The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[slapout9]

Link to the article below. Read and find out why Airpower Theory has NOTHING to do with the Air Force, it is simply anything guided that moves through Air or Space regardless of which organization owns it or the platform from which it is launched. Also Wilf will have a fit as he takes Clausewitz to task and makes a good argument for "Bloodless Warfare."


http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchr..._04_warden.pdf

[pvebber]

Not really a lot new here, mostly a rehash of:

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...les/warden.htm

and

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...ttle/chp4.html

A synthesis of this "strategic paralysis" school of thought , combined with with Boyd's work is done in:

http://ebooks.gutenberg.us/AU_Press_...adok/fadok.pdf


The fundamental flaw in the Warden school of thought is that it is based on a fundamentally mechanistic view of systems theory. The only way you can "backplan" from a desired future state to the sequence of "centers of gravity" you have to break, is if there is a rigid cause and effect linkage amenable to such a decomposition.

There is a name for systems that do NOT exhibit that feature. "Complex". If you are trying to break simple systems with rigid cause and effect like power grids or supply chains then the Warden theory works great. Start trying to apply it to political systems and social networks and, well Aaron Barr of HBGary found out the hard way about how "the adversary gets a vote"

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/n...d-the-hive.ars

Airpower allows the simultaneous attack of key points in the adsersary system causing it to collapse. The more precise the ability to attack, the smaller the actualy kinetic effect required and the less the collateral damage.

The reality is that "centers of gravity" are not static and a true systems theory understanding of an adversary of any apprciable complexity is that they are not "mechanism" but "organisms" that do not simply and predictably collapse when "affected" but adapt, repair, re-orient, and exhibit unpredictable emergent responses.

A strategy based on the ability to predict the future - which is what is required in order to foresee a desired end-state, and determine a set of simultaneous actions that will result in an inexorable path to it - is not a realistic one. Despite how energetically we may wish it were so.

[Ken White]

The reality is that "centers of gravity" are not static and a true systems theory understanding of an adversary of any apprciable complexity is that they are not "mechanism" but "organisms" that do not simply and predictably collapse when "affected" but adapt, repair, re-orient, and exhibit unpredictable emergent responses.

A strategy based on the ability to predict the future - which is what is required in order to foresee a desired end-state, and determine a set of simultaneous actions that will result in an inexorable path to it - is not a realistic one. Despite how energetically we may wish it were so. (emphasis added / kw)

Two very important facts. Thanks for posting that.

Our desire for detailed instructions or a blueprint nowadays never ceases to amaze me. It's almost like people do not want to think...

[Fuchs]

Air warfare strategy (real strategy!) becomes pretty interesting once it's being aimed at the enemy leadership's will (or ability to stay in power).

All else in air warfare is of rather secondary quality and ranges from support for army/navy (often very indirect) as lowly as to petty punishments.

Warden's airpower theory sounds to me like a) a misunderstanding and b) a surrender in face of the challenges. It's no wonder that many people are not convinced by him (and equally difficult to grasp why he's still famous!).


I wonder whether there's really no much better airpower strategist available (who's willing to publish something)?

Well, save for me, I think of myself as the great airpower strategist, of course. On the other hand, I thought I was a good driver until I wrecked my car without much outside help!

[Cliff]

Air warfare strategy (real strategy!) becomes pretty interesting once it's being aimed at the enemy leadership's will (or ability to stay in power).

What else is war about?

All else in air warfare is of rather secondary quality and ranges from support for army/navy (often very indirect) as lowly as to petty punishments.

Hmm, how do you think the Wehrmacht, or say the Iraqi Military in 1991 felt about this? Pretty secondary quality huh...

Warden's airpower theory sounds to me like a) a misunderstanding and b) a surrender in face of the challenges. It's no wonder that many people are not convinced by him (and equally difficult to grasp why he's still famous!).

Can you explain why you think this is a misunderstanding, or a surrender?

I wonder whether there's really no much better airpower strategist available (who's willing to publish something)?

Warden's strategy worked out pretty well for us in Desert Storm - it pretty much allowed the US to achieve its objectives. I know that many folks in the ground services scoff his theories... but then again, he is an airpower strategist. He is pretty well respected in the USAF, and his theories are taught at the USAF professional schools.

I think part of the problem with Col Warden's theories is that people want to use them like an Army FM on the Military Decision Making Process, like a cook book rather than a guide.

I think there's plenty of airpower strategy out there - the doctrine is fairly well established.

V/R,

Cliff

[Cliff]

Not really a lot new here, mostly a rehash of:

pvebber-

Col Warden's point is only partially to re-hash his theory, but to point out that airpower (as Slap pointed out, this doesn't just mean the Air Force) can be used in "complex" situations as you call it.

The fundamental flaw in the Warden school of thought is that it is based on a fundamentally mechanistic view of systems theory. The only way you can "backplan" from a desired future state to the sequence of "centers of gravity" you have to break, is if there is a rigid cause and effect linkage amenable to such a decomposition.

There is a name for systems that do NOT exhibit that feature. "Complex". If you are trying to break simple systems with rigid cause and effect like power grids or supply chains then the Warden theory works great. Start trying to apply it to political systems and social networks and, well Aaron Barr of HBGary found out the hard way about how "the adversary gets a vote"

So we should just give up on trying to understand the enemy? Warden's rings model is simply a way of depicting a system, complex or not. As Warden says in the article:

Opponents are complicated things with many moving and static parts, but we can simplify our analysis by seeing them as a system, which means that they function in some reasonably connected manner.

In other words, we must somehow simplify the enemy into a system to understand it. How would you recommend understanding the enemy's political system?

Airpower allows the simultaneous attack of key points in the adversary system causing it to collapse. The more precise the ability to attack, the smaller the actually kinetic effect required and the less the collateral damage.

The reality is that "centers of gravity" are not static and a true systems theory understanding of an adversary of any appreciable complexity is that they are not "mechanism" but "organisms" that do not simply and predictably collapse when "affected" but adapt, repair, re-orient, and exhibit unpredictable emergent responses.

An organism is any living system, or the highest level of cell organization (Nation Institute of Health). So no, they aren't static- and Warden isn't suggesting that. But we still need to simplify even a political "organism" into a system that we can understand if we are to affect it. Warden is also suggesting that the faster we hit a system (or organism) in a parallel attack, the less it can adapt and re-orient.

A strategy based on the ability to predict the future - which is what is required in order to foresee a desired end-state, and determine a set of simultaneous actions that will result in an inexorable path to it - is not a realistic one. Despite how energetically we may wish it were so.

This is the point of Warden's article - that airpower is not being used as effectively as it could be because the accepted wisdom is that it is "too hard" to use it in complex systems, and that "everyone knows airpower won't work" in situation x (say COIN). He argues that this is because of our terminology and past history. He believes we can find ways to make it work if we try. Warden is arguing that we should try to make sure we keep our desired end state in mind. He also is arguing that if we can't find ways to reach our objectives quickly, we should consider if we should really should go to war.

Warden is arguing not that we need to predict the future, but that we should know what future we want to create.

Do you really think that our strategy should not try and foresee our desired end state?

V/R,

Cliff

[Ken White]

pvebber can answer for himself but, for your consideration:

So we should just give up on trying to understand the enemy? Warden's rings model is simply a way of depicting a system, complex or not.

True, however there are two problems that must be addresssed -- and Warden and many smart guys who defend him do not bother to address them. First, the Rings model is also a simple way of depicting a system that may be more complex than some not so smart guys who try to use it realize. i.e. it can lead to mistakes. As yousaid above:

I think part of the problem with Col Warden's theories is that people want to use them like an Army FM on the Military Decision Making Process, like a cook book rather than a guide.

Secondly, it can depict the system but as has been said, many things out there defy categorization as a system.

In other words, we must somehow simplify the enemy into a system to understand it. How would you recommend understanding the enemy's political system?

I suggest that trying to understand the enemy's political system is often unnecessary -- it is also exceedingly difficult to get right, particularly if that system is conducted in another language and / or stems from a quite different culture. What is necessary from both a military and a strategic standpoint is relatively sure if basic knowledge of what that system does. 'What' needs to be known, 'why' and 'how' will most often be nice to have for diplomatic purposes but actually relatively useless for strategic or war purposes.

...So no, they aren't static- and Warden isn't suggesting that. But we still need to simplify even a political "organism" into a system that we can understand if we are to affect it. Warden is also suggesting that the faster we hit a system (or organism) in a parallel attack, the less it can adapt and re-orient.

Without quibbling over details, I agree Warden has some good points. As did John Boyd. And Curtis LeMay. Or CvC, Jomini, De Saxe (probably one of the best of the bunch) and Subatai (certainly one of the 'winningest' of all time...). So do you and so do I -- a lot of folks do. None of us or of them has all the answers. I know neither you or Slap suggest that, I'm just reiterating it to point out that the principle sometimes gets lost behind the name. Warden is good but he's not the be all and end all; the Rings have applicability in some situation -- but not in all. Airpower (all source) is great but it also has limitations -- as does ground power or sea power...

My problem with John Warden or anyone who offers THE optimum solution (even though they add caveats, their primary pet rock shows in their pocket) is that I'm old and have yet to see any one trick pony win the dressage.

He also is arguing that if we can't find ways to reach our objectives quickly, we should consider if we should really should go to war.

That's true, he always has -- and he rarely gets credit for that. I suspect his 'air power uber alles approach has a great deal to do with that and his valid points get obscured by that. Parochialism tends to draw parochial responses...

Warden is arguing not that we need to predict the future, but that we should know what future we want to create.

Do you really think that our strategy should not try and foresee our desired end state?

In reverse order:

Our 'strategies' (multi polar plural ) have not done that at all well in 236 years. Fortunately, we muddle through rather well.

We aren't doing the present really well. The future may be a step too far. The Wardens of this world might be able to get there but those really smart guys are only about 20% of the grand total -- that other 80% of us have to be dragged along and herded like a batch of cats. Hard to get there from here. Really hard. Particularly with a governmental system that changes directions every 2 to 8 years (that annoys the daylights out of the Strategists...). We tend to get really serious (that applies to both domestic and foreign political as well as military issues) only when confronted with an existential threat and there are none of those in view at this time...

[Steve Blair]

My problem with John Warden or anyone who offers THE optimum solution (even though they add caveats, their primary pet rock shows in their pocket) is that I'm old and have yet to see any one trick pony win the dressage.That's true, he always has -- and he rarely gets credit for that. I suspect his 'air power uber alles approach has a great deal to do with that and his valid points get obscured by that. Parochialism tends to draw parochial responses... In reverse order:

Warden is also terrible when it comes to using historical examples to "prove" his points. His "The Air Campaign" is riddled with poor examples and things massaged to fit. His guide is flawed in that he really doesn't admit that airpower has any limitations and totally ignores the "soft" aspect of airpower (where I think it can have a greater impact, especially in wars that fall below the "toe to toe nuclear combat with the Ruskies" level). I use his book as a class textbook simply because it's one of the few accessible works out there, but it generates good discussion every time.

[Cliff]

First, the Rings model is also a simple way of depicting a system that may be more complex than some not so smart guys who try to use it realize. i.e. it can lead to mistakes. Secondly, it can depict the system but as has been said, many things out there defy categorization as a system.

True, but we have to try to understand it somehow. Do the folks who say you can't understand things as a system advocate a trial and error approach to strategy?

I suggest that trying to understand the enemy's political system is often unnecessary -- it is also exceedingly difficult to get right, particularly if that system is conducted in another language and / or stems from a quite different culture. What is necessary from both a military and a strategic standpoint is relatively sure if basic knowledge of what that system does. 'What' needs to be known, 'why' and 'how' will most often be nice to have for diplomatic purposes but actually relatively useless for strategic or war purposes.

I agree that it is hard. Warden is arguing that we should acknowledge when things are difficult, but not let that make us think they are impossible.

Without quibbling over details, I agree Warden has some good points. As did John Boyd. And Curtis LeMay. Or CvC, Jomini, De Saxe (probably one of the best of the bunch) and Subatai (certainly one of the 'winningest' of all time...). So do you and so do I -- a lot of folks do. None of us or of them has all the answers. I know neither you or Slap suggest that, I'm just reiterating it to point out that the principle sometimes gets lost behind the name. Warden is good but he's not the be all and end all; the Rings have applicability in some situation -- but not in all. Airpower (all source) is great but it also has limitations -- as does ground power or sea power...

Agreed... again, Warden isn't saying there aren't limitations, he's just saying that we shouldn't let current limitations make us stop trying to overcome them.

My problem with John Warden or anyone who offers THE optimum solution (even though they add caveats, their primary pet rock shows in their pocket) is that I'm old and have yet to see any one trick pony win the dressage.

Valid point, I would re-iterate my point above on Warden's intent.

That's true, he always has -- and he rarely gets credit for that. I suspect his 'air power uber alles approach has a great deal to do with that and his valid points get obscured by that. Parochialism tends to draw parochial responses...

Unless the parochial response is from the Army, then it's ok, right?

Our 'strategies' (multi polar plural ) have not done that at all well in 236 years. Fortunately, we muddle through rather well.

We aren't doing the present really well. The future may be a step too far. The Wardens of this world might be able to get there but those really smart guys are only about 20% of the grand total -- that other 80% of us have to be dragged along and herded like a batch of cats. Hard to get there from here. Really hard. Particularly with a governmental system that changes directions every 2 to 8 years (that annoys the daylights out of the Strategists...). We tend to get really serious (that applies to both domestic and foreign political as well as military issues) only when confronted with an existential threat and there are none of those in view at this time...

Won't argue with you here- again, I think Warden acknowledges this, he just is trying to argue that difficult shouldn't mean impossible.

My next paper is going to be on ways to try and improve our strategic process...

Anyway, good points Ken, I think part of why Warden is misunderstood is because people see him as so parochial. What folks miss is that a lot of his efforts aren't addressed at outsiders, but the folks inside the USAF who are stuck in old ways of thinking. The message for them gets misread when people think it applies to outsiders...

V/R,

Cliff

[slapout9]

A strategy based on the ability to predict the future - which is what is required in order to foresee a desired end-state, and determine a set of simultaneous actions that will result in an inexorable path to it - is not a realistic one. Despite how energetically we may wish it were so.

pvebber,
I don't know where you got the idea(you are not alone,many people believe that) that warden believes in predicting things as his chart on the Time Value of Action points out it is about "probabilities."

He has always warned about war being the most dangerous activity there is because of the unpredictability, it goes all the way back to his original publication of "The Air Campaign." Below is a link to a 2004 presentation warning about trying to predict the future.

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/joi...Warden-PPT.pdf

[SWJ Blog]

Old Wine in New Bottles: Douhet, Warden, and Counterinsurgency

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
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[slapout9]

Link to article and interview of Retired USAF Colonel John Warden, author of "The Enemy Is A System" and Winning Strategist from Gulf War One on how to handle Iraq crisis by using Strategy and Airpower.




http://americanthinker.com/2014/06/i...hn_warden.html

[Steve Blair]

Sorry, slap...that's just Warden trying to make his preferred solution relevant even when it isn't. ISIS is still a relatively irregular foe, and according to Colin Gray's informative (if overly-wordy) study "Airpower for Strategic Effect" (commissioned by the Air University and Air Force Research Institute) one of the things airpower does poorly is "Apply heavy and potentially decisive pressure for conclusive strategic effect in (largely) irregular conflicts." (Gray, p. 281).

[JMA]

A well presented set of options.

This I liked:

Western political leaders are paralyzed by three “conventional wisdom” worries:

1. Nothing can be done short of a full-scale repeat occupation of Iraq.
2. Nothing we do can fundamentally change the situation, but simply postpone the inevitable collapse, and
3. Nothing we can do will create a stable, new situation sustainable over time.

Col. Warden insists that none of these assumptions are true.

Link to article and interview of Retired USAF Colonel John Warden, author of "The Enemy Is A System" and Winning Strategist from Gulf War One on how to handle Iraq crisis by using Strategy and Airpower.

http://americanthinker.com/2014/06/i...hn_warden.html

[TheCurmudgeon]

First, ISSIS is an extraordinarily vulnerable position from the perspective of a system. Warden analyzes that ISIS is especially susceptible to techniques similar to those used in the 100-hour Desert Storm miracle.

Second, the ISIS army has expanded rapidly across a huge territory. That looks impressive on a map. But it means ISIS is not well-established, dug-in, or supplied. As your author interprets it, ISIS is a mile wide but an inch deep. That makes them especially vulnerable with poor supply lines, communications, connections, and preparation.

Third, ISIS have put themselves into a position which is quite vulnerable, in that they stretch across rocky, barren country and desert. This leaves their forces and military equipment far more exposed than over normal terrain.

This demonstrates a complete misunderstnding of ISIS and their relationship with the large Sunni insurgency and the Sunni population.

He has no actual experience in these matters. In Desert Storm there was no attempt to hold territory or to deal long term with the population or Iraq.

I did not see anything helpful in the article.

[Steve Blair]

There are some valuable parts to Warden's stuff, but his biggest shortcoming is that he sees airpower as capable of doing EVERYTHING on its own and being applicable in every situation...even when it's not. Airpower is his hammer, and every situation is a nail...

[jcustis]

Hilarious.

Might work if everything collapses and we can get ISIS into a stadium to celebrate victory...then JDAM the snot out of it.

[JMA]

There are some valuable parts to Warden's stuff, but his biggest shortcoming is that he sees airpower as capable of doing EVERYTHING on its own and being applicable in every situation...even when it's not. Airpower is his hammer, and every situation is a nail...

In the context of the self imposed limitation of 'no boots on the ground' airpower is all that is available.

In the context of that airpower is indeed everything - being the only option available.

That said, feel free to offer a few ideas for other options you see as being available.

[slapout9]

There are some valuable parts to Warden's stuff, but his biggest shortcoming is that he sees airpower as capable of doing EVERYTHING on its own and being applicable in every situation...even when it's not. Airpower is his hammer, and every situation is a nail...

Steve,
I have know idea where this idea about Airpower being everything came from but it is NOT TRUE! He has never said that or written that to my knowledge. What he has said and does believe is that many times because of Political Policy in the USA and the advanced technology we have that Airpower will be the "KEY" force in the exact same sense that the Marine Corps believe in designating a "MAIN EFFORT". Take a look at the PPT he delivered in February this year 2014 down under in a place called Canberra.

Please take a look, is this not an excellent approach to WINNING instead of being a mind slave to some older/foreign/loosing doctrine.


http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/Uplo...esentation.pdf

[novelist]

There are some valuable parts to Warden's stuff, but his biggest shortcoming is that he sees airpower as capable of doing EVERYTHING on its own and being applicable in every situation...even when it's not. Airpower is his hammer, and every situation is a nail...

I concur. Air Power is important within the purview of applying a "Parallel Warfare" strategy to a functioning Nation State with a hostile military establishment. It also plays a vital role in CAS. But ISIS is an amorphous entity prosecuting an "unconventional war" that requires counter unconventional warfare methods along the lines of Internal Defense, COIN, etc. I don't think conventional force, even if it does follow COIN doctrine, should be applied to an unconventional warfare situation. Vietnam proves this out, as do the efforts of the Armed Forces in Iraq, which have been wasted along with many lives of brave men and women. The VC today would be called "Terrorists," not "Freedom Fighters." The terms "terrorist, guerrilla, and irregular" are somewhat interchangeable. I make this point only to say that Unconventional Warfare is more suited to Special Forces, and possibly "Light Fighters" conducting "snatch & grab" ops of Tier One personalities for interrogation supported by good, reliable intelligence collection and information constituting "ACTIONABLE INTEL"; PSYOPS, to include "special effects" and perhaps some VOA involvement; and some unspeakable Black Ops. The GWOT should be prosecuted by covert means with very minimal press coverage. Air Power cannot accomplish these things. This is the only way to root ISIS out and destroy it. The prerequisite however, is a friendly pro-American government in Iraq and a well trained Iraqi Army of mixed ethnic and religious backgrounds willing to defend their country in a common cause.