Results 1 to 20 of 52

Thread: ANSF performance 2015 onwards

Hybrid View

Previous Post Previous Post   Next Post Next Post
  1. #1
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    12,278

    Default ANSF performance 2015 onwards

    This is one of the five new threads on Afghanistan for 2015 onwards, its focus is ANSF performance.

    There are a small number of OEF threads now closed on the:

    1) ANA: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5384
    2) ANP: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1584
    3) ALP also appear in: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=10562

    I do appreciate that there can be cross-over between the new threads, notably how the NATO mission interacts with the ANSF and Afghan politics.
    davidbfpo

  2. #2
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    12,278

    Default WHAM: ANA style?

    Whatever happened in Helmand Province in this incident it is not encouraging:
    Afghan police are investigating an apparent army rocket strike on a wedding party that killed at least 28 people, many of them women and children. Police in southern Helmand province were looking into how soldiers came to fire a rocket at a house where a wedding was being celebrated late on Wednesday, the deputy provincial police chief, Bacha Gull, said.
    The rocket appeared to have been fired from an army checkpoint near the house in Sangin district as guests waited for the bride to arrive, he said.
    Police were “keeping an eye” on two army checkpoints to determine whether the soldiers manning them were engaged in a firefight with Taliban insurgents at the time or whether they fired the rockets arbitrarily. The strike wounded 51 people.
    Link:http://www.theguardian.com/world/201...-wedding-party


    Somehow I doubt we will learn the truth. Nor will it be simple.


    davidbfpo

  3. #3
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    12,278

    Default Now the real fight begins: a mixed picture

    One of the first comprehensive assessments of the ANSF, alongside the wider, mainly political context, by Professor Theo Farrell, of Kings War Studies, following a Q&A format:http://postwarwatch.com/2015/01/25/p...mixed-picture/

    This theme did strike me as odd, about the ANA:
    Afghan army officers identify their primary mission as protecting the Afghan state in a very conventional sense. Their main concern is Pakistan, and the defense of Afghanistan against conventional Pakistani forces.....Yet this is not really what ANA commanders want to be doing.
    davidbfpo

  4. #4
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Aug 2009
    Location
    USA
    Posts
    853

    Default

    This is just a vague thought, but here goes:
    Afghan army officers identify their primary mission as protecting the Afghan state in a very conventional sense. Their main concern is Pakistan, and the defense of Afghanistan against conventional Pakistani forces....

    This sounds odd at one level (conventional attack from Pakistan being unlikely, insurgency being very real, etc) but at another level it seems like a possible source of asabiya and future stability. States and their armies are based on some notion of common identity and common mission. Counter-insurgency on behalf of the corrupt ruling elite may be their mission, but is a shaky basis for common purpose and asabiya. What works in other states will also work in Afghanistan (and vice versa, what does not work well elsewhere will not work well there either, in this context). This sense of mission may be a positive..
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 01-26-2015 at 04:28 PM. Reason: fix quote

  5. #5
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    12,278

    Default What Campbell’s trying to hide is a disappearing army

    I'd seen a headline on General Campbell restricting access to data previously published and missed its importance until this hitherto unkown blog comment appeared via Twitter:http://sunnyinkabul.com/2015/01/30/w...e-afghan-army/

    What General Campbell doesn’t want us to know is that the army that’s supposed to be taking over for the US to fight all the terrorist things? It’s disappearing. Even faster than usual.

    So why is the Afghan Army quitting in droves? According to the Americans, it’s because…
    …high operational tempo, sustained risk, soldier care and quality of life, and leave issues. Afghan casualties increased since the ANSF took the lead for security in June 2013. Although combat losses comprise a relatively small percentage of total ANSF attrition numbers, reducing ANSF casualties remains both a top morale and operational priority for ISAF and ANSF leaders.
    But what’s underlying that is the uncertainty the Afghan forces feel after only a few years of existence. They haven’t been around long enough to know what it means to fight on their own. For most of those years they had their hands held by the most powerful military in the world. And by holding hands I mean we brought death from above in the form of all the A-10s and the B-1s and the F-16s and all the exploding things in the air over Afghanistan.
    davidbfpo

  6. #6
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    12,278

    Default The Hardest (and Most Important) Job in Afghanistan

    Sub-titled:
    A week on the frontlines with the Afghan National Police.
    Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/ma...hanistan.html?

    A good read, if depressing.
    davidbfpo

  7. #7
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    12,278

    Default Helmand: shrinking GIRoA presence

    A lurid headline in today's Daily Telegraph 'Taliban seize British stronghold in Helmand as security unravels', as:
    A Western official said Lashkar Gah.. was now “under serious military pressure”....As many as 400 fighters are advancing on Chah-e Anjir only around 10 miles from Lashkar Gah.
    Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...-unravels.html

    The headline ignores the fact the UK left Helmand Province a year ago, so it is no longer a British stronghold.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 12-14-2015 at 08:10 PM. Reason: This was in a stand alone thread
    davidbfpo

  8. #8
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    12,278

    Default Who has what land?

    A short ISW report (8 pgs), with a map of Taliban activity across much of Afghanistan and the link:http://understandingwar.org/backgrou...iban-and-isis?
    davidbfpo

  9. #9
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    12,278

    Default

    Once again lurid headlines on the contest for Helmand, this time over Sangin and the reported deployment of UK & US SOF, plus 300 NATO advisers (with no combat role):http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...g-Sangin.html?

    Slightly more detail:http://www.theguardian.com/world/201...pecial-forces?

    Here is a key sentence:
    About 65 per cent of the province is now under insurgent control, the head of Helmand's provincial council, Muhammad Kareem Atal, said.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 12-22-2015 at 09:17 PM. Reason: add 2nd link
    davidbfpo

  10. #10
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    12,278

    Default A RAND COIN scorecard

    I have never been persuaded of such devices, but RAND does keep on producing:http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1273.html

    The two key points for me:
    Two factors remained absent in Afghanistan in 2015 but essential to success in historical COIN campaigns: disrupting flows of tangible support to the insurgents and a demonstration (and improvement) of commitment and motivation on the part of the Afghan National Security Forces, the primary COIN force since the coalition drawdown.
    Three of the recommendations are laughable and have probably been said so many times before.

    Would RAND or another other contractor "think tank" say "Enough, we've been there long enough, time to go"?
    davidbfpo

  11. #11
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    12,278

    Default Musa Qala: GIRoA leaves

    Some classic Afghan quotes on this decision

    The commander of the Afghan army's 215th corps, Mohammad Moeen Faqir:
    Their presence in the area did not mean anything...We will use them in battle with enemies in other parts of Helmand province
    Citing Abdul Jabar Qahraman, presidential envoy for security affairs in Helmand
    There wasn't any deal....We learnt that there was no need to continue the fight in that area.
    Link:http://news.yahoo.com/afghan-troops-...72916177.html?
    davidbfpo

  12. #12
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Mar 2009
    Posts
    11,075

    Default ANSF performance 2015 onwards

    Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-06-2018 at 11:08 AM. Reason: Copied to here and slightly edited.

  13. #13
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    12,278

    Default What went wrong? The results less GIRoA control today.

    The cited SWJ Blog linked above IMHO contains some facts that reinforce concern that the ANSF serving the GIROA:
    By the fall of 2017 GIRoA only controlled territory containing less than 60% of the population which was down from over the 70% they held in 2016, and down from the 80% they held in 2014 when the lead for security operations transitioned from NATO to GIRoA. The remaining 40% was either controlled by the Taliban or was considered "contested". The ANDSF were incapable of recapturing the contested portions of the country, or those portions under Taliban control without increased levels of U.S. support.

    From 2010 to 2012 the U.S. led coalition conducted a full spectrum, comprehensive COIN campaign aimed at defeating the Taliban...The coalition, along with the ANDSF, was driving the Taliban, GIRoA had control over approximately 80% of the country, and security, governance, and basic services were largely in place. The ANDSF were maturing, and the transition of responsibility for security operations to Afghan control was underway. So what went wrong?
    For more explanation and a new strategy see the full article:https://www.realcleardefense.com/art...an_113012.html
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-06-2018 at 12:24 PM. Reason: 63,328v
    davidbfpo

  14. #14
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    12,278

    Default After the "near miss" @ Farah: A war of attrition and a waiting game

    Cross-posted from the thread on the Taliban.

    A report from the probably independent Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) on the recent attack on Farah city. It opens with:
    An attack on Farah city had long been feared. For years now, the Taleban have been taking control of the provincial capital’s outlying districts and inching their way towards the central hub. For a few days in mid-May, it looked as though the Taleban were about to take Farah city, which would have been their most significant military triumph since capturing Kunduz for two weeks in 2015. Their strategy of consolidating control over rural areas then digging in at a provincial centre’s outskirts before launching an attack appears to be an increasing trend. While they lost the battle in Farah on this occasion, the Taleban still pose a serious threat to the area. AAN co-director Thomas Ruttig together with Ali Mohammad Sabawoon, Rohullah Soroush and Obaid Ali unpack the attack and its aftermath.
    This is the first of two dispatches examining the recent attack on the city of Farah. This first dispatch focuses on the attack and its aftermath. The second contextualises the attack in light of post-2001 developments in Farah.
    It ends with:
    With regards to Farah, the fact that the Taleban were only pushed back to positions just outside the provincial capital from where they started their attack means that new attacks can be expected. Farah is only one example for a situation that prevails in at least a quarter of Afghanistan’s provinces.
    Link:https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org...e-for-farah-i/
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 1 Week Ago at 02:30 PM. Reason: 70,091v
    davidbfpo

Similar Threads

  1. Wargaming the South China Sea
    By AdamG in forum Training & Education
    Replies: 24
    Last Post: 05-05-2017, 10:05 PM
  2. Afghanistan 2015 onwards: Moderator's Notice
    By davidbfpo in forum OEF - Afghanistan
    Replies: 3
    Last Post: 12-30-2014, 09:12 PM
  3. Afghan National Army (ANA) thread
    By BNopsSgt in forum OEF - Afghanistan
    Replies: 129
    Last Post: 01-24-2014, 04:11 PM

Tags for this Thread

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •