Kill Qaddafi and his inner circle,destroy or seize his personal assets and those of his inner circle. Do not attack the public in general or damage public assets.Originally Posted by pvebber
Yes, National,Military and any other Intelligence source you can find.
Depends on the final effect you want to achieve.
Just like the movie...remember somebody (intelligence source) gave them the blueprint for the deathstar.
I would suggest you start with yourself. Make a list of what you need to operate, a five rings model of yourself. Now what would happen if one or more of the inputs were eliminated. For prioritizing I like C.A.R.V.E.R. myself. How Critical,Accessible,Recognizable,Vulnerable,Effect on people,Recuperable is the the target.
Warden would call that a fractal analysis.....going from a broad concept to the perceptual concrete level of a physical target to affect. You can do that with the same 5rings model, you don't need to use the spaghetti map.
I think you would be surprised just how much of that spade work has already been done.
pvebber, don't no why I didn't think of it earlier but for training/teaching purposes click on the link below for FM3-24.2 Tactics in COIN. Go to Fig. 1-2 for an example ASCOPE model..... you will like itthen go to Fig. 6.2 to see an example of CARVER-P this is how to use it defensively but it can and should be used offensively, that is why it was originally created.
Hope this clears things up. Anymore questions or concerns just ask away.
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/coin/repository/fm3242.pdf
Combining a rereading of the COIN pub withthe latest in the series on "To design or not to design"
To design or not to design
A number of things come to mind.
The COIN manual (and Design constructs) look at systems theory as a means to identifying and understanding problems, not a way to implement specific solutions. This is a totally different construct than Warden's theory, which sees systems theory as an avenue to "reverse engineer" the "transfer function" that gets you from the current system state to the desired system state.
The COIN manual seems "list-centric" rather than "relationship-centric". Identifying components of the system is a necessary, but insufficient step in understanding the system. The more important piece (as far a influencing the system"is the relationships between components (and since they are not static, how they chang over time). This reinforces the role of sysems theory as part of IPB where you are trying to identify components, but the importance of components is a function of realtionships that are in general only incompletely know. The COIN methodolgy hhas no construct for building understanding of realtionships (the matrices are "anecdotal" in nature, not exhaustive).
The COIN manual is "battle-centric" it emplys an interative process of interactions with the adversary system (the 7 lines of operations) in a fundamentally linear way. It recognizes, at least implicitly, the broader issues I have with the Warden theory by reinforcing the long timeframes, the need for heuristic (trial and error) rather than algorithmic (pre-planned) solutions and the dangers of decoming too enamored with "strategic CoGs" at the expense of "tactical" ones (ie local problems can have strategic effect and soving strategic problems do not always "trickle down" to local effects).
The COIN manual is written from the point of view of the MDMP being sufficient to deal with the problem. What in the COIN manaul justifies Warden's calim of the need for a 'redo' of the planning process?
I am left feeling that we are very much in agreement about the role of systems theory and its limitations. I am not entirely satified withthe COIN manual and share Major Zweibelson's critcism of the Army interpretation of design. Bht my feeling is they are "on the right track" and understand the limitations and caveats.
Which unfortunatly doesn't answer the criticisms of Warden, namely:
Removing "the control circuit" is not a substitute for convincing those in control to change their behavior. Removing the "control circuit" (as we saw in Iraq) can open a Pandora's box.
The problem of understanding a complex system completely enough to "find the flaw in the deathstar" and get the easy win. The still more complex notion of the single pulse of power that shocks the system from an undesirable state to a desirable one is even more questionable given the problems we have found in trying to "tweak the system over time" to get to a desired state. If we can't incrementally move the system to a desired state, what makes us think a single set of effects performed quickly will do it?
The notion that airpower (badly-defined) has a property that allows this transfer functin to be instantiated more easily than ground power or sea power is justified how?
So thats where I am. Still an evil, parochial, "Warden Basher" I guess.
I'm off on travel next week with limited internet connectivity. (My Kindle)
Greate discussion, Thanks!
Last edited by pvebber; 03-18-2011 at 04:37 PM.
"All models are wrong, but some are useful"
-George E.P. Box
Couple of points before you go.
There is much more to Warden than just the rings.
Step 1 of Warden's Prometheus Process(thats what he calls now) is called DESIGNthe future, but nobody ever brings that up.
Step 2 is TARGET for success. The Rings analysis or mapping the system(s).
Step 3 is CAMPAIGN to win. Much of your concerns about relationships happens in this step. Additionally you will learn about Phases not a single pulse, also you will learn not to depend on single points of failure, that is the whole point of attacking multiple targets in parallel. You also will encounter the "Red Team" process.
Step 4 is FINISH with finesse. About achieving the end state which is the whole reason to do this in the first place.
But you have to look at how someone uses the words and not what words they use. He also says not to rely on prediction, but then implies that you can create a plan to achieve a future desired state. The Prometheus process claims to allow you to control your destiny. The design concepts in military terms are all about balancing that which you can control with that which you can't. That is why it is as much art as science.called DESIGN the future, but nobody ever brings that up.
To create a set of specific actions that result in a specific future requires that the result of those actions is PREDICTABLE. If it is not, then you have no reason to believe that taking the action will result in a specific end-state.
Many of Wardens process laws are just plain wrong. Source:
Every action affects the future TRUE, however what that effect is, more often than not, is not measurable and is part of causal nexus that is not decomposable.The Prometheus Process is built on a group of natural laws of strategy as follows:
Specific actions create a specific future FALSE There is no 1 to 1 correspondence in complex systems between individual actions and outcomes. An action may have no discernible impact on a system until a "tipping point" of accumulated actions occurs.
Every thing and every action happens in a system TRUE The universe is a very large system. Isolating sub-systems within the universe can lead to problems however...
All systems have inertia and resist change FALSE violates the laws of thermodynamics. All open, dissipative, systems are constantly trying to change to lower energy states. One definition of 'life' is a system that exhibits self-organization to higher degrees of complexity by expending energy.
All systems have Centers of Gravity TRUE in the practical sense of components whose high degree of interrelatedness make them more important than other components. FALSE in the absolute sense, a system can be composed of identical nodes with symmetric relationships and therefore none are more important than others.
Systems Change when their Centers of Gravity change TRUE, given the definition of CoG, but there can be components that exhibit "tipping point" behaviors that will become CoGs when they tip, but are discernible as such beforehand.
The extent and probability of system change is proportional to the number of Centers of Gravity affected, and the speed at which they are affected ABSOLUTIVELY POSILUTELY FALSE. Proportionality means linear, and the vast majority of systems are non-linear and DO NOT exhibit proportional responses. ONLY linear systems do.
All known systems and things have a beginning and an end
TRUE from a practical standpoint, but not absolutely true (The jury is still out on the nature of cosmogony - the origin of the universe)
FALSE - a variation on the first law and suffers the same flaw. It also is not time reversible. A specific end is not the result of specific actions. It can also be the result of internal interactions within the system.Specific actions produce specific ends
To be able to choose specific targets, the "mapping" of the system needs to be detailed enough to enable prediction of the outcome of affecting the targets. I have yet to see an implementation of that gets beyond "target list making". Making a list of targets, with at least having a "theory of action" fro WHY the elements of that list are important gets you the sort of ad hoc metric-chasing that has befuddled our efforts in Iraq and AfPak.Step 2 is TARGET for success. The Rings analysis or mapping the system(s).
Either our best and brightest are incompetent, or an engineering design metaphor to creating a desired end-state JUST DOESN'T WORK IN ALL CASES.
The "rings of importance" construct (how ever many there are, and what you call the) is a useful framework for UNDERSTANDING the categories of components in a system and some general relationships between categories - but is WOEFULLY INSUFFICIENT for creating a desired endstate in a system of any real complexity.
How can you plan the campaign if you don't learn about the relationships between components until to start taking action? This is what distinguishes the "realistic" applications of systems theory to military operations (iterative, continuing and evolving) with the "engineered" episodic" application Warden claims in his theory.Step 3 is CAMPAIGN to win. Much of your concerns about relationships happens in this step. Additionally you will learn about Phases not a single pulse, also you will learn not to depend on single points of failure, that is the whole point of attacking multiple targets in parallel. You also will encounter the "Red Team" process.
You attack multiple targets in parallel, and then what? how long do you wait to asses if your end state is achieved? I assume that if you don't then you plan and execute another episode of parallel attacks. We are eliminating "battle" remember so there is no "steady state" engagement with the adversary (that would be to "do battle" with him).
Sorry, but I can't help but recall Buzz Lightyear "falling, with style". From the "military Warden" and not the business guru this meant being magnanimous in victory and not imposing demeaning conditions on the defeated adversary that will fester into resentments and a rekindling of hostilities. That is just common sense, not systems theory.Step 4 is FINISH with finesse. About achieving the end state which is the whole reason to do this in the first place.
This is a different strategic framework than the COIN or operational design frameworks.
It is also not in harmony with actual systems theory (for reasons given in the above discussion of warden's "laws".
I agree with you Slap on the usefulness of systems theory, again, I don't think the Warden theory is good systems theory, or good military art.
"All models are wrong, but some are useful"
-George E.P. Box
The History Of Ring Warfare
Well looks like I can't change your mind but maybe Walt can. Walt Disney Movie explaining the theory of Ring Warfare and how to win using Airpower.
Links to the Disney Classic from 1942 "Victory Through Airpower"
Part 7,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Zxof...eature=related
Part 8
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zlr_H...eature=related
Part 9
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfaFk...eature=related
Part 10
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuVkY...eature=related
Enjoy your trip.
Mental War Game
This thread is difficult. the conversation about the validity and applicability of a strategy keeps evolving into a sterile discussion between believers and non-believers. To improve the exchange of ideas, I propose a mental war game.
- We fast-forward the American Revolution War into the future. The thirteen colonies are under British rule in 2011.
- Everything on the ground (weapons, tactics, vehicles,...) remains the same.
- The British Crown receives five aircraft carriers, a manual on the application of the Five-Ring Strategy and John Ashley Warden III himself to lead the British forces at Her Majesty's service.
- The use of the aircraft carriers would double the monthly burden of the war effort, but only for the duration of the war.
My question is the following: under these circumstances, would the British forces win the War of American Revolution and keep the thirteen colonies under British rule?
How do you know what the key nodes of the 5 rings are without troops on the ground!
Not a legitimate scenario because views of what is acceptable vary depending on who employs the air/seapower.
If the colonists hugged populations, hid in the woods, used anti-ship ballistic missiles and diesel electric subs that waited for carriers to come to them, and hidden mobile radar air defense systems that engaged carrier aircraft and then shut down radars and repositioned...game on for the colonists. Plus, a more evolved colonist would simply move more inland with his leaders, processes, populations, infrastructure, and land-based aircraft and TBM...thus outdistancing carrier attacks.
Don't forget jamming GPS, attack of satellites, and an EMP attack of Hawaii, Guam, and Alaska...err I mean Britain and Canada. Lots of inflatable decoys out in the open will be sure to waste multiple bombs, followed up by air defense ambushes.
If the air/seapower didn't care about the population and bombed cities, infrastructure, and processes into oblivion, and bombed houses of perceived leaders killing their families (but not the leaders)...the British probably win. But the U.S. would never do that today, or would they per Warden's methodology? Russia appears to have leveled much of Chechnya to suppress that revolution. Gulbuddin Hekmatyr shelled Kabul and Russian bombers killed 24,000 in Herat early in the war. Did any of these methods solve the undlerlying problem and is the leader and his colonist lead followers still in power?
Would the colonists become meek, passive zombies following this slaughter...or increase their resolve and guerilla activities, not to mention terror attacks in Britain?
The bottom line Warden seems to miss, is it is virtually impossible to understand the ASCOPE and PMESII (whatever it is) operational environment without troops on the ground to report and attempt to understand those conditions. In addition, following the precision attacks, the underlying tensions remain and are aggravated by the need to rebuild...not a condition likely to endear colonists to the "homeland."
Plus cannot believe that any CoG analysis would ignore the intrinsic value of attacking key targets of the adversary's military! In a China scenario, for instance, air-to-air becomes largely irrelevant if you succeed in repeatedly attacking runways and airbases killing the enemy's aircraft and related logistics on the ground rather than in the air. Isn't that a 5 rings approach, largely ignored in the emotional desire to fight the white scarf war? Plus those attacks of airfields do not have to occur using fighters or manned aircraft. The enemy obviously can use the same methodology to destroy our few land-based airfields for fighters in a place like the Pacific where they are far and few between and well within range of TBM and ASBM.
Last edited by Cole; 03-19-2011 at 01:20 PM. Reason: Added to last paragraph
OK, so now a hard core attrition strategy is based on the Five Rings!?! This is the antithesis of Warden argument! If it can be all things to all people its just meaningless.Links to the Disney Classic from 1942 "Victory Through Airpower"
We are seemingly at a basic philosophical impasse about how the world works, and what the purpose of models of it are and when they are useful.
First is the desired endstate. DO the British just want to keep the Americans in the Empire, or do they want to return to the status quo ante? If you just want to keep them in the Empire then you negotiate out the grievances (with your carriers big sticks reminding the colonists of the stakes) and come to a compromise that increases American representation and tempers taxation without killing the golden goose. If you want to compel a return to the status quo ante, you have a problem that pretty much requires a use of force to compel.My question is the following: under these circumstances, would the British forces win the War of American Revolution and keep the thirteen colonies under British rule?
Then you get WHAT do you try to affect?
The Five Rings strategy starts with leadership. Assuming the latter desired endstate, Warden would focus on trying to identify the revolutions leadership.
Problem 1: Applicability of Mao's Peoples war theory - do we believe that the American Revolution was the product of the Founding Father's actions, thus their elimination would decapitate the revolution and end it? Or was the emergence of the Founding Fathers the product of an idea that enjoyed significant enough grassroots support, that, like we see with Al Qeada - crunch all the leaders you want, more will step up?
I'll give Warden credit for not cutting off his nose to spite his face and he would employ lots of SOF ground forces and Intelligence assets to learn the identities and locations of the Leadership.
Problem 2: How do come up with the set of parallel operations when the system you are affecting is in a constant dynamic state?
This is the problem with "hold at Risk" strategies. You can typically only determine the identity and location of a small subset of a mobile target set. You might be able to attack Franklin, Washington and Hamilton one day, and then Adams, Jay and Madison the next. And once you strike a subset you tip your hand and may burn some of your intel assets and drive the leadership to a new operating pattern.
It becomes a sequential operation , not a parallel one.
And if the Americans are smart they will make sure any strikes cause a significant collateral damage to loyalists.
Problem 3 of the whole strategy - The enemy gets a vote. Warden assumes that you can observe and affect the adversary system in a detached way. The Red Team effort in his is what we call "Blue red team" which is looking for flaws in the Blue plan. He does not address "Red red Team" Which is an independent team PLAYING RED and coming up with how Red may play the game, not just what the flaws in the Blue plan are. How to deal with a sophisticated Red that gives you the information they know you desire - but use the fact they know how you will respond to it against you (ie the leadership turns out not to be at the "big meeting" but its "take your child to work day" or "model Government day"? The strategy assumes that you in essence know what the enemy is thinking.
Problem 4 of the strategy is related to the above - The Media gets a vote. Warden doens't include this at all in his theory and assumes that you can conduct your application of effects in a vacuuum of broader scrutiny and political context. The Colonists will play the "underdog card" and ensure that the British are portrayed in the media as evil, jackbooted nazis because they are DELIBERATELY ignoring your military forces and conducting political assassination and brutal destruction of your civil infrastructure. Buy the PLO playbook and add Christien Amonpur and Anderson Cooper to speed dial. Play up that "good guys" use their military to attack the other guys military ONLY and that means there can be on other characterization of the British other than EVIL.
This is the essence of the "theory meets practice" problem that I made WAY to philosoicalThe bottom line Warden seems to miss, is it is virtually impossible to understand the ASCOPE and PMESII (whatever it is) operational environment without troops on the ground to report and attempt to understand those conditions. In addition, following the precision attacks, the underlying tensions remain and are aggravated by the need to rebuild...not a condition likely to endear colonists to the "homeland.". 5 Rings-like frameworks are importatn to understanding the problem, but the information you need to make them actionable is tremendous, fleeting and subject to contamination by an a sophisticated adversary.
This is the essence of the "you don't get to eliminate battle from the vocabulary if the enemy chooses to fight them" problem. Interestingly the potential problem in the future China scenario that has everybody crying "AirSea Battle" is that - by wardens definition - Lanpower now out ranges airpower and can hodl it at bay. SInce unguided ballistic missiles are not "airpower" but land power by Wardens definition, the abilty to take out airbases at it nearly intercontinental ranges with ballistic missiles (and potentially even carrier at sea) you are left having to fight battles of access to even get your air power in play en mass.Plus cannot believe that any CoG analysis would ignore the intrinsic value of attacking key targets of the adversary's military! In a China scenario, for instance, air-to-air becomes largely irrelevant if you succeed in repeatedly attacking runways and airbases killing the enemy's aircraft and related logistics on the ground rather than in the air. Isn't that a 5 rings approach, largely ignored in the emotional desire to fight the white scarf war? Plus those attacks of airfields do not have to occur using fighters or manned aircraft. The enemy obviously can use the same methodology to destroy our few land-based airfields for fighters in a place like the Pacific where they are far and few between and well within range of TBM and ASBM.
The bottom is that you are hard pressed to come up with a success scenario "with little unplanned destruction or spilling of blood" that achieves your objectives using the actual 5 Rings strategy.
As Warden points out in his article, this would be a war you would not choose to wage because the strategy can't win with a high probability.
So just what types of "end-states" can the 5 rings strategy compel an adversary to choose? Like Walt Disney points out, ones where the desired endstate is "surrender". That construct is simply not useful in the real world any more.
Over to the Warden-istas. How do you address the problems?
"All models are wrong, but some are useful"
-George E.P. Box
pvebber,
Good discussion so far, but both from non-Warden-istas. Like you, I look forward to the first comment by a Warden-ista. To paraphrase Warden:
"If we see the American revolutionaries as a system, we first determine what the system needs to look like so that we can realize our future picture for it. London envisiones to keep the thirteen colonies under British rule and benefit from its wealth by raising taxes. With this choice of the desired overall system effect, the next step is to find the centers of gravity whose alteration will create the desired system change as directly (strategically) as possible. We start with the center ring and work from the inside to the outside to find the right centers of gravity. This is how we, Warden-istas solve this problem:" PLEASE STATE YOUR COURSE OF ACTION HERE.
pvebber, kind of cheap shot don't you think? I plainly pointed out it was the History! of the rings from 1942.
Last edited by slapout9; 03-20-2011 at 03:36 AM. Reason: stuff
Marc, I am really confused now. I read the article when it was first published and I just reread it again. I don't see anything new in fact didn't the Holy Roman Church operate in a similar fashion? The church operated the public welfare system and they certainly did a lot of preaching but they also had a military arm to keep the kings in check if need be.
He doesn't miss it and has never said that ground forces would not be needed or don't have a vital role to play. Using Special Forces like we did in A's tan, Dropping Paratroopers to secure a COG or the Marines using a Helicopter Assault are all forms of Airpower. And if on the ground forces are need for ISR feedback he would have no problem with it. Because he is pro Airpower people think he is anit-Navy or Army he isn't. He just dosen't believe in taking the risk if it can be done from the Air but when it can not be done he has no problem with another service doing it. He understands Airborne Warfare as it was originally conceived better than most people in the Army.
He has never said any such thing in fact he has said the exact opposite. He has said you may not have any choice but to attack the military ring, but when you do it should be analyzed just like any other system.
But keep asking questions all in all you seem to understand him fairly well. A Few tweeks here and there maybe needed.
Cuius regio, eius religio.
It is not my point that a religion running a welfare system is something new. My point is that strategists have to take political restrictions into account (wether new or age-old). ALL power systems have political restrictions to worry about.
Autocrats derive their power from the barrel of a gun, so they face the political constraint of coup-proofing to avoid that barrel being pointed at themselves, at the price of military effectiveness.
Democrats derive their power from the consent of the governed, so they face the political constraint of fighting within the bounderies set by elections, opinion polls, lawyers, and pressure groups, at the price of military sustainability.
Islamists derive their power from the obidience of the faithful, so they face the political constraint of consistency to avoid alienating people from their faith, at the price of military applicability.
Your analogy with the Holy Roman Church is correct. Like the Islamic duty zakat, Christians have the duty to help the poor, resulting in a welfare system that advances the obidience of the faithful. Throughout history, this obedience has allowed the church to mobilize against "the further enemy" (the crusades against Muslims in the Holy Land for instance) BUT NOT (and that is the point) against the "nearer enemy". When the renaissance popes tried to mobilize the faithful in an effort to further their worldly power in the Italian political chaos, they lost all credibility in the eyes of the faithful and sparked a christian revolution headed by Martin Luther and the protestants. Similarly, Islamists can easily mobilize Muslims to fight against the west, but they have difficulty to mobilize the faithful against Muslim autocrats. Muslim autocrats exploit this Islamist political constraint.
A similar thing happened in Europe. After the renaissance popes and the protestant revolution headed by Martin Luther, a bloody thirty year war erupted in Germany. This war resulted in the treaty of Westphalia which is still the foundation of the current nation-state world political system. One of the pillars of this system was the principle "cuius regio, eius religio" in which each prince would have the right to determine the religion of his own state, the options being Catholicism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism. The power of this system is that the prince and the clergy can mobilize the faithful to fight a "further enemy", but that no priest or bisshop can mobilize the faithful against the prince.Over decades, the relatively moderate governments of Egypt and Jordan developed a delicate social, political, legal, military, and law enforcement apparatus to keep Islamist militant organizations in check. Conceptually, it takes the form of an arsenal of mutually reinforcing population control measures, and its focus is on the da’wa infrastructure, not on the jihadi operatives. The apparatus’s most important capabilities are to co-opt (parts of) Islamist militant organizations, to subject their da’wa activities to registration and licensing, to control their fund raising, to provide permanent surveillance of their cadres, and to intervene decisively when this surveillance detects preparations for a jihadi campaign.
Successful attack from the sea, and 3 B-2s...so why do we need a big USAF?;)
An example of what you described occurred during the recent Northern Waziristan attack that killed 40 with unmanned aircraft missiles. The Pakistanis promptly halt talks with the U.S., saying it was a meeting to discuss chromite mining between elders and Taliban. Unspoken was that the Taliban were attempting to tax the mining operation to gain funds for Afghan combat operations.The Media gets a vote. Warden doens't include this at all in his theory and assumes that you can conduct your application of effects in a vacuum of broader scrutiny and political context. The Colonists will play the "underdog card" and ensure that the British are portrayed in the media as evil, jackbooted nazis because they are DELIBERATELY ignoring your military forces and conducting political assassination and brutal destruction of your civil infrastructure. Buy the PLO playbook and add Christien Amanpour and Anderson Cooper to speed dial. Play up that "good guys" use their military to attack the other guys military ONLY and that means there can be on other characterization of the British other than EVIL.
So in theory, it may have been a legitimate target, however, the elders representing the mining operation were no doubt under pressure to give up funds to the "good Taliban"...or else. This is a classic example where aerial ISR alone, and SOF/CIA operations alone are insufficient to gain the total picture. Innocent or CLAIMED innocents are brought into many an aerial attack situation if insufficient aerial ISR is all that is available without a parallel context of ground forces fusing their information with that of the UAS operator.
To counter Slapout's point that SOF/CIA/JTACs are sufficient, Bin Laden was able to escape because we had so few troops on the ground that even when calls came to reinforce the Tora Bora area, those ground forces were not available. Even with ample ground forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was not until the surge that we were fully able to cover all affected areas and threats. Small teams are insufficient when the insurgent can simply move elsewhere.
Today we see the successful use of cruise missiles and three B-2 bombers to attack air defenses and airfields. So why do we need a huge USAF when we have these asymmetric capabilities...and no place to launch lots of fighters and tankers from near China outside TBM range?
In addition, we see Admiral Mullen saying that Qaddafi's overthrow is not the objective. So guess my question is how is this different than the last Northern Watch/Southern Watch that lasted a decade without ousting Hussein or suppressing ground operations?
Slap, you posted:
You bring it up in the context of trying to change my mind about the issues with ring theory, by seemingly extending it in hindsight to any application of airpower.Well looks like I can't change your mind but maybe Walt can. Walt Disney Movie explaining the theory of Ring Warfare and how to win using Airpower.
Links to the Disney Classic from 1942 "Victory Through Airpower"
I certainly did not intend a "cheap shot" I was simply venting my frustration that any criticism can be parried by seemingly extending the scope of the theory well beyond the scope of what it seems Warden intended (Removing the need for protracted "battle" and getting straight to strategic effects quickly and efficiently.pvebber, kind of cheap shot don't you think? I plainly pointed out it was the History! of the rings from 1942.
Warden himself in the article pointed out that the 8th Air Force effort was an incomplete attempt to include CoGs in the war effort and did not follow the 5 rings theory.
I hope we can agree that WWII airpower - regardless how effective we assess it in hindsight - was "a protracted battle" to achieve an effect over a long, long time, and not "highly compressed, highly parallel, inside the opponents reaction time". So bring it up as illuminating Warden's theory when Warden himself casts it off as a bad example? That is my frustration.
I have stated repeatedly that the notion of affecting CoGs to reduce the efficiency of the adversary war production is non-controversial. What is controversial is the notion that it can be not necessary - but SUFFICIENT to win a conflict. Airpower was not in WWII, nor any other conflict. Why should we think that increased precision alone now makes it so.
Are these not Wardens arguments?He doesn't miss it and has never said that ground forces would not be needed or don't have a vital role to play.
Ground forces can conduct only serial operations, which are to be avoided.
Ground forces must overcome adversary ground forces through battle in order to achieve effects and "battle" is not just to be avoided, but removed from our vocabulary.
The implication from Warden's theory is that ground forces are implicitly defensive in nature - they prevent enemy ground forces from attacking your airbases. Their role in the offensive should be as limited as possible.
I am open to other interpretations of what "removing battle from our vocabulary" and:
What could the offensive contribution of ground forces be in such a construct other than a limited SOF role in intelligence gathering and DA in support of air operations?To realize the future picture, we must change the opponent system, which we do by affecting one or more of its centers of gravity. The resulting impact on the system will be a function of how quickly the cen#ters are affected. If we do so too slowly (se#rially), the system will probably find ways to repair itself, protect itself against further attacks, and begin its own operations against its opponent’s systems. Conversely, if we affect enough centers of gravity quickly enough (in parallel), the system will go into a state of paralysis, preventing it from re#pairing itself, protecting itself against future attacks, or making competent attacks against its opponent’s systems.
How do paratroopers and marines take CoGs without battle? OR is it that we must redefine battle as we have redefined airpower (The joke in MC02 was that the Air Force wanted submarines to put torpedo shots on the ATO because they were launched with compressed airUsing Special Forces like we did in A's tan, Dropping Paratroopers to secure a COG or the Marines using a Helicopter Assault are all forms of Airpower.)
What if the bad guys have an actual Army that actually defends its CoGs requiring more force than you can transport by air? (like tanks).
This ignores the reality that the Defense budget is a zero sum game. If the air Force is to get the kit required to make his vision a reality, we need a helluva lot more than a couple dozen B-2s and a host of new strike capabilities with a VAST increase in capacity.Because he is pro Airpower people think he is anit-Navy or Army he isn't. He just dosen't believe in taking the risk if it can be done from the Air but when it can not be done he has no problem with another service doing it. He understands Airborne Warfare as it was originally conceived better than most people in the Army.
Do you really think he would be OK with giving up the Future bomber to build a new class of SSGNs as the deployer of choice of strike capability in future areas where land power outranges land based airpower?
If he thinks that "Airborne" operations are a means in and of themselves to achieve significant ends, then he did not learn the lessons of Viet Nam in terms of the roles and limitations of Air mobile operations.
Gotta sign out for a while now (and there was much rejoicing...yeaaaaa!)
I look forward to seeing some more discussion of the scenarios brought up so far. So far it seems that they gravitate to either "no holds barred" major theater war where the goal is coercion using a theory akin to "nuclear warfare by conventional means" , or "decapitation strikes".
If Wardens warning not to use airpower when it can't win preculed what's in between, then it is arguing itself into irrelevance in the main of future warfare.
"All models are wrong, but some are useful"
-George E.P. Box
A parting olive branch...
Warden's theory at its root is about improving the use of CoGs and a systems thinking framework to make military operations shorter, more efficient and more effective. It assumes that faster more parallel operations are "better". Reducing the unknown (both known and unknown) is assumed to be a key enabler of the attaining the understanding of the enemy system required to do this. Working back systematically from a singular desired endstate is the strategic method.
There are circumstances where this is the preferred approach. In these situations "airpower" is the supported arm.
Army COIN and Design-inspired theory (and much of USMC "Distributed operations" theory) is about accepting that there will never be enough information to "solve" the military problems associated with irregular and hybrid warfare - or even fully understand the nature of the problems you are trying to solve until you "grab the tarbaby". You are stuck engaging in a serial "probing' of the system you are trying to understand/affect along a number of lines of operation that are iterative, heuristic, and unpredictable in their outcome. Evolving solutions over time to favorable shape a wide potential set of endstates is the strategic method
There are circumstances where this is the preferred problem approach. In these circumstances "landpower" is the supported arm.
The Navy is off being "The "Global Force for Good" and is happy to be a resource provider in support of either one
Would Warden support that construct and a "why can't we all just get along" approach and accept that the two approaches have their preferred problem sets, both are necessary but insufficient to address the complete range of possible military operations and need to be integrated rather than in competition? (which is oh by the way basically what the Joint Operating Concept series describe).
Last edited by pvebber; 03-20-2011 at 05:10 PM.
"All models are wrong, but some are useful"
-George E.P. Box
Ok, so where do Republicans get their power? Bad joke
I am starting to understand the confusion now. I probably should have said this or asked this. What laws or constraints was UBL acting under when he attacked America? I don't see any, he simply wanted to achieve a desired effect by any means at his disposal. There were no rules or laws or constraints that I could see or understand.
Like I said Paratrooper are Airpower not just SOF. So why is it Warden's fault that the Army didn't have a battalion of Paratroopers or Rangers ready to go?
Think Bill Laden could have outrun these guys? We don't have any real Airpower Soldiers. But we could have this is late 50's early 60's Airpower technology.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOVh-vlUius
On the contrary.
slapout9,
On the contrary. ALL power systems have political restrictions to worry about. Islamists, like UBL, derive their power from the obedience of the faithful. Therefore, UBL's strategies, operations and tactics have to be (perceived to be) consistent with Islam. For instance, UBL has conducted terrorist attacks in Saoudi Arabia (the Khobar Towers bombing). This attack was possible because it was directed against foreigners. However, it would be impossible for UBL to conduct a terrorist attack in Mecca during the Hajj, even if this would result into a much higher number of victims.
Marc
I insist that there is no confusion. Warden already stressed the fact that "All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment." I hope we can agree that this statement is correct and valid for any strategist. All power systems have political restrictions to worry about and it is the strategist's job to come up with a strategy within the bounderies of these restrictions. It is NOT the politician's job to change the political and physical environment to suit the strategy.
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