Quote Originally Posted by Cole View Post
The bottom line Warden seems to miss, is it is virtually impossible to understand the ASCOPE and PMESII (whatever it is) operational environment without troops on the ground to report and attempt to understand those conditions. In addition, following the precision attacks, the underlying tensions remain and are aggravated by the need to rebuild...not a condition likely to endear colonists to the "homeland."
I disagree that you have to have a huge ground force. Ground observers help, but the information you are referring to shouldn't be beyond the capabilities of the CIA, DIA, State, etc.

Plus cannot believe that any CoG analysis would ignore the intrinsic value of attacking key targets of the adversary's military! In a China scenario, for instance, air-to-air becomes largely irrelevant if you succeed in repeatedly attacking runways and airbases killing the enemy's aircraft and related logistics on the ground rather than in the air. Isn't that a 5 rings approach, largely ignored in the emotional desire to fight the white scarf war? Plus those attacks of airfields do not have to occur using fighters or manned aircraft. The enemy obviously can use the same methodology to destroy our few land-based airfields for fighters in a place like the Pacific where they are far and few between and well within range of TBM and ASBM.
What you are talking about is definitely a part of Warden's 5 rings, and obviously the first step in just about any conflict - see the Libya thread for the most current example.

That said, it's tough to keep a runway out of commission permanently, and you can't be sure that the other guy doesn't have some aux fields you missed - hence why air to air is important even after you've killed the runways.

V/R,

Cliff