The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[Ken White]

Democratic politiciansARE NOT strategists (maybe they should be, but they are not).

Totally agree, even those with some military knowledge or experience have historically been poor as Politicians trying to influence the strategy of their Generals. Clemenceau who coined the ultimate Civilian control of the Military quip was poor at the task -- but he had enough sense to listen to his good Generals (and to know which were good)...

Expecting politicians to take up the role of strategist is a short route to disappointment.

While that is correct, the problem in a Democracy is that Politicians believe they must be seen as doing something. That the something they do is inept, inappropriate and does more harm than good is immaterial. They will meddle, they will screw things royally and only really good Flag Officers will keep them from doing too much damage. Unfortunately, in a system that rewards survival above all else, the number of really good Flag Officers isn't as high as it could or should be.

Regardless, with respect to your initial comment on the topic:

It is not the politician's job to deliver the political will needed for the application of a certain strategy. It is the strategist's job to develop a strategy within the limitations of his leadership's political will.

Most US politicians have little will for much other than getting reelected and have definite constraints on the amount of will they will be allowed to exert by the vagaries of Congress and party politics. Add the fact that to most US domestic political concerns far outweigh foreign policy concerns and you have a recipe for military power to be misapplied, misused and wasted by trying to do too little with too few.

While your approach is the way we have done it in this country since 1950 (and before on occasion), that does not mean that it is correct or even sensible. A quick look at recent history will show where that approach has placed us...

Thus this "...It is the strategist's job to develop a strategy within the limitations of his leadership's political will" is saying that the "strategist" should collude and shave points. That's illegal in sports -- and war is more important than any sport. Regardless, Franks did that, so to an extent did Westmoreland and there have been others. The issue should be whether or not that is in the interest of the nation.

[Marc]

While that is correct, the problem in a Democracy is that Politicians believe they must be seen as doing something. That the something they do is inept, inappropriate and does more harm than good is immaterial.

Ken,

True. The propensity to do something is an important cause of the difference between policy and strategy. We will probably see more of that in Libya soon.

[slapout9]

Folks, I have a busy schedule this week but shortly I will post a few responses including some of my personal contacts with Colonel Warden. I will start with how I met him and what he considers to be one of the most important elements of his Airpower Theory and Strategyin general. It is a good story, it shows if you really listen(from a non service dogma related viewpoint) you might just learn something.

[Dip]

Warden suggests, "airpower advocates must stop trying to use airpower as a substitute for its military predecessors." Accordingly, airpower detractors will engage airpower on that level for precisely the reasons Warden cites. That's what's going on here in spades.

HERE is an example of a sublime and enduring airpower victory in an irregular environment (i.e. the Pakistan tribal regions after the earthquake) that isn't "bound to an anachronistic view of war with an anachronistic vocabulary (Warden)."

Of that airpower-centric operation, terrorfreetomorrow.org writes, "Pakistanis now hold a more favorable opinion of the United States than at any time since 9/11, while support for Al Qaeda in its home base has dropped to its lowest level since then. The direct cause for this dramatic shift in Muslim opinion is clear: American humanitarian assistance for Pakistani earthquake victims." A subsuquent study showed that the reversals in opinion were not temporary.

Along those lines, THIS article suggests one way the AF could turn that knowledge into capability. But it won't because the AF is as unlikely to internalize Warden's guidance (cited at the beginning of this post) as the AF's detractors.

To the AF, conventional war = dropping bombs from jets and irregular war = dropping smaller bombs from turboprops. They don't even really recognize strategic effects even when they are creating them. Take the training of the Afg Air Force, for example. The zeitgeist is that the AAF is necessary to allow the gov't to continue to make security gains. What is frequently lost is that in a country like Afg (where vast distances are combined with scant infrastructure is combined with the strategic vulnerability of a central gov't that is too-far-removed from the people), airpower can provide the essential connectivity of the gov't to the population in the hinterlands. I have no idea why the USAF isn't blowing that horn. Maybe it is and I'm just not plugged in enough. More likely, though, that they view it as something they have to do so that the Afghans can start dropping the small bombs...

Regardless, nice to see a well-informed discussion of airpower. Very good exchange.

[pvebber]

Reread the article and the thread. There are several different lines of argument:

What is new about this article?

Given much of it is a review of Col Warden's previous work, what are the strengths and weaknesses of his theory?

How effectively does Col Warden make his historical case to defend his theory?

The last I will leave to Fuchs, as he has done a bang up job so far

So what is new here? What are the strengths and weaknesses? The thesis appears to be:

Regardless of airpower’s potential, it can never realize its real capability so long as it remains bound to an anachronistic view of war with an anachronistic vocabulary. On the contrary, if airpower is truly to come of age, it must do so in the context of a modern concept of war that associates the use of force as directly as possible with end-game strategic objectives, not with the act of fighting. If this is to happen, the operators of airpower must understand, believe, and teach end-game strategy as the foundation of airpower. Failure to do so will condemn airpower to suboptimization and deprive its owners of using force in such a dramatically different way that will achieve national objectives quickly and at minimum cost. To succeed, airpower advocates must stop trying to use airpower as a substitute for its military predecessors, connect it directly to strategic end-games, adopt a new vocabulary to match airpower’s promise, and become serious promoters not of machines but of ideas.

The premises for this appear to be:

Land operations have dominated warfare and the vocabulary of war is land -centric and therefore prevents unconstrained thought about airpower.

This is indeed something I have never seen argued before. The argument made is that landpower was historically used in series, and the things which occured in series were called 'battles'. Doing away with the concept of serial 'battle' will therefore free us of the notion of serial engagement of the adversary and free airpower to be used simultaneously to affect multiple CoGs in parallel.

Has COL Warden read Joint doctrine lately?

When required to employ force, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and adversary vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. JP 3-0

Simultaneity is a key characteristic of the American way of war. It refers to the simultaneous application of power against key adversary capabilities and sources of strength. The goal of simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an adversary’s collapse by placing more demands on
adversary forces and functions than can be handled. This does not mean that all elements of the joint force are employed with equal priority or that even all elements of the joint force will be employed. It refers specifically to the concept of attacking appropriate adversary forces and functions in such
a manner as to cause confusion and demoralization.

The COL's desires seem to be esconced in current doctrine, with the exception of attributing exculsivity of action to airpower.

Unconstrained, airpower provides the vehicle to directly achieve strategic ends without the need for other forces.

What if the strategic ends require interpersonal contact between human beings? Say to gain the support of a potential ally? Why can't land or naval forces be positioned so as to take simultaneous action that directly achives stragic ends? This key premise is actually an assumption, as no evidence is provided that it is true, and it is fairly easy to conjecture situations where it is not true. (for example if your desired end state is to enforce a strategy based on interdiction of maritime contraband how does one do board and search of potential interlopers with airpower?)

Strategy is about conceiving a desired endstate, identifying means to achieve it, implementing a course of action, and deciding when you are done.

Again, right out of Joint doctrine.

b. The design and implementation of leverage and the ability to know how and
when to terminate operations are involved in operational art and are discussed in Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations.” Because the nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations or groups, it is
fundamentally important to understand that termination of operations is an essential link between national security strategy, NMS, and end state conditions — the desired outcome. This principle holds true for both war and MOOTW. JP 3-0

Opponents are complicated entities that can be simplified by a systems analysis. (e.g. Five rings model).

Here is where things start to get contentious. The issue is "complicated" vs "Complex". When some of the "five rings" anaysis of Gulf War 1 are looked at, the sample centers of gravity (see http://www.venturist.com/Prometheus%...%20Summary.htm) are given as:

Saddam Hussien (dead),
the electrical system non-functional,
roads and bridges unable to support mobility,
military officers demoralized or defecting,
air defense unable to interfere with US operations.

With the exception of affecting military officers, those are all complicated, but not complex systems that can be modeled, simplified and decomposed into a subset of vital nodes. Physical systems that those that can be effectively approached from a systems analysis perspective. Truely complex systems - most notably social systems - are largely opaque to the sort of systems analysis that is required to predict what an effect will do. Complex systems also have a characteristic of irreducibility - they can be decomposed only so far before any resulting model is no longer useful, and you will not no until after the fact that you have exceeded the irreducibility threshold.


Centers of Gravity can be identified in the system which, if affected quickly and and simultaneously, allow the state of the system to be changed to a new, more desirable state.

Another charateristic of complex systems is that the output can not be predicted from a given set of inputs. You can "set the dials and pul lthe levers" of a complex system the same way, and even if you have modeled it with 100% accuracy, you will get different outputs. When dealing with complex systems there is no way to no way to establish a requisite list of CoGs and no way to be certain that doing something to one COg will have a positive feedback one time and a negative feedback the next. This is the fundamental problem with "effects-basd warfare" in general. In every case Ive seen thee is no "theory of action" that connects the action taken, to the desired result - it is simply a matter of "guilt by association" or "correlation equals causality" (until it doesn't).

Were it possible to create a "strategic effects machine" we would have figured it out by now in Afghanistan. Alas there is no "CoG analysis" that tells what levers to pull and dials to turn to create teh desired end state. You can lament "trail and error" but you can desire a magic strategic endstate computer all you want, but what we know about complex system theory says its impossible. Energent behavior is "emergent" becasue by definition it is not predictable.


continued in next post

[pvebber]

Affecting CoGs in series vice parallel is dramatically more expensive.

Only if you are inept at operational art. How do you know that the cost of firing 1000 cruise missiles all at once to achieve your objective is going to be more successful than firing 100 on 9 consecutive days. or 8 or 7? Boyd discusses this problem in realtion to OODA loops.

Maybe urban legend, but supposedly he tells the story of a dogfight with a new pilot where he makes a complicated series of manuevers, the response to which would lead to Boyd being on the youngsters 6. After completting the manuevers Boyd is horrified to find the younster behind HIM. He asks the youngster how he figured out how to turn the tables. The youngster said "I had no clue what to do, I was gonna go left, then thought maybe right and all of a sudden there you were in front of me!"

You can make the OODA loop so much faster than your opponent that you end up outsmarting yourself, or paralyze him so much that he can't even surrender. With tipping point phenomena, you can't predict how much effect you need to effect the tip, or how much excess you applied after the fact. Sometimes incrementalism is also a political requirement.

Again Warden's argument requires a very determinsitic world view to be correct. There are parts of an adversary "system" that operate that way, but on the whole they do not, and the parts that do may not always be politically acceptable because of collateral effects.

Now these criticisms should NOT be extended to "well, then you must mean we shouldn't even try". Criticism is not condemnation - it is the seemingly obvious caution that we should not try to apply a theory that indeed works against some parts of the some problems, to ALL parts of ALL problems.

Some systems we have to try to understand in their holistic, complete, complex entirety, because simplification introduces errors that render overly simplistic models useless. JUst becasue we want there to be an easy answer that we can apply airpower to simply, quickly and relatively bloodlessly doesn't mean that is possible. Everything we have learned from the last 10 years of war has demonstrated that the heady days of Joint Vision 2010, eliminating the Fog of war and mechnically applying combat power to centers of gravity win wars is folly. Either that or our best and brightest fighting these wars are criminally incompetent for not having achieved our desired endstate quickly and cheaply.

When all is said and done, lets assume Warden is 100% correct. Then what? What changes?

How do we change Joint doctrine to use a language that "enables unconstrained use of airpower"? What things would a Warden designed Air Force do that todays Air Force doesn't do? How does our concept of war change if we assume airpower is a "strategic end-sate generating machine"? How does it harmonize our future growth with China so the rising tide floats all boats? How does it convince Iran to abandon its desire for nuclear power? How does it reduce the strategic risk of our excessive debt? In a multi-polar world what are the end-states we can achieve by compelling, coercing, or denying? Can airpower be a carrot instead of a stick? (other than by giving away!)

[pvebber]

Dip writes:

I have no idea why the USAF isn't blowing that horn. Maybe it is and I'm just not plugged in enough.

You have not seen the latest Air Force ad campaign: HADR is not only sexy its "SCI-FI"

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bg9K1mCh65U

[Fuchs]

Saddam Hussien (dead),
the electrical system non-functional,
roads and bridges unable to support mobility,
military officers demoralized or defecting,
air defense unable to interfere with US operations

Let's use this as an example (and I read '91 here):

Two approaches to air war:
'True' strategic air war with the intent to break the enemy government('s will to resist) directly with air power
and
operational air war in support of other arms; usually land support of a land campaign, rarely (Pacific War) primarily support of naval warfare. This may include bombing industries if those industries supply the OPFOR.


Saddam Hussein was caught in a miscalculation.
His withdrawal (the mission to be accomplished under UN mandate) would almost certainly follow if he understood his mistake. Offering him a way out that saves his face would likely reduce his resistance once he grasps the situation (and hurry the process up).


So what needed to be done? He needed to be convinced that the situation is serious. Air power eventually achieved this when he ordered a withdrawal (ground offensive was accelerated to interfere with the withdrawal iirc).

It did actually not take much to convince him that the coalition was serious. Diplomats could have paved him a nice way out of the mess and air power could have demonstrated political resolution with actual attacks. Those actual attacks could have been directed against his counter-strike capabilities in order to minimise the mess; attack aircraft airbases, SCUDs (the latter did eventually fail, of course), suppress long-range artillery (longer range than the ubiquitous D-30's).
This would have required some self-support of air power in form of the strike package support; SEAD, AEW, ECM...
The bombing of barracks, bridges, palaces, electrical nodes, tanks and bunkers was not strategically necessary (the CAS at Khafij was tactically useful, though).


Now another version; air power in support of decisive land operations.
The scenario is roughly the same, but the decision is expected to lay in the hands of the ground forces (assumption: Hussein is too stubborn to yield to air power alone.
Air power softens up and deceives in order to prepare for a decisive land campaign advance: A near-encirclement of the occupation forces in Kuwait would almost certainly force Hussein to accept the need to withdraw. Alternatively, the encirclement could be completed in a more Clausewitzian approach of disarmament.


It should be obvious in both cases that I'm not intent on destroying a card house with some smart moves; I'm intent on defeating the will.
I look at personal preferences and assume somewhat purposeful decision-making within the limits of typical psychological malfunctions (such as cognitive dissonance or problematic group dynamics).
An enemy head of state only needs to be attacked if it itself is the problem or if by assumption a successor would be more inclined to bow to our demands. Aggressor politicians deserve a high explosive event, but killing them makes it damn hard to negotiate an armistice with them in the following days and weeks.

-----------------------------------
The 2nd kind of air warfare (in support of a decisive surface campaign) isn't truly strategic in my opinion, but rather a support campaign that works through the economy/infrastructure (WW2 examples). It's working only very directly towards victory:
Air power succeeds to pave the way for its exploits (SEAD, air superiority fight), air power affects the enemy at home (supply flow to OPFOR reduced), blue surface forces defeat red forces in battle more easily, red government accepts that it was overpowered militarily, its will is broken.
That's often way too indirect because more direct, more elegant, approaches are available.

[Cliff]

Let's use this as an example (and I read '91 here):
Saddam Hussein was caught in a miscalculation.
His withdrawal (the mission to be accomplished under UN mandate) would almost certainly follow if he understood his mistake. Offering him a way out that saves his face would likely reduce his resistance once he grasps the situation (and hurry the process up).

Uhhm, this is the guy who killed hundreds of thousands of his own folks in the Iran-Iraq war...

So what needed to be done? He needed to be convinced that the situation is serious. Air power eventually achieved this when he ordered a withdrawal (ground offensive was accelerated to interfere with the withdrawal iirc).

It did actually not take much to convince him that the coalition was serious. Diplomats could have paved him a nice way out of the mess and air power could have demonstrated political resolution with actual attacks. Those actual attacks could have been directed against his counter-strike capabilities in order to minimise the mess; attack aircraft airbases, SCUDs (the latter did eventually fail, of course), suppress long-range artillery (longer range than the ubiquitous D-30's).
This would have required some self-support of air power in form of the strike package support; SEAD, AEW, ECM...
The bombing of barracks, bridges, palaces, electrical nodes, tanks and bunkers was not strategically necessary (the CAS at Khafij was tactically useful, though).

You assume Saddam is a rational actor who cares about his people... I think that's a false assumption. Also, the second objective was to make sure Saddam could no longer threaten his neighbors - hence the CAS and AI. Your "demonstration" sounds a lot like McNarma and LBJ's "sending signals"... Most of the electrical and bunker targets were intended to degrade C2 of the Iraqi IADS, which is neccessary to do the rest of your list.

Now another version; air power in support of decisive land operations.
The scenario is roughly the same, but the decision is expected to lay in the hands of the ground forces (assumption: Hussein is too stubborn to yield to air power alone.
Air power softens up and deceives in order to prepare for a decisive land campaign advance: A near-encirclement of the occupation forces in Kuwait would almost certainly force Hussein to accept the need to withdraw. Alternatively, the encirclement could be completed in a more Clausewitzian approach of disarmament.

Again, I think you assume a lot about Saddam.

It should be obvious in both cases that I'm not intent on destroying a card house with some smart moves; I'm intent on defeating the will.
I look at personal preferences and assume somewhat purposeful decision-making within the limits of typical psychological malfunctions (such as cognitive dissonance or problematic group dynamics).
An enemy head of state only needs to be attacked if it itself is the problem or if by assumption a successor would be more inclined to bow to our demands. Aggressor politicians deserve a high explosive event, but killing them makes it damn hard to negotiate an armistice with them in the following days and weeks.

You are confusing Warden's model, Fuchs. Attacking the leadership ring doesn't neccessarily mean you kill them... you just have to affect them.

The 2nd kind of air warfare (in support of a decisive surface campaign) isn't truly strategic in my opinion, but rather a support campaign that works through the economy/infrastructure (WW2 examples). It's working only very directly towards victory:
Air power succeeds to pave the way for its exploits (SEAD, air superiority fight), air power affects the enemy at home (supply flow to OPFOR reduced), blue surface forces defeat red forces in battle more easily, red government accepts that it was overpowered militarily, its will is broken.
That's often way too indirect because more direct, more elegant, approaches are available.

Again, you seem to agree with Warden, but just don't like the way he wrote his arguement. The last line is pretty much his 5 rings model in one sentence...

V/R,

Cliff

[Cliff]

Affecting CoGs in series vice parallel is dramatically more expensive.

Only if you are inept at operational art. How do you know that the cost of firing 1000 cruise missiles all at once to achieve your objective is going to be more successful than firing 100 on 9 consecutive days. or 8 or 7? Boyd discusses this problem in relation to OODA loops.

I think Col Warden is making a generality here... but it is supportable. Take your example - the cost of deploying troops to the field for 9 days is going to be 9 times the cost of deploying them for 1 day. Not as big an issue for you Navy folks, but everyone else pays...

Maybe urban legend, but supposedly he tells the story of a dogfight with a new pilot where he makes a complicated series of maneuvers, the response to which would lead to Boyd being on the youngsters 6. After completing the maneuvers Boyd is horrified to find the younster behind HIM. He asks the youngster how he figured out how to turn the tables. The youngster said "I had no clue what to do, I was gonna go left, then thought maybe right and all of a sudden there you were in front of me!"

Having been that guy once (OK, it might have happened twice), I will submit that one of the hardest opponents in BFM can be someone who is new and thus has no clue... because sometimes they will do something completely dumb, but if you take a second to ask "why did he do that? that was dumb..." it might just work!

You can make the OODA loop so much faster than your opponent that you end up outsmarting yourself, or paralyze him so much that he can't even surrender. With tipping point phenomena, you can't predict how much effect you need to effect the tip, or how much excess you applied after the fact. Sometimes incrementalism is also a political requirement.

Hmmm... agree on the political. If you've properly analyzed your opponent, then the inability to surrender should be immaterial, because you'll know when he's there and leave him a way to let you know he's done.

Again Warden's argument requires a very determinsitic world view to be correct. There are parts of an adversary "system" that operate that way, but on the whole they do not, and the parts that do may not always be politically acceptable because of collateral effects.

Again, Warden is not arguing that we're there now - only that we are getting closer, and should keep trying - and that we will not get closer if we give up because ground and seapower folks tell us it'll never work.

Now these criticisms should NOT be extended to "well, then you must mean we shouldn't even try". Criticism is not condemnation - it is the seemingly obvious caution that we should not try to apply a theory that indeed works against some parts of the some problems, to ALL parts of ALL problems.

Which is why Warden says we should see if we can make airpower work in a quick/less costly way, and if not, consider if we really want to go to war.

Some systems we have to try to understand in their holistic, complete, complex entirety, because simplification introduces errors that render overly simplistic models useless. Just because we want there to be an easy answer that we can apply airpower to simply, quickly and relatively bloodlessly doesn't mean that is possible. Everything we have learned from the last 10 years of war has demonstrated that the heady days of Joint Vision 2010, eliminating the Fog of war and mechanically applying combat power to centers of gravity win wars is folly. Either that or our best and brightest fighting these wars are criminally incompetent for not having achieved our desired endstate quickly and cheaply.

This goes back to the same point above.

When all is said and done, lets assume Warden is 100% correct. Then what? What changes?

How do we change Joint doctrine to use a language that "enables unconstrained use of airpower"? What things would a Warden designed Air Force do that todays Air Force doesn't do? How does our concept of war change if we assume airpower is a "strategic end-sate generating machine"? How does it harmonize our future growth with China so the rising tide floats all boats? How does it convince Iran to abandon its desire for nuclear power? How does it reduce the strategic risk of our excessive debt? In a multi-polar world what are the end-states we can achieve by compelling, coercing, or denying? Can airpower be a carrot instead of a stick? (other than by giving away!)

My thoughts on what Warden would answer: We focus on the endstate. Our concept changes to focus more on the desired ends and the quickest way to get there vs. a force/battle centric way of thinking. On China, fully funding a robust airpower capability would potentially allow you to deter Chinese military action, confining the competition to the economic realm- which after all is what US grand strategy has been about since World War II. As for Iran, it either deters them or gives you the capability to affect their regime leaders in a way that convinces them it's too painful to continue. Rather than focusing on hitting their nuclear program, how about we target the president, mullahs, and revolutionary guards through their extensive financial holdings? That's the difference Warden would promote. The debt issue is not a military one, so I agree that airpower can't solve that - although if Warden's ideal was realized, we could probably cut a lot of folks. I think that airpower can be a carrot - reference our current strategy of outsourcing containment of Iran by improving other folks' Air Forces in the gulf.

Probably the biggest lesson I have learned over the last year of hanging with the Army is that the Army doesn't like strategy. I'm not trying to attack- there's good reason for this. And this is not something I came up with - this is what the Army folks have told me (one of them is going to be a FA-59, or strategist). Again, the Army drives most joint doctrine and planning because it is the biggest service and normally the JFC. This is a big part of why Warden is saying we have a hard time thinking about airpower. This is what Warden is arguing against - again, he's not saying we're there now, but that we (airpower advocates) should keep trying to get there. He is not advocating bombing everything in sight- or even that bombing is always necessary - in fact, he wants to reduce the amount of direct kinetic damage.

Good discussion pvebber.

V/R,

Cliff

[ganulv]

On China, fully funding a robust airpower capability would potentially allow you to deter Chinese military action, confining the competition to the economic realm- which after all is what US grand strategy has been about since World War II.

I don’t mean to come off as catty, but what is your metric for full funding? The U.S. military budget is already four to five times that of China’s. The federal government could spend even more on airpower, yes, but in a world of limited resources is there any realistic reason to argue that it should?

Even if your logic holds I don’t know that the U.S. really needs any more economic competition from China than it already has.

[Cliff]

I don’t mean to come off as catty, but what is your metric for full funding? The U.S. military budget is already four to five times that of China’s. The federal government could spend even more on airpower, yes, but in a world of limited resources is there any realistic reason to argue that it should?

Even if your logic holds I don’t know that the U.S. really needs any more economic competition from China than it already has.

Ganulv-

I was trying to respond to pvebber's theoretical China question... I agree that our absolute budget still is way bigger than China's, and the federal debt is a bigger threat than anything else- meaning budgets will get cut. Warden would argue that the airpower (again airpower is not just Air Force) budget should be boosted at the expense of other military accounts - and I was attempting to show how he might apply that additional airpower to the China scenario.

I think that given the current fiscal environment and our current commitments it is unlikely that any of the services will get a significant budget boost over anyone else. One feature of our current system is that everyone has supporters in the public and in Congress, meaning true tradeoffs are very difficult to get.

One note on budget, though - the USAF budget (proposed) for FY12 is $166B. Of that, $30.92B is not controlled by the USAF, but goes to joint organizations (a lot of classified stuff for three letter OGAs). Another $9B pays for space procurement for systems like GPS, comm sats, launchers that support the entire joint force (and a lot of other folks). That's a total of $39.92B, or 24% of the USAF budget that essentially goes to supporting the entire DoD. I'm not complaining about this - I just think folks don't realize how much money the USAF spends on space to enable the entire joint force. It's not all Raptors and white scarves! The Navy and Army are actually buying more aircraft in FY12 than the USAF.

V/R,

Cliff

Link to Budget docs:
Air Force Financial Management Budget Site

[Cliff]

There are several different lines of argument... ...How effectively does Col Warden make his historical case to defend his theory?
The last I will leave to Fuchs, as he has done a bang up job so far

Agree with all but your last line. Warden's historical examples aren't perfect, but Fuchs' aren't much better.

Has COL Warden read Joint doctrine lately?

When required to employ force, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and adversary vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. JP 3-0

Simultaneity is a key characteristic of the American way of war. It refers to the simultaneous application of power against key adversary capabilities and sources of strength. The goal of simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an adversary’s collapse by placing more demands on
adversary forces and functions than can be handled. This does not mean that all elements of the joint force are employed with equal priority or that even all elements of the joint force will be employed. It refers specifically to the concept of attacking appropriate adversary forces and functions in such
a manner as to cause confusion and demoralization.
The COL's desires seem to be esconced in current doctrine, with the exception of attributing exculsivity of action to airpower.

Note the focus on forces in the above paragraphs- that is what Warden is arguing against. Additionally, I would say that joint doctrine is not always (or even often) neccessarily followed. Additionally, the JFC is normally an Army commander, and the Army doctrine is very force centric.

Unconstrained, airpower provides the vehicle to directly achieve strategic ends without the need for other forces.

What if the strategic ends require interpersonal contact between human beings? Say to gain the support of a potential ally? Why can't land or naval forces be positioned so as to take simultaneous action that directly achives stragic ends? This key premise is actually an assumption, as no evidence is provided that it is true, and it is fairly easy to conjecture situations where it is not true. (for example if your desired end state is to enforce a strategy based on interdiction of maritime contraband how does one do board and search of potential interlopers with airpower?)

Again, Warden isn't saying that land or naval power won't work, or can't help- he is saying that airpower can be more effective in many situations. The fact that airpower can work doesn't mean that land or seapower can't.

Strategy is about conceiving a desired endstate, identifying means to achieve it, implementing a course of action, and deciding when you are done.

Again, right out of Joint doctrine.

b. The design and implementation of leverage and the ability to know how and
when to terminate operations are involved in operational art and are discussed in Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations.” Because the nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations or groups, it is
fundamentally important to understand that termination of operations is an essential link between national security strategy, NMS, and end state conditions — the desired outcome. This principle holds true for both war and MOOTW. JP 3-0

I agree, I don't think Warden would argue. He is saying that the language we use tends to drive us to a certain strategy. Your example cited puts the termination or desired outcome at the end... Warden is say

Okay, quibble time- MOOTW is out, your JP 3-0 must be out of date.

From JP 3-0, 17 Sept 2006, (Inc change 1 13 Feb 08), page I-3:

Theater strategy is determined by CCDRs based on analysis of changing events in the operational environment and the development of options to set conditions for success.

Warden argues that strategy should start at ends, then work backwards. The Joint Ops Planning Process starts at the ends and theoretically works backwards. But a few paragraphs after the one you cite we have this:

Commanders strive to end combat operations on terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners. The basic element of this goal is gaining control over the enemy and/or gaining influence over a relevant population.

Warden would say that control drives us to strive for decisive battle to seize control of terrain, when we might be able to achieve our objectives by influencing the enemy's will. Subtle differences, but Warden is saying that attrition and battle are a part of our basic mentality in the US military.

The Army's Military Decision Making Process is similar, although even more force/terrain centric- as it probably should be. The first steps of Course of Action Development are "assess relative combat power", then Generate Options which consists of making COAs...

A good COA can defeat all feasible enemy COAs while accounting for essential stability tasks.

FM 5-0, March 2010, B-14 to B-15

In other words, the COA is developed based on the enemy forces expected actions. Again, the Army tends to drive most joint planning because they are most of the people involved.

Opponents are complicated entities that can be simplified by a systems analysis. (e.g. Five rings model).

Here is where things start to get contentious. The issue is "complicated" vs "Complex".

Agree on that!

When some of the "five rings" anaysis of Gulf War 1 are looked at, the sample centers of gravity (see http://www.venturist.com/Prometheus%...%20Summary.htm) are given as:

Saddam Hussien (dead),
the electrical system non-functional,
roads and bridges unable to support mobility,
military officers demoralized or defecting,
air defense unable to interfere with US operations.
With the exception of affecting military officers, those are all complicated, but not complex systems that can be modeled, simplified and decomposed into a subset of vital nodes. Physical systems that those that can be effectively approached from a systems analysis perspective.

No argument there, Desert Storm was a relatively un-complex setup, especially since our objectives were fairly simple (eject Iraq from Kuwait, make sure they could defend themselves but not attack neighbors post-conflict).

Truely complex systems - most notably social systems - are largely opaque to the sort of systems analysis that is required to predict what an effect will do. Complex systems also have a characteristic of irreducibility - they can be decomposed only so far before any resulting model is no longer useful, and you will not no until after the fact that you have exceeded the irreducibility threshold.

True. Humans are complex. But you can still determine ways to affect them.

Centers of Gravity can be identified in the system which, if affected quickly and and simultaneously, allow the state of the system to be changed to a new, more desirable state.

Another charateristic of complex systems is that the output can not be predicted from a given set of inputs. You can "set the dials and pul lthe levers" of a complex system the same way, and even if you have modeled it with 100% accuracy, you will get different outputs. When dealing with complex systems there is no way to no way to establish a requisite list of CoGs and no way to be certain that doing something to one COg will have a positive feedback one time and a negative feedback the next. This is the fundamental problem with "effects-basd warfare" in general. In every case Ive seen thee is no "theory of action" that connects the action taken, to the desired result - it is simply a matter of "guilt by association" or "correlation equals causality" (until it doesn't).

I guess my point is, what alternative do we have? Also, I think Warden's argument on the time element is critical... because humans are involved, and provide most of the complexity and a lot of the uncertainty on effects you refer to above, psychology matters. If you can successfully hit someone so quickly and in so many places that they can't react, the likelihood of them reacting in the way you want is increased, because they don't have time to change their actions or adjust.

Were it possible to create a "strategic effects machine" we would have figured it out by now in Afghanistan. Alas there is no "CoG analysis" that tells what levers to pull and dials to turn to create teh desired end state. You can lament "trail and error" but you can desire a magic strategic endstate computer all you want, but what we know about complex system theory says its impossible. Energent behavior is "emergent" becasue by definition it is not predictable.

What was our desired endstate in Afghanistan? I think Col Warden would argue that putting in extensive troops in on the ground in the first place was part of where things went wrong... He also says that airpower may not be the answer (yet), but that we should try and figure ways to use it to achieve our ends.

The COIN scenario is obviously the most difficult to apply Warden's system to... but then again, have Design, JOPP, MDMP, or FM 3-24 been completely successful in AFG?

On to the next one... good points!

V/R,

Cliff