The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[Cole]

Posted by Cole:"If instead of massive bombing of hidden enemies and hitting populations instead, or their infrastructure/processes (that will make long term friends) we instead attack the invading country on the ground, from the sea, and air...they are forced out of hiding where airpower, long range fires, and rapid maneuver can engage them. They are slowly choked of oil and exports by blockades. Our rapid build-up of ground forces by air initially, and eventually sea, protects ports and airheads from further invasion. Having adequate force remaining for stability operations, and keeping the "enemy" army intact and on our side to help stabilize prevents the problems that occurred in OIF and an initially neglected Afghanistan."

Cole, your right. You just described Warden's Gulf War 1 Strategy. Perfect 5 rings example, works exactly as advertised.

Two points Slap:

1) Other than the 82n ABN, it took 6 months to sea deploy to Desert Storm which did not end the problem nor did the Iraq no-fly zone. What if Hussein had continued his attack into Saudi Arabia? Early airpower and airborne or SOF forces alone would not have stopped that. Even in 1991 in atypically open terrain, it took the ground attack to dislodge Iraqi forces from defenses and Kuwait so they were more effectively bombed and strafed. Assumptions that Hussein would fall did not pan out anymore than they are now in Libya. Multiple available options from air, land, and sea complement one another and cover multiple contingencies when things don't go as predicted.

2) An easy analogy for you is law enforcement. Is there any law enforcement agency that relies on aircraft or boats for anywhere near the bulk of its efforts. Of course not, because aside from cost (also an issue) even low flying helicopters and harbor ships cannot influence the bulk of the 24/7 ground efforts or respond to and deter crimes.

Ships are slow, vulnerable near the shore, and too far from many threat country interiors and their land-based forces and insurgents. Airpower at higher altitudes and faster speeds, often with a single pilot, cannot begin to locate and effectively target ground threats in complex or urban terrain even with effective electro-optical pods.

It takes someone on the ground finding targets for them, or a slower and lower flying helicopter or unmanned aircraft with a two-man crew and extensive combat arms, intelligence, and operations personnel cueing them to fullly exploit airpower. It takes ground forces able to survive close combat to force the enemy from cover and concealment to fully exploit air attacks and long range fires.