The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[Fuchs]

You seem to forget the Philippine insurrection and the Indian wars. The other services weren't saints either.

[Backwards Observer]

You seem to forget the Philippine insurrection and the Indian wars. The other services weren't saints either.

You're a troublemaker. But perhaps you're right, I appear to have a very selective memory. As stated, it was possibly an unfair thing to say. Airpower, es tut mir leid.

[pvebber]

I think Cliff and I are still having problems with our implicit assumptions and world views - the 'real problem' typically in airpower theory debates

This may sound unfair, and please correct me if I appear woefully misinformed, but out of the services mentioned, the USAAF/USAF is possibly the only one to have systematically engaged itself in the purposeful mass slaughter of civilians; yet it seems eager to cloak its existence in an aura of inerrant and pious purity somehow removed from the world 'red in tooth and claw'.

I think the better criticism in respond to this is that the Air Force is the only service that argue that the other services are "theoretically" unnecessary.

To be fair, the other service argue precious little at all at the strategic level regarding their " xxxx-power"...

[slapout9]

it took the ground attack to dislodge Iraqi forces from defenses and Kuwait so they were more effectively bombed and strafed.

That is debatable because less than 50% of Warden's original plan survived the cut list.

Is there any law enforcement agency that relies on aircraft or boats for anywhere near the bulk of its efforts.

Yes there is one I am personally familiar with the Alabama Marine Police a total water LE agency(they do have trailers and SUv's) to haul their boats to the launch but that is about it.

[pvebber]

I'll offer the following as some background reading on some of the arguments I've made and where my world view comes from (interestingly many from the AWC strategic links page:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/...strategymodels

On issues with Bayesian statisitics:

http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman...dbayesmain.pdf

On issues with systems theory applied to warfare:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/...go_systems.pdf

Vego is the closest thing to a broad strategic seapower thinker that we currently have - though we have a number of "niche" innovators.

On use of metaphor:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/..._metaphors.pdf

Addressing the "so what else is there" argument:

Colin S. Grey one of the best on strategic thought (has written a great book on seapower so I like him )

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/0910.pdf

and

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/1434.pdf

An Army view:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/...ew/forsyth.pdf

Kilcullen (interestingly calls for a different sort of "new lexicon" than Warden)

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/...lict_may07.pdf

On the difference between a "choose the end state I want" (Warden) approach and the "be best prepared to deal with a range of possible futures (our predominant current model):

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/...unio-protz.pdf

On moving from a strategy based on "compel the adversary to do what I want" to "convince my adversary to share my interests":

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/...eatkingdom.htm



On vocabulary:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au/faber.htm

On the decisiveness of force (book review and critical analysis):

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/2213.pdf


And for gluttons for punishment...On philosohical influences:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/pellegrp.pdf


Hopefully some interesting Sunday afternoon reading

[Fuchs]

I think the better criticism in respond to this is that the Air Force is the only service that argue that the other services are "theoretically" unnecessary.

Are you sure?

The navy could easily claim to be a full military with its naval + marine air and marine ground force...

[slapout9]

You'd still criticize him because he's Col Warden.

Yep!

I think it is funny... as I have mentioned before, the USAF is the one service that it is "cool" to bash. You don't see the USMC, USN, or USA bashing each other to the same extent (especially here), but just mention airpower and watch the spears fly. I think a lot of this stems from the bad blood from the 50s when the USAF took msot of the money due to the decision to rely on the few nukes we had to allow a smaller budget... I understand that folks can't get accept the fact that maybe an article has validity even though it was written by an airpower advocate for the USAF's professional journal.

That is the real problem if his uniform was different color none of this would matter. Look at the Army ASCOPE analysis system which is basically the same thing (6 rings analysis). If Warden's uniform was a different color we could be looking at creating common ground between the two (basically the same ideas) for better overall understanding of the Enemy.....but no we are going to do that, we are going to play the "not invented here (service oriented)game". So the country and the services as a whole will suffer.

[slapout9]

Colin S. Grey one of the best on strategic thought (has written a great book on seapower so I like him )

Gray also wrote a paper saying Americas ONLY true future is Airpower You may not know this but Warden thinks and has written that we should consider ourselves an Air-Maritime nation. Air-Naval Startegy is good but he want like the idea of Air-Naval Battle. Battle is for suckers

[slapout9]

Let's analyze COL (ret) Warden's perception that attack of the the Five Rings in the title above decreases in importance from left to right.

That is a good idea on how to learn the process. Don't want to be critical but you were a little off as to how you would actually do one. Want to do Qaddafi as a system so you can see what I mean?

[pvebber]

The navy could easily claim to be a full military with its naval + marine air and marine ground force...

It could, but it doesn't

And as you say the only reason it could is because it has an integrated force of air-, land- and sea- power capabilities. It could not argue the dominance of seapower the way airpower theorists do (if it did I would criticize it as vociferously as I do airpower dominance advocacy).

And there is the pre-airpower sea-power vs landpower debaets - but that was not about putting the other out of business, but in essence who was "supported and supporting".

That is the real problem if his uniform was different color none of this would matter.

If you'd follow along carefully, there is much of the THEORY side of Warden I have no problem with. Its what he claims the implications of the theory are where I cease willing suspension of disbelief...

Gray gets it - Airpower is an INDISPENSIBLE, NECESSARY part of America's future fighting force and without it as an enabler, the rest of the services are unable to play their role. I'm all over that!

That is a far different thing from saying that airpower will is SUFFICIENT to achieve our strategic goals.

Failure to do so will con#demn airpower to suboptimization and deprive its owners of using force in such a dramatically different way that will achieve
national objectives quickly and at minimum cost.

This statement is exemplary of the 'implication' problem. Even the 5-rings theory enabled the fog and friction of war to be lifted, there is nothing in the theory that justifies the leap from "what is good about the theory" to enabling the owners of airpower to use force ina "Dramatically different way" and bypass the need for "battle".

That is a good idea on how to learn the process. Don't want to be critical but you were a little off as to how you would actually do one. Want to do Qaddafi as a system so you can see what I mean?

Please - I'm all ears. I WISH I COULD BELIEVE. I am just a poor seapower sinner yearning for his soul to be saved

[slapout9]

Please - I'm all ears. I WISH I COULD BELIEVE. I am just a poor seapower sinner yearning for his soul to be saved

If you have ever seen any business versions of the 5 rings I would be whats called an evangelist so ok, I still have chores to do today so I will start tomorrow. So until then it's time for some music. So here is Jewelle and "Who Will Save Your Soul"

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-LukEq643Mk

[Marc]

That is the real problem if his uniform was different color none of this would matter. Look at the Army ASCOPE analysis system which is basically the same thing (6 rings analysis). If Warden's uniform was a different color we could be looking at creating common ground between the two (basically the same ideas) for better overall understanding of the Enemy.....but no we are going to do that, we are going to play the "not invented here (service oriented)game". So the country and the services as a whole will suffer.

I disagree, the 5 (or 6) ring analysis simply is not useful in many cases. It has already been mentioned that the model does not apply to law enforcement, counterinsurgencies and stabilization operations. However, many strategists have a tendency to discard these types of operations as military anomalies.

So let's do a relevant reality check: a blog wargame. How would Warden's theory work against Iran if the Iranian leadership chooses to apply a 2006 Hezbollah-style "Mosaic Defense"?

In 2005, the IRGC announced that it was incorporating a flexible, layered defense -- referred to as a mosaic defense -- into its doctrine. The lead author of this plan was General Mohammad Jafari, then director of the IRGC's Center for Strategy, who was later appointed commander of the IRGC.

As part of the mosaic defense, the IRGC has restructured its command and control architecture into a system of 31 separate commands -- one for the city of Tehran and 30 for each of Iran's provinces. The primary goal of restructuring has been to strengthen unit cohesion at the local level and give commanders more latitude to respond to potential threats -- both foreign and domestic. But the new structure would also make it difficult for hostile forces to degrade Iranian command and control, a lesson the Iranian military has learned by analyzing U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans.

The mosaic defense plan allows Iran to take advantage of its strategic depth and formidable geography to mount an insurgency against invading forces. Most of Iran's population centers and major lines of communication are spread out within the interior of the country. Iran's borders are ringed by rugged mountain ranges that serve as natural barriers to invasion. As enemy supply lines stretched into Iran's interior, they would be vulnerable to interdiction by special stay-behind cells, which the IRGC has formed to harass enemy rear operations.

The Artesh, a mix of armored, infantry and mechanized units, would constitute Iran's initial line of defense against invading forces. IRGC troops would support this effort, but they would also form the core of popular resistance, the bulk of which would be supplied by the Basij, the IRGC's paramilitary volunteer force. The IRGC has developed a wartime mobilization plan for the Basij, called the Mo'in Plan, according to which Basij personnel would augment regular IRGC units in an invasion scenario.

IRGC and Basij exercises have featured simulated ambushes on enemy armored columns and helicopters. Much of this training has been conducted in an urban environment, suggesting that Iran intends to lure enemy forces into cities where they would be deprived of mobility and close air support. Iran has emphasized passive defense measures -- techniques used to enhance the battlefield survivability -- including camouflage, concealment and deception.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontl...#ixzz1GZlSR02Z

[slapout9]

pvebber,sorry for the late start but here we go. Go to the link below and then go to chapter 3 for a good 5 rings analysis of how these systems are organized. Since Qudaffi is not much more than a Terorist leader IMO this is a pretty good template to start with.



http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/97-0393.pdf


Also bear in mind this paper was written in 1997, very far sighted as the capabilities that we are and will need in the future IMO, which is one of the key points in Warden's article.

[slapout9]

It has already been mentioned that the model does not apply to law enforcement, counterinsurgencies and stabilization operations. However, many strategists have a tendency to discard these types of operations as military anomalies.

Not sure what you mean by the that? It was through LE that I first found out about it, I saw it up close and personal and it does work. It was taught to Couter Drug Task forces in the South, Mid-West and North.

[Marc]

I saw it up close and personal and it does work. It was taught to Couter Drug Task forces in the South, Mid-West and North.

Ok, if the model works in counter drugs operations, then why are there still drugs in our streets?

[slapout9]

Ok, if the model works in counter drugs operations, then why are there still drugs in our streets?

Funding-Manpower-Laws! Many people think LE organizations are funded like the military which is hardly the case. We often fight major crime organizations that have the funding capabilities of small countries or major corporations. And finally we have to do it within a very restrictive legal framework, criminals don't care what the law is,they don't have to worry about due process or collateral damage. So considering all that we do very well.

[Marc]

Funding-Manpower-Laws! Many people think LE organizations are funded like the military which is hardly the case. We often fight major crime organizations that have the funding capabilities of small countries or major corporations. And finally we have to do it within a very restrictive legal framework, criminals don't care what the law is,they don't have to worry about due process or collateral damage. So considering all that we do very well.

Then we come to my original point (and BTW, Warden included it in his original article): "All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment."

It's not the politicians' job to provide funding, manpower and laws to fit the strategy. It's the strategist's job to come up with an effective strategy within the limits set by funding, manpower and laws.

[pvebber]

Since Qudaffi is not much more than a Terorist leader IMO this is a pretty good template to start with.

I would argue that being the head of a nation, there is more to the "system" he is part of than what the paper describes for each of the five rings for a terrorist organization.

Libya has considerably more infrastructure and fielded forces, and most importatnly a population not of "bad guys" but of innocents that one would hope would be spared suffering to the extent possible.

Is it your intent to treat Libya itlself as the "state sponsor" in the context of Chap 3 Table 1?

I thought the big thing with Wardens new article is the need to picture the desired end state to start off. Before we start looking at systems shouldn't we define our desired end state?

Qudaffi = Dead is a "degenerate case".

[slapout9]

Is it your intent to treat Libya itlself as the "state sponsor" in the context of Chap 3 Table 1?

I thought the big thing with Wardens new article is the need to picture the desired end state to start off. Before we start looking at systems shouldn't we define our desired end state?

Qudaffi = Dead is a "degenerate case".

1-No, as you point out Libya is NOT the system you want to attack but you need to make a systems map of the country in order to see what you should avoid attacking. From there you need to map the Qudaffi Mafia(using table1 as an example) and all it's elements and then decide what to Strike.

2-Yes, you should start with the desired end state, the political objective but that is usually something that is given to the military not something which they get to create.

3-If you notice the model is slightly different because it is older. The second ring is called the "Systems Essentials" ring as opposed to the "Processes" ring. I wished he(Warden) had never changed it myself. Systems Essentials gets right to heart of the concept of COG's or critical targets IMO. Essentials are physical inputs or/and physical production/conversion facilities. It is literally and physically something the System must have or it cannot operate. It is a good way to focus your thinking on what you should attack or not attack because of the resulting side effects. In fact once you map the System your final target list should be nothing but a list of the Essential COG's that the Sytem needs. From 5 rings to 1 so to speak

[slapout9]

It's not the politicians' job to provide funding, manpower and laws to fit the strategy.

It's not? Where do you think funding and laws come from?