The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[jmm99]

would not mind comments by Wilf, Ken and anyone else - if they are so inclined - on the following two (short) statements:

John Warden [JW]: Einstein once said that he was uninterested in observations unless there was a theory to explain them. Without theory, there is no rigorous way to develop and test new tactics for the strategic effect they may have.

and:

PKG: How does a combat leader demonstrate combat leadership qualities and lead by example in an age when manned aircraft are becoming increasingly obsolescent?

JW: The word “combat” may be an adjective that is not needed. Leadership is leadership.

[Bill Moore]

he made a couple of good points, but staying true to form he made a couple of comments that just don't mesh with the reality that I know, such as his comments about rotary wing and fixed wing. Granted it is situation specific, but there are not a whole lot of fixed winged air strips supporting many of the remote fire bases in Afghanistan. I know crisis du jour, but....

Other than carrying people and putting them down in small areas, it would appear that fixed wing aircraft can do almost everything a helicopter can do, but do it faster and more efficiently. In general, there is probably a greater need for more fixed wing capability (which includes UAVs) than for more rotary wing craft.

and the following statement tells me he still has a very narrow view of conflict, we have proven again and again we can't defeat anyone from the air whether in N. Vietnam, London, Kuwait, or Afghanistan.

We should really think about close air support as something that happens because of a big mistake on someone’s part. The idea should be to conduct operations in such a way that it is not needed. Finally, if a situation arises where close air support is needed, the decision to use it should be in the context of the operational level situation at the time.

On the positive side I thought his comparison of the objectives between the first Gulf War and the second Gulf War and Afghanistan were useful.

In the second Gulf War, US objectives for Iraq, other than deposing the Hussein government, seemed to be open-ended, but to include an effective end to historical, regional, religious, and tribal animosity; adoption of a democratic form of government; amicable compromise among groups over contentious issues; and ready acceptance of alliance with the US. Unlike the first Gulf War, with the exception of deposing the Hussein government, all of these objectives depended completely on Iraqi acceptance and cooperation.

The first part of the Afghanistan war was strategic: unseat the Taliban government and replace it with one that would not support and protect Al Qaeda; and destroy Al Qaeda operating facilities in Afghanistan. Following success in the first part, however, objectives expanded to include nation-building, democratization, elimination of the drug trade, and suppression of the Taliban. As in the second Gulf War, success required either dramatic cooperation by most Afghans or intense military operations sustained over prohibitively long time periods.

Open-ended objectives that required the conquered to change core beliefs.

Failure to operate against the right centres of gravity in the right way.

Assuming a short war in both cases while being aware that a very long and expensive war was not a palatable option either from a domestic or an international standpoint.

In my opinion, he is correct, we made every mistake he said we did, but I would argue these mistakes were made because too many officers adopted Warden's theories, and didn't plan to fight a people's war. So I'm agreeing, but adding to his argument that his narrow view of war and the narrow application of force is partly what led us down the wrong path initially.

He is a die hard air power advocate and appears to sincerely believe that air power can the decisive tool in any conflict, yet history informs us that his argument is bankrupt. Air power plays a "critical" role in the joint fight, but in the end we have to put boots on the ground. When we do that, we sure as heck wouldn't mind having some close air support, so I hope we plan for it.

[Ken White]

First, with respect to Slap's post. These excerpts from Warden:

Next, it became a powerful targeting tool because it provided a high level understanding of any opponent relevant to the objective for that opponent.

True in the ideal, unfortunately, it relies on fallible humans making the right choices, therefor...

We should really think about close air support as something that happens because of a big mistake on someone’s part. The idea should be to conduct operations in such a way that it is not needed.

That myth has killed more people than it should have. I will agree that if if you resort to combat, any type, a mistake has been made by someone or several someones. But once combat is required, you are flat not going to end it with air power.

Finally, if a situation arises where close air support is needed, the decision to use it should be in the context of the operational level situation at the time.

That's either an ambiguous or a meaningless statement. In the way I think he means it, it's not always possible and Afghanistan is an example -- the Operational level of that war is Afghanistan. The various actions that take place within that operational context are tactical and air support thus becomes of necessity tactically determined.

JW: The political objectives we used to put together the first Gulf War air campaign were as follows:

- Iraq to be out of Kuwait.
- Iraq not to be a strategic threat to its neighbours for at least a decade (as a result of losing so much of its offensive capability including its WMD programmes).
- Iraq functional and able to defend itself against its neighbours.
- The Middle East/Persian Gulf area to be more stable.

I guess two out of four is okay. I also guess that the failures in the last two plus the need for Northern and Southern Watches show the best laid plans and all the rings can be upset by dumb humans making decisions...

I would agree that in all areas of competition ranging from business to war, strategy is absent or poorly done. We definitely need to get better at it. Given the performance (or lack thereof) of economics, I don’t think, however, that economics would be my model.

Well, I can agree with him on that one...

I also agree with most of Bill's comments.

As to the two questions of JMM:

White's corollary; "A theory rigorously tested may prove that an observation was either correct or incorrect and later experience may prove that the testing or the tester was not adequately rigorous."

I agree on leadership. With a caveat. For most people, the transition is not a problem but there are a few people who do well in peacetime yet cannot adequately handle the stress of combat and, conversely, a few excellent combat leaders cannot cope with the boredom and tedium of peacetime.

Thus his statement is essentially correct but the theory and the reality differ due to human vagaries. Make that statements, plural...

[Steve Blair]

Not much to add to this one. Warden for me is something of a one-track recording. You need airpower in some situations, just like you need any sort of combat power. IMO our own LawVol did a much better job of showing how airpower can contribute to the non-kinetic fight here than anything I've seen from the colonel.

[William F. Owen]

PKG: Do the nature and character of war change?

JW: Yes to both but strategic principles seem to be fairly constant over very long periods.

Rubbish. War cannot change and warfare evolves. Strategy is a function of politics, so strategic principles are political principles.

As for the rest, there are a few other statements I catergorically disagree with but Ken White and Bill Moore got there quicker and with more style!

[slapout9]

Rubbish. War cannot change and warfare evolves. Strategy is a function of politics, so strategic principles are political principles.

As for the rest, there are a few other statements I catergorically disagree with but Ken White and Bill Moore got there quicker and with more style!

Wilf, everybody, it has been pretty mild compared to what I expected. But debate is good! If everybody agreed there would be no reason to post......there would be no reason for the SWC so let the fire bombing begin.