of elegance is totally gone missing because too many resources were at hand for too many conflicts.

Are you serious? You seem to have no familiarity with the way air campaigns are planned now... while brute force is a part of it (I suspect Wilf would argue that it must be part of any war!), the process is very tightly controlled.

---------------------
Just an example; scenario 1999 Kosovo Air War against Yugoslavia, what I would have done:
(1) negotiate an electricity embargo against Yugoslavia by all neighbours, employ observers along the high voltage power lines.
(2) Take out all powerplant turbine rooms in Yugoslavia (save for the one of the nuclear power plant; instead cut its nodes in a safe distance) with a single B-2 sortie (JDAMs were already available).

Initially the air targets were limited to fielded forces. Only later was the political leadership of NATO finally convinced to allow the air component to target key infrastructure and the regime. It was the specific push to target Milosevic and his cronies as well as their financial concerns that finally led to the Serbs capitulating. (See RAND report) This is not an airpower strategy issue- that is a grand/political strategy issue of going to war without the will to do what is neccessary- exactly what Warden is arguing against.

Offer a deal:
Yugoslavia re-establishes autonomy for Kosovo and accepts foreign (military) police forces of its choice (no more than 50% slavs, though) as reinforcements for a mostly prejudice-free maintenance of security in Kosovo.
NATO repairs the damage ASAP and asks the neighbours to lift the electricity embargo.

How many months would they have accepted a life with electricity restricted to hospitals, the upper class residence area of Belgrade and state buildings? In resistance to what? Basically a gift!
I guesstimate they wouldn't have accepted it for much longer than they endured the resistance-provoking bombardment.

THIS is elegant strategy.

Again, something similar to what you propose is basically what ended up happening... Oh by the way, you have just used Warden's 5 rings model to develop your "elegant" strategy. I would also submit that just being without power is unlikely to convince someone like Milosevic, especially when opposition to outsiders is the source of much of his power. But again, that's not an issue with airpower...

The problems that occured were not airpower strategy issues, but problems with NATO's internal political and military leadership. That's not an issue for airpower theory to address directly. Airpower does help mitigate these problems, however, by making the war shorter and less bloody, as Warden points out. So I guess you basically agree with Warden!

V/R,

Cliff

[Fuchs]

Uhhh, this may have been true before... but not anymore. While World War II did require a lot of effort, Allied Force, OEF and OIF required much less effort. The cost in lives is much less on both the friendly and enemy sides. Do you really think that a NATO ground invasion of Kosovo and Serbia would have been less effort, less cost, and less casualties than Allied Force resulted in?

The resources applied were in all the 1991-2011 examples out of proportion with the target. Show me contemporary air war strategy defeating a peer enemy in less than a half year anywhere and I'll buy that it's efficient enough.

Btw, the record for most rapid defeat of a Yugoslav government is an astonishing 11 days. The most powerful alliance ever took 78 days to force very limited demands.

Did you read the paper? Warden is suggesting selecting targets on the inner rings carefully so that you don't have to attack so many targets, the exact opposite of what you are saying above.

The problem is merely that the whole 'rings' stuff is nonsense. The whole approach is just a bad idea. His writing is full of cluelessness with minimal inspiration. You need to get to the core if you want to break will, you need to look at psychology and preferences, not against an organisation complex.

Here's a problem, though.
Let's assume I think I have a better concept that the world-famous five rings crap.
Would you expect me to publish it in an internet forum?

I wouldn't even publish it in my blog.

Warden's initial plan was not used, but because LtGen (at the time LtCol) Deptula was kept to be one of the key planners. He ended up writing the final plan.

... which was what he was told to propose, not what he proposed. There are certain people from that episode who do not hold him in high regard at all.

Why is airpower failing in Iraq and Afghanistan?

It has been a failure because it was no success, especially in regard to strategy. Doing this and doing that does not count much when the real idea was to win, not to keep doing things.

By your methodology, we should have declared failure in Iraq and withdrawn in 2007... good plan.

By my methodology, Iraq would have been left alone since '97, for it had been disarmed as demanded in '96 and was no real-world problem any more.

Are you serious? (...), the process is very tightly controlled.

Yes, and I don't care about tight control.
There's no inspiration behind what's being done, just transpiration and the standard meme of throwing resources at a problem.
The 90's and 00's air wars followed the 8th AF approach of destroying this, then that - trial and error. We need something more close to Biafra air force, Flying Tigers or Luftwaffe May '40.
We need air forces which deliver a good strategic effect on small budget, accomplish their mission against the odds and which can focus on what's decisive.

Initially the air targets were limited to fielded forces. Only later was the political leadership of NATO finally convinced to allow the air component to target key infrastructure and the regime. It was the specific push to target Milosevic and his cronies as well as their financial concerns that finally led to the Serbs capitulating.

I'll translate this for you:

The original strategy didn't work, a new set of targets was opened up and that strategy didn't work either, another set of targets was opened up and that strategy was still failing until finally the hero knight in shining armour arrived and rescued us all from the total strategic embarrassment: The Russian prime minister who convinced Milosevic that Russia would not intervene.

Again, something similar to what you propose is basically what ended up happening... Oh by the way, you have just used Warden's 5 rings model to develop your "elegant" strategy.

Hardly. We bombed a small power for 78 days. Not elegant at all.

The problems that occurred were not airpower strategy issues, but problems with NATO's internal political and military leadership. That's not an issue for airpower theory to address directly. Airpower does help mitigate these problems, however, by making the war shorter and less bloody, as Warden points out.

Most of all, it leads to additional wars because
a) there were already too many hundreds of billions spent on the AF bureaucracy and its toys (and politicians never fail to hit the sunk costs fallacy!).
b) air power offers a fantasy of a war (or bullying) on the cheap, without much negative effects of relevance

The Kosovo air war remains a strategic disaster on too many levels - it's astonishing how well this has been kept out of the public perception.
* technical failure of DEAD attempts
* technical failure of F-117
* tactical failure of way too inept mission planning (such as no variance in French UAV routing and predictable Tomahawk flight routes)
* tactical/technical failure of BDA from the air
* intelligence failure on colossal scope before the war
* political failure: lies about the reasons for war
* intelligence failure: BDA
* top HQ failure to teach politicians about what air power can achieve
* top HQ failure to understand that the short bombing around Sarajevo is NOT a good analogy
* political failure: opposition instead of cooperation with Russia
* logistical failure: Race to Pristina airport
* readiness and deployability failure: TF Hawk
* strategic failure: poor understanding of the purpose of destruction
* PR failure: slowed down train bombing video was a lie
* reconnaissance failure: aerial imagery misinterpretation on colossal scale
* reconnaissance and targeting failure: way too many decoys were engaged
* reconnaissance and targeting failure: deployed ground forces were barely scratched despite being targeted
* strategic failure: way too long campaign in light of the disparity between NATO and Yugoslavia
* political failure: Greece was not convinced to make bases available
* logistical failure: use of North Italian instead of South Italian bases was idiotic
* political failure: many countries provided small packages of combat aircraft instead of the alliance tailoring a force of only the best for the job
* political failure: no gains for us
* political failure: we're stills tuck in there with blue helmets
* political failure: a few thousand criminal insurgents fooled us into fighting their war
* political failure: said thugs are now operating the organised crime hub of Europe under our protection
* political failure: we came to end an ethnic cleansing campaign against Kosovars that did not really exist and then we didn't really keep the Kosovars from cleaning most of Kosovo ethnically from Serbs


The whole thing was a huge embarrassment, and the air war component contributed a lot to the embarrassment. Only so-called "victory" prevented that the whole world laughed about us.


Last but not least: Always keep in mind RAND is writing for its customers; the air force, the navy ...
Any paper that quotes Michael O'Hanlon is by default already at least 50% disqualified in my opinion.

[Cliff]

The resources applied were in all the 1991-2011 examples out of proportion with the target. Show me contemporary air war strategy defeating a peer enemy in less than a half year anywhere and I'll buy that it's efficient enough.

Hmm, there isn't one. That doesn't mean the strategy is invalid though. How about 1973 or 1967? Are those contemporary to you?

Btw, the record for most rapid defeat of a Yugoslav government is an astonishing 11 days. The most powerful alliance ever took 78 days to force very limited demands.

Mostly a political issue with NATO, which as I have pointed out Col Warden specifically warns against.

The problem is merely that the whole 'rings' stuff is nonsense. The whole approach is just a bad idea. His writing is full of cluelessness with minimal inspiration. You need to get to the core if you want to break will, you need to look at psychology and preferences, not against an organisation complex.

Name calling isn't useful, Fuchs. Psychology is exactly what Col Warden is talking about when he talks of attacking leadership.

Here's a problem, though.
Let's assume I think I have a better concept that the world-famous five rings crap.
Would you expect me to publish it in an internet forum?

I wouldn't even publish it in my blog.

Good of you to not share with us, then.

... which was what he was told to propose, not what he proposed. There are certain people from that episode who do not hold him in high regard at all.

That's true... because Col Warden bucked the establishment (TAC's leadership especially)... and the Army certainly didn't like that Stormin' Norman overruled their desires in favor of the USAF plan. Again, why does this matter in evaluating his ideas?

By my methodology, Iraq would have been left alone since '97, for it had been disarmed as demanded in '96 and was no real-world problem any more.

But you won't tell us how as you said.

Yes, and I don't care about tight control.
There's no inspiration behind what's being done, just transpiration and the standard meme of throwing resources at a problem.
The 90's and 00's air wars followed the 8th AF approach of destroying this, then that - trial and error. We need something more close to Biafra air force, Flying Tigers or Luftwaffe May '40.
We need air forces which deliver a good strategic effect on small budget, accomplish their mission against the odds and which can focus on what's decisive.

There was actually extensive analysis and resources were not thrown willy-nilly at the problem, and it wasn't just destroying things. The effects were carefully calculated. The big problem was that the target set was limited to fielded forces, which as you point out was not a great target. Then again, that's pretty much the opposite of what Warden is arguing we should do...

While the Flying Tigers and Luftwaffe in May '40 accomplished great things, I don't think they were shining examples of airpower strategy - especially the Luftwaffe. But this is distracting us from the real point - your argument for better use of resources is exactly what Warden is arguing for - so you agree with his ends but not his means?

I'll translate this for you:

The original strategy didn't work, a new set of targets was opened up and that strategy didn't work either, another set of targets was opened up and that strategy was still failing until finally the hero knight in shining armour arrived and rescued us all from the total strategic embarrassment: The Russian prime minister who convinced Milosevic that Russia would not intervene.

The strategy used was not the one recommended by the airpower experts involved. You are conflating NATO's national and international grand-strategy issues with airpower strategy. Also, Warden argues that we shouldn't go to war if we're not willing to do what it takes to win - which seems to be what you're arguing (don't go with a less-than optimum strategy). While Russia's position was important, I don't think it was decisive - but even if it was important, how does that diminish the air strategy? It worked in the context of the political situation.

Hardly. We bombed a small power for 78 days. Not elegant at all.

You're using the same point (conflating grand strategy with military strategy) again.

Most of all, it leads to additional wars because
a) there were already too many hundreds of billions spent on the AF bureaucracy and its toys (and politicians never fail to hit the sunk costs fallacy!).
b) air power offers a fantasy of a war (or bullying) on the cheap, without much negative effects of relevance

Fuchs, if the west ever goes to war with China, I hope I am still around afterwards to talk to you about the fallacy of airpower. Your second point is also one that is made by Warden- we shouldn't focus on technological miracles, but find strategies that work.

The Kosovo air war remains a strategic disaster on too many levels - it's astonishing how well this has been kept out of the public perception.
* technical failure of DEAD attempts
* technical failure of F-117

I disagree with the DEAD, although there were issues. Many of these problems have been resolved. As for your second point, why do you think the USAF was trying to buy F-22s?

* tactical failure of way too inept mission planning (such as no variance in French UAV routing and predictable Tomahawk flight routes)
* tactical/technical failure of BDA from the air

BDA is always problematic, but massive improvements have been made there. It will always be an issue.

* intelligence failure on colossal scope before the war
* political failure: lies about the reasons for war
* intelligence failure: BDA
* top HQ failure to teach politicians about what air power can achieve
* top HQ failure to understand that the short bombing around Sarajevo is NOT a good analogy
* political failure: opposition instead of cooperation with Russia

BDA is a repeat, the rest are issues with the NATO alliance and not airpower.

* logistical failure: Race to Pristina airport
* readiness and deployability failure: TF Hawk
* strategic failure: poor understanding of the purpose of destruction
* PR failure: slowed down train bombing video was a lie

Same point as above

* reconnaissance failure: aerial imagery misinterpretation on colossal scale
* reconnaissance and targeting failure: way too many decoys were engaged
* reconnaissance and targeting failure: deployed ground forces were barely scratched despite being targeted

Got it, why do you think there's been massive investments in ISR tech and systems?

* strategic failure: way too long campaign in light of the disparity between NATO and Yugoslavia
* political failure: Greece was not convinced to make bases available
* logistical failure: use of North Italian instead of South Italian bases was idiotic
* political failure: many countries provided small packages of combat aircraft instead of the alliance tailoring a force of only the best for the job
* political failure: no gains for us
* political failure: we're stills tuck in there with blue helmets
* political failure: a few thousand criminal insurgents fooled us into fighting their war
* political failure: said thugs are now operating the organised crime hub of Europe under our protection
* political failure: we came to end an ethnic cleansing campaign against Kosovars that did not really exist and then we didn't really keep the Kosovars from cleaning most of Kosovo ethnically from Serbs

Again, grand strategic issues.

The whole thing was a huge embarrassment, and the air war component contributed a lot to the embarrassment. Only so-called "victory" prevented that the whole world laughed about us.

Same. Fuchs, you argue many of the same points that Warden makes, but then criticize him. You take the fact that the NAC and the political leadership of NATO didn't take the advice of the military experts until it was obvious it was the only way to achieve victory, and use that to discredit the original strategy. Additionally, you give Warden no credit for the fact that he agrees that we should not go to war if we're not willing to use the proper strategy for political reasons. You criticize Warden for his argument's intellectual rigor, then use misleading and repetitive examples of your own to support your counter.

I know I am not going to convince you, and that's OK. I would appreciate it if you avoided name calling in future discussions, though. Even if you disagree with someone you can still respect them.

V/R,

Cliff

[Ken White]

but I posit this, properly redacted to preclude assignment of intent, evil or otherwise, for consideration.

"... no credit for the fact that he agrees that we should not go to war if we're not willing to use the proper strategy for political reasons."

Well, I freely give such credit -- however, being an ancient, curmudgeonly cynic, I also have to point out that most warfare theorists, good, bad and indifferent have said things to that effect. It is almost a mantra among them, ancient to classical to contemporary.

My suspicion is that part of the problem is few politicians read the treatises and will insist on sending folks off to fight while barring the use of good strategeries or even sensible TTP...

The follow on to that is that many arguments about theory and strategy -- indeed many great ideas pertaining to strategy -- founder on that shoal. If is a very problematic word...