he made a couple of good points, but staying true to form he made a couple of comments that just don't mesh with the reality that I know, such as his comments about rotary wing and fixed wing. Granted it is situation specific, but there are not a whole lot of fixed winged air strips supporting many of the remote fire bases in Afghanistan. I know crisis du jour, but....

Other than carrying people and putting them down in small areas, it would appear that fixed wing aircraft can do almost everything a helicopter can do, but do it faster and more efficiently. In general, there is probably a greater need for more fixed wing capability (which includes UAVs) than for more rotary wing craft.
and the following statement tells me he still has a very narrow view of conflict, we have proven again and again we can't defeat anyone from the air whether in N. Vietnam, London, Kuwait, or Afghanistan.

We should really think about close air support as something that happens because of a big mistake on someone’s part. The idea should be to conduct operations in such a way that it is not needed. Finally, if a situation arises where close air support is needed, the decision to use it should be in the context of the operational level situation at the time.
On the positive side I thought his comparison of the objectives between the first Gulf War and the second Gulf War and Afghanistan were useful.

In the second Gulf War, US objectives for Iraq, other than deposing the Hussein government, seemed to be open-ended, but to include an effective end to historical, regional, religious, and tribal animosity; adoption of a democratic form of government; amicable compromise among groups over contentious issues; and ready acceptance of alliance with the US. Unlike the first Gulf War, with the exception of deposing the Hussein government, all of these objectives depended completely on Iraqi acceptance and cooperation.
The first part of the Afghanistan war was strategic: unseat the Taliban government and replace it with one that would not support and protect Al Qaeda; and destroy Al Qaeda operating facilities in Afghanistan. Following success in the first part, however, objectives expanded to include nation-building, democratization, elimination of the drug trade, and suppression of the Taliban. As in the second Gulf War, success required either dramatic cooperation by most Afghans or intense military operations sustained over prohibitively long time periods.
Open-ended objectives that required the conquered to change core beliefs.

Failure to operate against the right centres of gravity in the right way.

Assuming a short war in both cases while being aware that a very long and expensive war was not a palatable option either from a domestic or an international standpoint.
In my opinion, he is correct, we made every mistake he said we did, but I would argue these mistakes were made because too many officers adopted Warden's theories, and didn't plan to fight a people's war. So I'm agreeing, but adding to his argument that his narrow view of war and the narrow application of force is partly what led us down the wrong path initially.

He is a die hard air power advocate and appears to sincerely believe that air power can the decisive tool in any conflict, yet history informs us that his argument is bankrupt. Air power plays a "critical" role in the joint fight, but in the end we have to put boots on the ground. When we do that, we sure as heck wouldn't mind having some close air support, so I hope we plan for it.